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This two-volume collection brings together the first 56 Joseph Fisher Lectures in 
economics and commerce, presented at the Adelaide University every other year 
since 1904. Funds for the Lectures, together with a medal for the top accounting 
student each year, were kindly provided by a £1,000 endowment to the University 
by the prominent Adelaide businessman Joseph Fisher in 1903 - before his death, 
to avoid 10 per cent going to the government! (Since the average adult male wage 
is now well over 200 times greater than it was in 1903 in nominal dollar terms, 
that endowment represents more than $0.5 million in terms of today’s spending 
power.) An additional sum of $10,500 was donated to the Adelaide University 
Centenary Appeal in 1974 by Trustees of Settlements made by Joseph Fisher. 
The Lectures, which are free and open to the public, have been published by the 
University as stand-alone booklets, and copies distributed at the fund’s expense.
The Lectures are mostly on economic issues and reflect Fisher’s interests in 
liberal markets and non-interventionist government. They have stood the test of 
time extremely well, while also providing a reminder of the events and concerns 
that were prominent at different times during the past century. That, plus the fact 
that many of the earlier Lectures are now out of print and only a small subset of 
them were reprinted in scholarly journals, justifies putting them together in this 
collection for posterity.
The timing of this collection’s first publication, in 2001, celebrated the 
centenary of economics teaching at Adelaide, which began with the Federation 
of Australia in 1901. It also celebrated the fact that it was 50 years since the 
2001 Joseph Fisher Lecturer, Peter Karmel, took the Chair of Economics at the 
University of Adelaide and built the department to an outstanding level (before 
Peter moved on in the mid-1960s to establish the Flinders University of South 
Australia). Since 2001, five more Lectures have been added to this second edition 
of the collection. (See List of lectures in volume 1, 1904-1954 following this 
Preface.)
The Centre for International Economic Studies (CIES) at the University of 
Adelaide is proud to be the publisher of the collection, particularly since so many 
of the Lectures deal with international economic issues or Australian issues that 
were influenced by major international events.
x
Preface
The lectures have been reproduced fully, preserving the spelling, punctuation 
and citation forms of the day, with reproduction of figures wherever possible.
This collection would not have been published had it not been for the 
thorough bibliographical research and editorial assistance including copy-editing 
and typesetting provided by Jane Russell. our thanks go to her, and to Bob Fisher 
and Keith Hancock in providing material for the opening chapters. Finally, to the 
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The benefactor Joseph Fisher
Extract from Joseph Fisher – A Pioneer Colonist  
by F. R. Fisher (Printed by open Book Publishers,  
Adelaide, in 1998)
Joseph Fisher was born in Yorkshire on 14 September 1834, to Joshua and 
Hannah Fisher. Joseph and his parents and sisters sailed for South Australia in the 
Pestonjee Bomanjee, leaving from London on 11 June and arriving in Glenelg on 
12 october 1838, when Joseph was 3 years old. 
A family friend, Anthony Forster, probably influenced their decision to 
choose South Australia. Forster himself travelled to South Australia in early 
1841, to take possession for George Fife Angas of the latter’s Barossa Estates. 
This was a fortunate event for Joseph, with whom Forster had a particularly close 
association both as a friend and mentor consequent upon Joshua’s untimely death 
on 3 September 1841. 
Joseph appears to have had the bulk of his schooling at the oddfellows 
School and subsequently in Anthony’s Forster’s old home. He left school at age 
12, five years after his father’s death, to work in the mercantile business established 
by Anthony Forster. Two years later Forster took up an offer of a share in the 
Register and Observer newspapers, and Joseph joined the Register’s commercial 
department. In an interview in 1903 Joseph described his duties as follows: 
“I had to assist the bookkeeper, deliver papers, take a turn at the old 
hand press, occasionally read proofs and also numerous other odd 
jobs at the office. I frequently remained on duty for 12-14 hours a 
day and I soon gained a practical knowledge of the work in almost 
every department of the newspaper office.”
In his article entitled ‘A Man of Honor’, which appeared on 17 February 
1958 in the Adelaide News, Douglas Pike (a distinguished historian at Adelaide 
University) wrote the following about Joseph’s early activities: 
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“With its new copper wealth and heavy immigration, Adelaide in 
1846 was full of opportunities. At 14 Joseph needed no prompting. 
For two years he quietly imported potatoes from Tasmania and had 
£2,000 in the bank before his little monopoly was invaded. He was 
still employed in the Register when it came up for sale in 1853. With 
his potato money he joined the syndicate that bought the newspaper.”
Shortly after that time Joseph took over the management of the commercial 
department of the paper, in which position it was his function, in the words of Dr 
Pike, to know ‘the ins and outs of every business deal in town’. It appears that he 
also acted as shipping reporter for the paper. 
By 1857 Joseph had acquired a quarter share as a proprietor of the Register. 
During that year he both married and purchased the 8-acre property Woodfield, 
his home until his death, in what is now the State Heritage-listed building at 78 
Fisher Street, Fullarton. His wife for the next 50 years was Anne Wood Farrar, 
the eldest daughter of Henry Wilkinson Farrar, a ‘highly respected Melbourne 
Merchant’ and also originally from Yorkshire. Joseph appears to have been 
intensely interested in and proud of his home and gardens. His obituary states 
that in the later years of his life he spent several hours daily in his garden and 
was never happier than when tending his roses and fruit trees. Tragedy hit the 
family at the end of 1865, however, with the death of three of their children of 
diphtheria. Subsequently three further children were born.
Joseph sold his interest in the Register and left his employment there in 
october 1865, at age 31. In recording his retirement, the newspaper made 
reference to his ‘recent domestic afflictions and the fact that his retirement would 
give him leisure for which he and his family would be grateful.’ 
At the time of his retirement he had already acquired what appears to 
have been his first outside interest, having accepted appointment as one of the 
trustees for shareholders of the Deed of Settlement of the Bank of Adelaide. This 
institution was established in August 1865 and Joseph’s association extended over 
the next 23 years, he having been appointed a director in 1868. He is quoted as 
having been a shrewd and industrious director, and acting for a time as Chairman.
 xvii
F. R. Fisher
Another South Australian Bank in whose foundation Joseph was involved 
was the Commercial Bank of South Australia. Trevor Sykes, in his book Two 
Centuries of Panic: A History of Corporate Collapses in Australia, says that the Bank 
was ‘the brainchild of Joseph Fisher, a shrewd, restless entrepreneur’. It was as 
a Member of the Legislative Council that Joseph in 1878 sponsored a Bill of 
Parliament and presented a petition to the House of Assembly. Hansard quoted 
Joseph as saying on the second reading that the Bill was almost a verbatim copy 
of the Acts under which the National Bank and the Bank of Adelaide had been 
incorporated. The shares had been subscribed three times over, he said, and five 
gentlemen who stood high in the colony for honour and probity had been named 
as directors. However, the accounts of the Commercial Bank were signed by a 
Manager appropriately bearing the surname ‘Crooks’. The Bank collapsed in 1886 
and Crooks was convicted of embezzlement and sentenced to eight years in gaol. 
It is unlikely that Joseph was ever a director of this bank because, throughout the 
years in question, he was a director of a competing bank, the Bank of Adelaide. 
Neither he, nor any members of his family, at any time owned shares in the 
Commercial Bank of South Australia.
Joseph’s advice was, as Douglas Pike says in his newspaper article in 1958, 
greatly sought after and he became director of a number of companies in addition 
to the Bank of Adelaide. He served on the Boards of the South Australian Gas 
Company, the Port Adelaide Dock Company (as chairman), the Adelaide Steamship 
Company, the Adelaide Marine and Fire Insurance Company (as Chairman) and 
the Momba Pastoral Company. He was also on the local Board of Advice in South 
Australia of the South Australian Company, established in England in 1835. 
The centenary history of the Stock Exchange of Adelaide, entitled Bulls, 
Bears and Wildcats, has this to say of Joseph and his assiduous interest in the 
performance of Adelaide companies: 
“Several city capitalists, with holdings in a number of companies, 
customarily attended company meetings to hear of current progress. 
one of the best known was Joseph Fisher. A doughty supporter 
of private enterprise, by his own practice of it he had become an 
early proprietor of the Register and a director of several companies. 
Fisher also served in Parliament, though he was better known for 
his business investments and astuteness. His remarks at the Gas 
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Company’s annual meeting in 1895 were typical of his attention 
to company affairs. He claimed that on a visit to England and to 
Europe he had taken as much interest in the Gas Company as if he 
had been in South Australia. He had walked the foreign streets to 
see how gas was competing with electricity, and was delighted that 
Adelaide’s citizens had turned down the Corporation’s proposal to 
light the streets with electricity.”
In addition to his interest in urban business, Joseph was involved in pastoral 
investments, frequently in association with a number of other South Australians 
such as Barr Smith, Elder and James Francis Cudmore. It would appear that 
his interests were financial in nature, however, rather than those of an active 
pastoralist. His first venture into this field was probably the property north of 
Adelaide known as Hummocks Run, comprising 97,000 acres of freehold land as 
well as some leasehold. 
In 1870 Joseph and Anthony Forster each acquired a one-eighth interest 
in the partnership that owned the Mount Murchison Run in New South Wales. 
In 1872 the partnership acquired a one-third interest in the Momba Run and 
the ownerships were amalgamated. The other partners at this time were Robert 
Barr Smith, McCullock Sellar & Co. of Melbourne (the then proprietors of Mt 
Gipps Pastoral Company of Broken Hill which was the employer of Charles 
Rasp, the discoverer of the Broken Hill lodes), Peter Waite, W.C. Swann, and 
Thomas Elder. In 1888 the interests of the partners were acquired by a limited 
company in which Joseph became a partner. In 1881 Thomas Elder and Joseph 
each acquired a one-eight interest in the Ned’s Corner Run, which held 1300 
square miles in Victoria just over the South Australian Border. on 1 August 1899 
Joseph transferred half of his interest to the Fisher Trust.
Joseph made five visits in all to England. The first of these was in late 1866 
or early 1867. Upon his return, at the age of 33, Joseph entered the Legislative 
Assembly representing the District of Sturt. He served there until February 
1870, and then in the Legislative Council from July 1873 to March 1881. In the 
obituary published on his death, the Register commented that ‘he was at all times 
plain spoken and was not the man to make compromises of principle for the 
sake of securing any private advantage’. His speeches in the House were usually 
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shorter than those of many of his colleagues, but he made his points clearly and 
forcefully. In his opening speech he expressed two strong views, which he was 
often to repeat in later years: a distaste for waste and profligacy, and insistence on 
his own imperviousness to pressure from any quarter.
During his next seven years at the Legislative Council, Joseph gave his views 
on a wide variety of matters in a typically uninhibited manner. In his first speech 
in the Council on July 30 he touched on an issue that was eventually to lead to 
his political downfall: immigration. 
In November 1873 Joseph opposed a Bill that would increase the Ministry 
from five to six members. He said he would be glad to see a Government that did 
not seek to be judged by the large number of Bills it introduced. In his view many 
of the Bills involved an expenditure of time and money for which there was not 
the slightest necessity.
Then in December that year, in an unusually lengthy speech, Joseph 
vigorously opposed a Bill providing for compulsory education and State 
schools. He said the voluntary system of education had not failed, whereas a 
Government system introduced in 1851 had been an utter failure. He was not 
opposed to education, but to the compulsory clauses in the Bill. He objected to 
the unwarrantable interference with the rights and duties of parents, and believed 
some parents who could afford private schools would no longer be able to if they 
had to contribute also to the cost of State education.
In the following year, 1874, he berated the Government for its lack of 
enterprise. He urged, not for the first or last time, that telegraphic communication 
be extended to Cape Borda to avoid uncertainty about shipping movements. He 
regretted that ‘no action had been taken in the matter of inter-colonial free trade’ 
and wanted ‘this colony to step forward and invite the more important colonies 
to come in’. 
He also stressed what he believed was an urgent need for a new railway 
to tap the Murray River trade. He said a Murray rail connection would enable 
the Riverina wool then being shipped through Melbourne to be diverted to Port 
Adelaide. This, he felt, would give employment to thousands: there would be 30 
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extra ships at the Port within twelve months of the line opening, and the squatters 
of Riverina would make their headquarters in Adelaide.
As well, he wanted better shipping arrangements than those provided by 
P&o steamers for landing mail to Glenelg; he opposed a Customs Bill imposing 
new tariffs to foster manufacturing; and he opposed a Bill to close hotels on Sundays 
to all but travellers (on the grounds that it simply would make people sneaks).
In 1877 Joseph strongly supported a no-confidence motion carried 
against the Chief Secretary, Sir Henry Ayers, the only Minister in the Legislative 
Council. The dissatisfaction with Ayers arose from a Government contract to 
build a new Parliament House, with an estimated cost of £200,000 and without 
the proposal being put before the Council. Joseph took exception not only to 
the Council being ignored but also to the proposed site of the new Parliament 
House, at the corner of North Terrace and King William Street. The site, he 
contended, should be reserved for the future railway station. He looked forward 
to the time when the colony would be regarded as the great centre of Australia. 
He thought mail steamers would possibly make Adelaide their terminus, with 
the mails being conveyed to the other colonies by railway. He believed the new 
Parliament House, with the University and the Institute, should be designed 
together on North Terrace and become ‘three of the grandest buildings in any 
of the colonies’.
In December 1877 Joseph successfully moved for an award of up to £4,000 
to John Ridley, the inventor of the reaping machine, for whom he had acted as an 
agent before entering Parliament. He said it was a standing disgrace to the colony 
that no substantial public recognition had been made of Mr Ridley’s services: had 
he taken the precaution to patent his invention, he would have been one of the 
richest men in South Australia.
Joseph’s parliamentary career, which he had never seen as the most 
important phase of his life, ended in 1881. His failure to win re-election was 
widely attributed to his opposition to legislation intended to restrict Chinese 
immigration, legislation that he regarded as unchristian, uneconomic and 
meddling in imperial matters. Joseph spoke about his election defeat in an 
interview published in the Register on 15 April 1903 as follows:
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“Some of my friends thought that I was unnecessarily outspoken at 
times, and I was frequently told that it would be better for me to 
give more diplomatic answers when questions were put to me on 
the hustings respecting popular measures which I could not support; 
but I refused to make compromises in connection with matters of 
principle merely for the purpose of gaining a seat in the House.”
It was during the decade of the 1890s that Joseph established what thereafter 
became known to his descendants, somewhat incorrectly, as The Fisher Trust. 
on 14 April 1903, Joseph wrote a letter to the Editor of the Register 
newspaper in which he made charitable donations totalling £3,315, which he 
requested the Register to distribute on his behalf. In his letter he sets out his 
reasons for making the donations during his lifetime rather than by will on his 
death. The letter reads as follows:
“Sir – I have much pleasure in sending you herewith a list of 
donations, which I have decided to give to the various institutions 
enumerated therein. Will you kindly communicate with the 
representatives of those institutions so that they may collect the 
amounts in which they are respectively concerned. Subject to your 
consent, the sums are payable at The Register offices, in Grenfell 
Street, Adelaide.
“In explanation I may say that for many years past I have made 
provision in my will for charitable and other public purposes, but I 
am now led by several considerations to anticipate the date on which 
effect can be given to that document. The only one of these which I 
need mention here is the law now in force that all moneys given in 
his will by a testator for charitable purposes are subject to a deduction 
of 10 per cent payable to the Government. I regard this exaction as 
equally unjust and unwise, and as one tending to check the flow of 
public-spirited benevolence. In these circumstances I have resolved 
to make during my lifetime the distribution, which I have intended 
to reserve until after my decease.”
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The first item reads:
“Adelaide University – To encourage commercial education – (1) 
a perpetual gold medal to the student of exceptional merit on 
completion of the course for the advanced commercial certificate; 
(2) a special lectureship on the commercial side – a lecture to be 
delivered in alternate years, and published; and (3) the remuneration 
of lecturers, examiners, and professors engaged in the general work 
of the commercial course – £1,000.”
For the last 20 years of his life, Joseph had been suffering from gout and 
diabetes. In mid-September 1907 he suffered an attack of influenza which, on 26 
September, assumed a serious form and he died the same day at Woodfield. 
He left a will in which he appointed his two sons his executors. It was 
signed on 21 May 1903 in the presence of G.J.R. Murray, subsequently Sir 
George Murray, Chief Justice, Lieutenant Governor and Chancellor of Adelaide 
University, and W.A. Magarey, Queen’s Counsel and donor of the Magarey Medal. 
on 5 october 1907 the Register published an obituary, which concluded 
as follows:
“The late Mr Fisher was a man highly respected in business and 
private life, and though in recent years he had taken little active part 
in public affairs, in his earlier political career he expressed himself 
as sternly opposed to many of the political ideals which have since 
found favour in certain quarters, and refused to shirk what he deemed 
to be his duties and responsibilities merely to retain his seat. He was 
at all times plain spoken, and was not the man to make compromises 
of principle for the sake of securing any private advantage. He always 
manifested a deep interest in the district in which he dwelt, and 
progressive municipal movements found in him a warm supporter.”
Half a century later, Dr Douglas Pike wrote in his article ‘A Man of Honor’ 
(the News, 17 February 1958):
“What makes a pioneer and brings him honour? Publicity, land 
ownership, and pastoral wealth? Does a townsman qualify? Some 
early arrivals did not care. Sincerity meant more to them than fame. 
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Joseph Fisher was content to boast that he had spent his life in sight 
of Adelaide. Parliament claimed him for 10 prosperous years when 
honest men were scarce. Reporters sharpened their pencils whenever 
Fisher rose to speak, but landjobbers and speculators quailed before 
his revelations. He knew the ins and outs of every business deal in 
town. His advice was sought by high and low. Proposals below his 
moral standards he denounced in plain unvarnished terms; what 
he approved was supported with equal vigour. He had too much 
candour to be accepted by the genteel, yet a dozen boards sought him 
as a director. Even the Cricket Association made him its president 
for 25 years. As agent for colonists retired to England he had further 
inside knowledge, but he rarely used it for personal gain. His own 
investments were varied, safe, and seldom changed. His family and 
home meant more to him than power. Solid and unpretentious 
Woodfield at Fullarton gave Fisher Street his name. Its roses and trees 
were his pride. The full extent of his charity was revealed only after 





There is of course no sense in trying to summarize as eclectic a set of Lectures 
as this one. The purpose of this note is simply to whet the reader’s appetite by 
describing the range of economic issues discussed over the almost one hundred 
years the Lectures cover.
Given the interest of Joseph Fisher in fostering higher education in matters 
commercial, it is not surprising that the first Lecture was on precisely that 
topic. The Lecturer, who headed a major bank at the time, was evidently very 
widely traveled and well informed of the embryonic attempts in other affluent 
countries to introduce economics and commerce courses into universities. The 
Inaugural Lecture provides fascinating reading for today’s graduate economists 
and accountants unaware that their courses had hardly begun to be established a 
century ago. Adelaide University can take pride in being at the global forefront in 
developing a course as early as 1901. Its initial requirements were not as tough as 
the University of Birmingham’s though, where commerce students had to master 
at least two modern foreign languages in addition to English!
The next few Lectures cover practical commerce/business issues before the 
topics turn to mainstream economics and finance issues that were important at 
the time and, in numerous cases, have remained so. 
The issue of price stability concerned Copland in 1919 in the aftermath of 
the Great War, for which he saw a return to the gold standard as an inadequate 
solution. That issue also concerned Gregory, Davidson and Melville at the time of 
the Depression in the early 1930s, where it was addressed more in an international 
context. 
Another big economic issue discussed just prior to the Depression was 
public finance, particularly in relation to Australia’s rapidly growing public debt. 
Prime Minister Bruce provided a political perspective while Professor Mills gave 
an academic economist’s view. It is also a crucial issue in times of war, as Irvine’s 
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Lecture in 1917 and Wilson’s in 1940 make clear. Within the public finance 
field, Federal-State financial issues are never far from the top of the agenda in a 
federation. It is surprising, therefore, that only one Lecture has been devoted to 
the topic, namely by Prest and not until 1954. 
Shortly after the Depression, Giblin provided a detailed analysis of the 
effects of import tariffs. This had been a hot political topic before federation in 
1901, and it continued to be so well into the twentieth century. At a superficial 
level the issue seems to have not changed, with Giblin referring in 1936, just 
as we do today, to the highly protected sectors of textiles and motor vehicles. 
But analytically the economics profession has come a long way since then. A 
comparison with Corden’s Lectures three and then again six decades later (1967 
and 1995) reveals a progressive development of understanding, not only by 
economists but also by the public at large, of the economic cost and distributional 
consequences of tariffs. Also noteworthy is a warning by Menzies at the end 
of his Lecture in 1942: despite his predisposition to favour import tariffs, he 
acknowledged that Australia would have to do its part in reducing barriers to 
international trade once the war was over. As Corden’s 1995 Lecture makes clear, 
Australia took a long time to get to that stage, but in the final quarter of the 20th 
century it did eventually liberalize its markets.
Just before World War II broke out, Colin Clark treated his Adelaide audience 
to an application to Australia of ideas that appeared shortly thereafter in his classic 
treatise on The Conditions of Economic Progress (1st edition 1940). His estimates 
suggest Australia in 1938 was the 4th most affluent country in the world after New 
Zealand, the United States and Great Britain, and perhaps equal to Argentina – 
down from first or second at the time of federation and a sharp contrast to today’s 
ranking of around 20th (using similar purchasing power parity measures). As if to link 
with the previous Lecture, by Giblin on tariffs, Clark points to the comparatively 
poor labour productivity performance in Australian manufacturing. He also stated 
that the future for Australian farm exports lies in the politics of trade agreements 
rather than in the economics of comparative costs of production – precisely what 
the post-war history of the GATT/WTo has revealed. 
Following World War II, attention turned to ensuring full employment. 
Among the chosen approaches were efforts to boost agricultural and industrial 
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development, including through infrastructural and research investments. These 
are the themes of the next five Lectures, by Coombs, Wadham, Lewis, Condliffe 
and Crawford. Coombs focused on the macroeconomic challenge of ensuring full 
employment once wartime activities ceased, suggesting the need for non-trivial 
government intervention. However Wadham, a Professor of Agriculture, warned 
that trying to boost employment by allocating land in small parcels for one-person 
farms could lead – as it did -- to them being uneconomic, and at the same time 
adding to environmental and resource management problems associated with 
soil, water and forests. on the positive side, he stressed the crucial importance of 
education for rural people if they were to share in the fruits of economic growth. 
Condliffe in 1950, like Williams in 1962, drew attention to the growth-
enhancing role of investments in research and development and the probable 
underinvestment in such activities by Australia. This topic has risen again in 2001 
as an election issue, along with the perennial concern with brain drain problems. 
Less emphasis is being given by today’s government to the other great contributor 
to economic growth, namely investments in formal education –- despite the strong 
empirical evidence linking educational attainment and income, as demonstrated 
for example in Ashenfelter’s 1993 Lecture. 
Another lecture topic in the 1950s that has a contemporary resonance 
is superannuation. Downing in 1958 argued that the Australian system of age 
pensions subject to a means test was not necessarily inferior to the compulsory 
national superannuation systems operating in numerous other countries at 
that time. 
The 1970s was a period when serious concerns with inflation and associated 
wages policy and unemployment arose. Some if their effects on economists’ 
activities are surveyed in Gruen’s 1978 Lecture, including the increased use of 
macroeconometric modeling designed to assist policy makers. Related lectures 
are the ones by Henderson in 1971 on inflation, by Laidler in 1986 on monetary 
policy, and in between by Gregory in 1981 on unemployment.
Not surprisingly, as globalization has proceeded, international issues of 
relevance to Australia are more prominent in the second volume of these lectures. 
Important among those in the 1950s was the issue on which Nobel Laureate James 
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Meade focused in his 1956 Lecture, namely, why post-war Japan’s membership 
of the GATT should be expedited. The arguments presented are remarkably 
similar to those currently being used in connection with China’s application to 
re-join the GATT/WTo system. Japan is also the subject of Bronfenbrenner’s 
Lecture three decades later, when that country had become far more affluent. At 
that time (1985), Bronfenbrenner argued that Japan was not yet suffering from 
the sclerosis problems of other advanced economies, a claim that would be less 
easy to make today.
Trade issues were the subject of several other Lectures since the 1950s. The 
two by Corden have already been mentioned. His analysis of Australian tariff 
policy in 1967 is still regarded as a classic reference. It provides great detail and 
insight into the tariff policy formation process and a critique of, and suggested 
alternatives to, the method of setting tariff rates at that time. His retrospecive 
analysis in 1995 reviews the extent and causes of the massive trade liberalization 
in Australia since his first Lecture, and compares it with the forces at work in 
many developing countries. one of the key forces aiding reform in Australia 
was greater policy transparency, thanks to the transformation of the Tariff Board 
in 1973 to the Industries Assistance Commission (subsequently changed to the 
Industry Comission and most recently to the Productivity Commission). Its 
first Chairman, Alf Rattigan, contrasts in his 1976 Lecture the IAC’s approach 
with that of the more interventionist Jackson Committee’s proposal for boosting 
industrial development.
Regionalism and American trade policy were the focus of the Lecture in 
1994 by Krueger (the only female Fisher Lecturer to date). She expresses concern 
that regional arrangements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement 
are being designed in ways that make them more stumbling blocks than stepping 
stones to freer global trade, for example through diverting the attention of 
trade negotiators away from the GATT (and now WTo). Since then regional 
agreements have sprung up like mushrooms, making this Lecture even more 
pertinent now than in 1994.
Food trade problems wax and wane, but the perceived long run problem of 
population outstripping supply growth, commonly associated with the name of 
Malthus, is erroneous according to Johnson in his 1996 Lecture. With population 
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growth slowing and new farm technologies expanding supplies, food-exporting 
countries will be under continual pressure to adjust to a long-run decline in 
international food prices – notwithstanding potential food import growth by 
China in the 21st century. This view contrasts sharply with that of the Australian 
government in the early 1950s when, according to Crawford’s Lecture of 1952, 
the prime aim of agricultural policy was to produce more.
External payments problems also received attention. In 1969, Phelps-
Brown focused on it from a UK perspective, prior to the freeing of currency 
exchange rates. The issue was revisited by Krugman in 1988, in his case focusing 
on the persistent US deficit which he saw as the other side of the coin to persistent 
trade surpluses in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. He claimed he would not be 
surprised if the high value of the US dollar was sustained for a long time, as 
indeed it has been.
Problems of developing countries had been barely touched on in this 
Lecture series until recently. The three exceptions in addition to Johnson’s Lecture 
on population and food are Arndt’s treatment of foreign aid policy (1964), an 
assessment of the impact of strengthening intellectual property rights in developing 
Asia (Maskus, 1997), and an economist’s perspective on the transmission of 
infectious diseases (Gersovitz, 1999).
only a few of the Lectures since at least the mid-1920s are not part of 
mainstream economic thinking of the time. one in particular is worthy of 
mention, namely that by the British social historian Asa Briggs, in 1960, on the 
mass entertainment industry. It provides a fascinating history of that industry’s 
development since the 1800s. According to Lord Briggs, it has been quoted more 
than any other lecture he has given.
Joseph Fisher would have been pleased that this series not only started 
with a Lecture on higher education, but also includes the 2001 Lecture by Peter 
Karmel who has had a distinguished career in higher education administration 
since leaving the George Gollin Chair in Economics at Adelaide in the mid-
1960s. Unlike the first Fisher Lecture by Turner, Karmel’s is focused not on the 
education of economists but on the need for better economic analysis to inform 
the higher education policy reform process.
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Several of the lectures since 2001 focus on issues associated with globalization, 
including its impact on trade, natural resources and the environment.
In a collection that covers a period longer than a century, the Lecturers’ 
word usage reveals changing social norms. Readers should be warned that the use 
of gender-neutral language does not become common until well into the second 
half of these Lectures!
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The Joseph Fisher Lecturers to date have been a mixture of prominent economists 
in academia and government, senior politicians including two Prime Ministers, 
and influential Australian bankers and businessmen. Most shared Joseph Fisher’s 
interests in liberal markets and small, non-interventionist government. Only one 
female has given a Fisher Lecture so far, a reflection of the male dominance until 
recently of the world of economics and business. Fifteen of the past Lecturers 
appear in Who’s Who in Economics (3rd edition, edited by M. Blaug, London: 
Edward Elgar, 1999), eighteen appear in A Biographical Dictionary of Australian 
and New Zealand Economists (edited by J. E. King, London: Edward Elgar, 2007) 
fourteen were knighted, two became lords, and one was awarded the Nobel 
Prize in Economics. Brief biographies of each of them follow. They are listed 
in alphabetical order, with the Fisher Lecture number and date given after their 
name.
Arndt, Heinz W., 1915-2002 (No. 31, 1964): Economist. After moving 
from Germany to Oxford with his parents in 1933, Arndt studied politics and 
sociology there and took up economics only after taking an appointment at 
Chatham House and then the University of Manchester under John Hicks. The 
University of Sydney attracted him to Australia in 1946, and by 1950 he moved 
to the new Chair of Economics at Canberra University College (later ANU), 
where he remained affiliated as an Emeritus Professor and continued to write and 
edit journals profusely until his untimely death on his way to Sir Leslie Melville’s 
funeral. Arndt did more than anyone to link Australian and Southeast Asian 
(especially Indonesian) economists.
Ashenfelter, Orley, 1942- (No. 42, 1993): Economist and wine enthusiast. 
Ashenfelter specializes in labour economics, law and economics, and econometrics, 
with some of the latter skill being dedicated to understanding the viticultural 
determinants of the ultimate quality of premium wines, including Penfold’s 
Grange. A professor of economics at Princeton since 1971, he has directed the 
industrial relations group there most of that time. From 1985 to 2001 he was 
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Editor of the American Economic Review, and was President of the American 
Economic Association in 2011-12, but that did not stop his own research program 
from flourishing.
Barbier, Professor Edward Barbier 1957- (No. 49, 2002): Economist. Professor 
Barbier is currently with the University of Wyoming but he has previously served 
at the University of York, UK and as Director of the London Environmental 
Economics Centre at University College London. As an environmental and 
resource economist, he has worked mainly on the economics of environment 
and development issues, including land degradation, wildlife management, trade 
and natural resources, coastal and wetland use, tropical deforestation, biological 
invasions and biodiversity loss. His latest book, Natural Resources and Economic 
Development, was published by Cambridge University Press in 2005.
Bhagwati, Jagdish N., 1934- (No. 56, 2012): International economist. Based in 
New York as University Professor in economics and law at Columbia University 
and senior fellow for international economics at the Council on Foreign 
Relations, Bhagwati has combined seminal scientific contributions to the theory 
of commercial policy with several bestselling books and myriad essays in leading 
newspapers and magazines. He has been a senior advisor to the heads of the UN 
and WTO, and remains one of the world’s strongest advocates for liberal trade 
and a rules-based multilateral trading system.
Braddon, Sir Henry Yule, 1863-1955 (No. 5, 1912 and No. 11, 1925): 
Businessman. Braddon worked for 44 years with Dalgety’s, the livestock and 
station agency, and was director of numerous companies. He was President of the 
Employers’ Federation of New South Wales in 1905-07, of the Sydney Chamber 
of Commerce in 1912-14, and of the Associated Chambers of Commerce of 
Australia in 1913-14. He also lectured on business principles and practice at the 
University of Sydney, and he served terms in the New South Wales Legislative 
Council as both an appointed and an elected member. 
Briggs, Asa (later Lord Briggs), 1921- (No. 29, 1960): Social and cultural 
historian of the 19th and 20th century. Born in Yorkshire, Briggs became Professor 
of Modern History at Leeds University (1955-61) before moving to the (then) 
new University of Sussex where he rose to Vice-Chancellor by 1967. He spent 
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1976-91 as Provost of Worcester College, Oxford and 1978-94 as Chancellor of 
the Open University. He is President of the British Social History Society and of 
the Victorian Society. His trilogy, Victorian Things, Victorian Cities, and Victorian 
People is published by Penguin.
Bronfenbrenner, Martin, 1914-1994 (No. 39, 1985): Macro-economist. 
Shortly after finishing his PhD at Chicago in 1939, Bronfenbrenner was engaged 
in the US Navy in Japan, which gave him an abiding interest in that country. In 
addition to economics professorships at such universities as Wisconsin, Michigan 
State, Minnesota and Carnegie-Mellon, he was Professor of Japanese History 
and Kenan Professor of Economics in Duke University (1971-84) and then of 
International Economics in Aoyama Gakuin University, Tokyo (1984-90).
Bruce, Rt. Hon. Stanley Melbourne (later Viscount Bruce of Melbourne), 
1883-1967 (No. 12, 1927): Prime Minister 1923-29. Bruce entered the 
conservative side of politics in 1918 with strong business connections. He was a 
strong believer in Empire economic development, a supporter of tariff protection 
for selected industries, and a successful protagonist of reform in Commonwealth-
state financial relations. His government was defeated in 1929 after Bruce failed to 
persuade the Parliament to pass legislation for abolition of the federal conciliation 
and arbitration system. Offices he later held included that of Australian High 
Commissioner in London.
Butchart, James R. (No. 10, 1923): Banker and dealer. At the time of the Lecture 
he was a foreign exchange dealer with Edward Dyason and Company. Previously 
he had been an Inspector in Victoria with the London Bank of Australia. In 1918 
he wrote a text on Money and its Purchasing Power.
Clark, Colin Grant, 1905-1989, (No. 18, 1938): Economist, public servant. 
Clark originated many of the concepts of national accounting and was a major 
contributor to the economics of economic development. He arrived from England 
in Australia in 1938 to take up an appointment at the University of Western 
Australia, but soon moved to Queensland as Director of the Bureau of Industry. 
He remained in Queensland until 1952. After a further period in England, at 
Oxford University, he returned to Australia, where he spent his later years.
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Condliffe, John B., 1891-1981 (No. 24, 1950): Economist. At the time of his 
Lecture Condliffe was a Professor of Economics at the University of California, 
but his first appointment to a Chair was at Canterbury University College in 
New Zealand in 1920. In 1931 he joined to the Economic Intelligence Unit of 
the League of Nations in Geneva for a time.
Coombs, Herbert Cole (‘Nugget’) (AC 1975, resigned 1976), 1906-1997 
(No. 21, 1944): Central banker, public servant, university leader, advocate of 
aboriginal rights, supporter of the arts. Formerly an assistant economist in the 
Commonwealth Bank, Coombs transferred to the federal Treasury in 1939, was 
appointed to the Commonwealth Bank Board in 1942 and in the same year 
became Director of Rationing. In 1943, he was appointed Director-General of 
Post-war Reconstruction. He became Governor of the Commonwealth Bank in 
1949 and of the Reserve Bank in 1960. He also served as Chancellor of the 
Australian National University (1968-76), which he helped found in 1946. He 
retired in 1968 to take up a Visiting Fellowship at the ANU in Canberra (1976-
95). In 1972 he was named Australian of the Year.
Copeland, Brian, 1956- (No. 53, 2009): Economist. At the time of his Lecture, 
Professor Copeland was Head of the Department of Economics at the University 
of British Columbia, where he was an undergraduate before completing his PhD 
at Stanford. His research has focused on developing analytical techniques to 
study the interaction between international trade and the natural environment. 
He (with Scott Taylor) wrote the seminal book on Trade and the Environment: 
Theory and Evidence, published by Princeton University Press in 2003. He has 
been co-editor of the Journal of Environmental Economics and Management and 
an Associate Editor of the Journal of International Economics.
Copland, (later Sir) Douglas Berry, 1894-1971 (No. 9, 1921): Economist, 
administrator and diplomat. Copland, a New Zealander, was appointed a 
Lecturer in the University of Tasmania in 1917 and Professor in 1920. He was a 
Professor in the University of Melbourne from 1924 until 1945. During World 
War II, he was Prices Commissioner. Copland was the first Vice-Chancellor of the 
Australian National University, the first Principal of the Australian Administrative 
Staff College and founder of the Committee for the Economic Development of 
Australia. He held diplomatic appointments in China and Canada.
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Corden, Warner Max (AC 2001, FASSA), 1927- (No. 32, 1967 and No. 44, 
1995): International economist. One of the world’s best-known analysts of tariff 
policy, Corden in more recent years has focused on the international monetary 
system, following a period as senior advisor to the IMF (1986-88). He has had 
long periods on the faculty of such universities as Oxford, Melbourne, ANU and, 
since 1989, Johns Hopkins University. He was instrumental in having the first 
official estimates of effective rates of protection included in the Vernon Committee 
of Economic Enquiry report of 1965. His writings on Australian economic policy 
are published in The Road to Reform (1997), but his globally influential works are 
Trade policy and Economic Welfare (1974) and Inflation, Exchange Rates and the 
World Economy (1977).
Crawford, (later Sir) John Grenfell, 1910-1984 (No. 25, 1952): Economist and 
administrator. After humble beginnings, Crawford became Economic Advisor to 
the Rural Bank of NSW before moving to Canberra as the head of a new Bureau 
of Agricultural Economics (1945-50) and then the Department of Commerce 
and Agriculture which became the Department of Trade. In 1960 he returned to 
academia as Professor of Economics and head of the Research School of Pacific 
Studies, became Vice-Chancellor (1967-73) and then Chancellor (1976-84). His 
impacts on agricultural economics, trade policy (especially towards Japan) and 
international development assistance were profound. In 1982 he was declared 
‘Australian of the Year’.
Davidson, (later Sir) Alfred Charles, 1882-1952 (No. 15, 1932): Banker. 
Davidson, at the time of the lecture, was General Manager of the Bank of New 
South Wales. He had played a leading role in the financial adjustments of the early 
phase of the depression. His actions included initiation of the breach of parity of 
the Australian pound with sterling. He was an advocate of an independent central 
bank. Davidson, in 1936, was a major witness before the Royal Commission on 
Monetary and Banking Systems.
Downing, Richard Ivan, 1915-1975 (No. 28, 1958): Economist. In 1954, after 
service as a lecturer at Melbourne, wartime public servant and economist at the 
International Labour Office, Downing was appointed to the Ritchie Chair of 
Economic Research at the University of Melbourne. He had wide interests and 
occupied various public positions. At the time of his death, he was Chairman 
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of the Australian Broadcasting Commission. Throughout his career, Downing 
displayed a strong conviction of the obligation of economists to improve the lot 
of people. His interest in national superannuation reflected this conviction.
Elles, J. Currie, 1852-1934 (No. 3, 1908): A self-described commercial man 
who dealt in investment stocks and mining shares, Elles also refers to himself 
as a Member of the University of Glasgow, Honorary Member of the Institute 
of Bankers of New South Wales and Correspondent in New South Wales of the 
Board of Trade of Great Britain (Intelligence Department). He also joined the 
NSW Stock Exchange and then, after its demise, the Sydney Stock Exchange. He 
spent some time in China, and was fluent in several languages.   
French, Sir John Russell, 1847-1921 (No. 4, 1910): Banker. French was for the 
last 27 years of his life the General Manager of the Bank of New South Wales. 
He was a founder of the Institute of Bankers of New South Wales, President of 
the Sydney Camber of Commerce and President of the Associated Chambers of 
Commerce of Australia. As the leader of Australia’s largest bank, he played an 
important role in relations between government and the banks, especially during 
World War I. 
Gersovitz, Mark, 1949- (No. 47, 1999): Economist. Following his PhD at Yale 
in 1995, Gersovitz has had faculty appointments at Princeton University, the 
University of Michigan and currently Johns Hopkins University. He has also 
taken time out to be Editor of the World Bank Economic Review and World Bank 
Research Observer, 1992-94. As an applied microeconomist, he has focused his 
research on the problems of poor countries, traveling widely to many African and 
Asian countries.
Giblin, Lyndhurst Falkiner, 1872-1951 (No. 17, 1936): Economist. Formerly 
government statistician in Tasmania and advisor to the Premier, Giblin was 
appointed in 1929 to the Ritchie Chair of Economic Research in the University of 
Melbourne. He was actively involved in the policy debates of the 1920s and 1930s 
and served on various advisory bodies, including the inaugural Commonwealh 
Grants Commission and the Bridgen Committee of enquiry into the Australian 
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tariff. As Acting Commonwealth Statistician, he prepared the 1933 census. A 
friend of J. M. Keynes, Giblin did much to introduce Keynesian ideas into the 
Australian debate.
Gordon, (later Sir) David John, 1865-1946 (No. 6, 1914): South Australian 
journalist and politician. Gordon had been employed by the South Australian 
Register in various capacities. He became active in the non-Labor side of politics 
and in 1911 was elected as member for the federal seat of Boothby, which he lost 
in 1913. In the same year, he was elected to the Legislative Council, of which he 
was President from 1932 until 1934. He served a brief term, in 1917, as Minister 
of Education. Gordon was an enthusiast for rural economic development.
Gregory, Robert George (AO 1996, FASSA), 1939- (No. 38, 1981): Economist. 
Following doctoral studies at LSE and a short teaching period at Northwestern 
University, Gregory has been based at ANU’s Research School of Social Sciences 
where he has been Professor of Economics since 1987. He shot to fame in the mid-
1970s with the ‘Gregory thesis’, on the structural changes that a mining boom 
inflicts on an economy, but since the 1980s has focused mainly on labour market 
and associated welfare issues where his research has been very influential through 
being widely disseminated. He has served on many government committees and 
was on the Board of the Reserve Bank from 1985 to 1995.
Gregory, (later Sir) Theodore Emanuel Gugenheim, 1893-1970 (No. 14, 1930): 
Economist. Gregory was, at the time of the Lecture, a Professor of Economics at 
the London School of Economics. He accompanied Sir Otto Niemeyer, who 
visited Australia in 1930 as a representative of the Bank of England to advise 
the federal government and the Commonwealth Bank on Australian economic 
problems.
Gruen, Fred H. (AO 1986, FASSA), 1921-1997 (No. 37, 1978): Economist. 
Gruen was born in Austria, lost his father when he was 15, was sent to boarding 
school in England in 1937 knowing no English, heard his mother died in the 
Auschwitz camp, was deported on the ship Dunera to Sydney in 1940, and then was 
interned in Hay, NSW until war’s end. Few would have risen from that beginning 
to become one of the country’s most widely appreciated economists. Starting 
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as an agricultural economist for the NSW government and then as Professor at 
Monash University, he moved to general economics at ANU’s Research School 
of Social Sciences in 1972. From there he made a formidable contribution to a 
wide range of economic policy debates, and mentored generations of economists 
including his two sons. 
Henderson, Ronald Frank (CMG 1976, AO 1988, FASSA), 1917-1994 (No. 
34, 1971): Applied social economist. Henderson took economics at Cambridge 
and, after World War II, was appointed a Lecturer in Economics there and a 
Fellow of Corpus Christi College. He visited relatives in Australia from time to 
time and took part in policy debates here. In 1962 he accepted an appointment to 
the University of Melbourne where he built up a team that became the Institute 
for Applied Economic and Social Research. When Henderson retired in 1979 
the Institute had 50 staff and a reputation as the country’s most influential unit 
analyzing economic and social policy issues, particularly poverty.
Irvine, Robert Francis, 1861-1941 (No. 7, 1917): Economist. In 1912 Irvine 
was appointed as the first Professor of Economics in the University of Sydney. He 
resigned, in controversial circumstances, in 1922. His views about economics, 
both during his tenure as a Professor and thereafter, were unorthodox.
Jessop, Lewis Angelo, 1842-1922 (No.2, 1906): General Agent. Little is known 
of this Lecturer beyond the facts that he lived in North Adelaide, was married in 
1879, addressed the Free Trade Association of South Australia on 26 November 
1898, and at the time of the Lecture he was employed at the Alliance Assurance 
Office in Adelaide. 
Johnson, David Gale, 1916-2003 (No. 45, 1996): Agricultural economist. 
Johnson was a member of the Economics Department in the University of 
Chicago from 1944, a full Professor from 1954, and then Eliakim Hastings 
Distinguished Service Professor from 1970. During that long tenure he served in 
a wide number of University positions including Provost. Outside the University 
he was equally influential in a vast array of offices, including as President of the 
American Economic Association in 1999. Notwithstanding, he was a prolific 
researcher and for decades was the world’s most influential agricultural trade 
economist. He is best known for his book World Agriculture in Disarray.
 xxxix
Kym Anderson and  Keith Hancock
Karmel, Peter Henry (CBE 1967, AC 1976, FASSA), 1922-2008 (No. 48, 
2001): Economist, educationalist and administrator. Appointed Professor of 
Economics at Adelaide University at the age of 28 (in May 1950), Karmel built 
up a vigorous and highly regarded Department. In 1961 he became Principal-
Designate of Adelaide University’s Bedford Park campus. This became Flinders 
University in 1966, with Karmel as its first Vice-Chancellor. He was later 
Chairman of the Australian Universities Commission and the Commonwealth 
Tertiary Education Commission, and Vice-Chancellor of the Australian National 
University. He served as chairman or member of many governmental, university-
related and public-interest entities, and was the first Chancellor of the University 
of Papua New Guinea. In 1965 he was appointed an Emeritus Professor with the 
University of Adelaide.
Krueger, Anne O., 1934- (No. 43, 1994): International economist. Krueger, 
the only female Joseph Fisher Lecturer to date, has been on the faculty of the 
universities of Wisconsin (1955-59) and Minnesota (1959-82) before spending 
a period as Vice President of the World Bank (1982-86). She then moved to 
Duke University until 1991 when she transferred to her present position at 
Stanford University. A prolific researcher in the areas of economic development 
and international trade, she is author or many influential books on the scope for 
policy reform, and an advisor to numerous developing countries. In 1996 she was 
President of the American Economic Association. 
Krugman, Paul, 1953- (No. 41, 1988): Economist. A PhD from MIT in 1977 
launched this brilliant analyst and advocate onto the world stage. He has since 
taught at Stanford and Yale universities as well as MIT, before moving in 2000 to 
Princeton. In addition to profound academic writings in international economics 
he is one of the most prolific and successful popularizers of complex economic 
ideas via the mass media. All of those popular writings get posted on his website 
which must be the most visited of any economist. In 1991 he was awarded the 
John Bates Clark Medal, given by the American Economic Association every two 
years to the top economist under 40. 
Laidler, David, 1938- (No. 40, 1986): Monetary economist. English born and 
raised, PhD from Chicago in 1964, a professor back in England (Manchester) 
until 1975, and then Laidler migrated to Canada to take up a Chair at the 
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University of Western Ontario whre he still is employed. In addition to research 
for his books and articles on monetary theory, Laidler has been heavily involved 
in monetary policy debates, particularly in Canada. In 1987/88 he was President 
of the Canadian Economic Association.
Lewis, Essington, CH, 1881-1961 (No. 23, 1948): Industrialist. A diplomate 
of the South Australian School of Mines and Industries (now the University of 
South Australia) and with major involvements in the Port Pirie smelters, Lewis 
remained with the BHP Company after its disposal of the smelters. He became 
general manager of BHP in 1921 and Managing Director in 1926. During World 
War II, Lewis occupied the major office of Director of Munitions, returning to 
the iron and steel industry in 1945. He was Chairman of BHP during the Korean 
War years (1950-52).
Maskus, Keith E. 1954- (No. 46, 1997): Economist. Maskus has been on the 
faculty of the University of Colorado ever since he completed his PhD at the 
University of Michigan in 1981, and a full Professor since 1995. He has been a 
Research Fellow with the Institute for International Economics in Washington, 
D.C. since 1998, and was also appointed as an Adjunct Professor at the CIES in 
Adelaide University in 2001. As a specialist in international trade policy and in 
intellectual property rights, he has been widely sought as a consultant/visiting 
scholar by international agencies, government and business.
Meade, James Edward, 1907-1995, (No. 27, 1956): Economist. From 1947 until 
1957, Meade was Professor of Commerce at the London School of Economics. 
During this period he wrote several seminal books about international trade. He 
was Professor of Political Economy at Cambridge University from 1957 until 
1968. Meade served a term as President of the Royal Economic Society. In 1977, 
he was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics. During a visit to Australia in 
1956, Meade collaborated with Adelaide’s Professor Eric Russell in producing an 
important paper on wages, prices and the balance of payments.
Melville, (later Sir) Leslie Galfreid (FASSA), 1902-2002 (No. 16, 1934): 
Economist, public servant, Vice-Chancellor. Trained as an actuary and employed 
in the South Australian Treasury, Melville in 1929 was appointed at age 27 as 
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the first Professor of Economics in the Adelaide University. He left his Chair 
in 1931 to become the first economist in the Commonwealth Bank. His later 
distinguished career included leadership of the Australian delegation at the 
Bretton Woods conference in 1944, Vice-Chancellor of the Australian National 
University (1953-60), Chairman of the Australian Tariff Board (1960-63), and 
Board member of the Reserve Bank of Australia (1965-74).
Menzies, Right Hon. (later Sir) Robert Gordon, 1894-1978, (No. 20, 1942): 
Australia’s longest-serving Prime Minister, holding office between 1939 and 1941 
and between 1949 and 1966. Prime Minister at the outbreak of World War II, 
he resigned in 1941 as Leader of the United Australia Party and Prime Minister. 
When the Labor Government led by John Curtin came to power later in 1941, 
Menzies moved to the Opposition benches. He became Leader of the Opposition 
in 1943 and in 1944 founded the Liberal Party. 
Mills, Richard Charles (OBE), 1886-1952, (No. 13, 1927): Economist. As 
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Japan and the General Agreement  
on Tariffs and Trade
James E. Meade 1
I am much honoured by the invitation which the University of Adelaide has 
extended to me to give this Joseph Fisher Lecture in Commerce. The subject 
which I have chosen to discuss is a current issue in commercial policy of great 
interest to Australians and Englishmen alike. But being an English man, it is my 
intention to discuss the problem today primarily from the point of view of the 
United Kingdom. I propose, therefore, in this lecture to examine the Japanese 
case for an easier access for her exports to world markets, to discuss what would 
be the effects of the treatment of Japan by the United Kingdom as a full member 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and to consider the difficulties 
which this course presents for the United Kingdom. 
Let me start, then, by considering the basic facts of the present Japanese 
economy. Japan is a country with a large population relatively to her resources. If 
the following figures can be trusted, the density of population per square mile of 
cultivated land is more than twice as high as in such densely populated countries 
as China and the United Kingdom, fifteen times as high as in the United States, 
and more than twenty times as high as in Australia. 
1 Twenty-seventh Joseph Fisher Lecture, 8 August 1956.
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Table 27.1: Density of population per square mile (1948-50)
Total area Cultivated area
Australia 3 164
United States 42 213
China 203 1639
United Kingdom 537 1,764
Japan 563 3,596
Source: “outlook of the Japanese Economy Today” Ministry of Finance, Japanese Government, Tokyo, 
1951. Quoted by Jerome B. Cohen, “Economic Problems of Free Japan”, Centre of International Studies, 
Princeton University, 1952. 
Moreover, the Japanese population is growing rapidly. As the following 
figures show, the Japanese death-rate since pre-war years has been drastically 
reduced as a result of improvements in medical practice and hygiene, and it 
is now as low as the death-rate in such rich and advanced communities as the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. 
Table 27.2: Crude birth-rates (BR) and death-rates (DR) per thousand of total 
population









































The Japanese birth rate has also fallen, but it has fallen rather less than the 
death rate, with the consequence that the natural rate of increase in the Japanese 
population is now as high as before the war. In 1938 it was just under and is 
now just over 1 per cent per annum. It is true that, as a result of a marked rise 
in fertility since the pre-war years, the natural rate of increase of population in a 
number of rich countries like the United States and Australia is of the same order 
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of magnitude. But it is a different problem in Japan with its 3,600 persons per 
square mile of cultivated land than in Australia with its 160 or the United States 
with its 210 persons per square mile of cultivated land. I do not myself believe that 
an overpopulated country should countenance a rapid and unrestrained further 
increase in its population and expect the other countries of the world to take the 
steps which are necessary to relieve the effects of its growing population pressure. 
It is up to the Japanese Government and people themselves to avoid ultimate 
economic catastrophe by restricting births in Japan. But such demographic changes 
are bound to be slow in their effects. We are inevitably faced by an overpopulated 
Japan with a rapidly growing population for many years to come. 
Relatively to her population Japan is poorly endowed not only with land, 
but also with other natural resources. She must import some 20 per cent of 
her requirements of food; although she is again the world’s leading exporter of 
textiles, she must import all her raw cotton; she must import 100 per cent of her 
requirements of raw wool, phosphates, rubber, nickel and bauxite, some 90 per 
cent of her oil, 80 per cent of her iron ore, tin, and salt, and 70 per cent of her 
cooking coal.  
This dependence of Japan upon imported raw materials combined with 
the dense and rapidly growing population of Japan raises another important 
problem – that of maintaining full employment in Japan. If Japan cannot 
import her essential raw materials, she cannot maintain her factories at a level of 
operations which will avoid heavy unemployment among her workers. Japan is 
already experiencing difficulties of this kind. Some reflationary expansion of total 
domestic money expenditure (through lower taxes and more ample supplies of 
money by the banks) would be needed to stimulate economic activity in order to 
give employment at home. But Japan has had to do exactly the opposite. In recent 
years she has adopted a fairly restrictive domestic financial policy in order to 
restrain the growth of demand and the rise of prices at home so as to damp down 
the Japanese demand for imported raw materials and foodstuffs, to make the 
price of her exports more competitive in world markets, and so to keep the deficit 
on her balance of trade within manage able limits. This policy has been fairly 
successful in affording some immediate relief to the balance of payments; for 
there has recently been a considerable increase in Japanese exports and reduction 
in her imports. But it has naturally had an adverse effect upon the employment 
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situation. The number of workers recorded as wholly unemployed has grown 
from 450,000 in 1953 and 580,000 in 1954 to 680,000 in 1955. Moreover, these 
figures greatly underestimate the unemployment problem in Japan, where, as a 
result of the country’s social and economic institutions, unemployment is likely 
to take the form of short time or of unrecorded unemployed persons supported 
without real opportunity for work on the land or in other similar positions. 
According to a recent official Japanese survey, the number of persons without 
jobs but seeking employment was in fact more than 3,000,000 in october 1954. 
It must also be remembered that some 700,000 new persons (a number equal 
to somewhat more than 3 per cent of the non-agricultural working population) 
seek employment each year.2 The maintenance of full employment has become 
a testing point for the efficiency of the economic systems of the free countries of 
the world. If Japan is to be attracted to the free and democratic way of life, she 
must be able to sell her manufactures on world markets in sufficient quantities 
to pay for the imports of foodstuffs and raw materials needed to make possible a 
domestic full-employment policy. 
Now what would one expect to be the economic situation in a country 
which, like Japan, is endowed with much labour but little land and other natural 
resources? Labour which is plentiful will be cheap; and land and natural resources 
which are scarce will be expensive. For this reason it will be easy and cheap to 
produce labour-intensive products (like cotton textiles) which require little land 
but much labour to produce; and it will be excessively difficult and expensive 
to produce land intensive products (like wheat and wool) which require much 
land but little labour to produce. Indeed, it may well be impossible for such a 
country to produce adequate supplies of food and raw materials for itself. In such 
a case, either its excess population must emigrate or it must be able to export 
large quantities of its cheap manufactures in order to acquire the foreign exchange 
needed for the purchase of a large part of its own foodstuffs, for the purchase of 
raw materials for the production of the manufactures needed for its own use, and 
for the purchase of the raw materials to be embodied in the manufactures which 
it is exporting. 
2 Economic Survey of Japan, l954-55, p. 19. Published by the Japanese Economic Planning Board.
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We can, I think, rule out as totally impracticable any solution of this 
problem through the mass emigration of-the Japanese into less densely populated 
areas. The Japanese in pre-war years, when there were overseas territories into 
which they could have moved, showed little willingness to migrate. Human 
beings are in any ease expensive things to move in a civilised manner, particularly 
when regard is paid to the need to provide new houses and other social services 
which cannot be transported with the migrants from their old to their new 
land. Any emigration from Japan on a scale which would appreciably affect the 
economic position of that country would be a fantastically expensive operation. 
Finally, I need not remind an Australian audience of the very real difficulties of 
linguistic, cultural, social, and political assimilation involved, and – since this is 
a lecture on economic problems – I will not pause to consider them now. There 
remains only the solution through foreign trade. A country like Japan which 
is very densely populated, which lacks most natural resources, and for which 
there is no possibility of large-scale emigration, must rely on selling its labour-
intensive manufactured exports and upon importing land-intensive food stuffs 
and raw materials. Let us accordingly consider what is in fact the present position 
of Japan in international trade. As the following figures show, Japanese domestic 
production has shown a very remark able recovery since the end of the Second 
World War. 
Table 27.3: Japanese population, industrial production and foreign trade
1934-36 1954 1955
Population 100 128 130
Industrial Production 100 167 181
Volume of Exports 100 55 72
Volume of Imports 100 86 90
In 1955 the Japanese population was some 129.5 per cent of the pre-war 
level, but her industrial production was 181 per cent of the pre-war figure, or 
in-other words, her output of industrial products per head of the population 
was 140 per cent of its level before the war. But her position in world export 
markets had lagged alarmingly behind this domestic recovery and expansion. 
The volume of her total exports in 1955 was only 72 per cent of the pre-war 
level, which means that the volume of her exports per head of her population 
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was as low as 56 per cent of the pre-war figure. Before the Second World War, 
in 1937, Japanese exports accounted for about 5.1 per cent of total world 
exports; in 1954 the corresponding percentage was only 2.1 per cent.3 Japan has 
indeed a long way to go to achieve an adequate volume of exports to support 
her domestic economy; and she could expand her exports greatly before she 
regained the share of world markets which she enjoyed immediately before the 
second World War. 
In view of the figures which I have just quoted, one may well ask how 
the Japanese economy has been able to sustain itself upon so exiguous a volume 
of exports. A part of the answer to this question is to be found in the fact that, 
because of direct and indirect United States aid and support, Japan has been able 
to acquire a larger volume of essential imports than she could purchase with the 
very low level of exports revealed in the figures which I have just quoted. Indeed, 
whereas the volume of Japanese exports in 1955 was only 72 per cent of its pre-war 
level, the volume of her imports was as much as 90 per cent of pre-war. During 
the occupation of Japan, the United States, as is the way with those wealthy and 
generous victors, instead of extracting reparations gave no less than $2,000m in 
direct economic aid to Japan. It is true that since the end of the occupation direct 
United States economic aid to Japan has amounted to the much smaller figure of 
$150m. But since the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 the United States 
has spent about $3,000m in Japan on special procurements for its armed forces 
in that part of the world; and the receipt of these dollars has, of course, enabled 
Japan to spend so much more on imports from the outside world than its receipts 
from its exports to the outside world. 
But even so, Japanese imports in 1955 were 10 per cent lower than pre-war 
although her population (which affects her need for imported foods) was 29.5 
per cent higher than pre war and her industrial production (which affects her 
need for imported raw materials) was 81 per cent above pre-war. Japan has been 
able to manage on so low a volume of imports only by means of the most severe 
quantitative restriction and licensing of imports so as to limit them to the most 
essential items. 
3 United Nations. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1954.
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If my argument is correct there are four important reasons why Japan 
needs to increase her exports substantially. First, as an unrepentant, if somewhat 
old-fashioned, believer in the gains to be won all round by freer trade and the 
international division of labour, I personally would stress the undesirability of a 
system which makes it necessary for a country to restrict its imports as rigidly as 
Japan is restricting hers at present. If Japan could export more of the products 
(like cheap textiles) in the production of which she has a clear comparative 
advantage and could thereby earn the foreign exchange which would enable 
her to import more freely the products (like United Kingdom machinery or 
Australian raw wool) in the production of which other countries have a marked 
comparative advantage, then it should be possible for standards of living to be 
raised all round. Second, it cannot be assumed that American aid to Japan or 
the expenditure by the United States on special procurements for her forces 
in that part of the world will continue indefinitely at the high level of recent 
years. At present the Japanese balance of payments is kept in good shape by 
these exceptional receipts, but their disappearance or substantial reduction 
would mean that Japan would have to increase her exports substantially in 
order to maintain even her present low level of imports. Third, if Japan, like 
other countries in the free world, is to have an effective full-employment policy, 
then she must be able to finance through larger exports the increased imports of 
raw materials which will be required to raise the level of output and production 
in her factories. Fourth, the increase in population in Japan over the next years 
will also necessitate substantial increases in imports of foodstuffs and raw 
materials. I cannot now enter into a discussion of the various estimates which 
have been made of the increase in Japanese exports which would be necessary 
to meet these different needs. Suffice it to say that the needed increase is very 
great. But may I remind you that the volume of Japanese exports in 1955 would 
have had to have been more than 1¾ times as great as it was to have regained 
the pre-war level of exports per head of population, over 2½ times as great 
as it was to have regained the pre-war relationship with domestic industrial 
production, and about 2.33 times as great as it was to have regained its pre-
war share of world trade? It is necessary to think in terms of a doubling of 
Japanese exports over the next few years. But granted that Japan needs to find 
additional openings for her foreign trade, would it not be possible for her to find 
a solution by the restoration of her trade with China to its important pre-war 
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level? The following figures4 show how much the reduction in Japan’s foreign 
trade is to be ascribed to the loss of her trade with this part of the world, in large 
measure as a result of the embargo on trade with communist China. 
Table 27.4: Volume of Japanese trade (Measured in millions of US dollars with   
 trade valued at 1934-36 prices)









Rest of the 
world
1934-36 (annual ave.) 307 599 197 744
1954 23 404 15 731
A little simple arithmetic from these figures leads to the conclusion that if 
in 1954 Japan had been able to send the same volume of exports to Mainland 
China and Korea as before the war without diverting any of her exports from 
other foreign markets, this would have involved an increase of roughly 66 per 
cent in her total exports. From this we can, I think, conclude that a re-opening 
of trade with the Chinese Mainland might make a substantial contribution to the 
solution of Japan’s trading problem. I have no desire in this lecture to enter into 
the important political issue whether the restrictions on trade with communist 
China should be relaxed or not. But it is clear that even if all such restrictions 
were removed, Japan’s export problem would be alleviated but not wholly solved. 
For in the first place as I have already argued, we must think in terms of a 
doubling of the volume of Japanese exports rather than in terms of a 66 per cent 
increase in it. And, secondly, it is certainly very over optimistic to think of Japan 
restoring her pre-war position in these markets. Before the war she was herself in 
control of much of the Chinese mainland. She imported from these markets large 
quantities of ore, coking coal, salt, and similar raw materials for her heavy and 
chemical industries; and in exchange she exported to them her textiles and other 
manufactured products. But the probability now is that China will need much 
of her own ore, coal, and other materials for her own industrial development, 
which will reduce the supplies of these things available for export to Japan, while 
 
4 Based on a report of the US Department of State, 29th March, 1955.
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her own industrialisation will lessen her own need for Japanese textiles and other 
manufactured goods. 
There are perhaps other hopeful possibilities for the expansion of Japanese 
trade. Japan has reasonably low costs in the production of some forms of capital 
equipment. Such goods might be produced for the countries of South-East 
Asia to help them in their programmes of economic development, and Japan 
might import from these countries increased quantities of some of the primary 
products which she needs. This concept of Japan playing a leading role in the 
industrialisation of South East Asia is perhaps a promising one, and there have in 
recent years been some developments of this kind. 
But all these developments are somewhat problematic and the Japanese need 
for expanded export markets is great. The full solution of the problem therefore 
involves also an expansion of Japanese trade with the main trading countries of 
the Western world – with the countries of Europe, the United States, and the 
members of the British Commonwealth. The admission of Japan as a full and 
equal member into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade – or the GATT 
as I shall call it in the rest of this lecture – has naturally come to stand as a symbol 
for this development. I intend, therefore, now to describe briefly the steps which 
have been taken towards the treatment of Japan as a full member of GATT, the 
attitude of the United Kingdom to this development, and the difficulties which 
this development raises for the United Kingdom. 
The GATT is a multilateral trade agreement. Each contracting party – or, 
as I shall inaccurately call it in what follows, each member of the GATT – must 
in general be prepared to undertake a bilateral tariff negotiation with each of the 
other members. Each of these negotiations results in the binding or reduction 
of certain rates of duty which the two members concerned levy on their imports 
from each other. But the benefits of these tariff concessions are then passed 
on to all the other members of the GATT through the operation of the Most-
Favoured-Nation clause which provides that, when any member undertakes to 
reduce any duty which it levies on imports from any particular country, it must 
reduce the duty also on the same imports coming from any other member of 
the GATT. 
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In addition to the obligation to enter into tariff negotiations of this kind 
and to grant to all other GATT members treatment which is as favourable as that 
which it grants to any other country, the GATT contains a number of additional 
articles, some of which (as for example, the article which in general prohibits 
the use of quantitative import restrictions) are designed to set limits to trade 
barriers other than tariffs, and others of which ( such as the article which allows 
countries with serious balance-of-payments difficulties to restrict their imports) 
are designed to allow certain escapes and exceptions to the general rules for the 
freeing of trade. 
The members of the GATT are able to admit new members to the agreement 
by a two-thirds majority vote. The admission of a new member to the GATT 
would automatically entitle that new member to receive Most-Favoured-Nation 
treatment from all the existing members; or in other words, the new member 
would automatically receive the advantages of all the reductions or bindings of 
duties which the existing members had previously negotiated among themselves. 
In order to prevent a new member from obtaining such benefits without itself 
giving similar concessions in the form of reductions and bindings in the rates of 
its own import duties, the practice has grown up of admitting new members to 
GATT only after there has been a series of bilateral tariff negotiations between 
the new member and a sufficient number of the existing members. By this means 
it is hoped to achieve a sufficiently extensive reduction in the tariff of the new 
member to make its admission a fair bargain for the existing members of the 
GATT. Finally, I must mention the important Article 35 of the GATT, which may 
be invoked by any existing member who has not entered into tariff negotiations 
with the new member. Any existing member who invokes Article 35 can refuse to 
extend to the new member the concessions and benefits which it would other wise 
be obliged to extend to it; and in this case, of course, the new member is similarly 
relieved of the obligations which it would otherwise have incurred towards the 
member which had invoked Article 35. In other words, a new member may be 
admitted into the club by a two-thirds majority vote of existing members; it is 
normally not admitted unless it has paid, as it were, its entrance fee in the form of 
negotiating a suitable reduction in the duties which it imposes on imports from 
other members; but any old member can decide to treat the new member as if he 
were not a member of the club, in which case the new member in turn can treat 
the old member as if he were not a member of the club. 
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Japan made formal application for membership in July 1952. There then 
followed a long period of enquiry, negotiation, and discussion, into the details of 
which I will not enter. Certain countries of which the United Kingdom may be 
taken as the leading example expressed their inability to commit themselves to 
extend the full privileges of membership of GATT to Japan. The United Kingdom 
was influenced by memories of the nineteen thirties when many existing lines of 
trade and production were disrupted by a sudden incursion of. cheap Japanese 
products, sold in many cases by means of questionable commercial devices which 
misled customers about the original content, or quality of the goods, which relied 
upon the copying of other traders’ designs, and which involved export subsidies 
of one kind or another. 
In the course of these negotiations the question arose whether there were 
not sufficient escape clauses already in the GATT for it to be possible for a 
country like the United Kingdom to take the necessary remedial measures 
against any repeated experience of this kind even if she had accepted Japan as 
a full member of the GATT. There are two provisions in the GATT which are 
relevant in this connection. The first is Article XIX which allows a country to 
take emergency action to restrict the import of particular products if as the result 
of concessions given under the GATT imports are coming into its territories in 
such quantities as to cause serious injury to its domestic producers. The argument 
against relying on this provision was that it did not exempt a member of GATT 
from its obligation not to discriminate against imports from any other member. 
In other words, if cheap Japanese textiles flooded into the United Kingdom, the 
United Kingdom would have had to restrict imports of textiles from all members 
of the GATT, which it might not wish to do, in order to protect her own textile 
industry from an expansion of cheap Japanese textiles. The other escape clause 
on which, in the opinion of some, reliance might have been placed was Article 
XXIII, under which, if action was taken by any member which had the effect 
of nullifying or impairing the purposes of the GATT, other members might, 
with the agreement of GATT as a whole, take action to offset the effects of the 
offending member. A proposal was made for an official GATT interpretation 
of this Article which would remove some of its procedural delays; but in spite 
of this the United Kingdom was not ready to rely upon it since, in its opinion, 
action under it was too uncertain. 
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In october 1953 a temporary compromise was reached. Japan was invited 
by the members of GATT as a whole to take part in all the meetings, discussions, 
and work of GATT. At the same time a declaration was drawn up under which any 
particular member of GATT which wished to do so could state that commercial 
relations between it and Japan would be governed by the provisions of GATT 
for the period which must elapse before Japan could finally accede to the GATT 
after suitable tariff negotiations between it and the other members of GATT. A 
number of GATT countries accepted this declaration and so in effect extended 
the full privileges of GATT membership forthwith to Japan. A number of other 
countries, including Australia and the United Kingdom, did not do so. 
In February 1955 tariff negotiations were opened in Geneva between Japan 
and a number of the GATT countries, including the United States, as a result 
of which Japan gave concessions in her duties and received further concessions 
in the duties of the other negotiating countries. In September 1955 Japan was 
admitted as a full member of the GATT. But that was by no means the end of 
the story; for no less than fourteen countries, including Australia and the United 
Kingdom, and accounting for more than 40 per cent of Japan’s trade with GATT 
countries, did not undertake tariff negotiations with Japan and invoked Article 
35 of the GATT, so that in effect commercial relations between these countries 
and Japan remain as if Japan had not been admitted to the GATT. 
So far I have considered only the negative side of the United Kingdom’s 
position. But the United Kingdom has stressed the fact that there was at no 
time any desire on her part to prevent Japan from regaining her status as a great 
trading nation. Membership of the GATT had become a symbol of this status, 
and Japanese membership of the GATT as such was not opposed by the United 
Kingdom. Indeed, it its official statement of policy on this subject, issued in 
April 1955, the United Kingdom Government expressed the “hope that the 
United Kingdom’s trading relations with Japan and Japan’s trading relations with 
the rest of the world will so develop as to enable the United Kingdom and the 
Colonial territories in due course to accept the full application of the provisions 
of the General Agreement to their trade with Japan”. But until there was more 
assurance of the course which Japanese trading practices would take, the United 
Kingdom required more adequate safeguards against excessive competition from 
Japan than were written into the existing GATT. Nor had the Untied Kingdom 
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any desire to prevent the expansion of Japanese export trade. Indeed, in a series of 
bilateral trade and payments arrangements outside the GATT, which concerned 
the total trade of Japan with the sterling area, and to which I shall return shortly, 
the United Kingdom, had taken steps to make possible an expansion off trade 
between Japan and the sterling area. But the United Kingdom was unwilling to 
undertake to impose no more controls over her trade with Japan than over trade 
with the other members of GATT. She would have preferred that the issue of 
principle should not have been raised, so that she could have continued gradually 
to relax her controls over Japanese reader by the ad hoc development of her special 
trade and payments agreements with Japan. Experience could then have shown 
whether the dangers which were feared in some quarters in the United Kingdom 
would or would not prove well grounded.
But Japan did raise the issue of principle by applying for membership of 
GATT. In the first place, she needed an expansion of her export markets; and the 
commercial benefits which she would obtain not only in the markets of the United 
kingdom, but in those of the other members of GATT through the application 
of GATT principles to her trade were of importance to her. Secondly, exclusion 
from GATT carried with it some stigma; and it was politically important to Japan 
to re-establish herself as a full member of the commercial club of the main trading 
countries of the free world.
Let me turn now to a brief description of the development of trade and 
payments between Japan and the United Kingdom since the end of the Second 
World War. At first during the occupation of Japan trade between Japan and 
the countries of the sterling area was very low. It would in any case have been 
low because of the initial disruption of Japan’s economy after the war. But it 
was specially restricted by the fact that the payments arrangements were such 
as to make Japan for currency purposes a member of the dollar area. Any excess 
of payments by the sterling area would have had to be settled in gold or dollars 
and thus imports from Japan had to be restricted as severely as imports from 
the United States. This was altered by the Anglo-Japanese payments agreement 
of September 1951, whereby payments between Japan and the sterling area sere 
to be settled in sterling. If Japan ran up a balance of sterling because of heavy 
imports of Japanese products into sterling area countries, these sums could not be 
converted by Japan into gold or dollars. The intention was that a broad bilateral 
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balance should be maintained between Japanese payments to the sterling area 
and the sterling-area payments in Japan. If an unbalance developed, then this 
would be corrected by a change in import controls on the one side or the other 
so as to encourage Japanese purchases from the sterling area and to discourage 
sterling-area purchases from Japan when Japan had large balances of sterling, and 
vice versa.
This original Anglo-Japanese agreement was to run for twelve months. It 
has been followed by a number of new agreements which are basically of the 
same pattern. There have been times when Japan has accumulated large balances 
of sterling. Such situations have been met to some extent bay a tightening of 
restrictions on imports of Japanese products into sterling-area countries, but also 
by a relaxation of Japanese restrictions in imports from the sterling-area. At other 
times Japan has been running down her sterling balances; and in this case the 
situation has been met partly by a tightening of Japanese restrictions on imports 
from the sterling area, but also by a relaxation of sterling-area restrictions on 
imports from Japan. The general development of these Anglo-Japanese payments 
agreements has been to plan each time for an expanded, but still a bilaterally 
balanced, volume of transactions between Japan and the sterling area.
At first these Anglo-Japanese agreements were reach multilaterally between 
Japan on the one side and many countries of the sterling area on the other side. 
That is to say, delegation form the Untied Kingdom) would attempt to work out 
simultaneously with the Japanese a programme of Japanese imports from the 
various sterling-area countries concerned and a set of programmes of imports of 
Japanese products into the sterling-area countries concerned which would result 
in a balance between Japanese payments to, and receipts from, the sterling area as 
a whole. But the more recent agreements have been strictly bilateral agreements 
between Japan and the United Kingdom. In these negotiations statistical 
estimates have been made of the total amount which, under their separate trade 
arrangements, independent sterling-area countries are likely to spend on Japanese 
products. Moreover, since 1954 there have been virtually no quota restrictions 
on the import of Japanese products into the dependent colonies of the United 
Kingdom, so that the imports of these territories can also merely be taken as a 
statistical estimate of what will be the result of such free importation into the 
colonies. Balance between the sterling payments and receipts of Japan as a whole 
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can then be maintained in the Anglo-Japanese agreement only by changing the 
restrictions on imports of Japanese products into the United Kingdom itself 
or, on the other side, by a change in Japanese restrictions on imports from the 
sterling area. It is in terms of these two variables that a balance has been sought in 
the most recent Anglo-Japanese agreements. 
As the following figures show, these Anglo-Japanese payments agreements 
have made possible an expansion of Japan’s export markets in the United Kingdom 
and in the rest of the sterling area. But this expansion has been at an uneven rate. 
In particular in 1953 there was a severe cut-back in the United Kingdom and 
other sterling-area imports from Japan to meet the situation which had arisen 
from the greatly increased – purchases of the sterling area from Japan in 1951 and 
1952 with the resulting heavy accumulation of sterling balances by Japan. 
Table 27.5: Value of  Japan’s exports, monthly averages (million yen)
Exports to United Kingdom Exports to rest of Sterling area Total exports
1949 1,264 6,195 15,293
1950 781 8,140 24,606
1951 1,620 16,758 40,637
1952 2,194 14,009 38,187
1953 994 8,526 38,245
1954 1,534 13,242 48,880
1955 1,823 17,649 60,320
The sterling area provides an important market for Japan. The proportion 
of Japanese exports going to the sterling area has ranged from nearly one half in 
1949 to one quarter in 1953, and in 1955 was about one third. 
Let us now consider against the background of these arrangements the 
particular difficulties which the United Kingdom would encounter if she were to 
accept full GATT obligations towards Japan. 
As far as tariffs are concerned, there would be no difficulties. Both the 
United Kingdom and her Colonies (unlike Australia) already extend Most-
Favoured-Nation treatment to Japanese imports in so far as import duties are 
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concerned. That is to say they do not levy higher duties on Japanese products than 
those which they levy on the products of any other country which does not enjoy 
Imperial Preference in the United Kingdom and Colonial markets. of course, the 
United Kingdom and the Colonies do give preferential tariff treatment to other 
Commonwealth countries; but these existing Imperial Preferences are permitted 
under the GATT rules and they would not be counted as a discrimination against 
Japanese products. 
The difficulties which the United Kingdom would experience relate to 
the quantitative restriction of imports by import licensing. In this connection 
we must consider, first, the question of the restriction of imports of Japanese 
products into the British Colonies and, secondly, the restriction of imports of 
Japanese products into the United Kingdom itself. 
In the nineteen thirties quantitative restrictions were placed on imports 
of Japanese products into many of the British Colonies as part of the general 
development of commercial policy to counteract the disruptive effects of the 
great flood of cheap Japanese manufactures. After the second World War imports 
of Japanese products into the Colonial territories, just as imports of Japanese 
products into other sterling-area countries, were at first controlled on balance-
of-payments grounds in order to prevent the accumulation in Japanese hands 
of excessive balances of sterling which directly or indirectly would lead to a 
pressure on the gold and dollar reserves of the sterling area. But since 1954, as I 
have already explained, restrictions on Japanese imports into the Colonies have 
not been used in this way. Colonial governments have been free to licence the 
import of Japanese products in any quantities which they desire. The old criticism 
that the United Kingdom has employed quota restrictions in order to protect 
expensive Lancashire products against cheap Japanese products at the cost of the 
inhabitants of Colonial areas can no longer be sustained. 
It is true that the apparatus of import licensing is maintained in the 
Colonies against Japanese products, but not against the products of the sterling 
area or of the European countries which are members of the European Payments 
Union. But the quotas set for Japanese products are now so large that they are in 
many cases ineffective and not fully used; and where the quotas are fully used, 
additional licences are fairly freely obtainable upon application. The reason for 
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the maintenance of this system is in order that the United Kingdom may hold 
ready in reserve a weapon which it might need to use once more on balance-of-
payments grounds, if there were another sudden surge of cheap Japanese products 
into sterling markets. This system is, of course, formally discriminatory under the 
GATT rules and would have to be abolished if the United Kingdom applied the 
GATT rules to Japanese trade. This might have some slight beneficial effect upon 
Japanese exports, since the maintenance of the apparatus of licensing may itself 
somewhat discourage Japanese trade. A Colonial importer must go through the 
tiresome drill of using an import licence if he buys from Japan, but not if he buys 
from Europe or the British Commonwealth; and there may be a tendency for 
the issue of the licences to concentrate the trade in the hands of existing traders 
who, be cause of their existing commercial connections, are somewhat less likely 
to buy from Japanese than from other sources. But the discriminatory effect is no 
longer substantial and the abolition of this system would not have any very direct 
favourable effect upon Japanese, or adverse effects upon British, trade. 
Quantitative restrictions on the import of Japanese products into the United 
Kingdom itself are quite a different matter. In this case there are quotas on the 
import of Japanese products which effectively restrain the imports of Japanese 
textiles, toys, and other products. To give GATT non-discriminatory treatment 
to Japan would mean the removal of these restrictions; for the import of these 
products is not similarly restricted when they come from other countries of the 
Commonwealth or of Western Europe. It is this requirement which presents the 
most direct and obvious difficulty which stands in the way of the United Kingdom 
giving GATT treatment to Japan. To let these Japanese products enter the United 
Kingdom without licence restrictions would not be catastrophic for the United 
Kingdom. These products are not basic essentials; and neither on military nor on 
economic grounds would a contraction of these industries in the United Kingdom 
be disastrous. Moreover, the problem of industrial readjustment would be easier 
now than it was in the nineteen thirties. In the first place, we now live in an 
inflationary instead of a deflationary atmosphere. Alternative opportunities for 
employment would now exist in the rest of the country for workers dismissed from 
factories hit by Japanese competition. Secondly, largely as a result of readjustments 
made in the second World War industry is now more diversified in Lancashire 
where there are now many light engineering and other industries available to give 
more local employment if the cotton industry were contracted. 
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But the transitional problems would nevertheless be very real ones. The 
difficulty of the problem for the United Kingdom is particularly great because 
the increased competition from Japanese products would be highly concentrated 
on a few industries in the United Kingdom. The removal of import restriction 
on Japanese products would not cause a little extra competition for a large 
number of industries; it would cause a great deal of extra competition for a small 
number of industries. Certain branches of the textile industry would be very 
seriously cut back. Certain small industries, like the cheap toy industry or the 
net-making industry, might be faced virtually with complete ruin. It is politically 
and economically a serious matter to take steps which may substantially effect the 
fortunes of a traditionally basic industry like the Lancashire cotton industry and 
which may bring concentrated loss on a few small producers. 
There is another possible danger for the United Kingdom which might turn 
out to be more important economically, although it presents less obvious political 
difficulty. Japan since the war has continuously spent a great deal more on dollar 
products than she has earned by her sales to the dollar area. There have been some 
structural changes in Japan’s trade which have emphasised this lack of dollar balance. 
For example, the development of competing synthetic fabrics in the United States 
has greatly restricted the United States demand for natural silks, one of Japan’s most 
important exports to the United States; and the collapse of the Chinese mainland as 
a main source of supply of important Japanese imports like cooking coal has meant 
that Japan must make heavy purchases of these products in the United States. This 
natural and perhaps inevitable structural change has been artificially reinforced by 
certain types of United States aid to Japan. For example, disposals of United States 
surplus wheat on special payments terms in Japan may have restricted the Japanese 
demand for Australian and so for sterling wheat. In 1954 the volume of Japanese 
exports to North America was only 57 per cent of its pre war level, whereas the 
volume of Japanese imports from North America was 135 per cent of its pre-war 
level. In 1954 Japan’s exports to North America were worth $349m, but her imports 
from North America were $1,102m. on the other hand, in many post-war years 
there has been a tendency for the purchases of the sterling area from Japan to exceed 
Japan’s imports from the sterling area. In these circumstances there might well be an 
underlying tendency for Japan to earn sterling for her exports and to convert this 
into dollars for the purchase of her imports, thus putting a strain upon the sterling 
areas gold and dollar reserves in London. 
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This tendency has up to now been avoided by the Anglo Japanese trade 
and payments agreements to which I have already referred. United Kingdom 
restrictions on purchases from Japan have been deliberately maintained and 
Japanese restrictions on sterling-area products have been deliberately relaxed 
so as to keep a rough balance between Japan’s sales and purchases in sterling. 
It is not at all certain that this would be permissible if Japan and the United 
Kingdom applied GATT rules to their mutual commercial relations. Under the 
GATT rules a country can restrict imports so long as its balance of payments is in 
serious disequilibrium. But the general GATT rule is that such restrictions should 
be non-discriminatory; and if Japan were not free to discriminate in favour of 
sterling products and the United Kingdom were not free to discriminate against 
Japanese products, it would not be possible to offset any underlying tendency 
for Japan to sell to the sterling area but to buy from the dollar area. It is true 
that the GATT rules do in certain circumstances also permit discriminations in 
import restrictions on balance-of-payments grounds. I cannot on this occasion go 
into these complicated rules in detail. Suffice it to say that the freedom of Japan 
and the United Kingdom to seek a bilateral yen-sterling balance would be more 
circumscribed than at present. 
Thus there are some very real difficulties in the way of the extension by the 
United Kingdom of full GATT treatment to Japanese products. There would, of 
course, probably be some compensating advantages to the United Kingdom in 
achieving a removal of barriers to Anglo-Japanese trade. While the transitional 
difficulties might be considerable, the change in the structure of United Kingdom 
industries would probably in the long-run bring some gains. Consumers in the 
United Kingdom would obtain cheaper supplies of certain products (like textiles 
and toys) which would be obtained from the export of products (like machinery) 
in the production of which United Kingdom industry was more economical. 
The main danger would be the instability of industrial production which would 
occur if there were ever once more a sudden surge of cheap Japanese products into 
the relatively unprotected markets of the United Kingdom, as happened in the 
nineteen thirties. But that development was a product of the Great Depression. 
In the early nineteen thirties the American market for Japanese silk and other 
pro ducts collapsed as a result of the collapse of buying power inside the United 
States combined with the erection of the excessive Hawley-Smoot tariff by that 
country. This was the main reason why the Japanese suddenly sought alternative 
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outlets for their exports at excessively low prices and by questionable commercial 
devices in markets such as the British which enjoyed little protection from them. 
In my view, we can rule out the possibility that the United States will once again 
permit a major domestic economic depression to develop, or will reverse their 
commercial policy and build once more an excessively high tariff. And if these 
things should occur, it is certain that the GATT, as we know it now, would not 
long survive. In present conditions Japanese products are not so excessively cheap 
as to cause an overwhelming flood of cheap goods into British markets. 
of course, the United Kingdom is not the only country which has difficulty 
in giving full GATT treatment to Japanese trade. There are the thirteen other 
members of the GATT – Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Cuba, France, Haiti, 
India, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 
and the Union of South Africa – which have followed the same course as the 
United Kingdom in invoking Article 35 so as not to be obliged to give GATT 
treatment to Japanese trade. But the United Kingdom is the leading trading 
country which has invoked Article 35 of the GATT in order to refrain from 
giving GATT treatment to Japan. It is probable that the United Kingdom’s 
example has been important. If she ceased to invoke Article 35, a number of 
the other thirteen countries which at present also invoke Article 35 might be 
persuaded not to do so. The indirect effects of this might be important for the 
United Kingdom. Suppose that some third countries remove some barriers on 
imports of Japanese products. In so far as similar products were previously being 
imported from the United Kingdom the result may be that Japanese products 
are purchased instead of United Kingdom products by the countries concerned; 
and this would mean contraction in the market for United Kingdom products. 
Such unfavourable developments are in fact likely to occur in some cases as 
Japan finds an easier access into third countries. But in so far as the easier access 
into third markets enables Japanese products to compete successfully in those 
markets against the domestic production of the third countries themselves, the 
effect may be to ease the pressure on the United Kingdom. For the more readily 
Japanese products are absorbed into such third markets, the less plentiful and 
cheap will be the remaining supplies of Japanese products available for sale in 
United Kingdom markets or in markets in which they compete directly with 
United Kingdom products. The extension of full GATT treatment to Japan by all 
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the other members of GATT might thus have some adverse effects upon United 
Kingdom exports, but at the same time it might relieve the pressure of Japanese 
competition in other United Kingdom markets.
Even those members of the GATT who did not invoke Article 35 have 
experienced difficulties in extending full GATT treatment to Japan. There was, for 
example, a very considerable expansion of cheap Japanese textiles into the United 
States after the mutual tariff reductions which took place before Japan’s entry 
into GATT relationships with the United States. This caused some considerable 
concern among the New England textile producers. It became clear that the 
United States Administration might be forced to take steps (either through the 
escape clause in GATT which can be invoked if a domestic industry suffers 
serious injury from imports or by other means) to prevent this natural expansion 
of Japan’s cheap labour intensive products. In fact, an uneasy modus vivendi has 
been found only through the agreement of the Japanese to restrict their exports to 
the United States. The formal GATT relationship between Japan and the United 
States has been accepted; but nevertheless some special restrictions on the trade 
with Japan have thus been continued. In other cases, of which Germany may be 
cited as an example, countries which have accepted Japan as a full member of the 
GATT have not yet found it possible so to liberalise their quota restrictions over 
imports of Japanese goods as fully to carry out the obligations which they have 
thus incurred. The United Kingdom should not per haps be too severely criticised 
for having been willing to incur the odium of stating in advance that she could 
not extend full GATT treatment to Japan. 
Is the assumption by Japan of the obligation to give GATT treatment to 
those members of GATT who do not invoke Article 35 likely to give rise to 
serious difficulties for Japan? Japan at the present is operating a system of very 
strict controls over her imports. As long as her balance of payments remains in 
its present difficult position it will be legitimate for her under the GATT rules 
to continue to control her imports. But her import controls will now be subject 
to review and challenge by the other members of the GATT on two counts: the 
Japanese restrictions must not be more severe than is necessary to cope with the 
Japanese balance-of-payments problem and they must be non-discriminatory as 
between the products of the other members of GATT which have accepted Japan 
as a full member of the GATT. It is possible that on both these counts Japan may 
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need to revise her restrictions. In particular, there have been serious complaints 
that the Japanese import restrictions have on occasions been administered in 
an arbitrary manner which has discriminated against the exports of particular 
countries. 
Another feature of the Japanese trading system to which serious exception 
can be taken is the well-known “link system” in Japanese foreign exchange control. 
Under this system the right to acquire foreign exchange for the purchase of certain 
imports has been linked to the export of certain other products. often the right 
to purchase imports of a certain raw material has been linked with the export 
of products made out of that material. But occasionally there has been no such 
obvious connection between the exported product and the imported product 
which is linked with it. Thus in the past the export of machinery, ships, and silk 
has carried with it a right to receive foreign exchange for the import of textile raw 
materials, sugar, petroleum, and bananas. This system is equivalent to a system 
of export subsidies. For the exporter will be willing to export, if necessary, at a 
price which does not fully cover his costs of production because his loss will be 
linked with the acquisition of a valuable right to acquire certain scarce imports. 
Until recently, the GATT rules did not include any direct prohibition of export 
subsidies on manufactured goods. They required only that such subsidies should 
be notified to the GATT and should be the subject of consultation with other 
aggrieved members. But the new GATT rules on this subject, proposed at the 
revision of the GATT in 1955, would provide for a standstill on export subsidies 
on industrial products until the end of 1957 and for their abolition at the earliest 
possible date after that. Japan has, in fact, recognised that the “link system” would 
be subject to criticism as not being in the spirit, even if it were within the letter, 
of the existing GATT rules. She is in the process of dismantling the whole system. 
Japanese traders have been the subject of severe criticism in many 
countries and, above all, in the United Kingdom, for adopting unfair methods 
of competition, such as the copying of designs which are in reality the property 
of their competitors. There is no doubt that these complaints have in the past 
been justified. Recently after discussions with the British traders concerned steps 
have been taken to attempt to stop the pirating of designs in the case of textiles. 
A Japanese Textile Colour Design Centre has been set up and all members of the 
Japanese Cotton Textile Exporters’ Association are required to obtain the approval 
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of the Design Centre for their designs before concluding a foreign sale. This 
method of control might have two forms of weakness. First, there is the problem 
how the Design Centre is to make sure that the foreign buyer of Japanese textiles 
who says that he is the owner of a foreign design is really the owner of that design. 
Secondly, there is the need to control the exports of the small Japanese producers 
and exporters who are not members of the Japanese Cotton Textile Exporters’ 
Association. Recent legislation in Japan has enabled regulations controlling the 
designs used in Japanese exports to be applied to the producers and exporters 
who are not members of the Exporters’ Association. It remains to be seen whether 
these measures will effectively put an end to objectionable trading practices in 
the case of textiles, and whether similar safeguards can be applied to other trades.
It is, in my opinion, greatly to be hoped that trading conditions will so 
develop, and that such safeguards will be found, that the United Kingdom will 
be able soon to apply GATT treatment to Japanese products. As I have tried to 
show, Japan is a country whose economic survival depends above all things upon 
being able to sell her manufactured produce in overseas markets; and for this 
reason there must be a reasonably ready access for Japanese products to world 
markets, if a healthy and contented Japan is to be attracted to the democratic and 
free way of life. In the nineteen thirties the countries of the free world made a 
double mistake in their attitude towards Japan. In the first place, they should have 
opposed Japanese military aggression more firmly. But, in the second place, they 
should have taken a more liberal line towards the expansion of Japanese export 
markets. They should have said to Japan: “You may not acquire the raw materials 
and foodstuffs which are necessary for your existence by force of arms; but it is 
possible for you to acquire them through a commercial expansion of your exports 
into our markets”. Alas, they said something which was almost the exact reverse 
to this. Today we must avoid finding ourselves in the position of saying to Japan: 
“You may not, of course, sell your exports on equal terms with the products of 
other free countries in our markets; nor should you trade with communist China. 
But, pray, join with us in the prosperity which is offered by the free, democratic, 
western way of life”. The old-fashioned, Cobdenite view that a reduction of trade 
barriers is a bulwark of this free, democratic, western way of life has often been 




National superannuation:  
Means test or contributions?
Richard I. Downing 1
The income of retired people gives them a claim on the flow of goods and services 
currently being produced by the active population. Whatever form their income 
takes, it must be paid at the expense of this active population. Retired people 
may be living on capital and the income from their investments (an annuity or 
an income from a superannuation scheme is a combination of the two) or on 
private gifts or national age-pensions. In all these cases, their spending is directly 
or indirectly, a charge on those currently producing any earning who save, pay 
taxes and pay rent, interest and dividends on the capital they use in production. 
This paper discusses how the amount of income accruing to retired people in 
these ways is to be determined. 
Private insurance
It is a common assumption that people should, both for their own good and for 
the community’s, provide for their own retirement. This is believed to promote 
the virtue of self-reliance and to reduce dependence on the welfare State.
We may take as our exemplar the man who, either alone or jointly with 
his employer, pays premiums on an endowment policy or contributions to a 
superannuation scheme. (I shall not be discussing here the question of relative 
contributions to superannuation schemes by employees, employers and 
 
1 Twenty-eighth Joseph Fisher Lecture, 24 September 1958. The late Mr. F. H. Rowe, former Director-
General of the Commonwealth Department of Social Services, and Mr. Max Wryell and his officers in 
the Research Section of that Department, gave me invaluable and friendly help in assembling a mass of 
detailed information about superannuation schemes in various countries. None of these people is in any 
way associated with either the analysis or the suggestions contained in this Lecture.
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governments; in effect, I treat all contributions as being, directly or in directly, 
a charge on earners’ incomes.) These payments accumulate in a fund, earn substantial 
compound interest and can be used, on retirement, to purchase an annuity. 
There is an increasing acceptance of the idea that the income so provided 
for retirement should be a substantial proportion of the individual’s income 
received while working. This relation of retirement income to earned income is a 
natural extension of the acceptance of income as a socio-economic criterion. The 
income a man earns during his working life determines not only the real income 
of goods and services he can enjoy, but also his material status in relation to other 
people in his community. 
With income playing this important socio-economic role, it is natural that a 
man should be anxious to ensure that, after his retirement, he will have an income 
adequate not only to meet his reduced need for goods and services, but also to 
maintain his material status relative to other retired people. The British Labour 
Party, for instance, bases its proposals for a national superannuation scheme on 
the desire to extend to workers, as well as to “the privileged minority” (that is, 
those who are in private superannuation schemes) the benefit of “between half 
pay and two-thirds of pay on retirement” rather than relying on a low flat-rate 
National Insurance benefit.2 It claims that “wage related pensions satisfy the social 
requirements of the second half of the twentieth century just as flat-rate pensions 
suited the first half ”. (one commentator, Professor A. T. Peacock, points out 
that, since the scheme proposed by the British Labour Party will not operate 
fully at least until the year 2030, it would really be necessary to ask one’s great-
grandchildren whether a system designed for the second half of the twentieth 
century would suit the first half of the twenty-first century.) 
For a man wanting an annuity equal to one-half his average earnings over 
his life-time, and with no widow to provide for, the cost through an Australian 
insurance office would be about 5 per cent of his income if he began his provision 
at age 15, 7 per cent at age 25, and 12 per cent at age 35. The cost would be 
greater if he wished to provide, as some schemes do, for a benefit related to his 
 
2 National Superannuation: Labour’s Policy for Security in Old Age (published by the British Labour Party, 
Transport House, Smith Square London, 1957).
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income in his last 5 or 10 years of earning, or his best 15 years; and if he wished to 
provide for a surviving widow. The United Nations’ pension fund, for instance, is 
based on thirty years’ contributions. It provides a pension equal to half the salary 
earned in the last ten years of the contributors’ career, with a half-pension for a 
surviving widow. It is financed by contributions totalling about 22 per cent of 
the salary, two thirds being paid by the employer who also carries any deficit in 
the fund. 
The case for Government intervention
It would appear within our reach to provide decently through private insurance 
schemes for our own retirement. What case is there for any intervention by the 
Government? Why not leave people to look after themselves? The case for the 
Government intervention rests on three bases: 
Improvidence
The first is the natural improvidence of man – his inability to look ahead and see 
that his future needs, when he comes to them, are going to be as urgent as his 
present needs. Pigou, in his Economics of Welfare, describes this irrationality as “a 
far-reaching economic disharmony . . . People distribute their resources between 
the present, the near future and the remote future on the basis of a wholly 
irrational preference . . . they will often devote themselves to  . . . obtaining a 
small (satisfaction) now in preference to a much larger one some years hence” 
(p. 25, 4th edition).
Because people do not realise, during their working years, the full 
importance of an income during their retirement, there is a case for the 
Government to introduce a compulsory system of superannuation. There is also 
an implication that anyone who prefers to provide his own endowment, or join a 
private superannuation scheme, provided the private arrangement gives at least as 
good cover as the nationally-prescribed minimum.
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Redistribution of income
Second, there is the age-old question of income-distribution. If community 
opinion was satisfied with the existing pattern on income distribution among 
income-earners, it might be reasonable to suppose it would also be satisfied with 
the similar pattern of income-distribution among retired people that would 
be achieved by, say, half-pensions for all, financed by uniform, percentage 
contributions from all. If the community is not satisfied with the existing pattern, 
it might be reasonable to suppose that it should seek to change relative incomes 
both directly, and indirectly through progressive taxation and social services, so 
as to bring out a pattern of income-distribution more nearly conforming to its 
ideals. Individuals could still be left to provide incomes for their own retirement 
related to the incomes the received while working.
There are, nevertheless, two reasons why considerations of income-
distribution might support government intervention in superannuation. Firstly, 
while the community may be satisfied with an income range for earners of, say 
£500 to £5000, it may, for the reduced incomes of retired people, prefer an 
income range of, say £300 to £2000 rather than the £250 to £2500, that would 
be achieved on a uniform insurance basis.
Furthermore, the community may feel that the task of changing income-
distribution, either directly or through the Government budget, is so difficult 
that the process could be made more effective if reinforced through the medium 
of a national superannuation scheme.
For both these reasons then, the community may consider it desirable 
that the provision made by lower-income groups for their retirement should be 
supplemented, either out of the insurance contributions collected from higher 
incomes or out of consolidate revenue.
Inflation
out third basis for believing that there is a case for Government intervention 
arises from the fact that, in this question of provision for retirement, we are 
dealing essentially with a problem with a long time-scale. It will normally be 
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a 40 to 60-year period between the time when a man begins providing for his 
retirement and the time when he dies and needs no further provision. During 
such a period we can be sure that there will be substantial increase in productivity, 
bringing corresponding increases in average real income to the whole community.
If the average level of incomes remained stable in money terms throughout 
the period, there would be continuing price reductions and/or improvements 
in the quality of products, so that the real value of these stable money incomes 
would be correspondingly increased. Thus, if a man received £1000 a year during 
his working life, he would enjoy, along with his fellow-earners, a steady increase in 
his real income as he and his fellows became more productive. The provision of an 
annuity of £500 a year would preserve his (reduced) relative income status during 
his retirement, enabling him to go on sharing in any increase of productivity 
accruing to the community as a whole in the form of price reductions or quality 
improvements.
In fact, average money incomes do not remain stable over time. Indeed, 
it does not any longer seem even to be accepted as a socio-economic objective 
that they should. It is often stated as an alternative that prices should remain 
stable, the implication being that money incomes should rise with productivity. 
If this objective were achieved, an average earner would then share in any gains of 
productivity during his working life. After retirement, however, his income, fixed 
in money terms, should also be fixed in real terms. He would no longer share in 
the community’s increasing productivity and his relative income status would 
sink as productivity rose.
Moreover, in view of our last 20 years’ experience, we must go further and 
acknowledge that, even if stable prices are our objective, it is one we have failed 
to achieve. In this period, prices in Australia have increased threefold. Many 
people have come to fear that prices are likely to go on increasing, if not at the 
rapid rate of the last 20 years, then anyhow by an average of, say, 2 per cent or 
3 per cent a year. over the 40-60 years in which we are interested, this implies 
prices tripling or quadrupling. our average earner, who keeps up with the average 
incomes, is, of course, protected against inflation during his working life. But 
on retirement, his life savings, designed to give him an annuity equal to half of 
his average earnings, might buy him an annuity of only one-quarter or one-fifth 
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of his average earnings at retirement; and he would have no protection against 
inflation after his retirement. Not only his relative income status, but also his 
ability to provide a stable real income of goods and services, would be destroyed.
It is often suggested that money accumulating in personal or group 
retirement-funds should be invested in securities that could be expected to rise in 
value with the general price-level rather than in the usual trustee-type security with 
a redemption value fixed in money terms. But inflation-hedged securities are not 
easy to identify and inevitably entail other risks from which trustee-type securities 
are free. Moreover, the supply of “growth-stocks” is limited. A substantial and 
sustained switch of funds into them would raise their prices immediately, partly 
defeating their usefulness as a hedge against inflation.
There is a real resentment that people are thus precluded, through 
no apparent fault of their own, from providing decently for their retirement. 
Moreover, the basic cause of inflation is the failure of the community as a whole to 
provide enough savings to finance the investment required for our development. 
There is a bitter irony in the fact that the very who, by saving, have done their bit 
to prevent failure of others to match their efforts.
It is especially the fact of inflation to date, and the widening fear of inflation 
in the future, which has brought the present ferment of anxiety and thinking 
about the problem of provision for retirement, and about the responsibility of 
Governments to protect people against an inflation which is the result of the 
community’s act rather than the individual’s.
We have found, then, three reasons for Government intervention in the 
provision of income for retired people. First, many people are so short-sighted 
that they will provide adequately for themselves only under a statutory obligation. 
Second, the provision which lower-income groups can afford to make for 
themselves may need to be supplemented by the Government at the expense of 
higher-income groups. Third, to an increasing extent people are coming to expect 
that the Government should protect their savings against loss by an inflation 
which is not of their causing, and should even make it possible for them to share 
in increases of productivity accruing to the community as a whole.
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Two basic types of national superannuation schemes have been designed, 
particularly in Western European countries, to meet the objections raised against 
pure insurance schemes which tie retirement-benefits to actual contributions. An 
examination of these will help us to assess the present Australian system and to 
suggest ways in which it might be modified.
The British Labour Party’s insurance-type proposals
The first type of scheme I shall describe is one which retains some of the features 
of insurance schemes. In particular, it accumulates contributions in a fund and 
the benefits are related to the contribution-history of the retired earner. I shall 
take as a basis for analysis the system recently proposed for adoption in the United 
Kingdom by the British Labour Party. The scheme is not, of course in operation 
there, but schemes incorporating similar principles are already in operation in a 
number of Western European and other countries – notably Germany, France, 
Italy, Belgium, Austria, Greece, Israel, Japan and Brazil.
There are several essential features of the British Labour Party’s proposals. 
Firstly, it is to be compulsory for all who are not members of approved private 
schemes. A condition of approval for opting out the national scheme is that 
the private scheme is that the private scheme should grant full transferability of 
accrued pension rights to anyone who wishes to change his job. It is a regrettable 
feature of most private superannuation schemes that, if a member changes his 
job, he gets back, at most his own contributions and loses his employer’s.
Secondly, the retirement-benefit paid is to be related to the individual’s 
average earnings during his working life. A typical wage-earner would get a 
benefit of about 60 percent of his income. But the scheme is so arranged as to give 
a higher ration of benefit to income for lower-income groups than for higher-
income groups. There are also both a floor and a ceiling to the rate of benefit, and 
a ceiling on contributions. The pension entitlement accrues to retired earners, 
whether single or married. A reduced pension will be paid to surviving widows.
Thirdly, in calculating the individual’s average earnings, his actual earnings 
in each year of his working life are to be revalued by means of an earnings index, to 
bring them to equivalence with the average rate of earning in his year of retirement. 
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(Thus, if the earnings index in the year of retirement say 1990, was four times the 
earnings index in 1960, the contributions paid and the actual earnings in 1960 
would be multiplied by four in order to calculate the pension right he would be 
credited with, in 1990 on account of his earnings and contributions in 1960). 
This adjustment will correct fully for any inflation of money incomes that occurs 
during the individual’s working life up to the time of his retirement.
Fourthly, during the individual’s retirement, his benefit is to be varied, each 
year, with an index of old people’s cost of living. This adjustment will correct 
fully for any inflation of prices that occurs after the individual’s retirement. The 
French and German schemes, already in operation, go still further and vary the 
benefit after retirement with the average earnings index. This not only protects 
the individual against any price inflation, but also enables him to share fully in 
any increases of productivity accruing to the community as a whole after his 
retirement.
Fifthly, a higher rate of benefits is paid to those who postpone their 
entitlement. Thus, in France, a man retiring at 60 receives 20 per cent of his 
average income as benefit; at 65, 40 per cent; at 70, 60 per cent and so on. In 
Germany, after 40 years of contributions he receives 60 per cent benefit, after 50 
years, 75 per cent.
Sixthly, receipt of the full benefit is conditional on a full working-life of 
contribution. (The estimated rate of contribution under the British Labour Party 
proposals is 10 per cent of earnings, 3 per cent paid by the earner, 5 per cent 
by the employer and 2 per cent by the Government; self-employed persons will 
contribute 8 per cent). The scheme will not, in fact, become fully operative until 
some 50 years or so after its introduction, that is, till some time in the next 
century, depending on when the British Labour Party goes into office. In the 
transition period, some minimum benefit will be paid regardless of contributions.
Finally, the British Labour Party believes that, during this transition 
period, contributions will exceed benefits, so that a fund will accumulate and 
be available to supplement resources available for investment. It is important 
to note, however, that the net addition to savings of such schemes will be 
less than might be expected. In the first place, people may make part of their 
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superannuation contribution at the expense of other savings they would have 
undertaken anyhow; and secondly, the fund will also be depleted to the extent 
that the desire to achieve some redistribution of incomes and to offset inflation 
forces the payment of benefits in excess of recipients’ contributions. Thus, for 
instance, the present National Insurance Fund in the United Kingdom, which 
is more strictly based on the insurance principle than the British Labour Party 
proposals will be, is expected to be in deficit by £126m in 1960-1, by £322m in 
1969-70 and by £475m in 1979-80.
The insurance element in these schemes turns out, in fact, to be largely a 
masquerade. This is inevitable. You can have a true insurance scheme, based on 
contributions determined by an actuarial calculation of what an individual has 
to contribute during his working life in order to receive an agree proportion of 
average earnings after retirement, only if you can make your calculations in terms 
of a money which retains indefinitely its value in relation to average earnings. 
You could even build into such a scheme a moderate degree of redistribution. But 
once you have to vary benefits to take account of changes in the general level of 
money-earnings, the insurance principle and actuarial calculations become a mere 
front, behind which you carry on the essential operation – namely the transfer 
from today’s earners of whatever part of their income is needed to support today’s 
retired people. Lewis Meriam comments, in The Cost of Financing Social Security: 
“Adoption of the term ‘insurance’ by the proponents of social security was a 
stroke of promotional genius. Thus social security has capitalised on the goodwill 
of private insurance and, through the establishment of a reserve fund, has clothed 
itself with an aura of financial soundness”.3
The Netherlands distributive scheme
The second type of scheme I shall describe retains the principle of contributions 
but abandons entirely the pretence of an accumulating insurance fund. It is known 
as a “distributive” or “assessment” scheme. I shall take as a basis for discussion the 
scheme which has been operating in the Netherlands since 1955.4
3 Quoted in A.T. Peacock, The Economics of National Insurance (William Hodges, London 1952), p. 41.
4 A summary of the relevant legislation is published in Industry and Labour (International Labour office, 
Geneva), Vol. XVI, No. 8, 15 october, 1956, p. 346.
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This scheme pays a benefit equal to about 27 per cent of average hourly 
wage rates for all single people, and about 45 per cent for married couples. The 
rate is varied automatically with the index of hourly wages. Retired people have 
thus full protection against inflation and enjoy full participation in any increases 
of productivity that accrues to the community as a whole.
The essential feature of the scheme is that contributions are levied on 
today’s income-earners aged 15 and under 65, at whatever rate is necessary to 
finance the benefits being paid to today’s population aged 65 and over. No fund 
is accumulated – today’s contributors support today’s retired people. The size of 
contribution needed will vary according to the ratio of these two populations. 
For Australia, at present, I estimate that provision of benefits similar to those paid 
in the Netherlands would require contributions of about 6 or 7 per cent of our 
national income. If our population growth slackened so that the proportion of 
older people rose, the cost would be higher.
It would appear at first sight that a distributive scheme of this sort must 
cost more than insurance scheme of this sort much cost more than an insurance 
scheme, in which contributions are multiplied by the powerful force of compound 
interest. This would certainly be so if, thanks to the funds made available while an 
insurance fund was building up, investment was higher than it would otherwise 
have been and if this led to increases of productivity greater than would otherwise 
have occurred. If, however, the community ensures through its general economic 
policy, as we are now trying to do, that it has always full employment and an 
optimum allocation of resources between consumption and investment, the rate 
of growth of productivity will in any case also be optimum. If this optimum 
growth is achieved, the real burden on the community, in any year, of supporting 
its retired population at, say, half-pay will be the same, whether it is financed by 
contributions levied on the distributive principle, or by a lower rate of contributions 
levied on the insurance principle plus interest payments on earlier contributions. 
The contributions paid by an individual may well be different according to 
whether he is contributing to an insurance or to a distributive scheme. But these 
contributions cannot be considered alone – they must be considered as part of his 
total payment of contributions, taxes and interest. Fiscal policy could be used to 
achieve any desired distribution of this total burden. 
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A second and corollary feature of a distributive scheme is that, while the 
receipt of full benefit will ultimately be conditional on contributions having been 
paid throughout the beneficiary’s working life, all people over the age of 15 when the 
Dutch scheme came into operation in 1955 are deemed to have been contributing 
since the age of 15. The entire population thus qualifies, as soon as retiring age is 
reached, for the full rate of benefit, instead of waiting until some time in the next 
century. This follows naturally from the principle that today’s retired people are 
supported by today’s earners, leaving to the earners of the future the responsibility 
of supporting today’s earners when they retire. For this reason, the national scheme 
is compulsory for all, with no provision for opting out into private schemes. 
An incidental feature of the Dutch scheme, and one that makes it more 
re-distributive of income than the British Labour Party proposals, is that while 
it too is financed by a proportional levy on incomes (subject to an upper limit), 
supplemented by a government contribution which is presumably progressive in 
its incidence on income, the benefits paid are a flat rate for all. The benefits under 
the British Labour Party scheme, it will be recalled, are largely proportional to the 
individual’s own earnings.  
A distributive scheme could easily be designed to pay benefits related to 
individual earnings, particularly once it has been operating long enough for a 
complete contributions-history of all beneficiaries to have been built up.5 In 
fact, in France, private schemes have been established for particular professional 
or occupational groups – notably civil servants, teachers, bankers, doctors and 
lawyers – on this same distributive basis.6 Under these schemes, retired members 
receive benefits varying according to the status they enjoyed while earning. Thus 
the pension of a retired Assistant Secretary to the Treasury or of a Professor would 
be determined in each year as a percentage of the salary currently being paid to 
the present occupants of these particular posts. The pensions would be financed 
by current contributions collected from currently employed members of the 
groups. The administration of a scheme of this type would be much simpler than 
the British Labour Party’s proposals. 
5 A distributive scheme granting differential benefits could operate immediately, on the basis of 
information as to the beneficiary’s occupational history and his past income-tax returns. This would give 
a fitting reward to those who have not understated their incomes in the past.
6 See V. S. Garibian and P. J. D. Wiles “Pensions and Rising Prices” Oxford Economic Papers (N.S.), Vol. 
IV, No. 2, July, 1952, p. 131.
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Any identifiable occupational group of private individuals, which is large 
enough “to carry its own insurance” and stable enough not to be threatened with 
a contraction in the future, could establish such distributive schemes. I commend 
them, in particular, to the Universities of Australia. Individuals in such private 
distributive schemes could be permitted to opt out of a national distributive scheme. 
Any superannuation scheme financed out of current revenue rather than 
a capitalized fund is essentially of the distributive type. Thus in Australia, Eire 
and South Africa, pensions are paid, subject to a means test, out of consolidated 
revenue. In New Zealand and in Canada, flat-rate benefits are paid to all, free of 
means test, out of current tax revenues. Moreover, the adjustments that have to be 
made to schemes which pretend to be based on the insurance principle, in order to 
incorporate in them some measure of redistribution and some protection against 
inflation, have made more obvious the extent to which any system of provision 
for retired persons has to be based on the distributive principle. It has been said 
of the present British National Insurance system: “It is difficult to regard (it) as 
genuine ‘insurance’ in any strict sense of the word, for . . . as it is compulsory and 
there is no adjustment of premium to risk, it is, in fact, a social service financed 
by a poll tax (on workers) by an indirect tax on employers and by general taxation 
levied by the Government.’’7
This being so, I believe that there are enormous advantages of ease of 
administration and clear understanding of the nature of the scheme, in adopting 
a simple distributive scheme like the Dutch one, rather than a complicated 
insurance scheme like the British Labour Party’s. 
The present Australian system
The two schemes we have been discussing provide benefits for the whole retired 
population and compel the whole working population to contribute. The present 
Australian system offers benefits to any person over the prescribed ages, 65 for 
a man and 60 for a woman, who can prove need under the means test. No 
specific pension-contribution is collected, the pensions being financed out of 
consolidated revenue to which everyone contributes in the various taxes they pay. 
 
7 Peacock, op. cit., p. 42.
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People are left to decide for themselves what private provision they will make for 
their retirement. According to the amount they so provide, they may receive in 
addition a full or a reduced national pension, or they may be disqualified under 
the means test from receiving any at all.  
The rate of benefit paid is fixed from time to time by legislation. Experience 
shows that, while there is a time lag, the rate of pension is adjusted upwards to 
match increases in prices and wages, thus providing a protection against inflation 
and enabling pensioners to share in increases of productivity accruing to the 
community as a whole. Indeed, compared with 1939 when the pension was 25 per 
cent of the basic wage, the rate has, in recent years, been between 30 and 35 per 
cent of the basic wage. Before, however, we can conclude that we are making better 
provision for old people now than we were before the war, we should allow for the 
facts, first, that the excess of actual average earnings over the Federal basic wage is 
now relatively greater than it was before the war; and secondly, that some important 
items in many old people’s living costs – particularly the rent of furnished rooms – 
may have increased more than has the average level of prices and wages. 
These age benefits, financed out of general revenue, cost only about 2 per 
cent of our national income. It seems reasonable to suppose that the incidence of 
public revenues in Australia, which include no substantial levy of contributions 
proportionate to income, is significantly more progressive in relation to income 
than is the incidence of public revenues in a country which, in addition to normal 
taxes, levies a substantial superannuation contribution proportionate to income. 
So, with benefits confined to those, presumably primarily from the lower 
income groups, who can pass the means test, and with finance raised by relatively 
progressive taxes, it seems likely that our system of age benefits is substantially 
more re-distributive of income than are national superannuation systems of the 
contributory type. 
Improving the present Australian system
of all the countries about which I have been able to obtain information, only 
Eire and South Africa have non-contributory means-tested schemes similar to 
Australia’s. All other countries have contributory systems paying benefits to all 
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free of means test.8  It is often assumed that our scheme, so different from most 
other countries’, must be wrong and that we also should change to a contributory 
system of national superannuation free of means test. Before accepting this 
conclusion, however, we should look at the arguments specifically raised against 
our present system and, where they seem valid, at the extent to which they might 
be met by improvements of that system. 
The basic rate
What the basic rate of pension should be is essentially a matter for political 
argument as to how income should be distributed between those who are earning 
and those who have retired. The rate of benefit payable under Australia’s national 
scheme is reasonable by international standards – the present rate of £4/7/6 a 
week, established in the 1957-8 Budget, represents 23 per cent of average earnings 
for employed single males, 34 per cent of the male basic wage rate and 46 per 
cent of the female basic wage rate. For a married couple both eligible for the 
pension, the rates are double these percentages. This is only slightly less generous 
than the Dutch scheme. For married people and for surviving widows and for 
spinsters, though not for retired males, it is not much less generous than the most 
advanced of the Western European insurance-type schemes – and it is available 
immediately and has been since 1909. We do not have to wait until some time 
next century for the scheme to come into operation.  
Whatever may be done about the basic rate, I should like to see the rate 
varied automatically with an index of average earnings. And I should like to see the 
principle of differential pensions according to need, established in the last Federal 
Budget for some of those who have to pay rent, and extended to other special 
cases. Pensioners who live alone and cannot share overhead expenses of rent, 
heating and light are especially in need of extra income. Many overseas countries 
pay to single people 60 to 65 per cent of the rate for married couples, rather than 
the 50 per cent paid in Australia. on this basis, if married couples receive £8/15/- 
as they do now in Australia, a single pensioner would receive about £5/10/-. 
others deserving differential pensions are those with no supplementary income 
8 It is, however, significant that both New Zealand and Canada find it necessary to supplement their 
national pension system, which is free of means test, with a means-tested pension for those who need it 
earlier than the age at which they become eligible for the national pension.
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or with other special needs. I should also like to see more substantial government 
subsidies given to municipal or private organisations who provide communal or 
domiciliary services for old people.9 
These improvements are important and have to be fought for. If we could 
get them, we would not need to feel our basic pro vision for the aged was mean. 
The means test
Several objections to the present Australian system of providing for retired people 
centre around the effects of the means test. First, it is said that the means test 
destroys any incentive to provide for one’s own old age. This is simply not true. 
Today more than half the population eligible by age – 52 per cent- does not draw 
the pension and has presumably therefore made enough provision to put them 
above the limit of the means test. More important, the means test is framed in 
such a way as to leave ample incentive for people to make supplementary pro 
vision for their old age without affecting at all their right to draw the full pension. 
Thus a married couple can own a house and all its contents, the land on which 
it stands and a car; they can have £400 in cash or other property; and they can 
have income from earnings, superannuation or annuities up to £7 a week. The 
capital value of all this might be £10,000 to £12,000, yet they can still draw the 
full pension totalling £8/15/- a week. 
Poverty and improvidence may inhibit our savings, but I do not believe 
that they are inhibited by the means test which leaves such great scope for saving. 
Certainly the means test could be improved. In particular the property test, 
which is grossly discriminatory against property, should be abolished. Even with 
the liberalisation introduced in the last Budget, no pension is paid to an applicant 
with property, other than a house, in excess of £2,250. on this property, he might 
be receiving an income of £2 a week or less, according to how it was invested. Yet 
if he used his capital to buy an annuity of £4/10/- a week, he could in addition 
 
 
9 See Raising Age Pensions (Melbourne University Press, l9S7) for a discussion of the case for differential 
pensions, by the author and a group of his colleagues. This case has recently been argued strongly also by 
the Brotherhood of St. Laurence in their pamphlet, 100,000 Depressed Pensioners (Melbourne, 1958).
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receive a pension of £3/7/6 (the full rate of £4/7/6 a week being reduced by the 
£1 a week excess of his annuity-over the prescribed maximum of £3/10/- a week). 
So, if he chooses to remain a small property owner – supposed to be the ideal 
citizen of our liberal democracy – he may be condemned to an income of £2 a 
week or less. If he gives up his capital and becomes an annuitant, he can receive 
an income of £7/17/6 a week.  
There is no reason to force people to give up the capital they want to keep, 
partly as a reserve for emergencies, partly as some thing to leave their families. 
These advantages accruing to the small property owner could be allowed for fully 
by valuing property, not on the basis of the income actually received from it, 
but on the basis of the annuity that could be purchased by the capital value of 
the property. I suggest that the property means test should be abolished, and 
that we should have only an in come means test. Full Pension would be paid to 
any person whose income from earnings, superannuation or annuities, plus the 
annuity that could be purchased by the value of his property in excess of £200, 
did not exceed the prescribed amount, at pre sent £3/10/- a week.  
This would leave people with complete freedom to dispose of their asset 
holdings as they wished.  
Another aspect of the means test needs modification. At pre sent, the pension 
is reduced by any amount of income from earnings, superannuation or annuities 
in excess of £3/10/- a week, the pension cutting out altogether when income from 
these sources reaches £7/17/6 a week. This, in effect, imposes a 100 per cent tax 
on such income over this range. It would be better to have a partial reduction, the 
pension being reduced by l/- for every, say, 2/- or 3/- of excess income. If considered 
desirable to accommodate this modification, the amount of in come permitted 
without any reduction of pension might be reduced below £3/10/- per week.  
It is also objected that the means test subtracts from human dignity – that 
people should not have officials prying into their private affairs. This sense of 
indignity probably looms larger in the imagination of those who do not have to 
undergo it than it does in the experience of those who do. In the last 20 years 
there has evidently been a great change in the attitude to social services. Any 
sense of social stigma attaching to them has practically disappeared, encouraged 
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by more sensible thinking and public discussion, by the universal acceptance of 
social services like child endowment and blind pensions which happen not to be 
subject to the means test, and by the fact that you can now get your pension by 
means of a cheque posted to you in a plain envelope, instead of having to stand 
in a queue in the post office on pension day.  
From the economist’s point of view, the main effect of the means test 
is, by excluding higher income-groups, to make the Australian scheme more 
substantially re-distributive of income. If, then, you want a substantially re 
distributive scheme, you will favour a means test. If not, then you won’t. 
Age qualification
It would be desirable to reconsider the age-qualification for our pension. of 
the 945,000 people qualified by age to receive the pension at the time of the 
1954 Census, 200,000 were women aged 60-64. Few overseas countries now 
have a lower age qualification for women than for men, and in still fewer is the 
differential as great as our present five years.  
Another 300,000 were men and women aged 65-69. Most overseas 
superannuation schemes incorporate some inducement to people to go on 
working after the age of 65. We might, under our present system, at least offer an 
easing of the means test for such people. Whatever system of providing for retired 
people we adopt, it is desirable to include some inducement for people to go on 
working while they are capable. This is tremendously important for the welfare 
of the old people themselves. With the prospect of a continuing growth in the 
proportion of old people in the community, it is also tremendously important to 
minimise the burden of supporting them. 
Taxes versus contributions
It is argued against our present system that there are several advantages in 
financing retirement benefits by contributions rather than by taxes. The British 
Labour Party, in putting forward its proposals, argues that a contributory scheme 
is the only way to secure adequate benefit rates, since there are limits to what 
can be raised by taxes (as distinct, apparently from insurance contributions); 
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and that it is the only way of ensuring that the benefits are never slashed “to 
weather an economic storm” and that they are received “as of right” and not as a 
social service. Australian experience shows, however, that it is perfectly possible, 
especially if benefits are confined to those who prove need under a means test, 
to pay adequate rates out of consolidated revenue. Those eligible do regard age 
pensions as a right, the receipt of which incurs no social stigma. It would be 
politically impossible to cut the rates significantly to weather an economic storm. 
And it is not unreasonable to argue that those who want, as of right, a retirement 
benefit greater than the basic rate should provide it themselves, through private 
savings or superannuation schemes.  
It is also often argued in favour of contributory schemes that contributions 
are popularly regarded less as taxes than as an instalment-purchase of a retirement 
benefit. They will therefore arouse less political opposition than taxes, and should 
be less disincentive to effort and risk-taking. In reply to this, I would argue, firstly, 
that, whatever may be the reactions of people in other countries, I cannot see 
Australians regarding a national superannuation contribution as any thing other 
than a tax. Certainly Mr. Chifley’s well-meaning attempt to disguise part of his 
income tax as a Social Service Contribution never fooled anyone, the separate 
levy was quickly abandoned by the present Federal Treasurer, in his 1950-51 
Budget. Secondly, insofar as contributions do have smaller disincentive effects 
than income taxes, it is because they are proportional to income, not progressive. 
It is this very lack of progressiveness in the incidence of contributions that makes 
some people prefer taxes for their distributional effect. 
Accumulation of funds
Finally, the present Australian system provides no interim accumulation of funds. 
It is argued that a national superannuation scheme, collecting contributions 
now and paying out considerably less in benefits for the next 40 or 50 years, 
would provide forced savings which would be quite invaluable at this vital stage 
of Australia’s development. We desperately want to maintain and even to increase 
our investment, but are chronically threatened by inflation because we cannot 
match that investment by voluntary personal savings, budget surpluses, business 
savings and overseas borrowing.  
Richard I. Downing 
 43
We certainly need a high level of savings to permit a high rate of economic 
development without an intolerable degree of inflation. But I do not accept that 
a national insurance scheme is necessarily the best way to achieve this. 
I have already pointed out that, by the time we allow for the replacement of 
other savings by contributions, for payments to beneficiaries during the transition 
period in excess of the actuarial value of their contributions, and for the raising of 
benefits in step with prices and earnings, the extra funds available for investment 
will be much smaller than we might expect from a first consideration of the 
scheme. We know that the present British National Insurance Fund is actually 
about to go into a rapidly increasing deficit.  
An insurance-type superannuation scheme, insofar as it does succeed in 
securing a net increase in savings, is essentially a device for financing investment 
by postponing an intended improvement in the living standards of a particular 
section of the population, namely, retired people. It is a device for making taxation 
more palatable to taxpayers, particularly in the lower income-groups.  
Its introduction for these reasons would degrade the contributory 
principle as a measure of self-reliance and community virtue. If we are to have 
a tax designed to yield forced savings, I should prefer us to take the plunge into 
educating ourselves to a higher standard of community responsibility. I should, in 
fact, call such a tax a “tax for investment” and not disguise it as a “social security 
contribution”. The institution of such a tax for investment would have two clear 
advantages over a social security contribution. In the first place, it could be varied 
from time to time according to whether economic pressures at the time were 
making for inflation or deflation. If the happy day comes when we can devote 
a smaller proportion of our resources to investment and more to consumption, 
then we could reduce or abolish our “tax for investment”. It would be difficult, on 
the other hand, to vary a social security contribution purporting to be determined 
on an actuarial basis. Secondly, social service contributions are traditionally levied 
proportionate to income. It could, however, be separately argued whether a tax 
for investment should be levied progressively, proportionately or even regressively 
(e.g., a tax on consumption) to income. 
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Protection against inflation for people providing for  
their own retirement
I want finally to spend a few minutes discussing the problem of the many people 
in Australia who want to make provision for their own retirement without 
becoming dependent on the age pension. It is this group which has become so 
keenly aware of how difficult it is to make such provision because of the erosion 
of the real value of their savings by inflation. They fear they will eventually be 
forced anyhow to take the pension despite the sacrifices they have made. There 
is a real resentment in this group that they should suffer so from inflation, when 
the age pensioner and the retired civil servant are protected against this threat 
by the Federal Government, which is ultimately responsible – “or perhaps more 
accurately irresponsible” – for having allowed inflation to occur.
If we want to retain our present system under which the majority of 
people make independent provision for their own retirement and all people are 
encouraged to make at least supplementary provision – and such a system has, 
I think, significant advantages, economic, social and moral, over a compulsory 
system of national superannuation – then we must be prepared to explore ways in 
which people who save can be protected at least in part against inflation.10
Private individuals who are employed in suitable occupational groups could 
protect themselves by organising distributive superannuation schemes of the type 
now operating in some French professions. Governments could acknowledge their 
liability for the inflationary threat which has given rise to the need for schemes 
of this sort, by introducing legislation to enable occupational groups to compel 
members to join the system and to keep it going indefinitely in the future.  
10 Professor Ludwig Erhard, Minister for Economic Affairs in the German Federal Republic, says, in his 
Prosperity Through Competition (Thames and Hudson, London, 1958): “The trend towards a Welfare 
State begins when State compulsion extends beyond the circle of the needy, to include people who as a 
result of their position in economic life consider such compulsion and dependence as unwarranted”. It 
is significant, however, that Professor Erhard simultaneously emphasizes the implication that inflation 
must be avoided – as he has avoided it during his ministry: “Any social policy,” he writes, “which does 
not regard the stabilization of the currency as of first importance must create the greatest dangers for the 
market economy”. (Quoted in the London Sunday Times, 19 January, l958.)
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Many individuals, however, will not be able to organise themselves in 
schemes of this sort. They could hope to protect themselves by investing, directly 
or indirectly, in inflation-hedged securities. As I have said earlier, however, this 
is not as easy as it sounds. For many investors, government securities are the 
desirable investment. It has been suggested, for instance, that governments should 
protect their bondholders by tying the redemption value of securities to a price 
index. This would not only give greater justice to bondholders, but would also 
provide an extra incentive to governments to avoid inflation.  
Many people, however, want to make their provision for retirement directly 
or indirectly through insurance companies. This not only frees them from the 
burden and risks of under taking their own investments, but also gives them 
protection for their dependents in the event of their own premature death. For 
these people, I see great advantages in a system recently adopted in Denmark. 
In that country, a rather low basic pension, varied automatically with the cost of 
living, is paid to all, free of means test. But in addition, any individual can take 
out through an insurance office, so-called “index-contracts” up to a maximum 
which is about double the basic national pension.  
These index-contracts are, in effect, endowment policies, pur chased during 
working life and used on retirement to buy an annuity. The premium to be paid 
on such a policy is determined in the first instance in the usual way, according 
to the amount of the policy and the age of the insured person. But thereafter 
the premiums are varied each year with the cost of living index. on retirement, 
the original annuity provided in the contract is also increased in accordance 
with the rise in this index since the contract was made. Thereafter the annuity is 
varied automatically with the index. Any deficit in this scheme is financed by the 
Government. In this way, individuals can secure an inflation-protected pension 
equal in all to nearly three times the basic national pension.  
These are three suggestions of methods for protecting savers against 
inflation. There are others. From them we should try to find some method that 
suits us. Unless we do give some measure of protection, we must expect a decline 
of self-provision for retirement. If some protection could be given, we could 
honestly encourage people to provide for their own retirement, or at least to 
provide privately for a substantial supplement to the age pension. There is, for 
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instance, a great opportunity here for insurance companies to develop schemes to 
make it easier for lower-income groups to take fuller advantage of the provisions of 
the means test, particularly with regard to home-ownership and annuity income. 
Employers could usefully extend the coverage of their private superannuation 
schemes, now mostly restricted to the salaried class, to wage-employees, by 
introducing schemes designed to provide benefits at least up to the limits set by 
the means test. I would suggest, however, that we do need legislation to force 
employers to give full transferability of all accrued pension rights to employees 
who wish to change their jobs. 
Conclusion
To sum up, I should like, first, to emphasize that I have, in this paper, been 
discussing, not visionary or Utopian schemes of providing for retired people, but 
schemes all of which are actually in operation in one country or another.  
It is also, I think, worth saying that, when I first began thinking about this 
subject, I had a strong prejudice in favour of national superannuation systems 
based on the insurance-fund principle. I was attracted to them because they 
eliminate the means test, they make people realize that they must provide for 
their own retirement, and they provide an interim accumulation of funds vital to 
our economic development.  
However, looking into and thinking about the implications of various 
schemes being operated throughout the world has persuaded me that our present 
national system of age pensions subject to a means test has substantial advantages 
which should not be overlooked. It needs improvements, particularly to meet 
special needs, and anomalies in the means test should be removed. With such 
modifications, however, the system would give adequate help to retired people 
who need it, it would confine public help to those who have not made adequate 
pro vision for themselves and it would effect a substantial measure of redistribution 
of income to the poor. 
our present system leaves people with ample incentive to make 
supplementary or independent provision for their own retirement. For the many 
people who will always want to make such private provision, it is urgent that they 
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should be given some protection against the erosion of their savings by inflation. 
Some occupational groups would be able to protect themselves by establishing 
distributive systems similar to those now operating in the French professions. 
For the rest, if the Government is not willing to tie the redemption value of its 
securities to an index which measures inflation, it should at least make avail able 
some protection along the lines of Denmark’s “index contracts”. 
If finally we wish, however, to abandon our present mixed system and 
adopt a national contributory system, paying benefits to all free of means test, 
we should do it on the distributive principle, not on the outmoded, discredited 
and dying insurance fund principle. Distributive schemes automatically protect 
participants against inflation of income and prices. They can be administered so 
as to achieve any desired pattern of income distribution. They can give full scope 
to appropriate private superannuation schemes, provided they also are based on 
the distributive principle.  
If forced savings are needed to finance economic development, we should 
obtain them by means of a tax designed for that purpose, and not by a tax 




Mass entertainment:  
The origins of a modern industry
Asa Briggs1
The provision of entertainment has never been a subject of great interest either 
to economists or to economic historians – at least in their working hours. Yet in 
twentieth-century conditions it is proper to talk of a highly organised entertainment 
industry, to distinguish within it between production and distribution, to examine 
forces making for competition, integration, concentration and control, and to 
relate such study to the statistics of national income and output, the development 
of advertising, international economic relations and – not least – to the central 
economic concept of the market which in the twentieth century is as much 
concerned with leisure as it is with work. 
In this Fisher Lecture I shall be directly concerned not so much with the 
present as with the recent past. I want to try to show how and why a so-called 
mass entertainment industry emerged. An understanding of this history, I believe, 
is necessary to an understanding of contemporary economy and society, above all 
to an understanding of the fascinating but formidable frontier areas of modern 
society where commerce touches questions of taste, discrimination and, deeper 
still, of human values. I am honoured to be asked as a historian to deliver the 
Fisher Memorial Lecture on this still neglected theme. Joseph Fisher himself as 
commercial director of the South Australian Register would have appreciated its 
importance. An additional pleasure is that Fisher was born only a few miles away 
from my own birth place in Yorkshire. Surely it is not fanciful to suggest that 
one of the biggest social differences between his world and ours has been the 
 
 
1 Twenty-ninth Joseph Fisher Lecture, 19 october 1960. Reprinted, with slight revisions, in Briggs, A. 
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revolutionary change in the amount and use of leisure and within that leisure a 
transformation in the provision of entertainment. Neither Yorkshire nor South 
Australia – each with its own strong cultural foundations – has been immune 
from assault, although neither area has been a centre of innovation. 
How far back is it necessary to go to understand the story? Some people 
would say the fall of the Roman Empire. “In the sixth century the barbarians closed 
the Roman theatres, amphitheatres and circuses. The dispossessed entertainers 
became wanderers on the face of the earth. ‘’2 Entertainment was decentralised, 
the status of the full-time entertainer was under mined, the travelling fair became 
the main institution. Although the entertainment of the few might on occasion 
be sophisticated and expensive, the entertainment of the many – with the 
exception of self-entertainment or home entertainment – was local, intermittent, 
boisterous, and cheap. In 1834, the year when Fisher was born, the biggest of the 
London pleasure fairs, Bartholomew Fair in Smithfield, was still going strong, 
as it had done in Ben Jonson’s day. For one penny you could see the Black Wild 
Indian Woman and Child, the White Indian Youth and the Welsh Dwarf; you 
could join a thousand other spectators in visiting Richardson’s Theatre with a 
twenty-five minute show of melodrama, pantomime, comic songs and incidental 
music (Dickens described it); you could take your pick of two menageries – one 
of them, Wombwell’s Menagerie, collected £1,700 in sixpences from satisfied 
clients in the three days of the Fair in 1828; or, if you wished, you could restrict 
your spending to one halfpenny and see real Chinese jugglers. The sponsor of 
these jugglers collected £50 in halfpennies in 1828.3
Such figures give a fleeting but vivid glimpse of the limited economic 
dimensions of show business at what was then one of the biggest fairs in the 
world. The businessmen behind the scenes were obviously far from being 
tycoons. They were still wanderers: some of them, as in Jonson’s times, were 
hucksters and tricksters, adept in judging the levels of popular credulity. But 
there was plenty of subsidiary and lucrative commerce at the Fair – in transport, 
accommodation, ballad selling (one of the biggest scale sectors of nineteenth- 
century entertainment), and, probably the most important of all, in the supply of 
 
2 S. McKechnie, Popular Entertainment Through the Ages (1931), p. 1.
3 Ibid, p. 52.
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food and drink. The retailing of commodities and the provision of entertainment 
were already associated. 
Bartholomew Fair disappeared before the rise of modern mass entertainment. 
It was too rowdy for the respectable mid Victorians and was held for the last time 
in 1855. In other parts of the country also, as a very shrewd observer noted just 
over twenty years later, fairs were becoming institutions which in their old form 
were “almost out of date.” “The showman’s van which, a quarter of a century 
since, collected the whole countryside to view its contents, has almost ceased to 
exist.”4 Big changes had also taken place during the middle nineteenth century 
in the provision of other kinds of entertainment. Vauxhall Gardens, the great 
seventeenth and eighteenth-century centre of outdoor entertainment in London, 
closed its gates for the last time in 1850 after a lavish fireworks display. A year later 
the Great Exhibition of 1851, housed in the Crystal Palace, was a triumphant 
landmark in the history both of “improvement” and entertainment, attended 
by over six million people drawn by cheap transport not only from London but 
from all parts of the country and overseas. The road to the Crystal Palace was full 
of stalls and sideshows, and the incidental business carried on in connection with 
the Exhibition was prodigious. The earnestness of the so-called lessons of 1851 
should not eclipse the incidental fun surrounding the event. 
There was no doubt about the fun in a long-term development, the biggest 
single development in entertainment during the next thirty years – the rise of 
the music halls. The first buildings specifically erected for this purpose were the 
Canterbury in Lambeth and the oxford in oxford Street. Charles Morton, their 
proprietor, had acquired his initial capital from receipts from so-called “free-and-
easies” in a London tavern. During the next thirty years the growth of music halls 
destroyed the hold of the old elaborate pantomime on the London audience. 
In sport there were big changes, too, as the rough, crude and often 
dangerous sports of earlier centuries gave way to more highly organised, more 
precisely regulated games. Football was one of these: eight years after the death 
of Bartholomew Fair the Football Association was founded – a small enough 
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association in all conscience, with an income in its first year of only £5,5 but a 
portent of the shape of things to come. The first admission charges to football 
games were made in Britain in 1870: the Aston Villa Club in Birmingham, 
founded as a Sunday School team, took 5s. 3d. at its first game when spectators 
were called upon to pay in 1874. Gates remained small throughout the 1870’s 
and professionalism was not legalised until 188S, but journalists were beginning 
to see the possibilities of sport appealing to spectators – or even mere readers – 
as much as to players. The participants would be few: the spectators and readers 
would be many. In 1867 Routledge’s Handbook of Football was the first important 
publisher’s response to the new developments. 
Publishers were usually in the vanguard of the mass entertainment business. I 
have already mentioned the sale of ballads. An early nineteenth-century publisher, 
James Catnach, specialised in sensational cheap books, ballads and broadsides to 
bewitch and tintillate the “masses” of his age. In 1828, the same year for which 
the statistics of Bartholomew Fair are available, he is said to have sold over 
1,100,000 copies of the “Last Dying Speech and Confession” of William Corder, 
the murderer of Maria Marten in the Red Barn. In 1837 he sold 1,650,000 copies 
(with illustrations) of the last thoughts before execution of another murderer, 
James Greenacre. That was the pinnacle of his success, for another spectacular 
murder took place just too soon afterwards for another publishing success. There 
is a modern ring in a Victorian comment on his inability to make good use of 
the second of the two murders. “That took the beauty off him. Two murders 
together is no good to anybody.”6 Catnach operated from the heart of London. 
He employed a team of helpers known as “The Seven Bards of Seven Dials” who 
knew their public and composed fluently to order. During the middle years of 
Victorian England – a very different age from that described in most nineteenth-
century history books or even in the pages of Lytton Strachey – there was a regular 
sale of “penny dreadfuls,” and at least one publisher “pre-tested” his manuscripts 
by having them read first by a servant or a machine-boy.7
5  M. Marples, History of Football (1954), p. 176.
6 See C. Hindley, The Life and Times of James Catnach (1878).
7 T. Frost, Forty Years’ Recollections, Literary and Political (1880).
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At the same time the Sunday newspapers first came into their own. They still 
lack a serious historian. A. P. Wadsworth, the economic historian and late editor 
of the Manchester Guardian, briefly described them in a most interesting lecture 
he gave to the Manchester Statistical Society in 1955. He pointed out that as early 
as 1812, when eighteen Sunday newspapers were being published in London, 
they were as renowned for their ribaldry as for their radicalism. “They were far 
from being mainly political, and their attention to crime and sport anticipated 
later publications, and in sheer frankness excelled them.”8 The Observer, for 
instance, specialised in wood-cuts of murders, Edward Lloyd’s newspaper named 
after him (1842) and G. W. M. Reynolds’s Reynolds Weekly News (1850) were 
pioneers of sensationalism, and the News of the World (1843) was selling 109,000 
copies a week by 1854. These Sunday papers were the real precursors of the mass 
circulation papers of today. 
In the United States of America as early as 1833 Benjamin Day, with a few 
associates, started a paper specifically intended – in his own words – for “mechanics 
and the masses generally.”9 The price of this paper – the Sun – was only one cent at 
a time when the other New York papers were selling for six cents. The publishers 
in what is now a familiar fashion expected to make up by larger circulation and 
by advertising the loss sustained by the lower price. This was the same successful 
formula later applied by Joseph Pulitzer and James Gordon Bennett, the publisher 
of the New York Herald, in New York and by Edward Harmsworth, later Lord 
Northcliffe, in London. The founding of the Daily Mail in 1896 should be seen 
against this background and not simply, as it far too often is, against the cultural 
back ground of the so-called new reading public created by the British Education 
Act of 1870. Titbits and Answers, the weekly papers which provided a cultural 
and a business prelude to the Daily Mail were part of an earlier tradition which 
linked reading and entertainment. The Daily Mail and Northcliffe’s later venture 
the Daily Mirror were attacked as earlier publications had been attacked – the 
first as the paper for people who could not think, the second (the pioneer of the 
tabloids) as the paper for people who could not read – but they survived. During 
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the first twelve months of its existence the average daily sale of the Daily Mail was 
over 200 thousand: three years later it was well over half-a million. The Mirror, 
designed at first as a women’s paper, had a more shaky start and passed through 
a number of business hands. In time, however, it became the daily paper with 
the biggest circulation in the world, appealing as much through the picture as 
through the word. 
The year 1896 is an important date in the history of mass entertainment, 
a vantage point from which to look backwards and forwards. In the same year 
that Harmsworth created the Daily Mail a young Italian inventor, Guglielmo 
Marconi, arrived in London to demonstrate for the British Post office how he 
could send signals by wireless for a hundred yards. Later in the year he filed his 
first wireless patent. Also in the same year the first moving picture show was 
presented in London. A February showing at the Regent Street Polytechnic was 
so successful that the cinema show was transferred to the Empire Music Hall, 
Leicester Square, where it subsequently ran for eighteen months.10 
The economic conditions for the development of a mass entertainment 
industry were all there in 1896. Five conditions stood out. First, a large and 
concentrated urban population had come into existence in the course of the 
nineteenth century: the citizens of the towns and cities, provided for half a century 
with only limited means of entertainment, made up the first segment of what 
has since been called “the great audience.” Second, the incomes in real terms of 
large sections of this urban population had risen sufficiently during the previous 
fifty years to enable people to afford to buy regular, cheap entertainment. Third, 
an increase in the amount of available leisure time had prepared the way for its 
commercial exploitation. Fourth, urban public transport systems had improved 
sufficiently in the 1880’s and early 1890’s to permit late night travel from city 
centres to residential suburbs; trams (and in London underground railways) 
were the latest instruments of this transport revolution. Fifth, technology was 
being applied to entertainment, sometimes falteringly and uncertainly, but, in 
retrospect at least, decisively. 
10 See P.E.P., The British Film Industry (1952), p. 23.
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Each of these five economic conditions – and particularly the first four – 
were also essential to the development of the retail trade in the 1880’s and 1890’s, 
and it is not an accident that the merchandising of entertainment and the large-
scale mass merchandising of branded retail products lead back to the same initial 
historical situation.11
The term “mass market” precedes the terms “mass communications” 
and “mass culture”: the department store preceded the cinema. Advertising 
provides an additional link between retailing and entertainment. Advertising and 
showmanship were closely associated in the 1880’s, and the successful proprietor 
of a departmental store had to have some of the qualities of a successful showman. 
Like his predecessors in the fairs and his contemporaries in the development of 
patent medicines, he had to understand and, if need be, tap human credulity. 
P. T. Barnum (1810-1891) was the classic figure in this context: a second 
was W. F. Cody, “Buffalo Bill,” whose Wild West Show, “the show of shows,” netted 
one million dollars in receipts in a year and profits of $100,00.12 In 1841, Barnum 
took over Scudder’s American Museum, which had been started in the year of his 
birth and had become New York’s greatest storehouse of “curiosities.” It was at 
Barnum’s American Museum that Tom Thumb first made his public appearance: 
it was this Museum which toured parts of Europe in 1844, Barnum having boldly 
announced that he intended to take over Buckingham Palace as his headquarters. 
Barnum’s later ventures were sometimes more sophisticated. For instance, he 
sponsored the American tour of Jenny Lind, “the Swedish Nightingale,” in 1849, 
paying her 1,000 dollars a time for her one-hundred-and-fifty appearances, along 
with one-fifth of the net profits. This, incidentally, was an early example of the 
“star system,” but Barnum did not invent it: in London in 1847 the crowds were 
so thick in the Haymarket where Jenny Lind was appearing at Her Majesty’s 
Theatre that the crush was later called “the Jenny Lind crush’’13 Barnum went 
on later in 1871 to develop the circus, which in the new familiar language of 
superlatives was proudly called “the greatest show on earth.” He remained in close 
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touch with retailers and advertisers: he had met the great Boucicaut in Paris in 
the 1840’s and in the 1880’s at least one pioneer English retailer deliberately set 
out to imitate Barnum’s methods in his departmental store.14 Although Barnum’s 
career had its ups-and-downs (bankruptcy, for example, in 1856), he achieved a 
hitherto unparalleled success in mass entertainment. He tried to tell his public 
the secret in a book published in the last year of his life with a touch of Samuel 
Smiles as well as of the showman in its title – Dollars and Sense or How to get on: 
The Whole Secret in a Nutshell. The sub-title was even more Smilesian – “Sketches 
of the Lives of Successful Men who ‘rose from the Ranks’ and from the most 
Humble Starting Point achieved Honourable Fame.’’15
The didactic side even of entertainment was never overlooked by the 
Victorians. Advertising, too, a superb mirror of social history, reflects the same 
features. And advertising was more than an historical link between developments 
in the expansion of the retail market and in entertainment. From the start it 
entered into calculations about the financing of mass entertainment, providing a 
hidden or overt subsidy from various forms of business to one particular business, 
the entertainment business. Newspaper history brings out this point very clearly, 
as does the later history of commercial radio. That it was not lost sight of even in 
the early days of the mass entertainment industry is shown by an incident in the 
history of the gramophone. In 1894 the United States Gramophone Company 
offered as a “novel form of advertising” to record any musical selection along with 
a sponsor’s advertisement. “Nobody would refuse,” the Company claimed, “to 
listen free to a fine song or concert piece or an oration – even if it is interrupted 
by a modest remark, ‘Tartar’s Baking Powder is Best’.’’16
of the five economic conditions, the fifth – the application of technology 
to entertainment – is in some ways most interesting. A characteristic cluster of 
inventions was developed in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. They were 
as basic to new ways of life in the twentieth century as were the inventions of 
the last quarter of the eighteenth century in textiles, iron and power to the new 
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industrial pattern of the nineteenth century. The difference between them is that 
the eighteenth-century inventions transformed the material standard of living and 
the nineteenth-century inventions the forms of culture. Critics of the first talked 
of “exploitation,” critics of the second have already talked of “manipulation.” Yet 
both clusters of inventions are related to each other. Without the existence of the 
first cluster there could not have been the second. one point of special interest, 
which must be elaborated later, is that the social consequences of the second 
cluster were not clearly foreseen: there was a great gulf between prediction and 
prophecy on the one hand and what has actually happened on the other. 
It is amazing how many of the inventions came out of the American 
laboratory of Thomas A. Edison, born one year after “Buffalo Bill”, in 1847. 
Edison’s formal education was limited to three months in a public school. At the 
age of twelve he had his first taste of communications – as a railroad newsboy 
– and at the age of fifteen he became a telegraph operator. He took out his first 
patent in 1868 for an electrical vote recorder. Later, among the thousand patents 
he took out, he devised telephones, gramophones, electric lamps and kinetoscope 
cameras. He lived until 1931 when all these key objects of the twentieth century 
were already taken for granted. He still lacks a good up-to-date biographer,17 but 
it is clear that he is the James Watt and Richard Arkwright (rolled into one) of 
the modern mass entertainment revolution. He had little direct to do with the 
early development of wireless before and after Marconi’s patent of 1896, but the 
invention of the thermionic valve, without which subsequent wireless history in 
the pre-transistor phase would have been very different, owed much to his work 
with electric lamps, the one invention of the four I mentioned above which, at 
first sight, seems out of place in the list. 
Paradoxically the telephone, which also may seem a little out of place, 
was associated by contemporaries with entertainment as well as with work, 
while wireless was at first thought of entirely as a means of point-to-point 
communication – a substitute for line telegraphy – rather than a possible medium 
of entertainment. It was certainly in relation to the telephone not in relation 
 
 
17 The “official” biography was written as long ago as 1910 when he was still in his prime. See F. L. Dyer 
and T. C. Martin, Edison, His Life and Inventions (1910).
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to wireless that the idea of scattering “sound-at-a-distance” was first mooted. A 
short story of 1878 published in a Sydney magazine, The Australian, includes this 
passage: 
“The telephone wire was laid on between Abney Hall and the village 
church of Mortham, so that the Hall people could have the benefit of 
Mr. Earle’s pulpit oratory without going outside their own doors.’’18
Frank Gill, in later years a leading figure in the 1922 talks leading up to the 
inauguration of broadcasting in Britain, wrote that “telephony has some of the 
properties both of the letter and of the newspaper: it can be clothed with privacy, 
given to one individual only, or it can be broadcast to millions simultaneously.”
In some towns and cities of Britain the practicability of the telephone as a 
technical instrument was first demonstrated by the transmission of music, from 
a “distant source,” and in 1892 performances at the Lyric Theatre in London and 
the theatres and concerts in Birmingham, Liverpool, Manchester and other places 
were successfully transmitted “with entire success” to an Electrical Exhibition 
at the Crystal Palace. Ten years before this experiment, a Hungarian, Theodore 
Puskas, had demonstrated a “telephoned newspaper” at an Electrical Exhibition 
in Paris, and his son went on to introduce a regular news-paper of this type in 
Budapest. In 1894 an Electrophone Company was formed in London to provide 
“listening facilities,” including four pairs of headphones and an answering-back 
“hand microphone” for every subscriber. Musical performances, public lectures 
and addresses, and church services were “electrophoned.” The service was neither 
a technical nor a business success:  after twelve years of activity sounds were 
distorted and there were only six hundred subscribers. In its restricted way, 
however, it pointed to the existence not only of a potential demand for diffused 
entertainment but of a wide range of available “programmes.”19
It took longer for Edison to realise the possibilities for organised 
entertainment of either the gramophone or the motion picture camera, the first 
of which he invented (in simple form as a phonograph or speaking machine) in 
1877, the latter in 1889. Both of them were thought of as ingenious “novelties” 
 
18 “The Days of the Telephone, A Tale of the Future,” The Australian, october 1878.
19 This brief account of the electrophone is taken from my fothcoming History of the BBC, Vol 1.
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rather than as instruments of mass entertainment, while Edison himself, the 
prototype of what David Riesman would call an “inner directed man,” attached 
chief importance to the “serious” rather than to the frivolous use of both, the first 
as an “aid to the businessman,” the second as an aid to the educators.
The showmen of the day were more percipient in relation to their immediate 
interests if not to an extended vision of the future. The early phonograph would 
“speak” in Dutch, German, French, Spanish and Hebrew and “imitate the barking 
of dogs and the crowing of cocks.” Showmen could collect as much as $1,800 a 
week by playing it at exhibitions.20 Edison was very annoyed in 1891 when some 
of his salesmen went further and offered to lease phonographs to cafes and stores 
for coin-in-slot playing. “The coin-in-slot” he wrote, with a sublime ignorance of 
the future of the juke box, “is calculated to injure the phonograph in the opinion 
of those seeing it only in that form, as it has the appearance of being nothing 
more than a mere toy.”21 It was not until three years later – after competitors, 
notably Emile Berliner and the Pathe brothers in Paris had entered the field – that 
Edison began to see the future of the gramophone in terms of entertainment. 
He was more dilatory still with the kinetoscope, so much so that Gilbert 
Seldes, one of the first serious writers on mass entertainment, has suggested that 
the history of the motion picture industry should be called “The Mistakes of 
Edison.” Edison himself thought of the kinetoscope as a toy, developed it slowly, 
and, even after he had seen a moving picture, stated that he thought the basic 
inventions (the camera and the so called peep-show machine) would be useful 
only because they made possible photographic reproduction of scenes from 
natural life, operas or plays. He saw no future in the projector. His reasoning 
was as follows: if hundreds of people could see a picture at one time, the public 
would be very quickly exhausted. In other words he failed to see the existence of 
either a potential mass or a market. As Seldes goes on, “The moving picture had 
to be taken away from its inventors by aggressive and ignorant men without taste 
or tradition, but with a highly developed sense of business, before it could be 
transformed from a mechanical toy into the medium of the first popular art.’’22 
20 R. Gelatt, The Fabulous Phonograph (1956), p.9.
21 The Phonogram, January, 1891.
22 G. Seldes, The Movies Come from America (New York, 1931), p. 18. 
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It was certainly humble men who first took up the new invention, men 
already in the entertainment business. The first films were made in single rolls, 
fifty feet long, and were shown in “peep-show machines.” Peep shows had always 
been popular at Bartholomew Fair – one of the most popular of the last of them 
was the Murder in the Red Barn – and as early as the 1820’s sequences of pictures 
could be manipulated through the peep hole. Edison applied the invention of 
the motion picture camera to the peep show, offering pictures of a performing 
dog, a trained bear and a strong man.23 The first cinema peep show was opened 
in Broadway, New York, in 1894. The business was thought to be so disreputable 
that even after the peep-show had been replaced by the more respectable-sounding 
nickel odeon, David Warfield, a well-known actor, kept secret his investment in 
one of these enterprises for fear that publication would ruin his stage reputation.24 
The title of one of the first peep-show films of 1894 – “Doloritain the Passion 
Dance” – suggests that he may have been right.25 
The first full screening of a motion picture took place in New York in 1896, 
the same year that the first motion picture was screened in London. In both cases 
the rendezvous was a music hall – Koster and Bial’s in New York and, as we have 
seen, the Empire Music Hall in London. The men responsible for developing the 
new medium – although it could not be so described at that stage – were men 
associated with old forms of entertainment The first American films were offered 
to the public for ten years in the composite package “Vaudeville and Pictures”: it 
was only after ten years that the label was changed to “Pictures and Vaudeville.”26 
The first show at the Empire consisted of an overture, a ten minutes programme 
of Tyrolean singers and dancers, a ballet, a trio, a group of Russian dancers (“first 
performance in England”), a display by Cinquevalli, the great juggler, then – 
and only then – the films, very modestly placed, to be followed by acrobats, a 
singer, an hour’s performance of Faust and, to close the four-hour show, a pair of 
“eccentrics.”27 There were four films – the Arrival of the Paris Express, A Practical 
Joke on the Governess, The Fall of a Wall and Boating in the Mediterranean. 
23 MCKechnie, op. cit., p. 177.
24 M. D. Huettig, Economic Control of the Motion Picture Industry (Philadelphia, 1944), p. 10.
25 T. Ramsaye, “The Rise and Place of the Motion Picture” in Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, Vol. 254 (1947).
26 Huettig, op. cit., p. 10.
27 P.E.P., op. cit., p. 24.
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The most numerous of the first British distributors of films were music 
hall proprietors and showmen who put up their booths at fair grounds. From 
1904 onwards they were able to hire films as well as buy them. A third type of 
distributor, however, the real innovators, held the key to the future. A number 
of more specialised dealers travelled round the country with films, booking a 
local hall and giving shows at 2d. or 8d. a time for as long as they could hold an 
audience. The dealers were sometimes known as “town hall” showmen because 
town halls were frequently the most convenient places to show the films. other 
places chosen were shops, theatres, music halls or even skating rinks. It was not 
until 1908 that the first building specially built for film shows was opened at 
Colne in Lancashire.28 By then there were three exhibiting companies in Britain 
with a total capital of £110,000: one of them was controlled by Albany Ward, a 
“town hall” showman, who by 1914 owned 29 cinemas, a second in Scotland was 
controlled by George Green, whose first activities had been in the fair grounds. 
It was not until 1909 that bigger business entered the field of film distribution, 
and Provincial Cinematograph Theatres Ltd. was set up with a nominal capital 
of £100,000, and a leading British financier, Sir William Bass, as its chairman. 
Progress was rapid – to use a film phrase “spectacular” – in the years immediately 
before the First World War. In 1914 there were at least 3,500 cinemas in Britain, 
and 1,833 companies were in existence with a combined capital of £11,304,500.29
At this stage the United States did not completely dominate either 
distribution or production. Demand for films was greatly in excess of supply, and 
A. C. Bromhead, who was later to become the chairman of the Gaumont-British 
Picture Corporation, has reported how in the early days of the cinema “American 
showmen, unable to find enough films on their own side, visited England and 
the Continent seeking films.”30 France was a main source of supply, as it was 
also in the gramophone business. Yet by 1914 the United States came second 
in the world export market and during the first two years of the First World 
War American Exports almost doubled. In the already large American overseas 
 
 
28 R. Low and R. Manvell, The History of the British Film, Vol. 11 (1949), p. 18. Another very early cinema 
was the Alpha Theatre at St. Albans. See The Bioscope, 18 September 1908.
29 P.E.P., op. cit., pp. 33-4, 26.
30 A. C. Bromhead, “Reminiscences of the British Film Trade,” An Address given to the British 
Kinematograph Society, 11 December 1933.
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market in 1918 Britain was the most important customer, Canada the second 
and Australia the third. American pictures by then had acquired something like 
80 per cent of the world’s screen time. As in so many other sectors of twentieth-
century economic life war has favoured the position of the United States in the 
world economy. 
Having started the story of technical invention in the laboratory of Edison, it is 
important to qualify the claim that technical change was primarily dependent on his 
personal contribution. He was no more the only inventor of the new entertainment 
devices than most of the eighteenth-century inventors were sole inventors of 
new industrial devices. Like them he was engaged in fierce patent battles which 
dominated the early years of business exploitation. It is possible to understand the 
early development of the mass entertainment industry only if two kinds of conflict 
associated with the business side of the story are unravelled. The first kind of conflict 
was that between one form of entertainment and another. This conflict did not always 
end in the supplanting of one kind of entertainment by another but more frequently 
by their commercial integration. The second kind of conflict was between different 
contestants seeking to provide the same kind of entertainment. This conflict centred 
on patent rights and invoked frequent litigation. Again, it was more likely to end in 
integration – mergers, trusts and the erection of a network of holding companies – 
than in complete victory or defeat. The details are frequently intricate and difficult: 
the pattern, however, is plain and straightforward.
The early history of the cinema illustrates both kinds of conflict. E. V. 
Lucas visited Barnet Fair in 1906, nearly two years before the first cinema was 
opened. He noted that “many of the old shows had given place to animated 
pictures, and at the Fêtes of the Invalides in Paris a few weeks later I observed 
the same development. Instead of taking the place of the illustrated paper, as 
the cinematograph did at first almost exclusively, it was taking the place of the 
theatre.” A year later a writer in Encore, the music hall journal, claimed that as 
early as 1900 he had “pointed out to the profession that the greatest enemies 
the artistes had were the film merchants. The kinematograph picture shows have 
come here to stay, was my argument, and each time an operator is employed two 
or three single items are ousted. How thoroughly my predictions were borne out 
by events is patent to everyone today although at the time I was being accused of 
being alarmist and pessimistic.” 
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There was some truth in these verdicts, particularly as far as music halls 
and vaudeville were concerned, but there was a real element of pessimism, too. 
The truth was twofold. First there was inevitable technological unemployment 
of a number of people in the old entertainment business, and second there were 
unprecedented and dazzling prospects for the artist who could adapt himself or 
be adapted to the new medium. The “star” system in the cinema dates back to 
Adolph Zukor’s activities before 1912. Charlie Chaplin is by far the best early 
example of the financial effects of the development of mass entertainment on 
the financial prospects of the mass entertainer. In the summer of 1913 he was 
appearing in vaudeville and refused an offer to appear in films for $75 a week. 
The offer was doubled and Chaplin accepted. His first feature-length comedy 
Tillie’s Punctured Romance was so successful that other companies began to bid 
for his services, and he soon signed for another company at $1,250 a week. It is 
said that in the course of the negotiations he was offered $1,000 a week and in 
reply asked for $1,075. When asked why he wanted so much, he said he had to 
have $75 a week to live on.31 A year after receiving $1,250 a week, he signed a 
contract in 1915 for $10,000 a week with a bonus of $150,000. The immediate 
consequences were first that Mary Pickford, working for a rival concern, had to 
have her salary put up, too, and second that the company producing Chaplin 
recouped its heavy costs at once by selling the British Empire rights of Chaplin’s 
comedies for $670,000. The size of these transactions emphasises the element of 
caution and pessimism in the critical verdicts of 1906 and 1907. Just as important 
as the “stars” to the success of the cinema were the “fans”: indeed it goes without 
saying that without “fans” there could have been no “stars.” 
over a long period the cinema did not so much divert an older audience 
from other kinds of entertainment as create an enormous new one. From its first 
beginnings until the end of the First World War the cinema attracted a steadily 
increasing international audience, including a large number of people who were 
regular habitues, neither of theatres nor music halls, and a very high proportion 
of young people (up to 30 per cent of the total cinema audiences below the age 
of 17) for whom the local cinema was the first institution of entertainment they 
had ever encountered. From 1918 to l926-7 the attendance rate appears to have 
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fluctuated within narrow limits until in 1926-7 there was a definite “slump” and 
the cinema appeared to be losing its hold. This slump was overcome first by the 
development of a new invention, the “talkie” – the first talking picture being 
shown in 1926 and second by a re-styling of cinemas and their amenities until 
they became “luxury palaces” for the masses of the population, the Granadas, 
Rialtos, Eldorados and Ritzes of modern urban life. From 1929 onwards 
attendances increased until in Britain they had reached 19 millions a week in 
1939. They reached a peak of over 31 millions in 1946, when the American peak 
of 98 millions was also reached, and since then – in a period which lies outside 
the scope of today’s lecture – they have fallen very sharply indeed. In Britain, for 
example, they fell by 16 per cent during the twelve months ending in March this 
year, and since 1945 more than a quarter of Britain’s cinemas have closed. In the 
United States average weekly attendances dropped from 98 millions in 1946 to 
41 millions in 1953. They are still falling.32 
These statistics measure the rise and fall of the greatest public audience ever 
collected. The facts of the fall, however, should not eclipse the facts of the rise. 
Superlatives are strictly appropriate in this context. The British public in the five 
years after the Second World War was spending twice as much (£105 million a 
year) on attendance at cinemas as on going to theatres concert halls, music halls, 
dance halls, skating rinks, sporting events (including football and racing) and all 
other places of public entertainment. Comparative American figures – they run 
into much bigger aggregates – are not easy to come by, but before the Second 
World War, in 1937, motion picture corporations in America, constituting 44 
per cent of all so-called amusement corporations, accounted for 78 per cent of the 
gross income and 92 per cent of the total net income of the group.33 The people 
who were afraid of the competition of films in 1906 and 1907 had no conception 
of the dimensions of the future demand for entertainment. They saw only the 
 
 
32 Available British statistics are set out in P.E.P., op. cit., Ch. XIII. For America, see P. P. Lazarsfeld “Audience 
Research in the Movie Field,” in Annals of the Arnerican Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 254 
(1947); U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Report on Motion Picture Theatres (1953). The 
1926-7 slump is an interesting phenomenon. The threat to the cinema was due partly to the poor quality 
of films, partly to the competition of radio. one response to it was the provision of additional attractions 
(eg., double features, cinema organs orchestras). Another was “give-aways” (dishes, refrigerators, etc.). 
Higher admission prices, the consequences of such policies, aggravated the problem.
33 Huettig, op. cit., pp. 57-8.
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shadows of conflict between different entertainment interests and were afraid just 
as today established film interests, saddled by high capital costs, are themselves 
afraid of the future. 
The established film interests are the product of bitter and prolonged 
internal conflicts within the rapidly growing industry. Edison’s patents were 
challenged. other inventors in several different countries were responsible either 
for parallel inventions or basic improvements, and it is historically accurate to 
say of most cinema inventions as of radio and gramophone inventions that they 
were products not of one particular man but of an epoch. Since in any case 
Edison’s patents were not international there was always foreign competition 
in the early days as well as domestic American development of thinly disguised 
Edison discoveries. An attempt in 1908 by the ten leading American producing 
and supplying companies of equipment and films – all using Edison patents on 
the basis of an agreement with Edison – to monopolise the industry through 
a Motion Picture Patents Company failed. The so-called “Independents,” who 
opposed the Patents Company, moved far away from New York the Company’s 
headquarters, to what Billie Burke has described as “a pepper-tree-lined village 
which had begun a few years before as a suburb (of Los Angeles) for retired 
Iowans.”34 The suburb was Hollywood, and some of the “Independents” were men 
who subsequently became the moguls of the growing inter national industry. The 
Motion Picture Patents Company was finally broken up in 1915 as a monopoly 
by order of the Federal Court. 
Zukor, the chief of the Independents, changed from rebel into mogul 
between 1911 and 1921. With the destruction of his enemy he turned to 
integration himself, passing from production to distribution and then into 
exhibition. In 1919 he raised funds through a $10 million issue of preferred 
stock, the first major attempt to finance cinema development from capital raised 
on the market. By 1921 he controlled over 300 cinemas. It was his turn now to 
be accused of the same monopolistic tendencies which he had condemned in the 
Motion Picture Patents Company. “It is made difficult,” ran a complaint made 
to the Federal Trade Commission in 1921, “for small and independent producers 
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or distributors of films to enter into or remain in the moving picture industry 
or market, or to lease individual pictures on merit . . . By the said methods 
Famous Players-Lasky Corporation (Zukor’s group) has unduly hindered, and 
is unduly hindering competitors, lessening competition, and restraining trade 
in the motion picture industry.”35 Zukor’s group was not the only menace to the 
new Independents, and by 1923 it was clear that they were fighting an inevitable 
losing battle. The American industry had taken on the shape which it was to 
retain until 1950 – throughout the whole golden age of the cinema. There were 
several large completely integrated units, including Paramount, Loew’s and Fox, 
(with unequal strength, however, in production, distribution and exhibition), a 
number of powerful unaffiliated chains of cinemas dominated by the so-called 
“first run” cinemas; and more numerous but less powerful individual cinema 
proprietors competing with the chains for “product and patronage.”
The most important shift in power after 1923 was the rise of Warner Brothers, 
who had grown from nickelodeon operators to a medium-scale enterprise, and 
who became one of the giants, the so-called “Big-Five,” because they were the 
first concern to exploit the commercial development of sound. other companies 
were conservative in technical matters, concentrating, as is so often the case in 
economic history, on commercial rather than technical development. They were 
really impressed only when Warner Brothers’ first all-sound feature The Jazz 
Singer, which cost £500,000 to make, netted $2,500,000 in box-office receipts. 
Warner Brothers converted earlier business losses into a profit of $17 million in 
1929. In 1928 they were a corporation with capital assets of only $16 million: 
in 1930 – with the financial crash of 1929 intervening – their assets totalled 
$230 million.36 Their stupendous progress was a measure not only of their own 
initiative and drive but of business acceptance of the film industry as a profitable 
field of activity. 
The most revealing expression of overseas alarm at the dominance 
of Hollywood in economic – and indirectly of cultural life – was the British 
Cinematograph Films Act of December, 1927. When the British film industry 
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(producers and exhibitors) failed to agree voluntarily on measures to preserve itself 
from threatened extinction, the government intervened directly in the industry. 
It controlled advance and block booking of films, established a quota system 
and created a Cinematograph Films Advisory Committee to advise the Board of 
Trade on the administration of the Act. Hitherto the government’s only measure 
of control over the industry was an Act of 1909 which regulated the licensing 
of cinemas and the censorship of films: it now maintained that while it saw no 
reason to give financial assistance to the British film industry, as one section of 
the trade wished, it had the right to intervene in the industry because of the 
magnitude of what were described as “the industrial, commercial, educational, 
and Imperial interests involved.”37 “Should we be content,” the President of the 
Board of Trade asked, “if we depended upon foreign literature or upon a foreign 
Press in this country?” At this point questions of mass entertainment were bound 
up with questions of propaganda and prestige. From a strictly business point of 
view, however, the Act had important consequences. With the prospect of quotas 
and a guaranteed market a new company, British International Pictures, founded 
a few months before the Films Act, quickly raised £1 million on the open market. 
Production increased, large scale vertical integration took place in the industry, 
and a decade of investment in the British film industry began.38 
I have spent a large part of this lecture discussing the history of the film 
industry because during the twentieth century it became by far the biggest element 
in the provision of mass entertainment. The story of the gramophone industry, 
however, has many features in common with the story of the cinema, while the 
story of radio touches the history of the cinema at several points and at the same 
time provides illuminating contrasts as well as comparisons. 
In the early years of the gramophone industry there were fierce struggles 
between the Bell and the Edison interests – a continuation of the telephone struggle 
– the rapid bankruptcy in 1890 of a businessman outsider J. H. Lippincott, who 
 
 
37 The phrase was Lord Newton’s. As early as May 1925, he had called attention in the House of Lords to 
the state of the British film industry and asked for the setting up of a Committee of Enquiry. This request 
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for a brief spell of two years secured control of both Edison and Bell inventions, 
the successful challenge of gramophone records to the discs which Edison 
employed on his early phonographs, and an agreement about the pooling of 
patents in 1902 – the same year as the famous American steel merger- of two 
of the biggest gramophone interests in America – the Victor and Gramophone 
Companies. Together they achieved a dominance in the American gramophone 
industry which endured for more than half a century.39 At the end of the First 
World War the Victor Company’s capital assets amounted to nearly $38 million. 
By 1921 a hundred million records were sold in the United States, four times as 
many as in 1914. 
Like the cinema industry, the gramophone record industry faced troubles 
in the mid-twenties, a little earlier than the cinema industry, particularly during 
the period from 1921 to 1925, but unlike the cinema industry it also faced a 
major crisis from 1929 to 1932. only six million records were sold in the United 
States in 1932, six per cent of the total sales in 1927.40 Immediate recovery 
was not spectacular, but during the difficult 1930’s it was a highly integrated 
industry on both sides of the Atlantic which faced the continued depression. 
Technical progress was not rapid, and it was not until much later in 1947-48 that 
magnetic tape recording and long-playing records introduced a new technical 
phase associated also with very substantial commercial expansion. The “battle 
of the speeds” was reserved for the post-Second World War generation. In the 
meantime, however, the “hit parade” established itself and by 1939 there were 
225,000 juke boxes in the United States. 
Integration on the business side led to many mergers and the formation 
in 1931 of one new company which was later to be of international importance 
– the Electrical and Musical Industries Ltd. EMI was a merger of the Columbia 
Gramophone Company and the Gramophone Company: it was to be the first 
company to produce cathode-ray tubes for television sets.41 This to point to the 
future. A fascinating side glance at the past is that in 1929, the year of another huge 
American merger, that between the Victor Company and the Radio Corporation 
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of America – a merger facilitated by the development of the radio gramophone 
– the Edison Company completely suspended the building of gramophones. 
Edison himself was then aged 82. It might be very revealing to have a record from 
that date of his impressions of fifty years of the mass entertainment industry. 
Mention of the Radio Corporation of America and earlier of the British 
Cinematograph Act directs attention to the place of wireless in this story. 
RCA, founded in 1919, was the biggest of the American radio interests, while 
on January 1st, 1927, the same year as the Cinematograph Act, the British 
Broadcasting Corporation came into existence, an experiment in public control 
which went much further than public control over the film industry. The British 
Cinematograph Act reflected British fear of American economic dominance in 
the film industry: the foundation of RCA eight years earlier reflected American 
fear of British dominance – through the Marconi Company network – of the 
international wireless business. From its foundation in 1898 to the end of the 
First World War the Marconi Company with its subsidiaries had controlled a 
number of key wireless patents. The big American electrical companies, such as 
Westinghouse and American Telephone and Telegraph, could not exploit radio 
fully unless they used Marconi-controlled patents in addition to the patents in 
their own possession. In 1919, therefore, the three biggest American electric 
firms, with substantial United States government backing, agreed to pool their 
resources, buy out American Marconi and, following a suggestion of owen D. 
Young, Chairman of the Board of General Electric, form a new company, the 
Radio Corporation of America. The corporation or consortium, as it is more 
properly regarded, was less concerned with the manufacture of radio sets than 
with their distribution, and far less concerned with broadcasting matter than with 
business expansion. The Corporation was drawn during the course of the 1920’s 
both into the gramophone business and after the advent of “talkies” into films: 
the RKo Film Corporation, founded in 1929 was an offshoot of RCA and soon 
became “an active, aggressive force in production, distribution and exhibition.’’42 
The chairman of its Board was a Vice President of RCA Films and radio were thus 
drawn directly into relation with each other. 
42 Huettig, op.cit., p. 47.
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Broadcasting developed as a by-product of business pressure, not as an 
end in itself. of all the new inventions of the late nineteenth century which 
were to transform twentieth-century social life, radio inventions were least clearly 
appreciated as potential agents of social transformation. Wireless was thought 
of, as we have seen, as a substitute for telegraphic communication by wire, and 
it was not until the First World War that the possibility of broadcasting regular 
programmes was recognised. Paradoxically it was believed in the early days that 
broadcasting was a disadvantage of wireless not an advantage: confidential messages 
designed for one person or place could be picked up indiscriminately by other 
people. Moreover, because free transmission of radio messages from individual 
to individual was known to involve a great deal of “mutual interference,” it was 
wrongly assumed that radio could not be fully exploited in populous areas. 
“Wireless telegraphy,” a witness told a British Select Committee in 1906, “can 
only be used in lines removed from each other’s disturbing influences, as in 
sparsely populated countries and underdeveloped regions.”43 To have restricted 
the use of radio to underdeveloped regions, lighthouses and ships at sea would 
have been like using the telephone only as an internal instrument within the 
house. Yet the use of radio in the Titanic disaster and the arrest of Dr. Crippen 
was what interested people most before 1914, not its possible use as an instrument 
of instruction or entertainment. The idea of a radio audience was stumbled upon 
not deliberately planned. 
Two young prophets saw more clearly than their contemporaries during 
the First World War that wireless could transform society. The first was David 
Sarnoff, later the first Vice President of RCA: the second was Arthur Burrows, 
later the first Programmes Director of the BBC In 1906, the same year that 
an American, R. A. Fessenden, made a pioneer broadcast of music and the 
human voice from Brant Rock, Massachusetts – the technical break-through 
from wireless telegraphy to wireless telephony – Sarnoff, then fifteen years old, 
became an office boy on the staff of the Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company 
of America at a salary of five and a half dollars a week. He grew up with radio 
till he became the commanding figure in the American radio business. It was 
in 1916 that he made his first striking prophecy about the future of radio. “A 
 
 
43 Select Committee of the House of Commons on the International Radio Telegraphic Convention (1906).
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radio telephone transmitter,” he wrote, “having a range of say twenty-five to fifty 
miles can be installed at a fixed point where instrumental or vocal music or both 
are produced. The problem of transmitting music has already been solved in 
principle and therefore all the receivers attuned to the transmitting wave length 
shall be capable of receiving such music. The receiver can be disguised in the form 
of a simple ‘Radio Music Box’ and arranged for several different wave lengths, 
which should be changeable with the throwing of a single switch or pressing of 
a single button.” Sarnoff did not stop at what we now call the “wireless set.” He 
went on to describe the potential radio audience, a large number of people all 
receiving simultaneously from a single transmitter. He even forecast the kind of 
programmes which would attract this new audience – broadcasting of events of 
national importance, concerts, lectures and baseball scores. Modestly he added 
that “there are numerous other fields to which the principle can be extended.” 
on this side of the Atlantic Arthur Burrows, employed by the government 
in collecting, editing and distributing to government departments the wireless 
propaganda of the Central Powers, was also successful in peering even further 
into the future. “There appears to be no serious reason why,” he wrote, “before 
we are many years older, politicians speaking, say, in Parliament, should not be 
heard simultaneously by wireless in the reporting room of every newspaper office 
in the United Kingdom. The same idea might be extended to make possible the 
concert re production in all private residences of Albert Hall or Queen’s Hall 
concerts, or the important recitals at the lesser rendezvous of the music world . . . 
Such departures would expose us, of course, to all sorts of logical but unwelcome 
developments. There would be no technical difficulty in the way of an enterprising 
advertisement agency arranging for intervals in the musical programme to be 
filled with audible advertisements, pathetic or forcible appeals – in appropriate 
tones -on behalf of somebody’s soap or tomato ketchup.” 
Burrows in Britain looked further into the future than Sarnoff in the United 
States, for Sarnoff did not reconcile himself to the arguments for commercial 
broadcasting until the late 1920’s. In looking forward, however, Burrows was 
also looking back. Given the likely transition from radio to broadcasting, he 
realised that a prophet had to take into account not only technical but social 
forces. Broadcasting would never be left to the scientists and engineers alone. 
He turned back to the previous thirty or forty years of history and selected a 
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number of elements in British history which would help to shape the use of the 
new invention. Today we can see them more clearly still, and they are in the 
background of all that I have said in this lecture – the attitude of government; 
the power of the press; the strength of business – particularly business in so-
called “consumer goods,” those which were bought over the counter and, as the 
market was extended, were advertised for all the world to buy; the organisation 
of entertainment, both local and national, and, not least in importance, the level 
of education of the potential radio audience. Given the transition from radio to 
broadcasting, all these became factors to take into the reckoning. 
on both sides of the Atlantic the radio audience grew rapidly during the 
early 1920’s, America leading the way in the boom of 1922 and 1923. There were 
only three American radio stations in 1920: by the spring of 1923 there were 
nearly 600, and the number of radio retail dealers had risen to 15,000; 60,000 
radios were in use in the United States at the beginning of 1922: 2,850,000 by 
the end of 1925.44 In Britain, where a licensing system was in operation, 35,744 
licences had been issued by the end of 1922, 1,645,207 by the end of 1925, and 
2,178,259 by the end of 1926.
American broadcasting was provided by a welter of stations, relying 
increasingly – against Sarnoff’s own personal predilections  – own commercial 
advertising for their revenue. There was no Federal direction either of financial 
control or the allocation of wavelengths until the Federal Radio Commission was 
set up in 1927.
The “chaos of the ether” in the United States served as a warning in the 
United Kingdom, where, with the approval of the Post office, broadcasting was 
established as a monopoly by a consortium of business interests in December, 
1922. Six manufacturing companies subscribed the bulk of the original £100,000 
capital of the British Broadcasting Company. Revenue was to be raised from 
royalties on the sale of receiving sets and from a share (50 per cent) of the licence 
fee which was to be exacted from everyone who bought a receiving set in Britain. 
Profits on the working of the Company were to be restricted to 7 per cent Per 
annum and there was to be no opportunity for windfall capital gains.
44 The above account of the history of radio is from my forthcoming book on the BBC. For statistics see 
W. Schramm (ed.), Mass Communications (Urbana, 1949), pp. 547-52.
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There were thus two completely different kinds of broadcasting systems 
in operation in Britain and the United States by the mid-1920’s – the American 
system resting on advertising subsidies and suggesting to the listener that radio 
broadcasting was like “manna from heaven” coming to them without money and 
without price, entertainment that was as free as air,”45 the British system directed 
as a public service but compelling the listener (sometimes against his will) to 
pay for benefits which he did not always appreciate. The gap between the two 
systems was further widened – formally at least – when on January 1st 1927, the 
British Broadcasting Company was converted into the British radio and electrical 
trade were broken, and under the continued regime of John Reith, who had 
been General Manager and Managing Director of the old Company and became 
Director General of the new Corporation, emphasis on the public service aspect 
of broadcasting continued to dominate all discussion of policy.
In the meantime, the volume and cost of American radio advertising sharply 
increased. It is impossible to give exact figures for the early years or to trace in 
detail the history of the great advertising agencies, one of the most important of 
which – the A. C. Nielson Company – was founded in 1923. Again, however, the 
big American networks, the products of difficult and often complicated business 
mergers, of which the National Broadcasting System of 1927 the second,46 looked 
for attractive broadcast programmes and then sought advertisers “who would 
take a fling at broadcasting.”47 After 1930 the agencies came in direct. By 1935 
the net incomes of NBC and CBS had soared to $3,656,907 and $3,228,194 
respectively. The financing of radio by advertisement followed the same kind of 
formula which had been followed successfully in relation to the press by Lord 
 
 
45 G. Archer, Big Business and Radio (New York, 1939), p. 64.
46 NBC was a subsidiary of RCA, General Electric and Westinghouse holding 50 per cent, 30 per cent 
and 20 per cent of the stock respectively:  it also had an agreement with American Tel. And Tel. CBS 
incorporated the United Independent Broadcasters and was briefly affiliated with the Columbia 
Phonograph Broadcasting System. Its success was due largely to the financial backing of W.S. Paley, 
a businessman with no previous interest in radio. In 1929 a short-lived deal was made with a motion 
picture company, Paramount Public Corporation. The linking of entertainment interests was further 
brought out in 1938 when CBS purchased from Consolidated Film Industries Inc. the capital stock of 
the American Record Company and its subsidiaries, changing the name to the Columbia Recording 
Corporation.
47 N.W. Ayer of the N.W Ayer Advertising Company, quoted by L. White, The American Radio (Chicago 
1947).
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Northcliffe in the 1890’s. When television developed as a natural growth within 
the radio and broadcasting business, the income (and profits) from advertising 
moved up sharply, and Britain itself succumbed to commercial television time in 
1954 – along with $137 million for radio advertising. one advertiser alone, the 
Proctor and Gamble Company, spent over $36 million.48
These figures are far removed from the figures of receipt of Bartholomew 
Fair in 1828. Mass entertainment had become big business and the bigger and 
more organised it grew, the higher the costs of entry became. When J. G. Bennett 
started the New York Herald as a mass paper he had a capital of 500 dollars:  today 
to launch a metropolitan paper would take at least ten million dollars.49 Press 
power has become increasingly concentrated in the hands of a small number of 
interests: it has also become increasingly concerned with entertainment, even 
in its own particular domain. The comic strip, for example, is the substitute for 
or perhaps complement to the image on the screen. But the mutual influence 
is not limited to cultural forms. After feuding with new agencies, particularly 
radio, the press has in some cases, as in Australia, penetrated them. There has also 
been marked economic interpenetration of sport by the different entertainment 
agencies – press, television, cinema and so on. Sport is a subject I have not touched 
on since an early part of my lecture, but it is common knowledge that there are 
many signs in the middle of the twentieth century that the small business of sport 
(leaving on one side amateur sport) is giving way to big business. Contemporary 
trends already have their history: by the late 1940’s there were 14 million people 
in Britain betting regularly on football pools and spending more than £60 million 
a year on them.50 Taxation introduced in 1948 meant that a share of this sum 
passed into the hands of the State. By the outbreak of the Second World War 
the annual turnover of the football pools in Britain was at least ten times as great 
as the annual turnover of all the football clubs put together: by a recent court 
action in Britain (1959) it was laid down that a share of football pool revenue 
should also pass directly to the Football League. Television, as the newest and 
most aggressive of the new entertainment interests, has already made an impact 
 
 
48 G. Chester and G.R Garrison, Television and Radio (2nd edn., New York, 1956), p. 100.
49 M. Lerner, America as a Civilization (1958), p. 763.
50 These figures are taken from the Royal Commission on Betting Lotteries and Gaming (1949-51). There 
were only 4 million people betting regularly off-course on horse racing.
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(still a controversial impact) on the organization of sport. British television 
companies, for example, have recently acquired a controlling interest in the 
Wembley Stadium, Britain’s greatest sports arena, while the televising of football 
matches has begun to revolutionise football finance. All this again is far removed 
from what at the time was a prophetic cartoon in the Strand Magazine of 1898 
showing a silk-hatted pedestrian at a rugby match equipped with a kind of walky-
talky set listening to the half-time scores, which he was about to pass on to a 
distant friend.51 
To an economic historian pausing briefly after surveying the vast field 
described in this lecture, the main conclusion must be that the chief theme of 
the story is the way in which massive market interests have come to dominate an 
area of life which until recently was dominated by individuals themselves with 
the intermittent help of showmen and the more regular help of two groups I have 
scarcely talked about at all – innkeepers and bookmakers. The massiveness of the 
control is certainly more revealing than the often dubious statements made by 
the controllers about the character of the “masses” whose wants they claim they 
are satisfying. For the sake of simplification in this lecture and in its title – I have 
talked throughout of “mass entertainment,” a now common term like a score of 
other terms beginning with mass like “mass media,” “mass communication” and 
“mass culture.” I must end, however, by querying the use of the term “masses” 
in this context since it begs more questions than almost any term which is used 
in business or society today. To see people as “masses” is not to know them or to 
think of them in terms of a market formula. To talk of “mass communications” 
is to mislead: the agencies of so-called “mass communication” are really agencies 
of mass or multiple transmission. These points have been well made by Raymond 
Williams in Britain and by Max Lerner in the United States. Let me quote Max 
Lerner’s comment on the idea of the “masses” applied to mass entertainment. 
“The editors of the big papers and magazines, the producers of movie, radio and 
TV shows, the publishers of paperbacks and comic books, and of popular records 
fall into the habit of abstracting some common denominator from all these 
audiences. I suppose they have to in order to keep themselves from going crazy. 
Yet the hardheaded, sharp-featured men must know that those whom they have 
 
 
51 M. Marples, op. cit., p. 232.
29 Mass entertainment: The origins of a modern industry
76
thus abstracted continue to be individuals with a variety of tastes. If they forget 
this they forget it at their peril, for an audience whose varied and changing taste is 
neglected will dissolve into thin air. Hence the continuing search for ‘fresh ideas,’ 
new ‘formulas’ and ‘formats.’ If the ‘mass’ of the ‘mass media’ were uniform, 
passive and plastic, there would be no need to woo it by novelties or to watch the 
fever chart of the changes and chances.’’52 In judgements of this kind we cross 
what I described at the beginning of this lecture as the fascinating but formidable 
frontier between problems of commerce and problems of taste, and we must 
remember that minority audiences as well as mass audiences have grown in the 
twentieth century. Even briefly to discuss the issues raised by this would take not 
one lecture but a dozen. 
Yet this is not the only theme in the story I have been telling. on the technical 
side scattered developments have led to the creation of an international electronics 
industry with a top tier interested in a large number of fields, producing a wide 
range of products and maintaining (sometimes with limited business results) large 
and impressive research laboratories. on the industrial relations side not only has a 
group of trade unions and employers associations been created – of which ASCAP 
and the Musicians’ Union in the United States have been the most notorious – 
but a huge network of agency organizations is now interspersed between the artist 
and his employer. on the social side, institutions of entertainment have come 
and gone in peaks and troughs of acceptance and rejection. The music hall, for 
example, has almost completely gone, while other new institutions the bowling 
alley in the United States, for example, are on the way in. Paradoxically some of 
the changes have reinforced the position of the home. Before the rise of radio 
and television, the revolution in mass entertainment was a revolution outside the 
home: now it is a revolution from within. Given the sequence and the pattern, 
there is need for greater public knowledge and discussion of what is going on and 
what has already gone on. The want of entertainment is basically a simple want 
which we all share: “show business” and “sporting business” are news. They are 
also history. 
52 M. Lerner, op. cit., p. 766. See also R. Williams, “Culture is ordinary” in Conviction (ed. N. Mackenzie, 
1958). For a different view see Dwight Macdonald, “A Theory of Mass Culture,” first published in 
Diogenes (1953) and reprinted in B. Rosenberg and D. M. White (eds.), Mass Culture, The Popular Arts 
in America (Chicago, 1957).
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30
Industrial research and  
economic growth in Australia
Bruce R. Williams1
Alfred North Whitehead once wrote that the greatest invention of the nineteenth 
century was the invention of the art of invention. He anticipated many later 
writers who have claimed this invention for our time. But whenever, if ever, the 
art of invention was invented, there is no doubt the use of science in agriculture 
and industry has made a profound difference to our lives. It has brought a truly 
remarkable increase in food and population, exciting new processes such at 
atomic power stations and computer-controlled machines and plants, and an 
extra ordinary array of new drugs, man-made fibres, TV, radar, jet aircraft, moon 
rockets, and bombs that could end it all. 
In the short time that I have been back in Australia, I have read and heard 
much of the need for more research. Australian expenditure on research is often 
compared very unfavourably with that in Britain and America. Whereas Britain 
and America spend more than 2 per cent of their gross national products on 
research and development, Australia is said to spend little more than one-half of 
1 per cent; and whereas Britain spends over 3 per cent of net industrial output 
on purely industrial research and development, Australian industry, it is said, 
spends a mere quarter of 1 per cent and most of that on “development rather 
than research.’’2
It is usually taken for granted that not keeping up with Britain and America 
is a sign of “backwardness”. To say, in this context, that Australia is backward 
 
 
1 Thirtieth Joseph Fisher Lecture, 24 July 1962. Reprinted in Williams, B.R. (1967), Technology, Investment 
and Growth, Chapman and Hall.
2 See S. Encel, Science, July 28,1961, pp. 260-266.
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implies that spending a higher proportion of national product on research and 
development would ensure a higher rate of economic growth; and Dr. Encel’s 
comment, which reflects the views of many scientists in universities and research 
organizations, that Australian industry spends very little on research and 
development and that “almost all of this is development rather than research” 
implies that to increase the rate of economic growth special attention should be 
given to research.
In this lecture I will not take all this for granted. Instead I will examine 
whether these judgments are based on the avail able evidence. Is it true that 
Australian economic growth could be increased by spending a higher proportion 
of national product on research and development? Is there a special deficiency in 
research expenditure? In an attempt to answer these questions, I will first define 
the terms involved, and then examine the expenditure on various types of research 
and development. 
How much research?
Research is the activity of extending the bounds of scientific knowledge. Basic 
research is concerned with fundamental scientific problems, which may be quite 
unrelated to the current problems of industry, agriculture, medicine and defence; 
by contrast, applied research is concerned with application to such current problems. 
Such applied research may be short-term and direct. It may, however, be background 
applied and difficult to distinguish from basic research, as suggested by a research 
worker in a large industrial laboratory who remarked that “if you want me to do 
it, it’s applied, if I want to do it myself, it’s basic.” Development, the process of 
appraising the results of research, of selecting the most promising, and of making 
them ready for actual application in industry, includes the process of building and 
testing pilot plants or prototypes. Application or innovation is the process of adopting 
a development and of getting it to perform as it was designed to perform, or better. 
It is only this final step that gives us the new or improved products or processes. It 
is therefore this final process of innovation that counts in growth.  
In Australia, Government research agencies dominate the field. The 
Department of Supply conducts Defence Standards Laboratories, Weapons 
Research Establishments and Aeronautical Research Laboratories for military 
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research and development, costing more than £12 million a year. The 
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research organization is concerned 
with civil research and development over a very wide field, ranging from basic 
research in such things as genetics and radio astronomy, to development work in 
textile technology and rain-making. It now spends more than £10 million a year. 
other Commonwealth Government agencies – the Atomic Energy Commission, 
the Commonwealth Health Department, the Bureau of Mineral Resources, the 
Bureau of Meteorology, the Forestry and Timber Bureau and the Ionospheric 
Prediction Service – spend another £7-8 million on research. 
Universities play a small but important part in research. Their research 
is mostly basic, and the conduct of this research is usually associated with the 
training of high-grade research workers. Because of this, and of the other teaching 
duties of professors and lecturers, estimates of spending on research in Universities 
depend in some measure on assumptions made about the proportion of time that 
members of staff devote to research. Recent estimates of University research have 
ranged from £3 million to £5 million. 
There is a notable lack of information about research and development in 
industry. In 1955 the Research Survey Committee of the Institution of Engineers 
inquired into the amount of industrial research but as the response was poor it 
could only conclude that “104 firms with production in excess of ~500 million 
spent £1.7m.”3 Two investigators from the Stanford Research Institute recently 
blew up this estimate to allow for incomplete response, for later salary increases, 
and for the sub sequent growth of secondary industry, and they concluded that in 
1960 industrial research was £15 million.4 By contrast Dr. Encel used the same 
original estimate, but after inquiries in BHP and the Colonial Sugar Refining 
Company decided that it could be “said with some assurance that the total 
amount spent in 1958-9 did not exceed £5 million.”5
3 Australian Industrial Research, 1955.
4 Applied Research on the Development of Australia.
5 “Financing Scientific Research in Australia”, Science, July 28, 1961.
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Two estimates of research and development
Encel 1958-59 Stanford 1959-60
£m £m
CSIRo 8.5 9.2
Supply Department 11.7 (12.5)a
AAEC 2.7 3.8
other Commonwealth Government 4.5 2.5




Percentage of GNP 0.6 0.7
(a. The Stanford estimate excluded defence. I have added the figure in brackets to make the two estimates 
comparable.)
We have no reason to trust either guesstimate of industrial research. To get 
a check I have tried an alternative approach by way of the manpower statistics of 
the Department of Labour.6 These statistics are not very satisfactory – they were 
built up from a purely voluntary register, the definitions of qualified scientists and 
engineers were loose, and the interpretation of research and development activity 
was far from strict – but more satisfactory information from CSIRo and the 
Department of Supply makes possible some necessary adjustments. 
The unadjusted Department of Labour statistics imply that 8,000 scientists 
and engineers were engaged in non-university research and development in 
1959 – one-third of this number in “industry”. Now we know the expenditure 
on research and development in CSIRo and the number of qualified scientists 
and engineers (as usually defined). From these we can deduce the cost of 
research and development per qualified CSIRo scientist or engineer. This was 
£6,800 in 1959. In the Department of Supply the comparable cost was about 
£10,000. If we use an average figure of £8,000 for Government research and 
 
 




development, the implication is that approximately 3,750 qualified scientists and 
engineers were employed on research and development. Using the Department 
of Labour ratio of industrial to Government employment, we arrive at a figure 
of approximately 1,900 qualified scientists and engineers employed in industrial 
research and development. In Britain the cost per qualified industrial research 
and development man was at this time just under £8,000. We do not know 
the figure for Australia, though from the few inquiries that I have been able 
to make it appears to have been in the region of £4,500-£5,000. If so, the cost 
of industrial research and development done by the 1,900 qualified scientists 
and engineers was between £8½ and £9½ million. This estimate is almost the 
average of the Encel and Stanford estimates. This is an accident from which I 
derive no comfort or assurance. My estimate is based on “informed guessing”, 
which is a beguiling but often misleading activity. However, the knowledge that 
in the seven large firms that are frequently named when industrial research is 
discussed the expenditure is near £5 million, makes me hope that my guess will 
prove to be “informed.”   
Recently Mr. L. Weickhardt7 argued that if we make proper allowance 
for the small number of large companies in Australia it is unrealistic to expect 
Australian industry to spend more than £7 million on research and development. 
However, this estimate is based on the assumption that the minimum cost of 
an effective research and development department is £100,000 per annum. This 
may be true of the chemical industry, but it is not true generally; and in any case 
there will be many firms engaged only in development work. 
The nature of Australian research and development
The overall position in research and development is that the Government effort 
costs £30 million, the University effort, say, £5 million, the industrial effort, say, 
£9 million. It is clear that Government agencies dominate the field. Defence 
accounts for more than 40 per cent of Government research and development. 
Commonwealth Government expenditure on the peaceful development of atomic 
 
7 “The Future of Manufacturing Industry”: a paper read at the Autumn Forum of the Victorian branch of 
the Economic Society, to be published as a monograph by the Committee for Economic Development 
of Australia.
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energy, medical research, re search into forestry, timber and mineral resources, 
and State Government research in agriculture account for another one quarter 
of the Government effort, and the remaining 30 per cent is provided by CSIRo.
In the civil field, both Government and private, CSIRo is the dominant 
organization. Fortunately it publishes a good deal of information about the 
nature of its activities. Until 1938, when defence problems pushed it into a 
range of industrial research, CSIRo’s research was centred on primary industry. 
After the war when defence research was transferred to other Government 
agencies, the reconstituted CSIRo did not take the occasion to “go bush” 
again. In 1960-61 CSIRo’s research budget was £10 million. £5½ million 
of this went on research and development related to primary industries. The 
other £4½ million was spread over chemical research (almost £1 million), 
the National Standards Laboratory (£848,000), Radio Physics (£500,000), 
Meteorological Physics (£128,000), Wool-Textile Technology (£450,000) 
Coal Technology (£280,0.00), Building (£207,000), and a range of smaller 
items. The expenditure that was consciously directed to the needs of Australian 
industry was in the region of £2½ million. 
To the CSIRo expenditure of £2½ million on secondary industry research 
and development, we can add industry’s own expenditure of £8½-£9½ million. 
This total of £11-12 million was approximately 0.6 per cent of the net value of 
secondary production in 1959. 
Primary industry research and development in CSIRo, in other-
Commonwealth, and in State research organizations, was approximately £9 
million. This was 0.7 per cent of the net value of primary production in 1959.  
To go further and to break down these civil figures into basic research, 
applied research and development involves a deal of guessing. However, CSIRo 
publications such as Research Review and Annual Report make possible informed 
guessing about the main civil spender. Let us start by allocating to basic research 
all the University expenditure of £5 million. Basic research in CSIRo appears 
to cost about £4½ million; in AAEC it may be £1 million. Total expenditure on 
basic research, then, is £10-11 million. 
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In applied research CSIRo spends £3½ million and State Government and 
other-Commonwealth agencies £3½ million. AAEC spends £2½-3 million and 
industry £2-3 million. Total expenditure on applied research, then, appears to be 
in the region of £11-12 million. 
on development, industry spends £6-7 million, CSIRo £1 million, and 
other Government agencies £2 million – a total of £9-10 million.  
These estimates are necessarily rough and are meant only to indicate the 
order of the problem. The Australian civil research and development effort 
appears to be fairly evenly distributed between basic research, applied research 
and development. The cost of each of these activities is a little less than the cost 
of military research and development.  
After this outline of the facts of the situation, so far as I have been able to 
establish them, I came on to the teasing problems of evaluation. Is the overall 
expenditure too low? Is there a sensible distribution of effort between primary 
and secondary industry? Is there an appropriate balance between research and 
development? These are the critical questions to which we would all like the 
answers. I wish that it were possible to give them, but in the present state of 
knowledge of Australian conditions it is easier to expose the wrong answers than 
to provide the correct ones. Still, this is something; and I hope to go further and 
indicate the appropriate lines of further inquiry.
Statistical relations between research and growth
It is important to emphasize that there is no established statistical link between 
research and growth. Britain and the United States devote a relatively high 
proportion of their national products to research and development but they have 
not achieved notably high rates of growth. The Australian rate of growth in real 
product per man hour has been higher than the British despite its much lower 
ratio of research and development to output. Nor in Britain and the U.S. has there 
been any apparent acceleration in the rate of economic growth with the post-war 
acceleration of growth in research and development. It is not possible to provide 
simple statistical evidence that it would pay Australia to raise its ratio of research 
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to output. The bald assertion that Australian industry is backward because it 
spends a small portion of net output on research, reminds me of Belloc’s jibe: 
The scientists who ought to know  
Assure us that it must be so;  
oh, let us never, never doubt,  
What nobody is sure about.
In fact the lack of a close statistical relationship between research and 
growth should not be a matter of surprise. The use of science in industry depends 
on research, on development and on application, as previously defined. But these 
are not measured and successive steps required for each innovation.  
In some innovations, basic research, applied research, development and 
application, do appear as measured and successive steps. Thus Rutherford’s atom-
splitting experiments were followed a short time later by applied research on 
atomic fission, by development work on making bombs, and by the industrial 
application of the results of this research and development. But this is by no 
means a typical case. J. J. Thomson’s basic research on electrons also provided, in 
the end, for a new industry, but the time lag was 50 years and there was not an 
orderly sequence of events from research to application.  
Just as a contemporary innovation may draw on the basic or applied research 
of an earlier generation, so it may draw on the research work of another country. 
Sir Alexander Fleming’s original observation on penicillin mould in 1928 was the 
starting point for Florey’s work between 1938 and 1942, Although Florey was able 
to produce enough penicillin for clinical trials, the high-yield methods of growth 
suitable for commercial exploitation were developed in America. The original 
work on silicones was done by 1908 by Kipping of Nottingham; the development 
and application between 1932 and 1942 was the work of the Corning Glass Works 
of America and The Dow Chemical Company. Most of the applied research and 
development leading to the atom bomb took place in North America; after the 
war, Britain built on this and developed the first atomic power stations. 
It is quite possible for a country to provide more than its share of the world’s 
scientific output but less than its share of development and innovation. This, it is 
often said, is the position in Britain: “Britain invents, foreigners apply.” Although 
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this is a conceit that Britain shares with other nations, it is true that if there were not 
a “development gap” British science would have a much bigger impact on British 
industry.8 Research may be relatively inefficient in generating growth because it 
is not followed through to the point of application. This follow through is by no 
means simple, as we shall see.  Another country might produce less than its share 
of science but more than its share of development. Until fairly recently this was 
true of America. other countries could decide to do little about either research or 
development and to concentrate on the effective application of foreign developed 
processes and products. This is a development gap in reverse. Switzerland followed 
this policy until the 1930’s, and in some measure Japan follows it still. Australia in 
its reliance on branches or subsidiaries of foreign companies, has acquired growth 
from Britain and America’s research and development. We can call this Australia’s 
vicarious research. If in our foreign dominated industries such as chemicals and 
vehicles, research and development was the relevant British percentage of net 
output (less present Australian percentage in these industries) industrial research 
and development would be £15-20 million more than the actual £9 million. This 
gives a rough idea of the importance of vicarious research and development in the 
Australian economy.  
The links between a country’s growth and its research and development 
expenditure are also complicated by military affairs. In 1958 Britain spent 2.3 per 
cent of net output on research and development. However, more than one-half of 
this total expenditure was for defence research and development.9 The position in 
the United States was very similar. Some defence research and development yields 
civil benefit, but by no means. 
The uses of scientific manpower
I have already mentioned that the follow through from research to application 
provides complex problems. It is obvious that scientists and engineers are needed 
for industrial research and development. They are also needed for the actual 
application of science to industrial processes. In the chemical industry in Britain, 
 
8 For an appraisal of this and related issues see C. F. Carter and B. R. Williams, Industry and Technical 
Progress, Chapter 3.
9 Industrial Research and Development Expenditure, 1958 (Department of Scientific and Industrial 
Research).
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qualified scientists and engineers make up 3.7 per cent of the total labour force, 
though only one-third of them are engaged in research and development. In 
aircraft, electrical engineering and precision instruments, only one-half of the 
scientists and engineers are employed on research and development work. For 
the whole economy, 40 per cent of the qualified scientists and engineers were 
engaged on research and development. The final application of science to industry 
often cannot take place unless scientific manpower is employed for the control 
of production processes. When even the day-to day operation of sophisticated 
industrial processes requires highly qualified technologists, the successful 
introduction of new processes in factories is likely to be still more dependent on 
them. The use of science in industry has very much reduced the usefulness of 
production men “qualified only by experience.” 
The need not to concentrate scientific manpower in research and 
development is increased by the problem of identifying the relevant lines of 
research. Efficiency in industrial research is largely a matter of choosing the right 
problems. There are thousands upon thousands of possible research projects – the 
crucial task is to choose those few projects which are made relevant by the market 
position, the financial resources, the production problems, and the management 
skills of the firm. Unless the research workers are guided by experts in production, 
costing, finance and marketing, they are unlikely to identify the promising lines 
of research; they are more likely to tangle their feet in the clouds. Perhaps Mark 
Spade had this in mind when in Business for Pleasure he sardonically advised 
Directors to “Give the Research Department only Big, Long Term Problems and 
leave the results in trust for your heirs.”   
It follows that there is an important problem of finding an efficient 
distribution of scientific manpower between teaching, basic research, applied 
research, development, application, control of production processes, and technical 
selling. It is quite possible to impede the application of science to industry by 
drawing scientists into research and so impoverishing activities in development and 
production departments. Since the purpose of applied research and development 
is presumably to generate innovations in industry and agriculture, it is usually 
better to think in terms of the overall use of scientific manpower and not simply 




The special problems of research in Australia
The number of qualified scientists and engineers in Australia is small, both in 
number and as a percentage of the population.10 It follows that it would be foolish 
to spread our research and development efforts as widely as, say, the British do. 
It follows too, that in some fields it may pay us to rely on the research and/or the 
development work of other countries. This sets a problem in identification. In 
which fields should we rely on others; in which should we concentrate our efforts? 
Let us start with defence. In both Britain and America defence research 
and development absorbs a large part of the scientific manpower. This is a field in 
which size really matters; a field on which we could not hope to make much of 
an impression. At most it could be sensible to take on a few marginal problems to 
complement the work of allied countries. The Weapons Research Establishment, 
operating at Salisbury and Woomera, which co-operates with the Britain’s Ministry 
of Defence, is an example of such a complementary effort. The Australian defence 
research effort at 30 per cent of the total spending on research and development 
uses a significantly smaller percentage of scientific manpower than do the British 
and American efforts. Given the low level of scientific manpower in Australia this 
seems wise. 
In primary industry, there are special problems set by climate and soil. We 
cannot rely on the research of others, and primary industry, with a net value of 
production of over £1,200 million, is big enough to justify a substantial effort in 
both research and development. There is in fact a substantial effort. In 1959 the 
expenditure was £9 million, 0.7 per cent of the net value of primary production. I 
know of no way of deducing from these figures whether we ought to be spending 
more, and I do not know enough about either the detail of the research effort 
or the problems of application to judge whether the research and development 
resources have been deployed in the best way. My general impression is that the 
resources have been deployed well, but a definite answer to this question requires 
a more careful joint scientific and economic appraisal of research programmes and 
their results than CSIRo, and State Departments of Agriculture or independent 
researchers have given them. 
10 As a percentage of population the Australian supply of scientists and engineers appears to be 60 per cent 
of the British figure.
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In secondary industries the problems of applying science are both more 
complex and less special than in agriculture. They are more complex in the 
sense that the isolated socialization of research is likely to be less efficient than 
in primary industry. The range of output is much less in wheat or wool or dairy 
farms than in engineering or chemical or electrical factories. And, because so 
much less of the actual production can be left to nature, the dependence on 
scientific manpower is generally greater within factories than on farms. Research 
and development isolated from production is therefore generally less successful 
in secondary than in primary industry. The problems are less special in the sense 
that our raw materials and climate do not render irrelevant much of the research 
work of other countries. This is fortunate, because any attempt to cover the whole 
field would lead to the growth of many inefficiently small and ineffective research 
departments and to a drain of scientific manpower out of other important work. 
(I assume, I think realistically, that the increased demand for scientific manpower 
would not be met by increased imports from abroad.) In development, too, 
the work of other countries is generally relevant, though there are some special 
problems of adapting foreign techniques to Australian climate, raw materials and 
cost structure. 
It does not follow from the fact that our problems are not for the most part 
special, that it must pay us to ignore industrial research. In some fields it will pay 
us, in others not. In some fields the cost of buying know-how may be so high 
that it would be more economical to develop our own technologies. The cost of 
buying know-how tends to be high in the “patent sensitive fields” in which, it 
so happens, small countries can sometimes compete with the big: witness the 
success of Switzerland in pharmaceuticals and dyes, and Holland in electronics. 
Where our Universities and Research Institutes make significant contributions 
to basic research in the relevant “patent sensitive” fields, we can expect to find 
opportunities for profitable industrial research and development. 
It is, however, misleading to think of research and development as the 
general alternative to buying know-how. often the relevant alternative will be 
between spending money on development or on buying know-how. Given that 
the objective is the fruitful application of science to industry it is reason able to 
assume that it would be wise for a country with a special shortage of scientific 
manpower (in the sense already explained) to concentrate more of its manpower 
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near the point of application than in countries with a less acute shortage. In 
other words, we should expect Australian industrial research and development 
to be more concentrated on development than in say Britain or America, unless 
a range of Australian industry is made so dependent on foreign technology that 
there ceases to be a shortage of scientific manpower to deal with the problems of 
the other industries. As I have indicated in my calculation of vicarious research, 
certain Australian industries, notably chemicals and vehicles, do draw consider 
ably on foreign research and development. But this does not keep them out of 
the market for scientific manpower. The vehicles industry uses engineers for local 
development and for production; the chemical industry is a large employer of 
scientists and engineers for research, development and production. 
Looked at in this way the roughly equal distribution of expenditure between 
basic research, applied research and development does not look ideal. Even by 
comparison with the US – a large economy with a relatively good supply of 
scientific manpower – the ratios of applied to basic research and of development 
to applied research are low. For industry alone, development expenditure is 
approximately equal to the total of relevant basic and applied research, which 
again by comparison with the industrial sector even in large countries suggests 
that development is very low in relation to research. 
There is another problem that calls for further investigation. A high 
percentage of expenditure on research relevant to industry is conducted by 
institutions with no direct interests in production and selling. There is evidence 
from other countries that does not encourage a rapid application of science to 
industry.11 Research detached from production problems and facilities is quite 
likely to increase the sum of unused applied science, to add to the development 
gap. In primary industry, CSIRo for example has experimental farms and is 
able to develop the results of its research under field conditions. In part of its 
coal research it is able to find solutions to particular problems referred to it by 
industry. In textile technology it has created production facilities to carry through 
its development work on processing and finishing to the point of application. But 
elsewhere CSIRo has not given such attention to the problem of the development 
 
 
11 See C. F. Carter and B. R. Williams, Science in Industry (o.U.P.).
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gap. Part of this problem must remain unsolved until manufacturers employ 
a sufficient number of scientists and technologists to make possible a fruitful 
collaboration, but even so I suspect that CSIRo is not giving sufficient attention 
to the choice of fields in which it could make its biggest contribution to Australian 
industry. I do not pretend to know what these fields are. The knowledge cannot be 
acquired without a considerable joint research effort by economists and scientists.
The role of overseas companies
I referred earlier to the importance of vicarious research and development. I have 
argued that these foreign companies do not relieve Australia of its special shortage 
of scientific manpower. But do they overcome the apparent under-emphasis on 
development? This is an important question. Australian subsidiaries or branches 
of overseas companies can draw on the results of research and development that 
costs very much more than £15-20 million, and, more importantly, they draw 
on the successful results. It is therefore reasonable to treat most of this vicarious 
expenditure as equivalent to development. It is this operation of overseas 
companies that begins to make sense of the Australian use of scientific manpower. 
I put the matter in this way quite deliberately. Much of the argument about the 
need for more research in Australia arises from the belief that we spend too much 
on buying foreign know-how. 
It is interesting to note that the role of Research Associations in Australia 
has been small. There are Research Associations for bread, wine coal and tobacco, 
but the total expenditure is very small – it is about one-twentieth of what it would 
be if we used Research Associations as they are used in Britain for co-operative 
research in industries where there are many small firms. 
Significantly, and shamefully, we do not know-how much is spent, but 
even if we did, the fact would remain that we lack the scientific manpower to be 
self-sufficient in our technology, and that the more we tried to be, the more it 
would be necessary in the interests of economic growth (though not necessarily of 
scientific fun) to put more money into development rather than research.  
At the beginning of this lecture I quoted Dr. Encel’s estimate that Australian 
industry spends a mere quarter of 1 per cent of net industrial output on research 
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and development. If Australian industry spent the same percentage as British 
industry, industrial research and development would cost £70 million. Such a 
comparison, though it is often used, is rendered meaning less by the different 
industrial structures of the two countries. The British weights are wrong for 
Australian conditions. If instead of using the British average net industrial output 
on research and development, we use the appropriate percentage for each industry 
– 36 per cent for aircraft, 12 per cent for electronics, 6 per cent for chemicals, one-
quarter of 1 per cent for wood paper and pulp, and so on – then the comparable 
figure for Australia is not £70 million but something like £40 million. (The 
eccentric way in which Australian production statistics are compiled makes an 
accurate estimate impossible.) If to the direct Australian industrial expenditure of 
(the calculated) £9 million we add the vicarious expenditure of £15-20 million 
(and, in the interests of realism, some such addition should be made to the direct 
expenditure) the Australian effort does not look quite so puny.  In saying this I do 
not want to give the impression that there is good reason for complacency. The 
special shortage of scientific manpower is in part due to a low ratio of scientific to 
total manpower. If this ratio is raised the opportunities to make and to use science 
will be increased. And though I have stressed the very important role of overseas 
companies I have not implied that we do get the benefits of these companies 
on the most favourable terms. Indeed I do not think that we do, and I think 
it high time that more attention was given both to the capital structure and to 
the limited trading opportunities of the Australian parts of overseas companies. 
These, however, are distinct issues.
Summary and conclusions
a) The relation between research and growth is complex. Growth in output per 
head depends on new or improved products and processes of production. The 
life history of such innovations is made up of the basic research from which 
applied research grows, the development of the results of applied research to 
prepare them for use in production, the decision to use the new development 
or design and where necessary to invest in the planned innovation, the 
application of the new method to the farm or the factory processes, and the 
marketing of any new products which in some cases involves sophisticated 
technical selling and service.  
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b) These events in the life history of innovations do not usually follow each 
other in a consistent time sequence. Nor need all these events take place in 
the same industry, or in the same country. In any country, the life history may 
start with research or with development or with application.  
c) All these events in the life history of innovation depend in some measure on 
the use of scientific manpower. Research and development depend on the 
employment of scientists and engineers. So, too, does the actual introduction 
of the new method to the farm or the factory – whether in the form of field 
officers or production engineers. Sometimes operating the new processes is 
fairly simple and only calls for occasional servicing by experts; frequently, 
as in a chemical plant, day to-day operation depends on highly qualified 
technologists. The use of science in industry has very much reduced the 
usefulness of those “qualified only by experience.” 
d) It is misleading to think of the possible contributions of science to industry 
just in terms of research, or even in terms of research and development. It 
is possible to have too much research. It is possible to produce many more 
useful scientific ideas than can be developed and applied by the scientists 
and engineers employed in development and production. It :is also possible 
to have too much research in another sense namely, that a higher rate of 
innovation could be achieved by using a higher proportion of a country’s 
scientific manpower to develop and/or apply the research results of other 
countries. In other words, it is possible to aim for an inefficiently high level 
of self-sufficiency in research as well as in production. The key problem is 
not how much applied research, but how best to distribute the scientific 
manpower between research, development and other activities. Much of the 
talk about the need for more and more research implies either that there is an 
unlimited supply of scientists and engineers, or that they are only good for 
research and development work.
e) It is not possible to speak with confidence (at any rate not possible for me to 
speak with confidence) about the precise balance of the Australian effort. The 
information on which such a judgment should be based is often conspicuous 
by its absence. However, such calculations as I have been able to make lead 
me to suspect that Australian industry is backward in its use, or lack of use, 
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of qualified scientists and engineers for both production and development. 
I suspect also that too high a proportion of the applied research effort is 
too detached from production interests and development facilities. Such 
remoteness usually leads to a mixture of irrelevance in applied science and of 
failure to bridge the gaps between invention and innovation. Such remoteness 
is therefore likely to impede growth. 
f ) To get to the answers to these questions we need accurate information on 
research and development expenditure in industry and on the size and 
distribution of scientific manpower. We need research into possible lines of 
innovation that look promising on both scientific and economic grounds, 
into the problems of distributing scientific manpower efficiently, into the cost 
of making innovations at home compared to the cost of buying them from 
abroad. These are important and interesting lines of research, and I take this 
occasion to express surprise that so very few resident Australian scientists, 
both natural and social, have not found them so. If this lecture should help in 
any way to stimulate such research, I should have some reason to think that I 




Australian foreign aid policy
Heinz W. Arndt1
I do not in this lecture propose to state the case for economic aid or for more 
economic aid by Australia to developing countries. This has recently been done 
well by a group of Melbourne colleagues.2 What I want to do is to discuss some 
of the difficult choices that confront a willing donor country in foreign aid policy. 
What kinds of aid are most effective? More especially, what is the most sensible 
foreign aid policy for Australia? 
Foreign aid has been the subject of much earnest and anxious re-thinking 
overseas in the last year or two. In the United States which for a decade and more 
had carried the burden almost alone, there was a good deal of disillusionment. 
The ordinary American often found it hard to see what there was to show for 
many billions of dollars other than the resentment so often and unfairly earned 
by charity. The new approach to foreign aid which formed part of President 
Kennedy’s New Frontier did not still all doubts whether American aid was being 
used as effectively as it might, doubts which were voiced again last year in the 
Clay Report. A similar re-appraisal has been going on in Britain and other donor 
countries, and in the United Nations and its specialised agencies. As The Times 
pointed out a while ago, “at a time when most economists are agreed that more 
aid than ever will be required in the next decade both the effectiveness of aid and 
the question of whether other countries can share the burden with the United 
States are coming under close scrutiny”.3
1 Thirty-first Joseph Fisher Lecture, 9 September 1964. Reprinted in Arndt, H.W. (1968), A Small Rich 
Industrial Country: Studies in Australian Development, Aid and Trade, Melbourne: Cheshire.
2 A Clunies Ross, and others, One Per Cent, Melbourne University Press., 1963.
3 The Times, London, 3 october 1963.
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Australians have so far left the job of thinking about foreign aid policy 
very largely to a few officials of the Department of External Affairs. If, as I hope, 
Australia will substantially increase its aid effort in the next few years to the point 
when it begins to hurt just a little, the issues of foreign aid policy will provoke 
public interest also in this country. 
The ends of aid
The first difficulty in formulating an effective foreign aid policy has everywhere 
been found to be uncertainty about the ends which foreign aid is to serve. 
“Effective” for what? There is no simple answer to this question. The wide range of 
motives behind national foreign aid policies has recently been neatly summarised 
by the United Nations economist, Dr. H. W. Singer: 
“There is a strictly humanitarian feeling that social welfare measures 
should not stop at home. There is the shock of world poverty in the 
midst of plenty. There is a feeling that such a world is not stable 
and the affluent nations will not be safe unless they help the others 
to higher standards (the ‘insurance policy argument’ for foreign 
aid). There is the desire to win friends and influence people. There 
is the desire to maintain open and democratic societies in the 
underdeveloped countries. There is the competition of the Cold War. 
There is the desire, or feeling of commitment as now in Western 
Europe, to repay help received in their hour of need, i.e. under the 
Marshall Plan. There is the desire to support one’s actual or potential 
customers. There is the desire to reduce one’s unemployment or get 
rid of surplus food or surplus industrial capacities. 
“As may be seen even from this short list, the motives range all the 
way from the sublime to the, well, less sublime.”4
The fact that in the democratic countries Governments lean over backwards 
to stress the selfish arguments for aid unfortunately hides the novel and exciting 
fact that very many of their ordinary citizens today accept, and indeed passionately 
 
4 H. W. Singer, “International Aid for Economic Development: Problems and Tendencies”, International 
Development Review, March, 1964, p. 17.
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believe in, the humanitarian case for aid to the developing countries. In the words 
of the authors of One Per Cent, they believe that “the simple fact that we, as a rich 
nation, can afford to help those whose needs are desperate is reason enough.” 5 
But even to assume, over-optimistically, that the object of aid is simply to help the 
poorer countries is to pose questions, rather than to answer them. 
Mere relief of poverty or distress, it is now generally agreed, is not enough. 
of course, relief is often imperative. It is hard to refuse food to starving people 
or medicines and doctors to fight epidemics. But such help does good only while 
it lasts. At best, it temporarily raises current standards of living in the poorer 
countries – or postpones a fall. It does little or nothing to further their economic 
development. This applies also to all technical assistance that merely helps out 
temporarily with scarce expertise of one kind or another. If – pace Shaw – foreign 
experts do not teach as well as do, technical assistance ensures at best that, for a 
time, the job is done better. It may even do harm by weakening the incentive to 
develop these skills locally. 
Aid must seek to accelerate economic development in the poorer countries, 
not merely to raise current living standards. In the broadest sense, it must be aid 
to investment rather than to consumption. Hence the increasing emphasis in all 
aid policies on capital assistance to supplement inadequate local saving for capital 
formation and scarce foreign exchange, and on technical assistance in education, 
training and research.
But even this definition leaves two major questions unresolved. Should aid 
policy concentrate on those countries which need aid most or on those which 
are likely to make the best use of it? Is the target a rate of economic development 
sufficient to enable the underdeveloped countries to catch up, to close the gap 
between the rich and the poor, or at least a rate equal to that of the advanced 
countries?
To take the latter question first, recent overseas thinking about foreign aid 
has moved away from either answer. For most parts of the underdeveloped world, 
a closing of the gap between rich and poor countries is for the foreseeable future 
 
5 Op. cit., p. 26.
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an impossibly ambitious target. Since World War II the gap has been widening 
because the rich countries have, on average, enjoyed much faster growth than the 
poor. Merely to aim at equalling the rate of growth of the advanced countries, 
which would still leave the absolute gap in living standards growing larger 
and larger, will seem too modest a target to most of the developing countries 
themselves, but is in any case of little relevance to aid policy. 
The target for foreign aid must be, not any particular level of income or 
rate of growth, but to make the developing countries independent of the need 
for further aid; in other words, in the current phrase, to aim at self-sustaining 
growth. on this basis, the haul may be a long one but there is an end to the road – 
in the sense in which the US Administration was able to announce last June that 
aid to Taiwan and Greece will shortly end because these countries have outgrown 
the need for it.6
Discussion of the other question, the best distribution of aid among recipient 
countries, has yielded a similar conclusion. Since capacity to make effective use 
of aid, like almost every thing else, improves with economic development, the 
two criteria are liable to point to opposite policies: the countries most likely to 
make good use of aid will generally be countries, like Malaya or Taiwan, already 
well on the road towards economic development, while the capacity to absorb 
aid of very poor countries may be very limited. A better criterion than either is 
that pro posed by President Kennedy’s chief adviser on foreign aid, Dr. Rodan: 
“Ideally, aid should be allocated where it will have the maximum catalytic effect 
of mobilising additional national effort or preventing a fall in national effort. The 
primary criterion is thus to maximise additional effort, not to maximise income 
created per dollar of aid.”7
In practice, this will not be an easy test to apply. Additional national effort 
is hard to measure or predict. But as a broad guide to aid policy, it offers the best 
chance of channelling aid where it will do most good, in terms not merely of 
growth but of self-sustaining growth. 
6 Sydney Morning Herald, June 10, 1964.
7 P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan, “International Aid for Underdeveloped Countries,” Review of Economics and 
Statistics, May, 1961, p. 107.
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The means of aid
While the economic objectives of aid policy have now been reasonably clarified, 
there is still much argument about the relative merits of different forms and kinds 
of aid: capital aid versus technical assistance; multilateral versus bilateral aid; 
loans versus grants; tied versus untied aid; project versus programme aid; the role 
o£ surplus disposal, trade credit, and private investment; supply of experts versus 
training programmes; and last but not least, aid versus trade. Even to summarise 
the pros and cons of each one of them would take all my time and more. I will 
confine myself to some that may have particular relevance to Australia. 
The choice between capital aid and technical assistance is obviously not 
mutually exclusive. All the developing countries need both. They need external 
capital because their poverty does not allow them to finance an adequate rate of 
capital formation from domestic saving. It is estimated that total aid – international 
financial assistance from public funds for economic development – at the present 
rate of $5-6 billion a year constitutes about 30 per cent of total net investment 
in the under developed countries.8 While there is no simple mechanical relation 
between the rate of capital formation and growth of living standards, it is doubtful 
whether even the current rate of growth in per capita incomes in the developing 
countries, on average perhaps 1-1.5 per cent per year, could be sustained without 
this aid.
Technical assistance has the advantage to the donor country that it costs 
less than capital aid – for the simple reason that the quantity of it that can be 
organised in any year, or for that matter absorbed, is limited. But there is little 
sense in the currently fashionable notion that education and technical progress 
are more important for growth than capital formation. Both must go hand in 
hand, and this holds for foreign aid policies as much as for planning for economic 
growth in one country. 
Much the same applies to the prolonged debate over the relative merits 
of multilateral aid, through the United Nations, the World Bank and other 
international agencies, and bilateral aid from country to country. There are still 
 
 
8 H.W. Singer, op cit., p.16.
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very great advantages in channelling at least some part of aid through multilateral 
channels. Such aid is less liable to be suspected of having political or other strings 
attached to it, particularly where, as in the case of the United Nations, the agency 
straddles both sides of the Iron Curtain; the usefulness of funds is less likely to be 
limited by their being tied to the exports of individual donor countries; in the case 
of some international agencies, like the World Bank aid will be administered with 
unrivalled expertise; finally, the United Nations and other organs of international 
co-operation deserve support for their own sake, and using them as channels of 
aid is support of the most telling kind. 
But there is also much to be said for bilateral aid, even from an international 
or from the recipients’ point of view. As the number of donor countries has 
increased, the opportunity to play off one against the other has made bilateral 
aid quite attractive to receiving countries and has diminished fear of interference 
or political strings. Arrangements like the Colombo Plan and the Aid-India 
consortium have, by exercising a measure of co ordination, alleviated one of the 
more obvious disadvantages of bilateral aid. When it comes to efficiency, some 
of the inter national agencies, hamstrung by country quotas in staffing and other 
respects, have a checkered record. The bulk of aid will in any case continue to 
be bilateral simply because bilateral aid is overwhelmingly more attractive to the 
donors. Each donor country cherishes its “freedom to be more generous to a 
decent, friendly government than to an indecent, unfriendly one”;9 all donors “have 
political objectives, regional loyalties, security interests, and special relationships 
which move them to provide assistance over and above what is available from 
elsewhere”.10 What may look like interference to the recipient may to the donor 
seem no more than a minimum assurance that aid will not be wasted. Even the 
developing countries would suffer on balance “if exclusive reliance on multilateral 
agencies resulted in substantial economies but even greater reductions in the total 
availability of aid for developmental purposes’’.11
9 R. E. Asher, “Multilateral versus Bilateral Aid. An old Controversy Re-visited”, International 
Organization, Autumn, 1962, p. 705.
10 Ibid., p. 719.
11 Ibid., p. 709.
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Ten years ago, it was common to urge donor countries to give aid by way of 
outright grants, rather than by loans with their burdens of interest and ultimate 
repayment. on this point there has been a change of emphasis. The problem of 
debt service has not disappeared; indeed, the International Bank has stressed that 
many poor countries are nearing the limit of their ability to borrow on present 
terms.12 But the answer is now seen, not so much in grants, as in “soft” loans, 
loans for fifty or more years, at low interest, with debt service waived for an initial 
period which, rather in line with Soviet thinking and practice, are felt to be more 
businesslike.13
on another major issue, tied lending, there has been some clarification 
of thinking. It is obviously in the interests of the developing countries that loan 
money should be freely available to be spent where their needs can be met most 
effectively and cheaply. It is no less obviously tempting to donor governments 
to buy domestic support for aid by tying loans and – thus making aid a vehicle 
of export promotion. What has come to be more clearly recognised is that 
tied lending is legitimate where the donor country is in balance of payments 
difficulties and that explicit provision should he made for this. Ideally, countries 
in balance of payments surplus would agree “to untie their aid while permitting 
the countries in deficit to tie theirs’’.14
Technical assistance as a form of international aid is little more than ten 
years old. It is the subject of second thoughts both in relation to the supply 
of experts to developing countries and to the training of their nationals in the 
advanced countries. To quote just one observation made some years ago by one 
of the experts of the Ford Foundation: “A large part of this [technical] assistance 
has been wasted, in the long view, because it was not related to the process of 
achieving relative institutional self sufficiency in the countries receiving it… For 
the most part technical assistance has dealt with immediate problems. only now, 
I believe, is it being applied to the long-range job of institution building.’’15 on 
this principle, the Ford Foundation is, for example, helping to establish more than 
 
12 The Times, London, 3 october 1963.
13 H. J. P. Arnold, Aid for Developing Countries, Bodley Head, 1962, p. 36.
14 H. W. Singer, op. cit., p. 19, cf. also Rosenstein-Rodan, op. cit., p. 111.
15 George F. Gant, “Technical Assistance in the Sub-Continent”, paper delivered at the London School of 
oriental and African Studies, London, January 8, 1960, Ford Foundation (roneoed), pp. 6, 7.
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50 polytechnics in Pakistan. This approach is also receiving increasing emphasis 
in the work of the Special Fund and other United Nations agencies. 
There is, finally, the large subject of Aid and Trade. It has frequently been 
pointed out that the developing countries lost as much through the deterioration 
in their terms of trade during the nineteen-fifties as they received in aid. The 
recent United Nations Conference on Trade and development was called to seek 
some agreed answers to the desperate trade needs of the developing countries. 
If UNCTAD achieved little agreement except on the establishment of another 
international organisation, it did secure all-round recognition that “the play of 
market forces is an inadequate basis for the economic relations between rich and 
poor countries’’.16 It is a paradoxical fact that the rich countries seem willing to 
pour out aid, but are niggardly to a degree with trade concessions. The reason is 
no doubt that “the burden of trade concessions and trade adjustments may be 
concentrated upon influential, if narrow, vested interest; whereas the burden of 
aid is more widely spread among the general body of taxpayers and less clearly 
defined’’.17 There would seem to be scope here for breaking down some of the 
opposition through tax-financed assistance to the vested interests in undertaking 
the required adjustments of production and trade. As Dr. Prebisch said in his 
preparatory report to UNCTAD, “it is no good to preach the need for them 
[the developing countries] to develop by their own efforts and at the same time 
to limit their possibilities of giving practical expression to that effort in the inter 
national field through the expansion of their exports’’.18
These then are some of the ideas on foreign aid policy that have emerged 
in recent overseas discussion. What is a sound approach to foreign aid for the 
major donor countries like the United States or the United Kingdom, however, 
does not necessarily make a sensible foreign aid policy for a country in Australia’s 
in many ways very different circumstances. Before we can test Australia’s present 
performance in the light of these principles, we should look more closely at her 
special circumstances. 
16 Lynceus (The Economist, London ), “After the Geneva Trade Talks”, Canberra Times, June 25, 1964.
17 H. W. Singer, op. cit., p. 19.
18 Towards a New Trade Policy for Development, Report by the Secretary General, UNCTAD, United 




The first of these, which places Australia much more nearly in the position of Britain 
or France than the United States, is her responsibility for a large underdeveloped 
dependent territory in Papua and New Guinea. While the United States has 
some dependent territories, their claims are negligible in relation to the total of 
American aid. More than 90 per cent of aid given by Britain and France, on the 
other hand, goes to their present or former Colonies.19
The case for giving first priority in aid to “the territory politically dependent 
on ourselves’’20 is obvious: being politically de pendent, it can get aid only 
from us or through us. At the same time, while we control its government and 
administration we will feel confident, perhaps unduly confident, that aid will 
be effectively used. It is not perhaps so obvious why Australia should not, like 
Britain and France, channel almost the whole of her aid effort in this direction. 
The answer is partly that, at least in the short run, the absorptive capacity of 
Papua and New Guinea is limited, but mainly that the former British and French 
Colonies represent a large part of the underdeveloped world. In Australia’s case, a 
policy of giving all aid to New Guinea and none for multilateral aid or bilaterally 
to other underdeveloped countries would, from a purely self-interest point of 
view, have a double disadvantage: it would mean giving up all the diplomatic, 
commercial or other purposes that aid can serve while making Australia look 
selfish in the eyes of the world.
The second feature which obviously distinguishes Australia from the 
major donors is that she is small. on a generous reckoning, Australia is this year 
contributing no more than 1.5 per cent to the world total of aid to developing 
countries and only one fortieth of the American contribution. If we, in common 
with all other rich countries, raised our aid to 1 per cent of national income, our 
share would be much the same as now.21 
19 Sir John Maud, Aid for Developing Countries, Stamp Memorial Lecture,1963, University of London, 
1964, p. 11; H. J. P. Arnold, op. cit., p. 87.
20 Sir John Maud, op. cit., p. 9.
21 Estimates given by Rosenstein-Rodan (op cit., p.118) suggest that Australia accounts for about 1.3 per 
cent of the aggregate national income of all the developed countries.
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It at once follows from this that, unlike the United States, Australia can 
never through her aid alone make a significant difference to the capital resources 
and therefore the rate of economic growth of the developing countries. What is 
happening to the overall rate of economic development of the recipient countries 
– New Guinea excepted – can never be a test of the efficacy of Australian aid. And 
this would remain true even if it were practicable, as it is not, to concentrate all 
our aid on one country, say Malaysia or Thailand. We can, of course, con tribute 
our mite to joint efforts large enough to make a difference – whether through the 
United Nations or through consortia – but only at the price of relative anonymity. 
The modest dimensions of what we can give also imply that we cannot, generally 
speaking, attach major conditions to our aid, while not weighty enough to insist 
on conditions which might reassure us as to the effective use of our aid, we have 
the correlative advantage that we are much less likely than a major donor to 
be suspected of interference in the recipient countries’ internal affairs. And, of 
course, we can, if we choose, help by setting the pace for other donor countries. 
A third closely related fact is that Australia is not a Great Power. We are free 
from the burden of leadership of the Western Alliance which inevitably colours 
most aspects of American foreign aid policy. It should therefore be easier for us 
than for the United States to concentrate on economic criteria in aid policy. But 
Australia is neither so small as to be effectively in capable of aspiring to a foreign 
policy of her own nor in the position – a by no means inexpensive position – 
of neutrals like Switzerland, Austria and (in some respects) Sweden. Even the 
smallest country is liable to pay regard at least to goodwill in its allocation of aid, 
because even the smallest country -like Ike – likes to be liked. To a greater extent 
than New Zealand, Australia has foreign policy interests which to her are vitally 
important and which she cannot ignore in her foreign aid policy. Unlike Canada, 
Australia lies close to one of the world’s trouble spots and has all kinds among 
her neighbours. Aid is to her in part a means of undoing some of the damage 
done in Asia by her restrictive immigration policy. Last but not least, Australia is 
a member of the Western Alliance and carries the obligations of this membership 
in her part of the world with respect to both military aid and the allocation of 
economic aid. 
Finally, there is the notion that, in the words of her official spokesman at 
UNCTAD, Australia is “in something of a midway position between the developed 
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and the developing countries’’.22 This is true in a sense but much less relevant to 
foreign aid (or trade) policy than is sometimes suggested. It is true that, as a country 
exporting primary products, we share the interest of most developing countries in 
more stable and expanding world markets for such products. on the other hand, we 
share the reluctance of the advanced industrial countries in giving the manufactures 
of the Asian countries freer access to our home markets. And to suggest that we 
resemble the poorer countries in being a “developing” and “capital importing” 
country and that this, in some way, excuses us from helping them through aid 
and trade in the same measure as other rich countries is sheer humbug. No doubt 
Australia is developing, but so are the United States, France Japan, Germany, 
and some of these a good deal faster. No doubt our immigration policy makes 
heavy demands on our capital resources, but it is a policy which is not in anyone’s 
national interest but ours. No doubt Australia is importing capital, but her capacity 
to “attract from overseas investors a large inflow of funds which those investors . . 
. would not invest in poorer countries”23 might well be thought to enhance rather 
than diminish her obligation to make what aid she can available to her less fortunate 
neighbours. I was shocked to hear that the resolution adopted at UNCTAD, asking 
each economically advanced country to give not less than 1 per cent of its national 
income in aid to developing countries, was qualified, apparently at the insistence 
of and for the special benefit of Australia, by the phrase “having regard, however, 
to the special position of certain countries which are net importers of capital”.24 I 
hope we will not use this miserable loophole to crawl out of an obligation which 
less wealthy countries are shouldering willingly. Here I must leave the discussion of 
principles in order to leave myself time to say something about what Australia is 
now doing, and what she might be doing, in the field of foreign aid. 
Australia’s performance
Table 31.1 gives an overall statistical picture of Australia’s past record and present 
performance. In 1963/64 Australian Government expenditure on foreign aid in 
all forms amounted to £45 million. Expressed as a percentage of national income 
this was two-thirds of 1 per cent. No equally up-to-date figures are as yet at 
my disposal for other countries. Since foreign aid effort has increased almost 
22 Statement to UNCTAD by Mr. John McEwen, March 26, 1964.
23 A. Clunies Ross, op. cit., p. 43.
24 UNCTAD, Final Act, Annex A, p. 86. E/CoNF. 46/L.28, 16 June, 1964.
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everywhere in the last few years, any comparison with figures for earlier years in 
other countries may put Australia in an unduly favourable light. For what it is 
worth such an international league table placed Australia well behind the leader, 
France (1.9 per cent), and also behind the United States (0.8 per cent) and two 
smaller countries with whom she might well compare herself, Belgium (0.9 per 
cent) and the Netherlands (0.8 per cent), but on a par with the United Kingdom 
and Germany in fifth place.25 
In addition to aid from public funds, Australians contribute a not insignificant 
amount, estimated at something over £3 million in 1963/64, through private channels 
such as the Churches, the Volunteer Graduates Scheme, the Freedom from Hunger 
Campaign and Community Aid Abroad.26 But if this is mentioned, one might 
feel constrained to mention also the perhaps not dissimilar amount of “technical 
assistance” which Australia still receives, mainly from American public agencies and 
foundations for research in Australia and training of Australians abroad.27 
Almost two-thirds of the £45 million of official aid last year was accounted 
for by net government expenditure in Papua and New Guinea. While one might 
blush at some of the items included in this definition of “aid” to the Papuans, 
it seems to me entirely reasonable, as I have said before, not only to treat such 
expenditure as aid but indeed for Australia to accord this form of aid high priority. 
of the rest of Australia’s official foreign aid last year, some £6.5 million 
constituted bilateral aid, the bulk of it under the Colombo Plan and SEATo 
Economic Assistance. Some £9.5 million was multilateral aid, of which £6 million 
went to the International Bank, its subsidiary the International Development 
Association and the Bank-sponsored Indus Waters Project, and most of the 
rest to the Special Fund and other agencies of the United Nations. Even if the 
contribution to the Indus Waters Scheme is treated as bilateral, Australia was doing 
rather better than most countries in the share of aid given in multilateral form.28
25 The percentages for other countries are those calculated by A. Clunies Ross for oECD data for 1962 
(op. cit., p. 12).
26 Nancy Anderson, “Australia’s Voluntary Foreign Aid Activities”, Australian Outlook, August, 1964.
27 Cf. statement by Dr. P. A. Siple, Scientific Attaché, US  Embassy Canberra, quoted Daily Telegraph, 
May 1, 1964.
28 “only some 10 per cent of total world aid is in multilateral form, 90 per cent being bilateral, and the 
proportions o£ our British aid are much the same” (Sir John Maud, op. cit., p. 9)
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Table 31.1:  Australia’s foreign aid (£A ‘000) 
(Australian grants and grant-like contributions to international 











 IBRD gold and dollar   
 payments
2,379 119 - -
 IBRD release of 18 per cent  
 subscription                            
18,583 2,817 2,672 2,672
 IFC 998 - - -
 IDA 1,909 382 1,346 2,724
Others:
 UN Special Fund - - - 375
 UNRRA 22,522 - - -
 Post UNRRA 1,830 - - -
 UNKRA 1,799 - - -
 UNICEF 6,068 230 240 240
 UNHCR 479 51 50 75
 UNRWA 1,300 88 90 90
 UNEPTA 2,926 299 279 335
 UN Fund for Congo 335 67 - -
 ICEM Far East Refugees 265 48 50 50
 Indus Waters Scheme 2,594 519 968 2,770
 World Food Programme 202 40 202 240
 WHo Malaria Eradication 48 9 - -
 FAo Freedom from Hunger 8 2 - -
 WRY 50 10 - -
Total 67,657 4,687 5,906 9,529
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Table 31.1:  Australia’s foreign aid (£A ‘000) 
(Australian grants and grant-like contributions to international 










Laos Stabilisation Fund - - - 179
Colombo Plan:
 Economic development 35,783 2,638 2,764 2,700
 Technical assistance 12,716 1,588 2,082 2,300
Gifts to United Kingdom 45,000 - - -
SEATo: Economic Assistance 3,774 717 1,248 1,000
SCAAP 96 30 76 150
Scholarships 685 110 273 322
Flood and disaster relief 429 42 89 35
Refugees 291 4 22 -
Congo Medical Team 19 27 - -
Total 98,793 5,156 6,554 6,686
Papua/New Guinea
Grants to administration 143,619 15,275 20,000 25,250
Identifiable departmental 
expenditures
12,434 1,448 3,000 3,000
Agricultural loans to ex-servicemen 
(Net)
2,327 463 634 354
Total 158,380 17,186 23,634 28,604
Grand total 324,830 27,029 36,094 44,819
Source: Department of External Affairs, Canberra.
It is the £5 million of Australian Colombo Plan aid that Australians hear 
most about because, though given in response to specific requests by the receiving 
countries, it consists of Australian products, experts and training facilities and 
thus comes into the lives of numerous Australians. Since the beginning of the 
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scheme in 1950, Australia has given more than £35 million in economic aid, a 
good part in the form of commodities such as wheat, flour and skimmed milk, 
but also buses, tractors, road building and agricultural machinery, radio sets for 
schools, books scientific instruments – a great range of things selected largely from 
specialties incorporating Australian know-how. Under Colombo Plan technical 
assistance, Australia has supplied some 600 experts to give assistance and advice,29 
and has provided training facilities at universities, secondary schools, technical 
and other colleges for some 5,200 students from Asia.30 In addition, some 400 
Australians have undertaken technical assistance missions under United Nations 
and other auspices,31 and some 3,000 Asian students a year study privately at 
Australian universities, like Australian university students very largely at the 
expense of the Australian taxpayer.32 
Table 31.2 shows the country distribution of Australian Colombo Plan 
Aid – in the nature of the case no similar breakdown is possible for multilateral 
aid. More than one-half of the total has gone to India, Pakistan and Ceylon; but 
most of this has been economic development aid, a not inconsiderable portion 
in wheat and flour. The largest recipient of Australian technical assistance (in 
all three forms, training, experts and equipment) has been Malaysia; followed 
for training facilities by Indonesia, India, Burma, Thailand, Pakistan and the 
Philippines; by Indonesia, Pakistan, Ceylon, Vietnam and Thailand for experts; 
and by Vietnam, Thailand, Pakistan, India and Indonesia for equipment. 
So far so good. But is this record good enough for a country as wealthy 
as Australia and, through her geographic position, so intimately associated with 
many poor neighbours? Certainly our performance so far does not justify excessive 
self-congratulation. 
29 J J. Pratt, Deputy Director, Commonwealth offIce of Education, “The Services of Australians overseas”, 
paper delivered at Fifth Annual Conference, Australian College of Education, Canberra, May 15-18, 
1964 (roneoed), Table 1.
30 Senator Gorton, Acting Minister for External Affairs, Canberra Times, July 1, 1964.
31 J. J. Pratt, op. cit.
32 G. Caiger, “What are we doing for Foreign Students in Universities?” paper delivered at Fifth Annual 
Conference, Australian College of Education, Canberra, May lS-18, 1964 (roneoed), p. 7.
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It was only last year that Australia’s total official aid expenditure, including 
expenditure on New Guinea, reached two-thirds of the one per cent target. In 
1962-63 Australia’s multilateral aid contribution was under £6 million, less than 
one-tenth of 1 per cent of her national income. Until that year, Australia was one 
of the few developed countries which did not contribute to the United Nations 
Special Fund. By June, 1964, Australia had contributed in all some £24 million 
to the International Bank (and its subsidiaries) from which it had, in return, 
obtained loans totalling almost £170 million.33 Most of the rest of Australia’s 
multilateral aid (apart from steady support for the United Nations Children’s 
Fund) had been for refugee relief, a laudable cause, but not perhaps entirely 
unconnected with the immigration programme towards the cost of which a not 
inconsiderable contribution has been made by international agencies and over 
seas governments.34 Even in 1963-64, Australia’s total aid effort of £45 million 
was less than one-fifth of the amount she borrowed from overseas and not much 
more than the amount she lent – very sensibly, in my view – as 12 months’ trade 
credit to Communist China.35 
Australia will, I hope, without quibbling, aim to fulfil the obligation assumed 
by the developed countries at UNCTAD to raise their contribution to foreign aid 
to at least 1 per cent of national income. If expenditure is to be thus increased, it 
becomes correspondingly more important that the money is well spent.
Comparing Australia’s present foreign aid policy with the principles 
I discussed earlier in this lecture, I do not feel that there is much seriously 
wrong with the forms or directions of Australian aid. In particular, none of the 
suggestions for radical reform one hears from time to time – such as that all 
or none of Australia’s aid should go to particular countries or assume particular 
forms – does justice to the complexity of the problem. But there are a number of 
suggestions I would make.
33 Commonwealth Year Book, 1963, p. 973; Commonwealth Statistician, Balance of Payments 1963/64.
34 Attempts to estimate this contribution have so far failed.
35 Total sales of wheat to Mainland China in 1963/64 were worth £64 million; one-half of this was on 12 
months’ credit, 40 per cent on shorter-term credit, 10 per cent in cash.
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Suggestions for the future
Australia is committed to an all-out effort to prepare New Guinea for independence, 
economically as well as politically. This will require raising Australian government 
expenditure to the limit of the Territory’s absorptive capacity, and attracting 
private capital by any means which will not store up trouble for the future. Nor 
should we be too proud, at the Papuans’ expense, to ask for United Nations and 
other multilateral aid in this task. 
Table 31.2:  Australia’s expenditure on the Colombo Plan  
(cumulative total 1947 to 31/12/63)
Head of expenditure Total
Country Economic 
development




£A’000 £A’000 £A’000 £A’000 s. d.
Brunei - 32 1 - 32 7 5
Burma 682 569 58 187 1,496 1 5
Cambodia 780 45 82 69 976 4 0
Ceylon 3,450 357 186 158 4,152 8 2
India 13,112 725 87 258 14,183 0 7
Indonesia 3,347 1,710 451 235 5,743 1 2
Korea - 16 - - 16 0 0
Laos 308 33 25 61 427 4 10
Malaysia 832 2,348 827 524 4,531 9 0
Nepal 132 51 25 13 222 0 6
Pakistan 10,950 548 217 293 12,008 2 7
Philippines 43 405 57 204 709 0 7
Thailand 1,351 550 119 306 2,326 2 0
Vietnam 1,504 327 160 340 2,330 3 5
Mekong Survey - - 170 65
Miscellaneous 250
Total 36,740 7,717 2,464 2,713
Source: Department of External Affairs, Australia in the Colombo Plan, Progress Report to December 31, 
1963, Canberra, 1964.
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In return, Australia might well increase her contribution to multilateral 
aid, especially to the United Nations Special Fund and by joining the India and 
Pakistan consortia. 
Australia is almost unique among the rich donor countries in that all her aid 
has hitherto consisted of grants, virtually none of it of loans. Such a policy, as we 
saw before, no longer earns the high marks it would have done ten years ago. In 
Australia refusal to lend to developing countries tends to be justified by her own 
large-scale borrowing from overseas. This is a specious argument. Why should 
not Australia make her contribution in part by passing on to the developing 
countries some of the benefits of her high international credit standing and other 
attractions to overseas investors? Through such institutions as the Inter national 
Development Association, or a regional Development Bank in the ECAFE area or 
in other ways, Australia might per form a modest role as an international financial 
intermediary – not for profit but as a contribution to the common purpose of aid. 
If our balance of payments situation demands it -as it surely does not at present – 
let us by all means offer tied loans which are better than no loans.
Without suggesting that Australia’s aid programme under the Colombo 
Plan is not in general soundly conceived, there is a case for re-appraisal of some 
of its features. How effective is the technical assistance Australia gives through the 
supply of experts? Could it be made more effective by better selection or briefing 
here or by more careful preparation at the other end? Would money be better 
spent by taking up the Ford Foundation’s principle of “institution-building”? Is 
the student training programme as useful to the students and their countries, and 
as productive of goodwill for Australia, as is commonly assumed? What happens 
to the Asian students when they return? Are they dissatisfied, nostalgic for western 
fleshpots? Do they find jobs for which they were trained, or for that matter, any 
jobs at all? Without departing from the Colombo Plan principle of acting only in 
response to specific requests for aid by the receiving countries, could aid be made 
more effective by Australian advice on the selection of aid projects, for instance 
by the appointment of some capable and sympathetic Australian of standing as 
Aid Adviser? To some of these questions we are now, at the Australian National 




There may be scope for greater participation in Australia’s aid effort, and 
particularly in technical assistance, by Australian private enterprise. The US 
Government has recently set up an Executive Service Corps which “will provide 
American business men with an opportunity to furnish, on request, technical and 
managerial advice to businessmen in developing countries”.36 Australia’s capacity 
to help in this area is obviously much more limited, but it is not negligible. CEDA 
– the Committee for Economic Development of Australia – is the obvious body 
to examine the possibilities for a larger aid contribution by Australian business.
one has the impression that in Australia the politicians are reluctant to 
adopt a more ambitious foreign aid policy for fear of hostile public reaction 
while large sections of the public, particularly among the younger people, are 
increasingly impatient for the Government to give a stronger lead. Could this 
gulf be bridged by following the example of the Netherlands where the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs has recently set up a Foreign Aid Advisory Council to ensure 
continuous contact between Government, voluntary agencies, universities, 
business, trade unions and other groups actually or potentially concerned with 
foreign aid issues. 
Finally, a few words on trade and aid. Australia has every right to fight side 
by side with the developing countries for a better deal for primary products in 
the markets of the industrial countries. But she also shares the duty of the rich 
industrial countries to stop discriminating against the exports of manufactures 
of the so-called “low-wage” countries and, indeed, to examine some of the ways 
suggested in the Prebisch Report by which the principle of non-discrimination 
might be waived in their favour, so as to compensate them for their initial infant 
industry handicap. In her trade agreements with Japan, Australia has gone 
some way in this direction. But much more is needed. Yet it will not be done 
if every increase in imports from Asia threatens some Australian vested interest, 
some existing local industry. It can be done only in the context of a long-range 
programme for Australia’s own industrial development which links the pattern of 
expansion of Australian manufacturing production with the pattern of mutual 
trade in manufactures most likely to be beneficial both to Australia and to her 
Asian trading partners. 
36 President Johnson, Message to Congress on “The US Foreign Aid Program”, March 19, 1964.
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In turn, Australia should not be backward or mealy-mouthed about linking 
aid in some measure to her own trading interests. Aid in kind, soft loans, technical 
assistance – all these can be of genuine help to the developing countries and 
at the same time assist Australian manufacturers in overcoming the difficulties 
of breaking into new export markets in competition with the major overseas 
industrial countries. As has been pointed out, even “Soviet aid, just like the 
market operations of Western commerce, ought to be regarded as a method of 
securing foreign markets”.37 
————
In 1919 Alfred Marshall wrote: “It is becoming clear that this [Britain] and 
every other western country can now afford to make increased sacrifices of 
material wealth for the purpose of raising the quality of life throughout their 
whole populations. A time may come when such matters will be treated as of 
cosmopolitan rather than national obligation: but that time is not in sight.”38 
Today, much sooner perhaps than Marshall expected, we can say that the 
time has come. Foreign aid is the extension to the international sphere of the 
principles of the Welfare State. To rich countries like Australia foreign aid is as 
much a matter both of moral obligation and of self-interest as were progressive 
income tax and social services for the well-to-do in Marshall’s England. 
37 K. Billerbeck, Soviet Bloc Foreign Aid to the Underdeveloped Countries, Hamburg Archives of World 
Economy, 1960, p. 100, quoted H. J. P. Arnold, op. cit., p. 117





Tariff policy has recently been a matter of controversy. Criticisms of government 
policy have been along two lines. First, it is said that there have been important 
increases in tariffs and extensions of the field of protection so that in many cases 
protection is now excessive. Secondly, it is said that the Government is not leaving 
it to the Tariff Board to decide which industries should be protected and how 
much protection there should be, but that it is limiting the Board or by-passing 
it in various ways. While the two issues are in principle distinct, in practice they 
tend to get mixed up because the Tariff Board has come to be regarded to some 
extent as a guardian of tariff moderation against the supposed protectionist 
inclinations of the Government.2 
Here my purposes are as follows. First, I shall present briefly some of the 
main facts about recent tariff policy bearing on the two criticisms above. This is 
not an easy task since our tariffs, and the machinery for changing them, are very 
complicated and are in fact in a continuous state of change. It is therefore not 
surprising that most people find it very difficult to get a clear perspective on what 
has been happening. Secondly, I shall discuss a central issue of long-term tariff 
policy, namely the question of the “bench mark.” 
1 Thirty-second Joseph Fisher Lecture, 27 July 1967. Since published as chapter 6 in Corden, W. M. 
(1997) The Road to Reform: Essays on Australian Political Economy, Sydney: Addison-Wesley
2 The debate and the general development of tariff policy have been fully reported by Mr. Alan Wood in 
the columns of The Australian Financial Review. A review of the issues and the political background by 
Mr. Peter Samuel appeared in The Bulletin, May 13, 1967.
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I. Recent tariff changes
Between January 1965 and April 1967, 57 Tariff Board reports were tabled in 
Parliament. These covered a wide range of products and industries, from the 
trivially unimportant, such as pins, cycle saddles and bubble levels, to such major 
reports as those on motor cars and components and on industrial chemicals. To 
obtain proper perspective it is necessary to be selective. My basis of selection 
is the size of the industry or activity affected by a report, judging primarily by 
employment. There were 15 reports affecting manufacturing industries which 
employed at least 800 persons. In addition there is the report on crude petroleum 
which must be included in a list of important reports. The 16 reports are listed 
in the Appendix. Most of the other reports affected quite minor products or 
industries. of the 16 reports on which my discussion will be based, the two most 
important ones by far are those on motor cars and components and on industrial 
chemicals. Much of the political controversy has been provoked by tariff changes 
resulting from this last report. It must be stressed that the tariffs reviewed in all 
these reports are only the top of the iceberg which happened to emerge in the 
period considered; many important tariffs were not looked at and indeed have 
not been looked at for many years. 
First I shall outline the level of protection provided as well as the devices 
that are being used. For each tariff item there are usually two rates, the General 
and British Preferential rates; I shall always cite the former. Every thing I shall say 
will be oversimplified and thus somewhat inaccurate. I am looking for a broad 
picture. Details can be found in the relevant Tariff Board reports and Ministerial 
statements. At this stage I shall describe not Tariff Board recommendations but 
actual tariff changes imposed by the Government. As will be indicated later, in 
important cases these have not been in line with Tariff Board recommendations. 
I begin with the two major cases. 
Motor cars and chemicals
In the motor car field we may broadly distinguish the vehicle manufacturers from 
the manufacturers of components. The former were until recently protected by 
a 35 per cent tariff. The tariff rate for most components was also 35 per cent, 
but the crucial complication was that manufacturers were allowed to import 
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a high proportion of the components they used under by-law, that is free of 
duty or at a rate of 7.5 per cent. This was not important for those cars, notably 
the Holden and the Falcon, which in fact have an Australian content of 95 per 
cent or more. But for manufacturers such as Volkswagen it meant that their 
effective protection3 was well above 35 per cent; in view of the limited volume 
production of all producers other than GMH and Ford they clearly needed very 
high effective rates to survive. In 1964 the Government decided to enforce a 
higher Australian content on the smaller motor car manufacturers. Continuation 
of the privilege of importing their components under by-law was made subject 
to an undertaking to increase steadily the Australian content of their vehicles, a 
time-limit having been set to reach 95 per cent Australian content for all but the 
very lowest volume producers. The details of these arrangements have been varied 
several times; a complete assessment is difficult because information about the 
content percentages of the different firms and the Government’s requirements 
for them is insufficient. Essentially it means that protection for the components 
manufacturers is being increased sharply at the expense of protection for the 
smaller vehicle manufacturers. At first sight it seems that the tariff on components 
is really no more than 35 per cent since the vehicle manufacturers appear to have 
the option of moving to 95 per cent Australian content or simply paying a 35 per 
cent duty on all parts. But this is not really so. It is clear that the Government 
is determined to increase the Australian content of locally assembled vehicles 
and in fact to induce a movement towards 95 per cent. If many manufacturers 
chose the option of not following such a “plan”, the Government would no doubt 
raise the duty on components until the manufacturers made the desired decision. 
Thus the new arrangements are really the equivalent of the gradual imposition on 
components of a near-prohibitive duty. In addition there has been a rise in the 
tariff on completed vehicles from 35 per cent to 45 per cent. This was designed 
to discourage increased imports but might also be regarded as part compensation 
for the “forced march” to Australian content. on balance there appears to have 
been a large increase in protection for components producers paid for partly by 
the lower-volume vehicle manufacturers and partly, through the rise in the tariff 
on fully assembled cars, by the consumer. 
3 I use the term “effective protection” as meaning the rate of protection in relation to value added. The 
concept is explained in the Vernon Report and in my review of this report in The Economic Record, XLII, 
1966. Figures cited in this paper are apparent, not effective rates, unless indicated otherwise.
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The great chemicals case covered numerous industrial chemicals and plastic 
materials. This was a comprehensive case covering many items which had been 
investigated several times separately before. In fact in the last few years chemicals 
have kept the Tariff Board busier than textiles. The normal tariff rates were 
simplified and consolidated. Most chemicals were given either a 25 per cent or a 
40 per cent tariff. Certain products, namely synthetic rubber, PVC, polyethylene 
and vinyl acetate monomer, were given a 60 per cent tariff. The tariff was extended 
to cover substitutes which had previously not been protected and provision was 
made for future substitution resulting from technical developments. There were 
some unimportant tariff reductions; on important items there were increases or 
extensions of the tariff. 
The innovation coming out of the chemical industry review was the system 
of “support prices”. A price is fixed which is regarded as a “normal” duty-paid 
import value. If duty-paid import prices fall below this, 90 per cent of the 
difference is charged in tariff. Currently support prices apply to about forty 
chemical items. Let me take an example of how the system works. Say the support 
price is $134, that the normal tariff rate is 40 per cent and that normally transport 
accounts for 15 per cent of the landed duty-free cost of goods. This implies that 
the normal f.o.b. price is $85 and the normal c.i.f. price $100. Now if the actual 
f.o.b. price is $70 and the actual c.i.f. price $82, the normal tariff will be $28 and 
the special duty $21.60, the consumer thus paying $131.60. The impact of the 
system depends of course completely on the level at which support prices are fixed 
and on actual import prices, and is very difficult to assess. Its object seems to be 
to provide almost complete protection against “disruptive pricing” from abroad. 
It is a form of “ultra-protection” which the European Economic Community uses 
for its agriculture. 
There are interesting contrasts between the motor car and the chemical 
cases. The motor car and components industry must be regarded as broadly 
an economic industry for Australia. If there were little or no tariff on cars and 
components there would still be a substantial Australian industry, even though 
protection was no doubt required in its early stages and some components 
would, very rightly, not be produced in Australia. With a uniform tariff of 
30 per cent (and no by-law imports) there would probably be a readjustment 
involving expansion of components manufacture and some contraction of 
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marginal vehicle manufacture. By contrast there must be serious doubt whether 
a substantial section of the chemical industry is economic, in the sense of 
having reasonable prospects of being able to manage in time with moderate 
protection. With a uniform tariff of 30 per cent and nothing else, important 
parts of this industry would, on their own evidence, be in serious and probably 
long-term difficulty. There is another contrast. The motor car components 
manufacturers have not been in difficulties. They have been expanding and 
profits have been good. The Government’s move to increase Australian content 
has thus not been a rescue operation. Rather, there seems to have been a 
deliberate decision to expand this section of Australian industry. The reason 
for this has not emerged from Government statements; perhaps it reflects an 
ideology of forced manufacturing development, the motor car having the same 
mystic role in Australia as the steel mill has in some underdeveloped countries, 
or per haps it was in response to specific pressures. on the other hand, the 
increase in protection to the chemical industry has more the appearance of a 
rescue operation for the companies concerned (mainly six foreign controlled 
companies), though it is not clear from the evidence just how great the need 
really has been. 
These are the two major cases which dominate the tariff history of 1965 
and 1966. The chemical case may go down in history as a high-water mark of 
Australian postwar protectionism. Let me now quickly run through some of the 
other cases listed in the Appendix. 
Other industries
Protection for crude petroleum production has been provided for the first time; the 
object is to stimulate exploration, but of course it will also stimulate production. 
A domestic price above the price of imported crude has been fixed; together 
with arrangements designed to ensure that refiners absorb all the crude produced 
domestically, it has an effect equivalent to a tariff (c.i.f. basis) of about 45 per 
cent. In the short run the cost is borne by the refiners, who are themselves not 
protected – so that it gives them a negative effective rate – but in the long run 
they are likely to be allowed to raise prices to take account of the higher cost of 
domestic crude so that the cost will be borne by consumers. 
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For small engines a tariff of 65 per cent has been provided, with a specific 
alternative duty which may yield even higher protection. This tariff rate is to be 
reviewed within three to five years. The three foreign-owned companies producing 
electrical capacitors were until 1966 receiving a 100 per cent tariff, except for those 
capacitors used by electricity supply authorities on which the tariff was 50 per 
cent. These were all reduced in 1966 to 45 per cent. The effective rate would now 
be about 100 per cent. The industry producing air conditioning and refrigerating 
equipment was reviewed this year and the tariff was left undisturbed. For its main 
item the tariff is at least 57.5 per cent, and more for lower-priced imports. For 
the average price of sealed compressors from Japan the duty would be about 75 
per cent.
The changes in the glassware tariff reflected a fairly typical pattern. Consider 
heat-resisting glassware. The normal tariff had been 40 per cent. In addition there 
had been a temporary duty imposed by the Special Advisory Authority in specific 
form. In ad valorem terms, the total duty had ranged from 55 per cent to 130 per 
cent. Now the normal tariff was raised to 60 per cent. Thus the tariff change to 
some extent consolidated the temporary duty by making it permanent, but not 
wholly so, since for lower-priced items there was a tariff reduction. The duty on 
table glassware was in creased to 45 per cent or 30 cents per dozen, whichever is 
the higher. 
An important case is the footwear industry’s. It is important because this 
highly labour-intensive industry employs about 23,000 persons. For leather 
footwear there is now a single rate of 45 per cent; previously the rate had been 4S 
per cent for men’s shoes and 40 per cent for ladies’ and children’s shoes. Leather 
is obtained at or near world prices and the effective rate is probably over 100 per 
cent. The rubber footwear industry obtains much higher duties. 
The tariff on man-made fibre yarns is fantastically complicated with many 
types of products and complex rates of duty. So far as I can tell, the main items 
seem to be nylon and terylene yarn, produced by a subsidiary of ICIANZ, for 
which the tariff is now about 40-50 per cent, with the effective rate much higher. 
Finally, I come to those habitues of Tariff Board hearings, the manufacturers 
of textile fabrics. There have been two important cases in the period. For cotton 
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fabrics the tariff has been greatly simplified, a great mass of complex tariffs having 
been replaced by a single rate of 55 per cent. This applies only to those items 
(accounting for about one-quarter of the Australian market by value) which are 
produced domestically, tariffs on other cotton items being at non-protective 
levels. The 55 per cent rate for the protective items seems to be roughly an average 
of pre-existing duties but represents a substantial decrease in the tariff for certain 
sections that were previously protected at very high rates, notably that producing 
canvas and duck. The effective rate for cotton fabrics would be well above 55 
per cent. Similarly a uniform duty of 55 per cent was provided for man-made 
fibre fabrics, though in this case an alternative specific duty would yield higher 
protection for very low-priced fabrics. Previously the ad valorem equivalent of 
duties had been much higher than 55 per cent for the lower-priced fabrics, this 
being the type of fabric competitive with most Australian production. I would 
estimate the tariff on relevant items to have averaged 75 per cent, so that there 
has been a significant decrease in protection for what has been one of Australia’s 
most highly protected larger industries. on the other hand, protection for higher-
priced fabrics has been increased. 
So as not to present an unbalanced picture, let me end with another case. 
Tubes of iron and steel paid a tariff of 35 per cent up to 1965, when the tariff was 
reduced to 20 per cent. There has been virtually no import competition. The 
principal producer is the British-owned firm of Tubemakers and it was found to 
be making high profits. 
What emerges from this? The difficulties in tariff averages are well-known 
and I have not attempted to summarize the story in a few figures. one is struck 
above all by the high rates of protection provided in almost all cases. This is so 
even though I have not been able to calculate the implications in ad valorem terms 
of support prices for chemicals. These high tariffs must be regarded in many cases 
as the long-term consequences of the period of import licensing. In major cases 
there have been increases in protection or consolidations of temporary duties 
into normal duties. But this has not been an invariable trend. Some tariffs have 
been reduced, the major examples being electrical capacitors (to 45 per cent) and 
lower-priced man-made fibre fabrics (to 45 per cent), and others have remained 
constant, though often at very high levels. The assessment of these tariff levels 
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depends on many considerations, some of which I shall explore later in my 
discussion of the “benchmark”. 
The Government and the Tariff Board
Some people think that all tariff decisions, other than purely administrative ones, 
should be made upon the advice of the Tariff Board and that the Board should 
be completely independent in its approach. Let us see what this might imply 
in any particular case. First, the Department of Trade and Industry would send 
a tariff reference to the Board that would simply ask the Board to recommend 
“whether assistance should be accorded the production in Australia” of the 
products concerned, and what rates of duty should be provided. There would 
be no “writing of policy into the reference”. Secondly the Board would make its 
recommendations without taking into account what sort of recommendations 
it thinks the Department would welcome; it might perhaps provide a choice of 
policies, indicating its own preference. In other words, it would be independent. 
Thirdly, the Government would accept the recommendations and propose the 
relevant legislation. It would not vary them nor send the reference back to the 
Board. Fourthly, the Government would not within a short period send any of the 
tariff items concerned to the Special Advisory Authority. Fifthly, the Government 
would not send the case back to the Board for reconsideration within the following 
few years, unless indeed the Board itself requested that it do so. 
I am unable to say anything definite on the second point. But on the other 
points I have assembled some information from my sixteen cases. 
 Motor cars and chemicals
Let me begin again with motor cars and chemicals. In both cases the policy was 
written into the reference in considerable detail. The motor car reference began: 
“Having regard to the Government’s policy of ensuring the sustained 
development of an economic and efficient automotive industry in 
Australia, in relation to the production of complete motor vehicles 
with max mum Australian content. . . . 
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“The chemical industry reference was very specific, and made it clear 
that the Government wanted “a reasonably profitable development 
of a soundly based chemical industry” and that it was looking for 
something like support prices to deal with “disruptive low prices”. 
In the case of motor cars, the main features of the Board’s recommendations 
were not accepted. It proposed a scheme for relating by-law admission of 
components to scale of output of motor car producers without in general any 
time-limit element. The details are too complicated to pursue here, but the 
essential point is that the Board’s scheme would have involved less protection 
for the components manufacturers and less difficulties for the marginal motor 
car manufacturers and assemblers than the Government’s scheme. In fact the 
Government was already half committed to its scheme which had been under 
way before it sent the reference to the Board. It modified its original scheme a 
little, but the main features of the Board’s recommendations were not accepted. 
The Board gave detailed and convincing reasons for its recommendations; by 
contrast the Government’s policy statement was quite curt. 
In the case of chemicals, the Board proposed a scheme of bounties and tariffs 
combined or, as a second preference, a scheme of protection by tariffs alone. The 
Government rejected the bounty proposal and chose the second preference. But 
apart from this it accepted all the Board’s proposals, including those for extending 
the field of protection and for support prices. 
Other industries
As for the remaining fourteen cases there were nine where the policy was not 
written into the reference, where the Tariff Board recommendations were fully 
accepted, where significant parts of the industry have not so far gone before the 
Special Advisory Authority since these reports were produced, and where the 
cases have not been sent back to the Board before it wanted them sent back. Now 
let us look briefly at the remaining cases.  
The policy was written into the reference in two other cases, crude petroleum 
and man-made fibre yarns. The petroleum reference was extremely detailed, stating 
that Government policy was “that crude oil shall be utilized when found in Australia 
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in quantities which, having regard to the location, may be regarded as commercial” 
and affirmed “the Government’s desire to encourage oil exploration . . . ”. It set out 
at length five guiding considerations for the benefit of the Board. The man-made 
fibre yarn reference clearly hinted at support prices. 
The Board’s recommendations were not wholly accepted in these two cases, 
nor in the cases relating to small engines, man-made fibre fabrics and agricultural 
tractors. The Government’s variations in the last two cases were rather minor,4 so 
let me just refer to crude petroleum, man-made fibre yarns and small engines. In 
the case of crude petroleum the Board was asked to provide a price valuation for 
domestic crude. It arrived at a price which can be calculated as equivalent to a 
24 per cent tariff (this is c.i.f. basis; the equivalent would be higher on an f.o.b. 
basis). This incorporated an incentive margin for exploration. 
But the Government decided to raise this margin, in effect increasing the 
protection to about 45 per cent, saying no more than that “it is very important 
that exploration in Australia should be at a high level and the level of the stimulus 
adopted by the Government should provide a significant incentive”. In the man-
made fibre yarns case the three Board members who conducted the inquiry 
examined the case for support prices at length, but rejected it, while the Chairman 
of the Board came in with a minority recommendation recommending support 
prices. The Government rejected the report and sent it back to the Board asking 
it to look more closely at the reference – which is understood to be a direction 
to propose support prices. Meanwhile the Government sent some of the main 
items to the Special Advisory Authority who continued or even increased the pre 
existing temporary duties and recommended some support prices. In the small 
engines case two Board members recommended 55 per cent and two 75 per 
cent. The Government rejected both recommendations, criticized the Board for 
producing a divided report and decided upon 65 per cent. But this is not really 
the significant feature of this case. The Tariff Board had looked at this industry 
in early 1961 and in late 1962; on both occasions it recommended and the 
Government apparently accepted a duty of 42 per cent or £6.10.0, whichever is 
the higher. In fact the specific rate was normally equivalent to 50 per cent or even 
 
 
4 There was also a very minor variation in the case of cotton fabrics which I have ignored.
W. Max Corden
 125
more, so it was the operative normal duty. Thus for seven years a normal duty of 
£6.10.0 had operated. But on three occasions temporary duties were added by 
the Special Advisory Authority or his predecessor, with the net result that for half 
of the seven years the operative duty was far above £6.10.0, at least for one of the 
two major types of engines. This type of situation has not been unusual in recent 
tariff history. 
The role of the Tariff Board
An inevitable question is: does it really matter whether tariff policy is made upon 
the advice of the Tariff Board or not? In fact, why do we need a Tariff Board at 
all? The issue is an old one. The last Joseph Fisher Lecture to be devoted to the 
Australian tariff was delivered 31 years ago by Professor Giblin. He was quite 
eloquent about the virtues and role of the Tariff Board and expressed his concern 
that the Board had been ignored by the Government on two important occasions.5 
Three reasons in favour of the Tariff Board system can be suggested. First, 
tariff investigations are a specialized and detailed matter; for this work to be done 
adequately there must be a specialized agency. If there were no Tariff Board one 
would need a separate government department. This would not be so if we had 
just a few tariff rates which were infrequently changed, but it is essential given 
the present approach to tariff making in Australia. Secondly, it seems essential 
that this type of work be done by a body removed one stage at least from politics. 
Tariff decisions have vast effects on the profits of individual companies, so that 
the temptations for questionable connections or pressures must be immense. If 
the detailed application of tariff policy, as distinct from the broad principles, is 
made in a political way – as it has been made lately – it becomes at least possible 
 
 
5 I cannot refrain from quoting Professor Giblin: “There have been at times hesitations and postponements 
but in the end the Tariff Board’s recommendations have been substantially carried out. It appeared 
likely that this policy if pursued would give the Board a status in public confidence that would be 
increasingly difficult to upset; so that even a die-hard freetrader or protectionist in the Ministerial Chair, 
though he might impede, would find it impracticable entirely to frustrate the Board’s guidance to a sane 
and balanced protective economy. . . This pious hope has been rudely dashed by the new trade policy 
promulgated from Canberra. [He then details three  cases] . . . By this action the Government appears to 
have undone the good work in  the past, to have destroyed the promising building it has been patiently 
erecting, and to have exposed the whole structure of our tariff policy to the vagaries of future political 
expediency, and the log-rolling of interested parties.”
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that contributions to party funds would have some effect on actual policies. The 
Tariff Board system of public enquiries is particularly important in bringing issues 
and facts out into the open and so reducing the scope for tariff decisions being 
made in an underhand way. Incidentally, it might be wisest if the Tariff Board 
were attached to the Prime Minister’s Department rather than to the office of 
Secondary Industry of the Department of Trade (even though the office might 
continue to be the source of tariff references). The latter sees itself, perhaps rightly, 
as primarily concerned with the interests of secondary industry.6 But tariff policy 
is more a matter of adjudicating between tariff applicants on the one hand and 
consumers and other industries on the other. Thirdly, the Tariff Board’s custom of 
providing in its reports a great deal of information as background and in support 
of its recommendations is valuable. By contrast, the Minister for Trade and 
Industry has provided the minimum of information and reasons for his decisions 
on tariff matters. 
The Tariff Board can obviously be no better than its members and staff. If 
one day all its members were incompetent or lacking in detachment we should 
all want to reduce the role of the Tariff Board. And it is always within the 
power of the Government to make this so by its appointments. To judge by 
the limited evidence available, excessive enthusiasm about a number of recent 
Tariff Board members would be unwarranted. Nevertheless detachment should 
be somewhat easier for Tariff Board members than for the Minister for Trade 
and Industry. 
The problem is both to have a genuinely independent and influential Board 
and to ensure that its members and staff are of adequate quality. Some of the 16 
reports which form the basis of my discussion here have been very good, containing 
most of the relevant information, drawing attention to relevant characteristics of 
the industry, clear in their analysis and making the essential calculations about 
the impact of the duties proposed. Some others have been inadequate. Thus the 
chemical industry report tells us a lot about the industry and its point of view. 
But it is quite devoid of information enabling the reader to assess the impact of 
the recommendations, nor does it contain a critical examination of the issues 
 
6 See the speech by Mr. W. Callaghan, the Head of the office of Secondary Industry, to the Australian 
Industries Development Association, 24 october 1966.
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involved in protecting by support prices. I have the impression that the quality 
of a report and of the recommendations seem to depend a good deal on which 
Board members sat on the case concerned. 
The benchmark
Is there a simple guiding principle for tariff policy, one which can be used as a 
“benchmark” even though it may be modified by various other considerations? 
The Minister for Trade and Industry has a ready answer in his only recent 
statement of government tariff policy:
“The Tariff Board is bound to recommend protection only to 
those industries which it judges are reasonably assured of sound 
opportunities of success – industries which are efficient and economic 
– and at levels which it considers will not prevent reasonable 
competition from imports on the basis of economic and efficient 
production in the Australian economic environment. This is a policy 
of this Government. It is a policy of previous governments.”7
The magic, oft repeated words are “economic and efficient”. But what 
is “economic”? Certainly no clear answer emerges from the Minister’s 
statement or from the discussion of “the principles and procedures 
in tariff making” which were contained in the Tariff Board’s Annual 
Report for 1958-59 and which he quotes with approval. The Vernon 
Committee attempted to give some meaning to the concept. It made 
an impact on the Tariff Board, which commented on the Committee’s 
suggestions for a “benchmark” at length in the form of a majority and 
a minority view in their Annual Report for 1965-66. An important 
talk given recently by the Chairman of the Tariff Board also reflects 
keen concern with the fundamental issues.8 
7 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, H. of R. 1967, p. 804.
8 G. A. Rattigan, “The Tariff Board and Today”, delivered in Perth, May 24, 1967; see also the talk by Mr. 
E. J. L. Tucker, a member of the Board, “The Tariff Board and Tariff Policy”, delivered in Melbourne, 11 
July 1967.
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The subject of course is complex and no single, simple approach is likely 
to be ideal. But the more questing attitude of members of the Tariff Board, the 
widespread desire for some coherence in tariff policy and for making the logic of 
policies explicit, and the unease with which recent policies have been received 
all suggest that it may be useful to put forward an analysis of various alternative 
approaches as well as some concrete suggestions. 
I shall assume a fixed exchange rate and rule out radical “overnight” 
changes.9 I shall ignore a variety of special arguments for or against protection 
which concern particular industries, and which deal with such matters as whether 
industries are foreign or Australian-owned and whether economies of scale, 
dumping or fluctuating import prices (what the Government and the chemical 
industry call “disruptive low pricing”) justify special protection. In order to cover 
a good deal of ground the approach will have to be somewhat less rigorous than 
might be appropriate. A more rigorous discussion covering some of the same 
ground can be found in my review of the tariff chapters of the Vernon Report.10 
Inevitably, the policy suggestions advanced depend on implicit assumptions, first 
about the working of the economic system, secondly about orders of magnitude 
of various elements in the system, thirdly about the relative valuations to be 
placed on the real incomes of relevant sections of the community, and fourthly 
about political possibilities. 
Free trade approach
Given full employment and balance of payments equilibrium, it is at least arguable 
that free trade would yield the optimum allocation of resources, or at least a better 
allocation than any likely protective system. So one could take the view that the 
only proper direction in which to move is towards free trade, the only desirable 
movements in tariffs therefore being down ward movements. This view would 
lead to the following practical recommendations: (a) Tariffs which protect existing 
industries should be brought down as far as possible, the downward movement 
being faster wherever political resistance is less; and (b) No new tariffs should be 
 
9 To assume a fixed exchange rate is not of course to advocate that it should be fixed. But for various 
reasons it seems a realistic assumption. 
10 W. M. Corden, “Protection”, Economic Record, XLII, 1966.
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imposed, and no import-competing industries or activities should be encouraged 
to come into existence if they would require tariffs for their survival. 
Those critics who regarded the Vernon Committee’s tariff chapters as too 
protectionist probably subscribe to a view of this kind. The Vernon Committee 
suggested that tariffs at a “benchmark” rate of, say, 30 per cent should be provided 
 
 
readily. But in this view such a policy would represent an undesirable movement 
in the wrong direction, further away from free trade. 
There are at least four objections to this free trade position. The first is 
that there may be some general arguments for protection of manufacturing in 
Australia – generalized external economies associated with industrialization, 
“infant economy” arguments, arguments for diversification, for improving the 
terms of trade and the distribution of income, and so on. I shall not elaborate 
them here as they are well known. It is doubtful whether one should give these 
much weight in present Australian conditions, though no doubt some protection 
in the past was justified, above all by “infant economy” arguments. A second 
objection is probably more important. If existing tariffs were indeed dismantled 
completely while the exchange rate remained unaltered, either unemployment or 
a balance-of-payments deficit would result. Non-frictional unemployment could 
be avoided by expansion of demand through fiscal and monetary policy, but 
only at the cost of a balance-of-payments deficit, while external deficit could be 
avoided by contraction of demand but only at the cost of unemployment. Thus 
some significant downward movement in existing tariffs would be practicable 
only when (with a given tariff level and full employment) balance-of-payments 
trends were favourable. Such an opportunity would result from an improvement 
in the export situation (such as might result from present mineral developments) 
or if the Australian wage and price levels could be made to increase more slowly 
than wages and prices abroad. 
The third objection is of a different kind and applies only to tariffs 
protecting existing industry. It may be politically impossible to bring about 
by deliberate policy a substantial reduction in the size of any major protected 
industry even though full employment and balance-of-payments equilibrium can 
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in general be ensured. A change might have to be so gradual that the reality of 
some continued protection has to be accepted. The fourth objection follows from 
the third one and applies to tariffs for new activities. If existing tariffs are not 
substantially dismantled the argument for providing some protection for new 
import-competing industries becomes much stronger. If existing industries were 
protected but no protection were provided for new potential developments there 
would be a misallocation of resources as between existing and new activities. 
This would be so even if existing resources in existing industries were completely 
immobile. For existing industries would tend to be extended, in preference to the 
development of new industries or activities, even when the latter would require 
much less protection. 
Existence principle
At the opposite extreme to the free trade approach is a view which may be crudely 
summarized as follows. Any industry or economic activity which is actively in 
operation and which has involved the investment of substantial capital or the 
employment of a significant labour force shall be protected sufficiently to enable 
it to continue in existence. In this view it is the role of the Tariff Board and 
the Special Advisory Authority to recommend the use of whatever devices are 
possible, whether straight-out tariffs, temporary duties, anti-dumping duties or 
support prices, to achieve the object of a tariff made-to-measure for existence. It 
is usually conceded that this tariff should not “over-protect” but should normally 
allow “reasonable competition from imports” and should not be so high as to 
yield the industry abnormal profits. But even quantitative restrictions or devices 
with equivalent effects could be used. 
But who decides which industries shall exist? To some extent history – wars, 
a period of import licensing, and a variety of past circumstances – bequeaths 
industries whose survival the tariff must then ratify. To this extent the principle is 
simply one of economic conservatism – hardly a prescription for economic progress. 
To some extent the initiative comes from private enterprise. But in recent years the 
Commonwealth and State governments have in fact played a crucial role in giving 
encouragement to new developments and, in the case of the Commonwealth, 
in giving explicit or implicit assurances about adequate protection. Clearly the 
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Altona petro-chemical complex, which appears to be rather a costly venture for 
Australian users of synthetic rubber and other chemical products, cannot have been 
started without Commonwealth encouragement. Thus the argument with regard 
to extensions of the field of protection is really that the Government should decide 
who shall be protected and the Tariff Board and the Special Advisory Authority 
recommend the form or degree of protection required. 
How then should the Government decide who shall be protected? one 
answer might be that it can be left to chance, to the relative pressures and 
initiatives from the interests concerned, to “political considerations”. An other 
approach might be to promise protection to any activity at all which is likely to 
yield substantial import replacement, irrespective of the excess cost of the new 
production over the value of the imports replaced. This view, which completely 
disregards cost considerations, might be justified if there were a desperate 
balance-of-payments or employment problem. But otherwise it can only reflect 
ignorance of the elementary economic concept of opportunity cost. If economics 
is to come back into the picture, then for any new venture involving extension 
of protection the question must be asked: “In the light of estimates of expected 
costs, markets and overseas supply prices, what long-term level of tariff protection 
may be required to sustain the new activity?” And if the degree of tariff protection 
expected to be required turns out to be too high, the new venture should not 
be given any assurances about protection but should rather be discouraged. The 
question remains of what is “too high” a degree of protection? This in fact brings 
us back to the unavoidable problem of a tariff benchmark. 
Cost approach: simple uniform tariff version
one way of discriminating between activities and industries on the basis of cost 
is the application of a simple uniform tariff. The logic behind this idea is well-
known. In addition to its merits as an allocator of resources it has the appeal 
of simplicity and of some degree of certainty. There are really two aspects of a 
decision to apply a uniform tariff: 
i. It involves an acceptance of protection, perhaps because of generalized external 
economies believed to attach to import-replacing industrialization or other of 
the general arguments for protection listed earlier, perhaps for balance-of-
payments reasons or perhaps as a second-best policy of political realism. 
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ii. It ensures an optimum allocation of resources within the import-competing 
sector, at least in so far as relative private costs of various import-competing 
activities reflect also the relative social costs, and provided that private 
enterprise is efficient from its own point of view; it uses the cost criterion for 
this aspect of resource allocation, even though, because of the fixed exchange 
rate, the allocation of resources as between the import-competing and the 
export sectors may remain distorted. 
An appropriate rate of uniform protection must be selected. In any period 
this must be determined primarily (though not wholly) with a view to the balance 
of payments. If we go some way towards accepting the free trade approach this 
uniform tariff might be reduced over time, at least whenever balance-of-payments 
prospects permit, with free trade as the long-term objective. 
The general idea is thus quite simple. There are certain complications arising 
from the input-output relations between products – that is, the need to consider 
effective rather than apparent rates – which I shall consider in Part 7 below. 
Until then, my discussion will refer only to apparent rates and I shall assume that 
effective rates are equal to apparent rates. 
Two problems would be created by a uniform tariff, the problem of 
“under-protection” and the problem of “over-protection”. The uniform tariff will 
inevitably be too low for some industries and too high for others. Modifications 
to the simple uniform tariff approach can take some account of these problems. 
But as we shall see, the modifications would create new problems. 
Cost approach: Two uniform tariffs
If the uniform tariff rate were fixed at so high a level that it would maintain the 
output from every existing activity and would protect adequately every conceivable 
new activity then it would have no discriminating effects on resource allocation 
within the import-competing sector. To have any effects on resource allocation it 
must under-protect some existing industries, causing a contraction of output or 
even the closing down of industries. Similarly it must “discriminate out” some 
potential new activities. The under-protection of potential import replacement 
creates no problems, provided it is clearly made known in advance what uniform 
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tariff rate will apply. But the under-protection of existing activities is a different 
matter. The political and social reality which motivates the existence approach to 
tariff-making cannot be ignored. one approach might be to apply the uniform 
tariff or benchmark only to new activities. This is what a minority of the Tariff 
Board appear to have in mind in their comment in the Annual Report for 1965-
66. They might argue that one cannot do much about the resource allocation 
mistakes already made, but at least one can avoid new mistakes. Another, less 
conservative, approach would be to have two uniform tariffs to start with – a 
relatively low one for new activities, say 30 per cent, and a higher one for existing 
activities, say 45 per cent or even 55 per cent. Notice would be given that the 
higher tariff would over a long period be reduced until it reached the lower one. 
Between the two extremes of not applying the uniform tariff at all to existing 
activities and of having two uniform tariffs, with the one for existing activities 
relatively high, there are a variety of compromises all of which would involve 
concessions for those existing industries which depend on high protection. 
The difficulty is that one cannot distinguish clearly between tariffs which 
protect existing production and tariffs which induce new production. The 
economy is not static and even a tariff which has given an existing industry the 
whole domestic market, and which applies to a product with no close substitutes, 
will induce new production as the size of the market expands. But the problem 
is greatest where there is significant substitution. The chemical industry may 
be correct that a 60 per cent tariff on high density polyethylene is needed to 
protect the existing production of low density polyethylene. But the fact is that 
this extension of the tariff has induced for the first time domestic production 
of the high density product. In such a case the distinction between a tariff 
which protects existing production and a tariff which protects new production 
completely breaks down. 
If high tariffs applied to some or all existing activities, in so far as these 
could be narrowly defined, while a lower uniform tariff rate applied generally to 
new industries or extensions of existing industries, we should have the odd result 
that new industries obtain less protection than old ones. This is odd because 
it conflicts with the widely accepted view that infant industries should obtain 
an extra margin of protection. The validity of the various versions of the infant 
industry argument I cannot discuss here; but in so far as some argument of this 
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type is valid, the following further modification might be made to the policy 
outlined above. New activities obtain a high rate (say 50 per cent) in their first 
year, dropping in steps for three years down to the benchmark rate for newly 
protected products. If the benchmark is to mean anything at all there would have 
to be complete certainty that the tariff will indeed drop to the benchmark within 
a short specified period. 
Cost approach: Made-to-measure version
Inevitably, a uniform tariff would provide more protection for some industries 
than they need; that is, it would over-protect them. This may simply mean that 
some part of the tariff is redundant, the Australian market price being below the 
duty-paid import price. But it may also provide opportunities for monopolies 
or oligopolies to raise their prices above the minimum required to make normal 
profits. The excess profits may eventually induce new entrants and so lead to 
inefficient fragmentation of production. All this may lead to the conclusion that 
tariffs should be made-to-measure to the needs or costs of different industries, 
the calculations being based on the assumption that each industry consists of 
an optimum number of firms and that individual firms are managerially and 
technically efficient. This sort of made-to-measure approach under lies much 
current thinking about tariff-making. It is supplemented by the view that there 
should never be a tariff when it would have little or no protective effect, that the 
worst tariff is one that does not protect, especially when it is a tariff on an input.11 
The case for made-to-measure tariffs is in fact similar to the case for price 
control; and it is subject to the same objections. To begin with, there is simply the 
difficulty of measuring the right tariff rate. Any suggestion of accuracy implied in 
fine variations of rates must be spurious. A tariff rate that yields minimum profits 
to one firm producing a product will give excess profits to another producing the 
same product. Secondly, the whole concept of a single made-to-measure tariff rate 
for each product valid for a reasonable period of time is doubtful. A rate which 
is just right for existing production may keep out new production as the market 
expands. Thus a tariff on a particular product may have been squeezed down to 
ten per cent to deprive existing producers of excess profits; yet as demand expands 
 
11 Ibid., p. 139.
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there might be scope for extra production provided a 20 per cent tariff were 
provided. Thirdly, one can argue that industries which require tariff rates below 
the benchmark should be allowed to make excess profits. These are the industries 
that have the greatest potentialities for exporting, and the high profits may help 
to finance their expansion for export production and make possible exporting at 
marginal cost. Furthermore, the low tariff requirement may be an indication of 
managerial efficiency, which it is certainly desirable to reward. 
In spite of these qualifications, one should probably take some account of 
the made-to-measure principle. The benchmark rate would be an upper limit. 
Those industries, for example steel, which clearly need less than the benchmark 
rate, could continue to receive a somewhat lower rate. There may also be cases 
where a tariff below the benchmark rate would clearly prevent monopolistic 
exploitation or undue fragmentation of production. The benchmark rate need 
not be imposed where it would bring forth little or no domestic production, 
especially if the product concerned is an input into export or into other protected 
industries. But new developments which would be economical at the benchmark 
rate must not be discouraged by this policy; thus anticipatory protection at or 
below the benchmark rate could be provided, with free-of-duty (by-law) entry for 
imports until the possibility of domestic production arises. 
Industry rates approach
It is clear from recent Tariff Board reports, from the Annual Report for 19~66 and 
from the Chairman’s recent speech that there is a movement towards simplifying 
the tariff and aiming in general at a limited number of “industry rates”. Thus we 
now have an industry rate of 55 per cent for woven cotton and man-made fibre 
piecegoods and two industry rates, 25 per cent and 40 per cent, for the chemical 
industry. There has been an industry rate for motor car components since 1957. 
(These are not the only rates applying in these industries; furthermore, in the 
case of chemicals and motor car components they are partly overlaid by the other 
arrangements I mentioned earlier). The virtues of industry rates are considerable 
and are the same in nature as those of a single uniform tariff, though less in 
degree. Resource allocation as between different products produced by the 
“industry” is left to market forces, tariff administration is simplified, and a 
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clearer under standing of the height and pattern of tariffs results. Furthermore, 
the establishment of a limited number of such rates might be regarded as a 
step towards a modified benchmark approach. The industry rates approach is 
a compromise between the more radical uniform tariff approach and two of 
the other approaches discussed above, namely the approach which takes into 
account the impracticability of greatly under-protecting existing industries, and 
the made-to-measure approach. 
But it is clearly inadequate as a guiding principle for tariff-making. It does 
not deal at all with the problem of resource allocation as between industries. 
Perhaps one must accept, at least in the short-term, the choice of high industry 
rates which are designed to avoid major areas of under protection for long-
established industries. The main objection is rather that industry rates may 
provide the wrong signals for resource allocation as between new developments. 
Even though an existing industry may require for its survival a 55 per cent tariff, 
it does not follow at all that new developments in the industry must also be 
protected at 55 per cent. 
Thus, while the general tendency towards industry rates is probably to be 
welcomed, where industry rates are especially high or low they should clearly not 
be applied rigidly to extensions of the field of protection. In any case, industry 
rates can only be a step, if an important one, on the way to a coherent tariff policy 
based on economic considerations. 
Effective protective rates
So far the complications presented by the input-output relations between 
products have been ignored. These are allowed for in the concept of the effective 
protective rate. It is these effective rates, and not apparent rates, which are relevant 
for assessing the impact of a tariff system on resource allocation. The whole of the 
preceding discussion should have referred to effective, not apparent rates. Thus, 
if the degree of protection for a group of products is to be uniform, it is their 
effective rates, and not necessarily their apparent rates, which must be uniform. 
The difficulty is that effective rates are not easy to calculate. There are many 
problems in the concept itself. The calculation depends on information about 
the shares of certain types of inputs in costs; there are difficulties about deciding 
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which inputs are relevant for the calculation; furthermore, the input shares differ 
for different firms and vary year by year as a result of changes in techniques and 
relative prices. 
Is this then a reason for giving up the whole idea of a benchmark? Is a 
benchmark in terms of apparent rates wrong and in terms of effective rates 
impossible? Should one let the benchmark wait until reliable calculations of 
effective rates on a large-scale have been made? These are reasonable questions, 
but the answers are really a matter of commonsense. If we wait until all the 
calculations have been made we shall have to wait a long time – and meanwhile 
decisions about tariff rates must still be made. We must be careful not to allow 
the important complication of effective rates to prevent the evolution of more 
coherent tariff policies. Effective rates often cannot be calculated precisely or 
require an inordinate amount of work. But rough calculations indicating the 
broad order of magnitude by which in any particular case the effective rate is 
likely to be above or below the apparent rate are certainly possible and in fact 
have been made frequently by the present author and probably also by the Tariff 
Board. And this will usually be enough. 
Undoubtedly effective rates differ frequently from apparent rates. This 
would be true even if there were a completely uniform tariff with raw materials 
and intermediate goods all paying the same apparent rate as finished goods. For 
products which use exportable inputs purchased in Australia at world prices 
such as wool, steel and leather, would obtain effective protection higher than the 
uniform tariff rate. But when most imported inputs come in duty-free or at low 
non-protective rates of duty, perhaps under by-law, the possibility of divergence 
between effective and apparent rates is much increased. 
The solution to the problem seems to me to be along the following lines. 
The uniform tariff or benchmark rate (or the two rates, one for existing industry 
and one for new developments) should be expressed in ad valorem apparent 
terms. Where there is clear evidence that the effective rate would be significantly 
above the apparent rate, the tariff-makers should diverge below the apparent 
rate benchmark. Thus the apparent-rate benchmark would have some of the 
characteristics of an upper limit even when the made-to-measure complication is 
not introduced. 
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There is of course the possibility that the effective rate is less than the 
apparent rate, in which case the divergence should be above the apparent rate 
benchmark. But such cases would be rare. It must be remembered that for the 
effective rate to be less than the apparent rate it is not sufficient that there are 
tariffs on the relevant inputs; the input tariff rates must actually be higher than 
the apparent tariff rate on the final good. 
The divergence between apparent and effective rates might be similar for 
the various products of an industry; if this were so there would be an industry 
apparent rate which reflected the general divergence from the benchmark 
appropriate for these products; this would yield a partial re habilitation of the 
idea of industry rates. But I do not think one could explain or justify much of the 
present pattern of industry rates in this way. 
Effects on exports
In so far as protection of import-replacing industries draws resources out of export 
industries which are unsubsidized, or at least subsidized at lower rates than the 
effective protection of the import-competing industries, and in so far as there 
are no special arguments for protection, there is a misallocation of resources. 
The balance-of-payments-cum-employment argument for protection to which I 
referred earlier and upon which a case for a uniform tariff could be based assumes 
that, in the absence of exchange devaluation, the resources absorbed by protected 
import-competing industry could not be employed in export industry. In general, 
the more easily the resources could be absorbed at the constant exchange rate in 
the export industries and the extra output sold without undue price falls, the 
weaker the argument for protection and hence the lower the optimum uniform 
tariff or benchmark. Thus the scope for increasing export production and selling 
the extra output must be taken into account when determining the long-term 
level of the benchmark. 
Effects on exports may also justify divergences from the benchmark. In 
general, those import-replacing industries which use resources that are close 
substitutes for resources in unsubsidized actual or potential export industries 
should be protected at rates less than the benchmark. Furthermore, tariffs on 
products which are significant inputs into export industries will raise the costs 
W. Max Corden
 139
of export industries. If, like wool and meat, the export industries them selves 
are not protected, they obtain in fact negative effective rates. This is obviously 
undesirable from a resource allocation point of view and suggests that tariffs on 
products which are important inputs into export industries should in general be 
somewhat lower than they would be otherwise. 
Conclusion: The benchmark
To conclude, what should the benchmark rate be? This is clearly a matter of 
judgment rather than precise calculation. It should be the higher, the higher existing 
tariffs; to this extent calculations of tariff averages are relevant in determining the 
benchmark rate. It should also be the higher, the higher are the tariff rates that 
seem to be required to get any new import-replacing development. on the other 
hand, the better the balance of payments prospects and the more scope there is for 
expansion of export industries, the lower it should be. Perhaps a benchmark (in 
apparent rate terms ) of 30 per cent for new activities and 45 per cent for existing 
activities would be reasonable at present. The benchmark for existing activities 
would involve lopping off the substantial high protection areas, an operation 
which would have to be gradual, perhaps in steps announced precisely in advance. 
The lower benchmark rate would be readily available to new activities. 
The two benchmarks would be upper limits exceeded only rarely, except 
during the transitional period for existing high protection industries and during 
a short “infant” period for some new industries. Apparent rates would be reduced 
below the relevant benchmark for any of three reasons: (a) made-to-measure 
reasons (avoidance of excess profits, of fragmentation of production, and of 
tariffs on inputs which have no protective effect at all); (b) effective rates clearly 
exceeding apparent rates; and (c) adverse effects of protection on exports. There 
are also some special reasons, which I do not have time to discuss here, that may 
justify departure from the benchmark upward or downward in limited cases. 
These are suggestions which take into account the constraints of what is 
possible. They are close to, though somewhat more radical than, the approach 
towards which some members of the Tariff Board seem to be moving, especially 
the three members who wrote the minority comment in the Annual Report 
for 1965-66, but to a lesser extent also the Chairman. Practical “benchmark 
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policy” involves a balancing of various opposing considerations: on the one hand 
the arguments for tariff simplicity, for firm guides to tariff-making and for a 
little ruthlessness in the interests of economic efficiency, and on the other, the 
arguments for providing for numerous complications and repercussions and 





Between January 1965 and April 1967, 57 Tariff Board reports were tabled in 
Parliament. of these 15 dealt with industries or sections of industries employing 
at least 800 persons. These 15 reports, along with the report on crude oil, are 
listed below. The date of the report follows in each case. In those seven cases 
where the Tariff Board recommendations were not wholly adopted the date of the 
relevant Ministerial statement is also given. 
Satisfactory employment figures for many of the industries or products 
concerned are not available. But using information in the reports, combined with 
some guessing, one can give the following indication of orders of magnitude 
involved. The motor vehicle and components industry is by far the biggest 
employer in the group, with over 64,000 employees. Next comes the footwear 
industry with about 23,000. The production of industrial chemicals and synthetic 
resins employs about 9,000, and all the other industries listed, other than crude 
oil, together about 25,000. Most of these others, except small engines (860) and 
man-made fibre yarns, employ between 1,500 and 2,500 persons. While the 
figures are likely to be too low rather than too high, one must be impressed by 
the small proportion of the Australian manufacturing workforce which appears 
to be concerned in these cases. 
The largest capital investment is in motor vehicles and components and in 
chemicals followed no doubt by crude oil exploration and production. 
The list, which does not include the important report on aluminium which 
was made public in July 1967 is as follows: 
Copper and Brass Strip, etc. (25 February 1967 and 19 November 1965). 
Hollow Bars, Tubes and Pipes of Iron or Steel (22 June 1965). 
Sulphuric Acid and Pyrites Bounty Acts (30 June 1965). 
Crude Oil (23 July 1965). See also statement by Minister for Trade and Industry 
September 8, 1965; A. Hunter, “Investment in Petroleum Exploration in 
Australia”, Economic Record, XLII, 1966; and S. McL. Cochrane, “The Pricing of 
Australian Crude oil”, Australian Quarterly, XXXIX, 1967. 
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Agricultural Tractors (2 September 1966). See also Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Debates, H. of R. LIII, 1966, pp. 2102-2103. 
Motor Vehicles and Concessional Admission of Components (24 September 1965). 
See also statements by Minister for Trade and Industry, 8 February 1966, and 
July 29, 1966.
Tinned Iron and Steel Hoop, Strip, Plates and Sheets (24 September 1965). (These 
items were not protected; deferred duty provisions were cancelled.) 
Woven Cotton Fabrics, Bed Linen, etc. (6 August 1966). 
Woven Man-made Fabrics (6 August 1965). See also Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Debates, H. of R. XLVIII, 1965, pp. 2346-2353. 
Glassware (22 December 1965). 
Industrial Chemicals and Synthetic Resins (13 April 1966). See also Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Debates, H. of R. LIII, 1966, pp. 2103-2105 and H. of R. 1967, 
p. 1863. 
Electrical Capacitors (30 November 1966). 
Air-cooled Engines not Exceeding 10 B.H.P. and Parts (December 15, 1966). See 
also Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, H. of R. 1967, pp. 613-614. 
Man-made Fibres and Yarn, Tyre Cord and Tyre Cord Fabric (15 December 1966). 
See also Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, H. of R. 1961, p. 548; and 
Report of Special Advisory Authority on High Tenacity Man-made Fibre Yarns, 
etc. (23 June 1967). 
Air Conditioning and Refrigerating Equipment (17 February 1967). 
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Balancing external payments by 
adjusting domestic income
E. H. Phelps Brown1
I owe my hearers an apology at the outset for taking a subject that has so much 
immediate application to the United Kingdom, and so little to the happier land 
of Australia. The external balance has been a recurrent source of embarrassment 
to the United Kingdom for many years past: no such difficulties afflict or threaten 
the Australia of today. The regulation of money income by means of a national 
incomes policy has been attempted in recent years by a number of countries, the 
United Kingdom among them, in which wages and salaries are generally changed 
by collective bargaining without the intervention of third parties: but Australia has 
inherited a different procedure, whose availability has largely spared her the need 
to devise new institutions in order to check cost inflation under full employment. 
Yet if nonetheless I invite you to consider these issues, it is not only because it is 
they alone that I can speak of from my own experience in the United Kingdom, 
but also because I believe they have their relevance to Australian thinking. For 
in the weather map of international trade, high and low pressure systems are 
apt to succeed one another unexpectedly; especially where the external balance 
is supported by an inflow of capital, change may set in rapidly; he would be 
a rash man in any country who would say that its balance of payments could 
not become adverse in the foreseeable future. And not only if such a change 
should ever come about again in Australia, but already for many years past, the 
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission in its major awards has had to have 
regard, among other things, to the prospective impact of those awards on the 
level of costs in Australian industry, and on Australian foreign trade. Although, 
 
 
1 Thirty-third Joseph Fisher Lecture, 26 June 1969. The author is very much indebted to Professors Keith 
Hancock and E. A. Russell for comment. 
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therefore, the thoughts I shall lay before you have been formed mostly in the light 
of United Kingdom experience, and will be couched in corresponding terms, I 
hope you will find the question of how far the adjustment of domestic incomes 
can help to balance external payments not without its relevance to economic 
policy in Australia. 
I
Any government that commits itself to a National Incomes Policy soon finds 
out how to lose friends and fail to influence people. What has pushed many 
governments into that commitment nonetheless has been a pressing need to right 
the balance of payments. At least three countries, the Netherlands, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom, maintained a wage stop for some time in the later 1940s, 
when their first necessity was to restore their export trade – and, in the United 
Kingdom, to raise it far above its pre-war level. Through all the subsequent 
vicissitudes of Dutch incomes policy there has run a concern with the prospective 
“room”, as the Dutch say, for rises in pay, and in a country whose exports yield 
more than half its national income that “room” has meant the greatest rise in 
domestic incomes compatible with balancing external payments. Similarly in 
Sweden: there, it is true, the government itself eschews all overt commitment 
to incomes policy: but exports yield a quarter of the national income; and when 
the national organisations of employers and labour meet to negotiate a central 
framework agreement that will regulate the course of wages throughout the 
economy for the next two or three years, the question of how much rise in wages 
will be consistent with maintaining exports is crucial. It was remarkable that 
President Kennedy commended to the Congress an elaborate set of guideposts 
for pay and prices, at a time – early in 1962 –  when prices in the United States 
had been comparatively stable for some years. The purpose in great part was 
to ensure that the spending to be released by tax remissions would not simply 
be mopped up by rises in pay and prices in the sector of existing employment; 
but so controversial a step might not have been taken had there not also been a 
mounting concern about the balance of payments. Most evidently of all, in the 
United Kingdom, it was the crisis of sterling in 1957 that induced a Conservative 
government, dedicated to restoring the working of the free market, to set up the 
Council on Prices, Productivity and Incomes and so take the first step along a 
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road that the continuing troubles of the British balance of payments have driven 
governments farther and farther down since then, until a Labour government has 
taken statutory power to defer for up to twelve months rises in pay that its trade 
union supporters might obtain in negotiation. 
The restraints that these essays in incomes policy have imposed have often 
been resented by those on whom they bore, without solving the problems of the 
economy as a whole. There have been uneasy compromises, chops and changes of 
the policy, outright defeats for it. If nonetheless the policy has been adopted by 
governments, and accepted in principle by national organisations of management 
and labour, that is because no other way has offered itself of checking inflation 
while maintaining full employment. The immediate compulsion to apply that 
policy has often been exerted by the effects of inflation on the balance of payments. 
In particular, incomes policy has been invoked as a means of stemming a deficit 
in the balance of payments in the short run, and of preventing one from being set 
up in the long. Let us consider those two purposes in turn. 
II
In the short run the contribution that incomes policy can make to righting 
the balance of payments is small. Certainly the determination of a government 
to bring in or stiffen an incomes policy will have its effect on confidence: if 
government can be credited both with willingness to undergo the opprobrium 
it must incur by attempting to check the rise of wages and salaries, and with 
the power to make that attempt good, the prospects of the economy escaping 
from the inflationary spiral will be visibly enhanced, and that will take its effect 
on world opinion. But the embarrassments and rebuffs that have attended on 
incomes policy hitherto tend to deny credibility to the announced intention of 
governments to apply it anew. Even, moreover, if they do make it take hold, 
its immediate effect on the balance of payments can hardly be pronounced. 
For the function of incomes policy is to check the parallel rise of unit labour 
costs and prices, not to hold back money incomes relatively to prices so that 
real demand is restrained. Certainly, insofar as incomes policy does check the 
rise in costs and prices, it will help to keep imports down and exports up, but 
this price effect will not be great in the short run. In any case, what is needed 
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to restore the balance of payments quickly will almost always be a reduction in 
aggregate real demand. In the experience of the United Kingdom, for instance, 
a rapidly mounting deficit in the balance of payments has been set up not by 
any rapid turn for the worse in relative costs and prices but by a rapid rise in 
aggregate real demand – a rise that cannot be satisfied by domestic output and 
spills over into imports. This surge of aggregate real demand will not have been 
brought about by increases in pay, for it has been of the essence of the process 
that, insofar as rises in pay exceed those in productivity and so raise unit labour 
costs, they carry prices up with them. The surge must have been due to a rise 
in a form of outlay largely independent of money incomes, and not like them 
currently linked through costs and margins to prices. That form of outlay is 
investment. There is no reason why firms’ decisions to increase their outlay on 
investment should be matched by an increase in voluntary saving. Nor, so far as 
it impinges on the home market, will much of the increased investment outlay 
be quickly absorbed by higher prices, because unlike a rise in spending due to 
higher pay it does not tend to raise costs at its point of origin, and it is to rises 
in cost, not to extensions of demand, that administered prices respond. Insofar, 
then, as the increase in investment outlay impinges on domestic output it can 
only set up queuing, as delivery dates recede; the frustrated customer turns to 
the foreign supplier; the excess of real demand is met by higher imports. Since 
the upset does not begin with spending out of income, we cannot look to 
incomes policy to put it right. True, if incomes policy did actually check the rise 
of money incomes while the rise in prices went on, it would reduce aggregate 
real demand, but this is not how it is meant to work, or likely to be allowed to 
work for long in practice. 
In the short run, then, though incomes policy has in practice been included 
among the measures adopted by governments that need immediate relief from 
balance of payment troubles, its virtue at the time lies largely in its announcement 
effect. This in turn depends on its capability of preventing inflation from 
worsening the balance of payments in the long run. 
We look to it to do this by guiding the course of costs and prices. The 
assumption is that the higher the domestic level of costs and prices, with a fixed 
exchange rate, the bigger imports will be, and the smaller exports. How, then, do 
we want costs and prices to behave? A country with persistent balance of payments 
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difficulties might well want to aim at what has sometimes come about in the 
past – constancy of money incomes, with costs and prices falling as productivity 
rises, and real incomes rising with productivity through the rise in the purchasing 
power of money. But we are all so accustomed nowadays to taking out the rise in 
productivity in the form of higher money incomes, that this aim seems visionary, 
and most governments would be gratified if their incomes policy could achieve 
the aim set by President Kennedy’s economic advisers in 1962, of holding the 
general level of costs and prices constant. In practice, many governments would 
be content if they could even ensure only that costs and prices rose more slowly 
in the future than in the past. Looking around them in the world market for 
manufactures, they would have reason to expect that if they could achieve only so 
much as this, they would still not be undercut by their competitors. 
The effectiveness of such a policy must be assessed differently according 
as it is required only to prevent fresh trouble being created by a rise in domestic 
costs and prices relatively to those of other countries, or is expected to remedy an 
external deficit arising from other causes. 
III
If incomes policy is looked to only in the first of these ways, as a way of avoiding 
a relatively high rate of inflation, no question arises of its usefulness if only it can 
succeed in its own immediate aim. We should all agree that the more slowly a 
country inflates, the less likely it is to run into fresh balance of payments difficulties 
through its costs becoming uncompetitive. But many of us will ask, granted that 
you want to check inflation, why resort to such a clumsy: laborious and unproven 
type of interventionism as incomes policy? Why not rely on the familiar fiscal and 
monetary restraints, working impersonally through market forces? 
The answer is not merely that if those restraints are familiar, so also is the 
unemployment which they inflict when they are imposed, and which if created 
deliberately by any western government would be likely to bring it down. If that 
were all, then the aim of incomes policy would be to keep the economy in a state 
of suppressed demand inflation – to keep demand high enough to ensure full 
employment, while preventing the pull of demand from raising costs. But its aim 
is not that. It has the same aim as the fiscal and financial restraints, namely to 
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avoid inflation altogether. If it imposes itself in their place, that is because, unlike 
them, it goes to the source of inflation in the contemporary economy. 
For this source proves to be on the side not of demand but of costs. The 
world has known for centuries the inflation that is caused by excess demand – 
be it when Spanish gold and silver spread across Europe, or when governments 
created fiat money, especially to pay their way in time of war: then excess demand 
set up shortages, and the pay of labour and the prices of products were pulled up 
by the competition of buyers. But a study of what has actually been happening 
in recent years soon reveals a process quite other than that. Excess demand has 
not been an invariable condition of rises in pay and prices. In the industries 
that are shedding labour, or carry a substantial margin of unemployment, pay 
has risen at much the same rate as in the others. In Denmark down to 1959 the 
prevailing level of unemployment was around 6 per cent, and in some districts 
and occupations it was more like 10 per cent; but pay went up at much the same 
rate in Denmark as in its Scandinavian neighbours where employment was full. 
The sequence, so far as that can be distinguished in a spiral, has been not that 
pay follows prices up, or even that pay and prices move together, but that prices 
follow pay. They have done so because the rises in pay have generally been 
greater than those in productivity, so that unit costs have been raised. Pay has 
been able to rise so fast, because the habit has grown up of raising it annually at 
a rate that has emerged from a spontaneous alignment of decisions. The rate has 
varied somewhat from year to year, but not in a way that can be systematically 
related to the state of the labour market. What has happened is rather that a 
consensus has grown up about the rate of change that will prevail from time 
to time. Management in any one firm or industry will find it hard to settle for 
less than this; nor has it any incentive to involve itself in a painful struggle to 
do so, when it knows from experience that so long as it does not raise its own 
costs faster than others are doing all around it, it will be able later to maintain 
its profit margins by raising its selling prices, without losing business. What 
the rate is about which the consensus grows up is within wide limits arbitrary. 
Those who take part in negotiations and settlements feel individually that little 
discretion is left them; but collectively they are largely autonomous. So far at 
least as they sell in the home market, they can afford any rise, provided enough 
of them are tacitly agreed on it. 
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At the root of cost inflation, then, there is an alignment of expectations 
about a norm. It is the specific merit of incomes policy that it does go to this, the 
root of the matter. In a word, its purpose is to align expectations about a norm 
that is non-inflationary. 
It may well be objected, however, that expectations never could have 
become aligned about an inflationary norm unless experience had shown that 
the government would provide the money needed to support a growing real 
turnover at a rising level of prices. Even if cost inflation does arise independently 
of an extension of the flow of spending, it still depends on such extension for its 
continuance. So, it will be said, even if inflation under full employment is cost 
inflation ex ante, it is demand inflation ex post: let the government only make it 
clear that demand is not going to be raised so as to float firms off whatever level 
of costs they allow to accrue, and the accrual will cease. one proposal is that 
the government should announce its intention of increasing the monetary base 
by no less but also no more than the expected increase in tumover at constant 
prices – say three per cent per annum. It would thereby serve-notice on the pay-
fixers that if their determinations raised the general level of costs and prices, sales 
would fall and unemployment would rise. But in this proposal the difficulty is 
twofold. How far will individual decisions be influenced by a sanction that is 
activated only by the aggregate of decisions? And how far will the threat of that 
sanction be credible, when it is itself so painful, so invidious in its incidence, and 
so easily lifted? – for should the community collectively overshoot the mark, the 
pressure on the government of the day to provide the once-for-all addition to the 
stock of money, which was all that was needed to cure unemployment and restore 
prosperity, would surely be irresistible. 
An alternative proposal is that governments should guide the decisions of 
pay-fixers not by direct intervention but by using fiscal and monetary controls to 
adjust the balance of aggregate supply and demand. In one form, this proposal 
would keep industry running with a rather wider margin of unused capacity 
than of late, so as to avoid bottlenecks in which competitive bidding for scarce 
resources raises costs, and to give firms a continuing incentive to keep prices 
down in order to get additional orders which they will now have the capacity 
to fill if only they can get them. We can agree that aggregate demand cannot be 
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raised beyond a certain level without excess demand being set up at particular 
points, and without firms generally becoming much less concerned with keeping 
costs down than with getting production up. We must accordingly accept the 
necessity of using fiscal and monetary restraints to prevent aggregate demand 
from passing through the level at which costs begin to rise in bottlenecks and 
cost control is loosened widely. But this is not to say that so long as we achieve 
this there need be no fear of cost inflation: for in recent years the movement of 
costs has come to depend on something other than the balance of supply and 
demand. 
That this is so appears when we examine another proposed way of 
adjusting that balance – the proposal, namely, to maintain a rather higher level 
of unemployment than has prevailed of late. Higher unemployment is seen as 
marking a changed balance of supply and demand in the labour market, and it is 
believed that the rates of pay arrived at in that market would then rise more slowly. 
This belief rests upon an association observed in the past between the change 
of the general level of wages on the one side, and the current unemployment 
rate, together with the direction in which that rate was changing, on the other. 
But the labour market is not a produce market. It is arbitrary to interpret the 
observed association as the outcome simply of the changing balance between 
job vacancies and job applicants. All that the observed association shows is that 
the movements of wages varied with the phases of the eight-year trade cycle; the 
rate of unemployment, and the direction in which the rate is changing, serve 
only as an indicator of the phases. If we take an alternative indicator, namely the 
deviations of pig-iron output from trend, we get an equally close association, 
but no one would suggest that by regulating pig-iron output the government 
could control the movement of wages. It seems likely that what determined wage 
movements was not so much the rate of unemployment itself as the state of 
expectations prevailing in each phase of the cycle. Today, however, estimates of 
firms’ current and prospective ability to pay no longer rise and fall with the course 
of a trade cycle that seemed to be no less exogenous than cycles in the weather. We 
all know now that we can spend our way out of depression, and that governments 
can reduce unemployment if only they choose to. This knowledge, fortified by a 
quarter century of full employment, has given our current expectations a new base 
and a force of self-propulsion. It is these expectations that govern the rises in pay 
that the community has come to expect and that employers have come to believe 
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they can concede without harm to their businesses; and it is these expectations 
that must be changed by any policy that is to influence the rise in pay. A plunge 
into depression would shatter them, but this is precluded. The alternative is to try 
to mould and guide them through incomes policy. 
These are the reasons, I believe, for which governments concerned to avoid 
the worsening of their external balance by a rise in their costs have turned to 
incomes policy. They have done so because incomes policy goes directly to the 
point at which cost inflation under full employment arises, and because fiscal and 
monetary restraints of themselves offer no politically practicable or ultimately 
effective alternative. They have persisted in it, for all its embarrassments, because 
their external balance forbids them to let cost inflation go unchecked, and they 
know no better way of checking it in the state of mind induced by years of full 
employment. 
IV
The case we have just been considering is that for using incomes policy to prevent 
inflation from bringing a country into balance-of-payments difficulties. What 
has been at issue is the appropriateness of the instrument, namely incomes policy, 
and not of the operation, namely, regulating domestic money income. But as 
we now come to consider the regulation of income as a remedy for a deficit 
in the external balance arising from causes other than domestic inflation, what 
is in doubt is the effectiveness of the operation. Balances of payments can go 
wrong for many reasons other than the domestic level of costs and prices. An 
inflow of capital may dry up; an outflow of capital may set in; or the government 
may undertake additional expenditure overseas for aid or defence. Especially in 
countries at an early stage of development, but not in them alone, an increase in 
the rate of growth may systematically raise imports more than exports. As between 
different sectors of one economy, so between different economies, there may be 
structural changes, arising from the advance of techniques and shifts in consumers’ 
demand. Some of these factors can be dealt with directly by government, but by 
no means all: in particular, governments are inhibited by the rules of GATT, or 
the apprehension of counter-measures, from restricting imports or subsidising 
exports. How much can regulation of incomes do to restore the external balance, 
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when it is not with incomes that the trouble begins? Much can be done, we know 
from sad experience, by restraining not monetary income merely but real income. 
Let us consider for a moment why we hear so much of the balance of payments 
between one country and the rest of the world, and so little of that between one 
region and the rest of the same country. Forty years ago I heard Edwin Cannan 
in a lecture at oxford ask why there was no public concern about the balance 
of payments of the Isle of Wight, and I would like to follow him now, though 
not, as I remember, to the conclusions he then drew. If the balance of payments 
between one region and the rest of the same currency area becomes passive, it 
will be corrected by a ruthless deflation within the region. The multiplier effect 
of a passive balance will not be offset in the interests of sustained activity by fiscal 
and monetary easements at the centre; the quantity of money within the region 
will be reduced by the amount of the deficit; and this will go on until the region’s 
bill for imports from the rest of the country ceases to exceed what it earns by 
selling to it. The major part in that adjustment will be played by the reduction of 
spending on the region’s imports. But this will be only part of the total reduction 
in spending within the region that will have to be brought about. If a quarter of 
the spending that is cut would have been spent on the region’s imports, then the 
whole cut in spending will be four times the required reduction in the region’s 
imports, and output within the region will have been cut back to the tune of 
three times the required reduction in imports. This loss of employment, output 
and consumption, moreover, itself contributes nothing to the restoration of the 
balance, except insofar as the resources now made idle can be diverted into sales 
outside the region, and there is no assurance that they will lend themselves to that. 
The cut in external purchases is thus achieved only through a waste of resources, 
and an invidious infliction of unemployment on particular men and women. 
For a monetary problem there has been substituted a structural. No regional 
imbalance of payments troubles the authorities; but the region may become a 
depressed area. And this may be no less the plight of any entire economy that 
holds down domestic income in order to counter a persistent tendency of imports 
to exceed exports. There come to mind the examples of the United Kingdom in 
the inter-war years, and of Denmark with its high unemployment between the 
Second World War and the righting of its balance of payments in 1959. Yet when 
governments obligated to maintain full employment refuse to allow an external 
deficit to reduce real income, the deficit will persist. Is there any way out? 
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one way of diagnosing this dilemma is to see it as arising from a gap in the 
system of incentives in the market economy. Generally, when the economy needs 
an increase in a given line of output, the market gives producers an incentive to 
supply it. But when a persistent tendency to import more calls for an increase in 
exports, the market gives producers no incentives whatever to bring this about 
if domestic income is maintained; while even if domestic income is cut they are 
given only the doubtful incentive of needing to find fresh markets, at a time of 
depression and dubiety, for what they cannot now sell at home. What the market 
should be doing, we feel, is to make exports immediately more profitable. But 
this is just what it would do if the external value of the currency were not pegged 
regardless of supply and demand, but allowed to float. For then as imports rose the 
rate of exchange would fall, and the yield in domestic currency of exports selling 
at unchanged prices abroad would be raised. There is no gap after all in the market 
system of incentives if the external value of the currency is in the market too. 
Another line of diagnosis leads to the same conclusion. By this we view 
both the persistence of an excess of imports in the absence of a cut in domestic 
incomes and the wastefulness of the cut in incomes that will restore the balance as 
alike derived from our inability to separate the money that will buy abroad from 
the money that will buy at home. The two are not separate so long as the central 
bank will at need provide foreign currency at a fixed price in terms of domestic: 
for then anyone who holds the domestic currency is a potential buyer abroad; 
and the availability of foreign currency cannot be reduced save by a reduction 
in the domestic currency for all purposes. What is wanted is a way of separating 
the domestic currency from the money that will buy abroad, and limiting the 
amount of that money to so much as is being currently offered in exchange for the 
domestic currency. This can be done, with a fixed rate of exchange, only if there 
is rationing of imports. one form of rationing is by administrative allocation 
of licences to import. It has been suggested that the allocation would be more 
efficient as well as simpler if it were left to the market – if import licences were 
put up to auction. The procedure would be simpler still if there were no licences, 
but those who wanted foreign currency had to bid for the available supply. But 
this is only a way of describing a floating exchange rate. 
Two lines of diagnosis of the malady of the persistently passive balance of 
payments have thus brought us to the same prescription: let the exchange rate 
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float. Needless to say, there is more to the argument than this. Governments 
would not have held on to fixed exchange rates so long and been at such pains 
to re-establish them when they broke down, if the only case for them were that 
they are traditional and suited the convenience of bankers. Nonetheless, it is 
the usefulness of a floating exchange rate that we come upon when we ask how 
a persistent deficit in the external balance can be removed without a wasteful 
contraction of domestic income, and follow the argument where it leads. 
Yet this is by no means to say that a floating exchange rate would make 
incomes policy needless: on the contrary, incomes policy would be an essential 
complement of a floating exchange. And this for two reasons. First, it is the great 
political danger of the floating exchange that it might be taken to remove all 
checks on cost inflation: no longer could an inflationary rise in the general level 
of pay be resisted because of the threat to the balance of payments through higher 
costs, for these, it would be said, would be offset automatically by a depreciation 
of the exchange rate. With this, secondly, goes the danger of a vicious spiral, in 
which a high rate of rise of pay leads to a fall in the exchange rate, which raises 
the price of imports and the cost of living, and this in turn prompts claims for a 
further rise in pay. The removal of a deficit in the balance of payments can never 
be painless, for – save insofar as it can be provided for out of the annual increase 
in production – it means a reduction of the resources available in the home 
market. When the deficit is removed by a fall in the exchange rate, the reduction 
of resources imposes itself in great part by way of a rise in the price of imports. In 
modern economies that rise may have to go a long way – for price is only one of 
the factors on which the volume of imports and exports depends. As the articles 
traded have become more elaborate and more dependent for their appeal on their 
design, and as the promotion of trade has come to require more investment in 
sales effort, stocks and service, changes in the volume of imports and exports have 
shown persistent trends. The changes in prices required to remove an external 
deficit, whether by promoting exports or checking imports, may therefore have 
to be big; and where imports enter substantially into consumption, the cost of 
living may have to be pushed up sharply. If the improvement is to be maintained, 
money incomes must not rise correspondingly. There as elsewhere, the movement 
of those incomes requires to be guided by a policy that has regard to the many-
sided needs and prospects of the economy. 
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V
There remains one observation of particular relevance to Australia. At several 
points I have urged the usefulness, even the indispensability, of a national incomes 
policy in meeting problems arising on the side of the external balance. The prime 
function of that policy is to avoid cost inflation in economies that maintain full 
employment and mean to go on maintaining it, so that firms in the aggregate have 
no reason to resist inflationary rises in pay on the ground that higher costs will 
reduce their profit margins or their sales. The requirements of the policy are mainly 
two: the participation, in the reaching of particular decisions, of a spokesman of 
the common interest; and an understanding of the grounds on which decisions 
are reached. I wish at the last to state my belief that both those requirements 
are met, more fully than through the institutions of most other countries, by 
the conciliation and arbitration system of Australia. For this provides for the 
participation in major decisions about pay of a third party, concerned both to do 
justice to the cases put forward by the two sides and to see the particular award 
in the context of the needs and prospects of the whole economy; while the public 
hearings, and the deliverance of reasoned judgements, serve to inform opinion, 
and gain acceptance for the awards. It may be an accident of history that long 
before the need for a national incomes policy was apprehended, Australia came 
to adopt procedures so propitious to one; but that they should now be available 
to meet the needs of the hour seems to me a precious legacy of their history to 




Income inflation in Australia
Ronald F. Henderson1
1971 will go on record as the year in which the general public in Australia began 
to worry about cost inflation or income inflation as I prefer to describe it. This 
concern was expressed clearly in the Commonwealth Treasurer’s budget speech; 
unfortunately the action taken in the budget did not correspond, for it was aimed 
at further restraint of demand which was already sagging below the level of full 
employment. In public discussion it is now understood that the 1971 variety 
of inflation is significantly different from previous bouts, in that this time the 
general level of demand, profits, and activity are not very high as they have been 
on previous occasions pulling prices up. Indeed the use of the term “stagflation” 
to describe the 1971 situation is becoming common to indicate the combination 
of a stagnant level of activity combined with a rapid rise of prices.   
The problem of cost inflation is not really economic; it’s more difficult than 
that; it is social and political. It is another variant of a very old political problem 
how to prevent a pressure group, whose interests are immediately and obviously 
affected, from prevailing over the greater interest of the whole of the community. 
In the United States recently it has been how to prevent the well organised 
militant coal miners’ union from wrecking the whole of President Nixon’s prices 
and incomes policy to restrain inflation and reduce unemployment.
But while recognition of the disease is fairly general there is still a long way 
to go in the difficult process of analysis and discussion of causes and remedies. It 
is to that discussion that I hope to make a small contribution this evening.   
1 Thirty-fourth Joseph Fisher Lecture, 2 December 1971. 
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My first point is that this income inflation was only recognised in Australia 
a year after it had been prevalent and carefully documented throughout the 
rich countries which constituted the membership of oECD in 1970 – USA , 
Canada, Japan and Western European countries (Australia joined belatedly in 
1971). A special report on the subject was published by oECD in December 
1970 showing that for the group as a whole the rise in prices in 1970 was 5.5 per 
cent as compared with an average of 2.6 per cent for the years 1960-65. It was 
only towards the end of 1969 and in early 1970 that a general acceleration took 
place throughout the oECD countries. This happened in the absence of strong 
pressure of demand. Demand was particularly low and unemployment high 
in both Britain and the United States. In 1969-70 in all these countries except 
France the share of wages and salaries in national income was rising to well above 
its long term trend value and profits were being squeezed. As a proportion of 
national income profits in the United States fell from 12.5 per cent in the period 
1955-64 to 9.7 per cent in the first half of 1970. This, of course, is clean contrary 
to what one expects to happen when a boom is caused by demand inflation. 
The first condition I want to draw from international experience is that as 
this disease is so widespread it is most unlikely that its main cause in Australia 
is a purely local phenomenon such as the rate of immigration. Yet this is being 
forcibly suggested by the Institute of Public Affairs. Further consideration suggests 
that the upsurge of inflation in 1971 cannot really be attributed to long term 
immigration policy; the inflationary influence of high migration, which is real, is 
exerted on the demand side through demand for new housing and new factories, 
not on the cost side. The influence of an inflow of migrants of working age is to 
moderate rather than aggravate the rate of increase of wages and salaries. Thus a 
reduction in the rate of migration is not a remedy for income inflation.
Another local phenomenon that has been suggested as a substantial cause 
of the 1971 inflation is the high level of government expenditure, with the 
corresponding remedy cut “government expenditure”. The main part of the answer 
to this has been given by Dr. P. J. Sheehan in The Australian Economic Review, 
Issue 3, 19712 in which he points out the remarkable stability of government 
 




expenditure as a proportion of gross national product. For the decade 1959-60 
to 1970-71 it averaged 20.4 per cent; for the 1970-71 it was 20.3 per cent. one 
need only add that there was no upsurge in government expenditure throughout 
the oECD areas either to account for the upsurge of income inflation on an 
international scale.
There is not yet a consensus of opinion among economists as to the precise 
causes of this burst of income inflation. Many I think would agree with professor 
Meade in his Wincott Memorial Lecture3 that one reason is that “wage earners 
have become more conscious of rises in the cost of living and more insistent that 
it is real wages rather than money wages in which they are interested”. Moreover, 
he continues, “a marked increase in the rate of rise of money wages rates may 
have given individual trade unions an unexpected glimpse into the very large 
monopolistic powers which they posses for pushing money wage rates up and 
which they have not fully exploited in the past. The consequence may have been 
a basic change in their attitudes. The order of magnitude of what is regarded as a 
reasonable annual claim may have been more or less permanently changed; and 
trade union leaders may have become much more acutely aware of their power to 
obtain concessions through the threat to disrupt basic economic activities.”
I would wish to add that this increased awareness of inflation is not 
confined to wage earners. In Australia it is clearly evident among salary earners 
such as engineers, teachers and public servants who have also changed their 
expectations as to a reasonable rate of increase of their money incomes, have 
made much bigger claims and have succeeded in getting much bigger rise sin 
money incomes. These rises in incomes, of course, raise costs of production and 
lead to rises in prices just as rises in wages do. So to control this type of inflation 
the rate of increase of all incomes – not just of wages – must be reduced. This is 
the economic justification for an incomes policy as distinct from a wages policy. 
There is also a social or political justification for an incomes policy; trade unions 
will certainly not acquiesce in a policy that restrains wages while increases of a 
thousand dollars a year or more are obtained by judges, doctors and professors.
3 Inflation the Present Problem. Reports of the Secretary General oECD. December 1970.
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Why has there been this apparently sudden acceleration in the rate 
of increase of incomes in the rich countries in the past three years? Is this a 
sudden gust of wind that has blown us of course and can we expect to return 
to a comfortable situation in which the pursuit of sensible monetary and fiscal 
policies to prevent over-full employment will be sufficient to prevent prices from 
rising at more than three per cent per year? If so, all we need, presumably, is 
some temporary corrective such as a six month income freeze before returning to 
business as usual. President Nixon in his speech of october 7 introducing phase 
2 of his New Economic Policy, with a pay board, a price commission and a cost 
of living council, said specifically “we will not make controls a permanent feature 
of American life”.
I think this analysis is mistaken, for I believe that the experience of inflation 
has caused such a change in expectations and modes of action that we cannot 
hope to get back to the conditions of the early 1960s when inflation could 
be controlled by monetary and fiscal policy alone. In technical terms I think 
the Phillips curve has shifted right out and cannot be pushed back by a short 
term incomes policy. There is no longer a moderate, politically acceptable level 
of unemployment which will prevent an unacceptable price inflation. on the 
contrary we have seen in Britain, the United States and are threatened with I 
Australia the combination of unacceptably large unemployment at the same time 
as unacceptably rapid inflation.
one important underlying reason for this change is that one generation is 
succeeding another in the seats where important decisions are taken. Men and 
women over 50 years of age grew up in a world of stable prices. For many of them, 
subconsciously perhaps, that is still the normal world from which aberrations 
occur but to which, with a bit of luck, things will return. So they act accordingly, 
they put up their prices when they have to, they stick to price stability as long as 
they can. But that generation is being replaced by a younger one that never knew 
price stability; for them rising prices are the normal state of things and so they 
act differently, young professional men adjust their fees to allow for rising prices, 
young trade union leaders claim larger wage increases, business men expect their 
costs to rise further and so raise their prices. As this replacement of the generation 
is completed it will become even more difficult to check inflation.
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So I submit that what is needed is not just a temporary set of controls over 
prices and incomes but something built to last. In the future there must be three 
main elements in control over the economy, fiscal policy, monetary policy and 
controls over prices and incomes. 
Evidence in support of this view can be culled from European experience. 
In Britain and in Holland it can be seen in retrospect that “wage freezes” failed 
because they were temporary. oECD studies of inflation stress that these short 
run efforts have been disappointing and a broader, longer term approach is 
needed. The report4 by the Secretary General of oECD, for instance, states in 
its conclusions, “The question remains of how in practical terms to make price 
incomes policy more effective over the longer run”. 
This conclusion that a structural change has occurred that requires a change 
in long term policies is reinforced, I think, by careful study of the sequence of 
events in the 1960s in Britain and in USA  In both countries there was growing 
awareness of the cost inflation problem throughout the period and under the 
Wilson and Johnson governments. In USA  the Council of Economic Advisers 
set up guideposts for wages and prices and engaged in continuous efforts to 
prevent wage and price increases greater than these. It is probable that in the 
years 1962-65 when demand was not excessive these efforts did moderate price 
increases. They were swept away by the strong demand pressure that developed 
with the escalation of the Vietnam War. Then with a change of government in 
1969 President Nixon abandoned attempts to influence prices and incomes by 
“jawboning” and resorted to an old fashioned policy of demand restraint. This 
failed. It created heavy unemployment but prices continued to rise. So in August 
1971 the New Economic Policies of price and income control were introduced. 
In Britain there was a rather similar pattern with a National Board for 
Prices and Incomes exerting some pressure on prices and wages under the Wilson 
government. This was swept away by the Heath government devoted at first, like 
that of President Nixon, to orthodox restraints of demand as a counter to inflation; 
but it too failed to cure stagflation by these orthodox measures. After considering 
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a policy of heavy differential taxation on all companies giving wage and salary 
rises of more than the established norm it shelved this when the Confederation of 
British Industry introduced a policy of pledges by leading companies not to raise 
prices by more than 5 per cent over the next 12 months. 
Thus in both countries governments initially hostile to any form of prices 
or incomes policy introduced or welcomed such policies after two years with out 
them – years of heavy unemployment and rapid rises in prices. 
The other protagonists in this drama are the central bankers who have to 
carry out monetary policy with the aim of restraining inflation without causing 
too much unemployment. Dr. Arthur Burns, President of the Federal Reserve 
Board of the United States, has been one of the most persistent and persuasive 
advocates of some form of prices and incomes policy to supplement fiscal and 
monetary policy. others of this persuasion include the Governor of the Bank 
of Norway who said recently,5 “An incomes policy is obviously no panacea in 
itself but is a vitally important supplement to demand management policies. In 
Norway the expert reports on the effects of alternative wage awards on price 
developments have proved very helpful. These estimates have been worked out 
by an expert committee chaired by a prominent economist and with members 
representing both the trade unions and the employers organisations. A remarkable 
degree of agreement has been reached and this has probably had some influence 
in moderating wage and price increases. This, of course, is facilitated by the 
centralized character of the wage and price negotiations in Norway.” 
overseas observers often suggest that Australia has had something like an 
incomes policy for many years, as the Commonwealth Arbitration Commission 
gives judgements on wage and salary increases. But the objective of the 
Commission, as its President has stated clearly, is to preserve industrial peace not 
to prevent inflation; and it has not prevented inflation. That is and must be the 
direct responsibility of the government, a responsibility that cannot be discharged 
simply by giving evidence before the Commission but must be discharged by 
action. 
5 The Banker, London, August 1971.
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This action must be a long term programme in which monetary, fiscal and 
incomes policy are co-ordinated. 
Thus I disagree with a recent statement by Mr. Snedden who said, “With 
Australia’s system of independent arbitral tribunals a complete incomes policy 
would be possible only if the Government in its public interest interventions is 
able to persuade tribunals to make decisions which accord with the established 
criteria”. I do not think this will achieve success. I believe that the government 
must introduce legislation laying down norms, a permissible range of income 
increases within which in future the arbitral tribunals must operate. This would 
be a major change, but I am convinced that major changes in our apparatus of 
control over the economy are required. Insufficient attention has been paid, I 
suggest, to the question “In what circumstances has an incomes policy a chance of 
success?” Clearly it has little or no chance at a time of strong demand inflation as 
in USA  in 1967. What is perhaps not so obvious is that it may well break down 
if the government is responsible for a severe recession as in Britain in 1971. For 
in those circumstances wage earners and trade union bodies may flatly refuse to 
co-operate in any way, and without some such co-operation no incomes policy, 
statutory or voluntary, can hope to succeed. 
So a reasonably high level of demand, activity and employment must 
be maintained by monetary and fiscal policy without bursting into over-full 
employment. Australia has had a good record in this respect since 1962.
In such conditions prices will not escalate unless incomes do, but there is 
no longer any reason to be confident that trade unions and professional bodies 
will refrain from using their monopoly power to drive up their incomes and cause 
an income inflation. This must be controlled and is the nub of the problem. In 
order to achieve acceptance of that control by those affected it may be necessary 
to erect a control mechanism over prices and dividends, but that mechanism is of 
secondary importance. It may be sufficient, as has been done in the United States 
to exercise direct price controls only over a small number of the largest companies. 
If incomes escalate out of control no control over prices and dividends will be 
sufficient to check inflation.  
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Control over incomes must be exercised in both the public and the private 
sectors of the economy. A norm must be set and should be below the average 
aimed at in order to leave room for a little upgrading for special reasons. If we 
estimate productivity per employee to be increasing at two per cent a year and 
are willing to allow prices to rise at three per cent our target average income rise 
will be five per cent and our long term norm four per cent. When introducing 
the policy to reduce unfairness between those who have recently had a rise and 
those who have not, a three-year base period might be used. Ideally using four per 
cent this would mean that par would be 12 per cent in the past three years. But 
such large increases in incomes have been gained in this period that some higher 
norm will have to be accepted as par and a gradual transition made to the four per 
cent. Within the public sector it is particularly important that restraint is seen to 
start at the top with the salaries of the Prime Minister, the cabinet, the judiciary, 
and senior public servants, and extend downwards as far as the influence of the 
government extends. This would include the fees of doctors for instance.  
To regulate incomes in the private sector it may be useful to have a series 
of committees with representatives of labour, employers and the government as 
has been done by President Nixon in stage 2 of his operation. These may help 
to secure an informed consensus of opinion and to secure voluntary compliance 
with the norm. But behind this there must be a stiffening of compulsion and 
sanctions against those who refuse to comply. There are a number of possible 
methods and the choice in Australia will depend on constitutional and political 
considerations as well as economic ones. We can, however, distinguish certain 
characteristics that are common to schemes under discussion. The penalty for 
non-compliance – arranging for too big an increase in income – may be imposed 
on either the employer or the employee (theoretically it could be imposed on both 
but I have not yet heard of such a proposal). The penalty may be prosecution or 
loss of certain privileges or it may be liability to substantially increased taxation.  
Australian experience suggests that attempts to impose legal penalties on 
large trade unions are unlikely to be effective. Professor Meade has proposed for 
Britain a modified scheme of penalties which will only apply to strikes in support 
of a claim judged to be in excess of the norm by an independent tribunal. These 
include loss of accumulated rights to redundancy payments and charging the cost 
of supplementary benefits to wives and children of strikers to the trade union or 
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individual concerned. I doubt whether any modification of such measures for 
Australian conditions would be acceptable. Moreover, such reliance on penalties 
on employees on strike will only be effective in preventing inflationary wage 
and salary settlements if the employers resist large claims. A few years ago such 
resistance could be taken for granted. But this is no longer the case. The most 
flagrant example in the private sector is the Metal Industries Trades Association 
acceptance of an increase of $6 a week for tradesmen and $4.50 a week for others 
awarded on 16 July 1971. This did not even occur at the peak of a boom but at 
a period of some slack in the economy when unemployment was 30 per cent 
higher than in the previous year and when we were suggesting in The Australian 
Economic Review that a stimulus should be given to the economy in the budget. 
Thus we must accept the fact that employers can no longer be relied 
on unaided to resist inflationary claims even when the level of activity in the 
economy is not excessive. Although this is regrettable it is hardly surprising when 
no effective steps are taken to restrain even greater increases in the public sector 
such as a 15 per cent increase in salaries for second division public servants, a big 
increase for judges and a large increase in doctors’ fees. 
In these circumstances neither legal penalties nor a tax on employees seem 
likely to be sufficient to restrain income inflation even if they were politically 
acceptable. 
Professor Weintraub6 has set out a proposal for using company tax policy 
to restrain employers from granting wage and salary increases. For Australia this 
might be modified, on the lines of the 30:20 legislation for insurance companies, 
to give a tax rebate to those companies which conform to the wage and salary 
guidelines. The rebate should be substantial, perhaps 20 per cent of company 
tax, for the object is to secure conformity; it should be tapered so that those who 
only slightly exceed the norm pay only a slight penalty, “it should be based on 
total wage and salary payments in each job classification and grade divided by the 
number of man hours worked in the respective categories and combined into a 
 
6 Sidney Weintraub, “An Incomes Policy to Stop Inflation” Lloyds Bank Review, January 1971, pp. 1-12. 
Henry Wallich and Sidney Weintraub, “A Taxed Based Incomes Policy”, Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 
5, 1971, pp. 1-19.
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weighted index of wage increases”.7 The data are available for such calculations but 
the administrative burden would be substantial. It would not be worth considering 
if the problem were thought to be temporary. But if, as I believe, this is a long term 
problem and the alternatives are substantial unemployment and loss of output or 
rapid inflation, then the burden of this tax rebate system is well worth shouldering. 
Since the penalty will fall on company income it is less likely to be passed 
on in higher prices than a levy on units produced or labour employed. There is at 
least a good chance that most companies would try hard to earn the maximum 
tax rebate by resistance to demands for wage and salary increases above the norm. 
It is, of course, essential that such a policy in the company sector be buttressed 
by strict adherence to the norm in the public sector. of course there will be 
hard cases, but hard cases make bad law. It is surely fair overall that one norm be 
applied to all increases in incomes. It is possible, I think, for the taxing power of 
the Commonwealth Government to be used to restrain inflation in this way. So 
this is one suggestion for a long term policy. 
I am very glad that the Federal Treasurer has now joined in the discussion 
of income policies in a most interesting address on 18th November. He said, “it 
has yet to be demonstrated that such a shift has occurred here that our problems 
are not now amenable to the normal range of policies” and points out that 
prices incomes policies will seem like unwarranted interference to companies, 
professional people and wage earners alike.  
I suggest that the situation is rather like that which obtained in the 1930s 
when Keynes was advocating that the government should assume responsibility 
for maintaining the general level of demand and output in the economy by 
counter-cyclical fiscal policy. There was strong opposition to that for many 
years. We have now reached the next phase of development in which, after 30 
years of high employment, additional government measures, which do involve 
interference with the decisions of individuals and companies, are required in 
order to restrain inflation to an acceptable pace while maintaining a high level 
of employment and output. I hope we shall not have to wait for a major disaster 
before we learn this lesson. 
7 Wallich and Weintraub, op. cit. If this is not done salaries of higher executives can be raised without 
penalty if some more charwomen are hired to keep down the average wage paid.
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Political economy and the  
problems of our times: In defence  
of general economics
John Vaizey1
Despite the eminence which is accorded by our profession (if such it be) to the 
abstract theorist, it is the general economist who in the long run decides what 
is the significant theoretical innovation, or points to the inadequacy of accepted 
theoretical formulations.2 It is his needs and problems which ultimately determine 
the shape of the theoretical structure. It is my thesis that we are witnessing today 
the culmination of some fifty years of radical restructuring of economic theory 
in the light of radically different problems that the general economist has had to 
deal with. And while fifty years may seem a long time, it is only the lifetime of 
one academic, it may be that a long working life is the necessary perspective in 
which to see the full working out of a new system of ideas. I am not claiming 
continuous victory for those ideas; a young revolutionary of 1789 looking back 
on his lifetime in 1848 – a revolutionary year seen as the logical culmination of 
1789 – from one point of view would see the Terror, Napoleon, Waterloo, the 
restoration of the Bourbons and the reign of the Citizen King. That it was a series 
of uninterrupted victories from any one point of view, only a man who turned his 
coat as often as Talleyrand could say; most people would be content to say, with 
the Abbe Sieyes, “J’ai vécu.” But, sir, we have come through, and 1789 did mark 
the end of the ancien regime. 
1 Thirty-fifth Joseph Fisher Lecture, 18 September 1974. 
2 This lecture is not intended to be a contribution to the history of economic theory, that is a task I 
am doubly disqualified for by a lack of reputation as a theorist, and only a partial knowledge of the 
manuscript sources which would be necessary for an historian. The job that I am particularly trying 
to do is a different one. It is the need of a general economist, like myself, who is interested now in one 
thing, and now in another, to judge the state of economic science as a whole. 
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As general economists we may lock ourselves into one field, as I did with 
the economics of education, but our claim to competence cannot arise from our 
specialism alone. A general economist requires a general theory which in some 
sense must preside over the works of different specialists, whether in industrial 
or monetary economics, in the economics of transport or econometrics. The 
training of a general economist, and his function, is neglected at our peril, and 
those who have done most to advance our discipline – Marshall and Keynes, or 
Schumpeter and Myrdal – have not only carried economic reasoning to a higher 
point; they have also been interested in the history of their own subject, its links 
with the other disciplines, and above all, with the world as it really is and as 
people have to deal with it. And just by standing a little on tiptoe, by neglecting 
for a moment the latest article in the latest journal, and looking back at our own 
professional lifetimes, we may see how the world has changed while we have been 
looking after our particular interest; it is as though, sleeping on some aircraft, 
we were to awake and see below us some strangely unfamiliar landscape. In my 
view, this landscape is the new subject of political economy which has claimed to 
replace the so-called economic “science” which is now past. It is my view that a 
false analogy with physical sciences has led us and the world up the garden path. 
What I shall discuss is the nature of the general theory of economics that links the 
different parts of our subject. I shall argue the concept of general equilibrium is 
elegant but unhelpful; and that political economy is inelegant but helpful. 
Consider, briefly, the disarray that our subject is in. I will not refer to 
the hostility that the world bears us for events, like falls in share prices, over 
which we have as much control as the doctor does over the onset of senility or a 
meteorologist over the weather. (We can, admittedly make things worse.) I will 
merely list a few of the topics where a general economist, hired by a government, 
or a firm, or a newspaper, or by a co-operative of adult students, has to fly by his 
own bootstraps because the high theorists disagree and hope he will do less harm 
than another might. I do not denigrate the achievements of our subject; I merely 
list the problems where the answers are in dispute. 
What causes inflation and where will it go to next? Is the Common Market 
a Good Thing or a Bad Thing? How far can the redistribution of income go 
without adversely affecting economic growth? ought school teachers to be paid 
more or less than skilled carpenters? What ought to be the price of bread? We 
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don’t know the answers, or we deny that they are appropriate questions. Yet to all 
these, and to many other questions, there would have been virtually unanimous 
replies at the time of Marshall’s death, fifty years ago, in the English-speaking 
world. The exceptions would have been the Marxists, a tiny handful, tenuously 
in power in Russia; some Thomists, busily providing an ideology for Mussolini; 
and the German and American historicists. But “true” economists, especially 
Marshall’s slightly less than best pupils, and through them the overwhelming 
majority of English-speaking economists, would have known all the answers to 
my questions.3 Indeed, the test of their professional status would have been to 
know the answers, as you would expect an anatomist to know where the kneecap 
is, or a navigator to get to Tasmania rather than New Guinea, if he wishes to. I say 
“slightly less than best pupils” because Keynes and Sir John Clapham – the only 
economic historian to have students queueing up to attend his lectures and to 
be cheered to the echo at the end (how times have changed!) – shared Marshall’s 
doubts, expressed in his appendices, and by small quibbles in the footnotes, about 
the system, or at least large parts of it.4 
In the 1930s and 1940s specialists in a range of peripheral subjects, like 
the theory of wages and of distribution, and various topics in applied economics, 
including industrial and agricultural economics – peripheral, that is, to the 
central theoretical topics to which the journals and the ambitious young men 
addressed themselves, but far from peripheral to general economists and to those 
who sought their aid – carried on as though nothing had happened. Keynes had 
put everything into the melting pot, and the process of sorting it all out was – is 
– still going on. Came the war and the incidental suspension of all free-market 
economic laws, by rationing, direction of labour, and forced egalitarianism, and 
after the war the Bourbons returned, to write their textbooks, as though the 
 
 
3 There were then very few economists. And there were substantial numbers of currency reformers tariff 
advocates, and socialists, whom Marshall dealt with faithfully in his enormous footnotes. The case for 
free trade, laissez-faire and the gold standard, with Jevon’s supply and demand curves, was economics. 
The rest was heresy.
4 And, two years after Marshall’s death, Sir John Clapham’s doubts were expressed in his empty economic 
boxes metaphor. Sraffa prompted Joan Robinson into the overthrow of the theory of competition. Sraffa 
and Richard Kahn – and above all three million unemployed – had stimulated Keynes into the overthrow 
of the theory of money and employment. Kalecki and Joan Robinson had done away with distribution 
theory. All that was left of the economic consensus was the theory of value, increasingly under the assault of 
those who had doubts about utilitarianism, so Hicks and Allen tried to put economics on a “positive” basis. 
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Revolution had never been, having learned nothing and forgotten nothing. In the 
1950s tranquillity reigned, along with Eisenhower, whilst once more the world 
economy transformed itself, neglecting to obey economic laws the while. Now, 
why was there this strange experience? 
The answer to this is, I suggest, not a simple one. It is certainly not enough 
to suggest (what is undoubtedly historically true) that the brand of general 
equilibrium theory which the fervently anti-statist theorists took to the United 
States in the late thirties, which missed the Keynesian revolution5, was successful 
because it then suited a particular political ideology. Too many socialists, like 
Anthony Crosland, share it for that to be wholly true. And there are conservatives 
on the other side, too, including Sir John Hicks. Rather, it seems to me, that in 
the field of the social sciences there is an almost inextricable welter of ideology 
and technique, of ends and means. Not only are these disciplines relatively under-
developed, but they draw not only upon mathematics, but upon history and 
philosophy for their techniques, and they are inescapably policy-oriented. To 
try to abstract from this in a quest for “intellectual purity” seems to me to be 
understandable but erroneous. Lacking the methods of experimental science, we 
have no real way of building up a stock of accepted results. But that is, surely, not 
to say that all non-natural science is not intellectually valid? It is surely possible 
to have integrity, to try not to fake results, but to be eclectic, as historians are; 
to blinker your vision as though you were a horse in a classic race is to speed up 
the attainment of the goal, but to leave the question whether the goal is right or 
wrong out of consideration. And really, it is the goal which is interesting, as well 
as the way to it.
I think to identify economics with the present set of techniques is to ignore 
the fact – for it is a fact – that the bases of our subject are still in dispute, especially 
as many of us hold that the question of – for example – the measurement of 
capital, and hence of the concept of capital (and capitalism) is still (to put it 
mildly) open. To suggest that we hold the views we do is because we are either 
badly trained or politically committed (or both) may be partly but it cannot be 
 
 
5 Sir John Hicks in Value and Capital broke with Marshall and embraced Walras, which was a major 
revival of old ideas which fitted, however, American theory in the 1950s, with its assumption that 
flexible prices guaranteed full employment.
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wholly true. The question of what economics is about is not yet settled, nor in 
my view ever will be. Yet we still refer to ourselves on both sides as “professional 
economists”. 
The model of economics that is still widely taught is a fully-employed 
economy with steady money prices; where there is pure laissez-faire, and no 
government, where competition between small artisans determines supply, and 
roughly equal and informed consumers – who are immortal, for Time has been 
abolished, and single because they are solipsists – carefully weigh up their needs, 
and settle prices by haggling outside the carpenters’ huts or the hen runs.6 
In the 1950s there was a major revulsion, in Cambridge especially, against 
those ideas because the real problems arose from growth and change – that is time 
– and the notion of who should get what – that is ethics and justice. In the 1960s 
the real facts of the real world broke into the academy, and it is this revolution of 
ideas which is my theme. 
Here we are, then, once more at the barricades of our discipline. Even 
the most reactionary of Bourbons have packed their things for fear of the sans-
culottes. Professor Hahn so rightly says, 
“ . . . the achievements of economic theory in the last two decades are 
both impressive and in many ways beautiful. But it cannot be denied 
that there is something scandalous in the spectacle of so many people 
refining the analysis of economic states which they give no reason to 
suppose will ever, or have ever, come about . . . It is an unsatisfactory 
and slightly dishonest state of affairs”.7 
Some may think it is indeed scandalous, and though the achievements 
of that economic theory are still taught, in many universities it has now been 
replaced by a new political economy. What is it that has caused this? It is, I suspect, 
 
 
6 The Keynes theory of employment was, initially at least, accepted. But his theory of money, wages and 
prices was not. “Pure” theory was revived on the basis of a Walrasian system of general equilibrium, with 
no time, and with perfect knowledge. This cut it off automatically from real problems of society – which 
is what the subject is about, according to the political economists.
7 Professor Frank Hahn, quoted in John Kenneth Galbraith’s Economics and the Public Purpose, p. 27, 
footnote 4. It is from Hahn’s Presidential Address to the Econometric Society.
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the return of commonsense as it was found that the conclusions of neo-classical 
economics seemed increasingly paradoxical to ordinary intelligent citizens. It is 
also a theoretical consolidation of a high order, which I shall attempt to spell out. 
But before we get to that point I must deal with the Bourbon restoration, 
and for that story I must turn to some recent extraordinarily interesting 
publications by Professor Harry Johnson. It is perhaps easier to take these lesser, 
casual publications as a topic for discussion than Professor Johnson’s assuredly 
more technical articles, because they raise directly what the technical articles only 
raise by implication, namely what subject it is that Professor Johnson says we are 
all professing. I have no doubt that Professor Johnson represents precisely and 
fairly the point of view of a large group of economists, who regard what they 
do as economic science and what the others do as drivel. “Economics has been 
undergoing a research revolution”, Professor Johnson writes8, and he refers to 
the “demonstrable superiority” of “the new techniques of mathematical analysis 
and econometrics, as contrasted with the social wisdom and philosophizing that 
characterised the older style of ‘political economy’.” “Economics shifted from 
an orientation towards ‘political economy’ to an orientation towards ‘economic 
science’; and the essence of science is research . . . the application of known . . 
. techniques to the solution of suitable problems . . . which . . . may not be of 
general social interest.” Johnson attributes this shift to a dominance of the US 
graduate schools. That dominance was due to the vast availability of graduate 
awards in the US for American and foreign students, in the late 1940s and early 
1950s; the coherence and rationality of graduate training programmes in the US; 
and the exhaustion and demoralisation of postwar Europe. 
In his Encounter article Johnson describes his own departure from 
Cambridge as he “began to appreciate the difference between scientific and 
ideological motivations for theoretical work.” “Keynesian economics”, in 
Cambridge, “was not a theoretical advance . . . it was only a tool for furthering 
left-wing politics”. This is an extremely serious charge, and one that is often made. 
It is that “the intellectual poverty of English economics” is due to “a mistaken 
belief that to prove capitalism to be logically impossible is sufficient to dispose 
 
8 “Cambridge in the 1950s”, Encounter, XLII, I January 1974.
John Vaizey
 173
of its existence.”9 In contradiction to this group of Lysenko-ish ideologues, 
squabbling in an environment of intellectual and physical poverty – “no coal, and 
they managed also to contrive a shortage of bread” . . . “English public licensing 
hours are rather barbarous” . . . “bitterness” . . . “you can be as incompetent as you 
want to be” . . . “material poverty” . . . and so on – Johnson describes a group of 
competent, hardworking scientists who are using known techniques to advance 
the truth. In the United States, we are told, “a professor is not a member of the 
national élite” (Kissinger?), he lives in “a fairly self-contained world, within which 
entry and promotion are fairly strictly governed by academic standards.” The 
United States has “a long tradition of explicit and organised programs of graduate 
instruction . . . in which the program adapts itself . . . to the incorporation 
and transmission of new developments in the field . . . an orientation towards 
techniques and research comes more naturally to the US than to the European 
scholar” and so on. In the US economists share “the general freedom of the public 
to disagree with its government”10 – a freedom presumably lacking in the United 
Kingdom and Australia – and “as a result of this freedom, the most impressive 
characteristic of the economic profession in the United States is its consistently 
high quality.” Johnson correctly points out that a concern with “research is an 
extremely modern phenomenon in the history of the academic community . . . 
up to modern times, what was valued was knowledge or ‘scholarship’.” 
Towards the end of his article Johnson concedes that “the possibilities of 
acquiring useful knowledge by further research along scientifically respectable. . . 
lines will play out, and . . . the world will discover that what it needs, after all, are 
political economists and not economic scientists.” 
9 This belief he attributes to a Marxist, Maurice Dobb, and to Joan Robinson – who “was not recognisable 
as a female of the species and did not behave like one” – and Richard Kahn, who conspired against 
the “shy and gentle” Dennis Robertson, who was “incapable of standing up in public and defending 
himself.” Robertson was a sophisticated academic, who, far from being incapable of standing up in 
public, had been President of the Union, President of the ADC, a senior civil servant, an army officer 
on active service, who at first regarded Harry Johnson as a sinister influence. What Robertson was 
frightened of was poverty, and, most clever and charming of men, he lived frugally. 
10 Paul Sweezy’s comments would be relevant at this point. There have been no “loyalty” oaths in England 
since the abolition of the laws against dissenters, Catholics and Jews over a century ago, which even then 
were rarely enforced, and only applied to the House of Commons and oxford and Cambridge.
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That is, indeed, the point of this lecture. I think social wisdom is as 
important as equations. Let me at once concede that, despite the unfortunate 
tone and factual errors of Johnson’s article, there is much in what Johnson says. 
It is easier for clever people to debate than to do research. And there is a degree 
of absolute ignorance about so many matters that is inexcusable. If I may I will 
give three instances from my own autobiography. The first concerns education, 
the second the Irish famine and the third the British steel industry. I shall try to 
show how various interpretations are possible, but that the facts tend to suggest 
extremely complex answers to difficult questions. 
Education first. Perhaps I should explain the points at issue. In the early 
1950s the perennial problems of the British economy were attributed by the 
Economist newspaper, by economists like John Jewkes and Lionel Robbins, and 
by H. G. Johnson (in The Overloaded Economy), as due to excess demand, partly 
due to the welfare state with its substantial increase in public expenditure. Abel-
Smith and Titmuss, in a report to the Guillebaud Committee on the Cost of 
National Health Service, showed that the NHS had not added greatly to the 
proportion of the GNP devoted to health, but had redistributed its benefits and 
economised in its use of resources. In The Costs of Education (London 1958) I 
showed that the same was true of education and, moreover, that the benefits of 
the public education system went proportionately more to the better-off. It was 
also necessary to refute the theory held by the more sophisticated – that education 
expenditure was demographically determined. (This heresy is now returning. It 
seems to be a feature of economic crises and the reactions to them.) 
At the same time, Chicago sought to argue that people chose different sorts 
of education because of their evaluation of their discounted life-time earnings. 
This ignored much sociological research. But it was necessary for them to (a) 
prove that the labour market “worked”, and (b) that “human capital” – a central 
part of the new neo-classical formulation – was not a mere metaphor (as Marshall 
had asserted). These matters are examined in Vaizey, Norris and Sheehan, The 
Political Economy of Education (London 1972). 
I was also concerned to examine the actual role of education in economic 
and social change and development. This could not be argued a priori, but had 
to be examined case by case. Chicago, on the other hand, took the view that 
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“investment in man” could be subjected to the same criteria as capital projects – 
the cost of educating a person being equivalent to buying a machine. The trouble 
with all this was an absence of facts. 
When I took up the economics of education nobody knew how many 
British children were at school – the official estimates were half a million out 
– and the accepted view was that the slump of 1931 had caused disastrous cuts 
in expenditure. Laborious research, including the calculation of outlays and the 
construction of price indices, showed that from 1931 to 1934 a combination of 
falling prices and a reduction in the number of children caused per capita real 
expenditure on education to rise. In my view, the “human capital” argument was 
unnecessary, on the principle of occam’s razor. 
Ireland next. The accepted explanation of the Irish famine of 1845 to 1850, 
20 years ago, was that the English landlords extracted the surplus from their 
Irish tenantry in specie and spent it in London. By months of going through 
dusty and uncatalogued documents in the basements of Guinness’s brewery I was 
able to show that this was not the case. The famine was the result of the collapse 
of a virtually moneyless economy in the interior of Ireland as a direct result of 
the post-Napoleonic war deflation, consequent upon the revaluation of the Irish 
pound, in the maritime sector. This is now the “accepted” explanation of the 
Famine which the clever young men are attacking. My argument, it will be seen, 
rests upon simple supply and demand. So much, I hope, for the charge that we 
eschew ordinary economic tools. In the Irish case, the error was nationalism. The 
accepted view was that the Union of the Parliaments in 1801 was designed to 
kill Ireland’s nascent industries, condemning the Irish to a marginal, subsistence 
economy. The Guinness documents showed a great growth of prosperity between 
the mid-1790s and 1815. This coincided with the devaluation of the Irish pound. 
The postwar slump coincided with (a) a reduction in military expenditure in 
Ireland and (b) a very substantial revaluation of the Irish pound, as F. W. Fetter 
and F. G. Hall pointed out. At this time, the maritime sector contracted. In the 
view that Patrick Lynch and I took (Guinness’s Brewery in the Irish Economy, 1859-
1876, Cambridge University Press, 1962), the famine resulted chiefly from this 
fact and was – as a Marxist historian, Strauss, had suggested – the death throes 
of a subsistence economy which was contiguous to a commercial economy. The 
Irish emigrants added greatly to the reserve army in Scotland, England, America 
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and Australia. Irish landlords, continuously hard up, were exploiters, but on a 
most petty scale. The Guinnesses were the first wealthy Irish family, and not until 
the late 1860s. 
In this case, there were three “explanations” – nationalist, laissez-faire and 
Marxist. 
Lastly steel.11 The issues are indeed serious. In the Brewing Industry 1886-
1951 (London 1960) I had already demonstrated that profit maximisation was 
not a realistic description of business motivation, and that the mix of political 
and economic considerations in industrial policy was inextricable. The issues in 
steel were: (a) the technological superiority of Germany and America; (b) tariffs; 
(c) location; (d) home based and foreign ores; (e) the level of investment. It is 
now clear that the joint-stock banks controlled the industry; that from 1929 the 
Bank of England had clear and strong policies; that agreement with the Bank’s 
views was essential for promotion to the chairmanship of a major steel firm; that 
these steel firms had operated as a cartel from (at least) 1910. All this determined 
their approach to government, and to location and price policy. It does not make 
“supply and demand” wrong; but it utterly changes their context. The British steel 
industry has been nationalised twice and the debates between the free enterprisers 
– what Keynes called the lazy fairies – on the one hand and the centralisers on 
the other have been acrimonious, both at the political and the so-called scholarly 
level. As I read through literally thousands of forgotten documents about the 
steel industry in the past sixty years, I discovered that in 1930 an American 
consultant, Colonel Brassert, had written a six page secret report for Montagu 
Norman, the Governor of the Bank of England, which formed the basis of the 
next forty years’ structure of the steel industry. The political and – more relevant 
to our purpose – the academic debates on pricing, location and investment were 
almost entirely irrelevant. It had all been decided by Colonel Brassert. The logic 
of inertia explained a great deal. 
These three examples show that I emphatically agree with Professor Johnson 
on the need for research in our scholarly discipline. It seems to me that research 
may mean what I have just illustrated. or it may mean a string of mathematical 
 
11  The History of British Steel, London 1974.
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theorems from a priori assumptions, which are not derived from any appropriate 
real problems. The assumptions are convenient for that particular mathematical 
reasoning. Now, it is far dirtier, and more difficult, to build up a plausible story, 
which makes some kind of sense, from the complexities and realities of the world as 
it is. This is what an historian means by research. In other words, we have to have 
the courage to be rough and ready if we are to try to tell the truth about reality.
Let all Johnson’s claims be conceded. But a central question remains. What 
is this science that leads to all this research? This science that is clean and true, 
like the hero of some Edwardian novel. Why does Joan Robinson’s remark that 
economic theory is difficult since economies which are not capitalist have come 
into being since it was invented still rouse Johnson’s ire? And, if this clean and true 
discipline is indeed a science, why are all its results entirely predictable? There are 
two senses of predictable. If the scientists are right about the atom, then on a given 
day Hiroshima will blow up. But I can also teach my pet parrot to say “marginal 
productivity” every time it opens its mouth. Neo-neo-classical economics is just 
not predictable in the first sense, the sense in which a weather forecaster, with 
enough data to hand, can predict rain in the next few hours, but predictable in 
the second sense. one must pressingly ask why is scientific economics, as defined, 
so predictably pro-market, so predictably oriented to a particular set of policy 
prescriptions? If “intellectual purity” means a deductive axiomatic system, it is 
not a science, natural or historic a science requires (by definition) an empirical 
content. That is the reason, I think, why neo-neo-classical economics is widely 
regarded, not as a pure science, but as inherently apologetic: a dogma.
Now, then, is economics a “science”? This raises directly the question of 
what is a professional economist and what is not? I will not try to evade the 
question by the obvious positivist answer that an economist is somebody who is 
hired to be an economist, or recognised as such by the Royal Economic Society or 
the American Economic Association. I am trying to suggest a deeper question and 
answer. At any time those who study a subject may be divided into three: those – 
by far the greater number – who study the subject for an examination and then 
leave it; a second group who will carry on with the subject as practitioners, and as 
teachers and as researchers, whom we may call the professionals and who add to 
knowledge; and a third group who will ask really new questions. Now only in the 
second and third groups will an intellectual revolution be successfully achieved; 
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and since most people are intensely conservative about most things – from eating 
to sex – only a few even in the third group will question the bases of the subject. 
It is easy to see, therefore, why a subject carries on along railway lines, even when 
new discoveries are being made which suggest that a trek across country will be 
more interesting. Progress is bound to be fastest on railway lines. But occasionally 
the need for a reformation of the subject is so great that it affects all three groups. 
The need arises either from intellectual incoherence, or from pressures to answer 
questions that the subject refuses to acknowledge. These pressures have been 
present since the great slump, and are redoubled by the current economic crash.
Both intellectual incoherence, and new questions ignored, have been 
charges levelled at economics. We are obliged to answer many questions from 
the world of affairs by saying that a major part of the answer lies in the territory 
assigned to other disciplines. Take inflation as an example. There are two main 
sorts of explanations of inflation. one is the monetarist and the other is that it is 
ultimately the consequence of wage-fixing arrangements under full employment. 
Both sets of explanations are “economic”, though the wage-fixing argument is 
suspect to “scientific” economists, and – nota bene – for its validity it depends 
upon a series of statements about the behaviour of trades unionists which are 
derived from what might be conventionally regarded as non-economic disciplines. 
But that is equally true of the “monetary” explanation, which is more orthodox 
in economic terms. If monetary mechanisms were to be effective in controlling 
inflation they would require quite specific political and social conventions – 
viz. that government did not seek to intervene in the economy in the way that 
governments have been intervening in the economy for the past 35 years, and 
that the trade unions did not seek to overthrow the political structure in order 
to force governments to resume their interventionist techniques, in the face of 
widespread unemployment. In other words, even the “purest” economic doctrine, 
that of the monetarists, not only assumes a given framework of social and political 
institutions, but is explicitly concerned with preserving them in a particular form. 
This fact, for so I take it to be, is openly acknowledged by Professor Milton 
Friedman, whose stated – and in my view wholly praiseworthy – concern is with 
the need to avoid coercive relationships. He is an old-fashioned liberal with a 
highly specified moral and political position. His economics, for which I have a 
great deal of respect, is derived directly and explicitly from the Austrian general 
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equilibrium school. This model is not in any sense value-free except when it is 
wholly formal. That is a point Professor Hahn has frequently made. There is no 
instance (that I have seen, at any rate) where the policy prescriptions are not 
predictable, in their general tenor, from the political and ethical predilections of 
the economist who undertakes the analysis. I do think this is an important point 
because if it is valid, the movement from a formal model to a situation where it 
is intended that a description of reality should be relevant, either to policy or to 
academic study, is inescapably “dirty”. In that sense, then, a “clean” social science 
is impossible except in the wholly trivial sense that a formal model is bound 
to be neutral, since it assumes (explicitly) that it is neutral, in the sense of not 
being “about” anything. This is relevant to the notion of positive economics as 
a discipline that is “scientific” in the non-political sense. (I shall argue that it is 
possible to be “scientific” as historians and literary critics are – though the words 
“scholarly” and “dispassionate” may be better).12
Several questions immediately arise. The first is why a theory which some 
would claim has been discredited should not only have survived but still be 
flourishing. That might suggest that it has not been discredited. The second is 
whether or not it matters that theory and practice have so markedly diverged. 
That is a matter of common observation. The third is what the “correct” theory 
might be. In the 114 years since Soapy Sam Wilberforce was acidly rebuked by 
 
 
12 Galbraith argues that one of the purposes of the preoccupation of the self-styled “pure” economists with 
this abstraction is in order to divert attention from the real world. He suggests that this diversion is 
not as unconscious as the amiable eccentricity of many of the economists concerned would lead us to 
believe; it serves the interests of those who wish their behaviour not to be thoroughly examined. He 
then begins a root and branch examination of the working of the modern American economy, pointing 
out that the consumer society depends for its functioning upon the subordinate role of the housewife, 
and that any change in the status of women would require a fundamental re-evaluation of the nature 
and process of consumption. He then points out that the major part of the economy is dominated by 
large firms which plan their own output and set their own prices at reasonably low levels, and that by 
a system of interlocking contracts they impose some degree of stability upon that part of the economy 
(predominantly the manufacturing sector) which they control. Furthermore, they exercise this power of 
planning partly through government agencies, with which they also have close and sometimes – though 
not necessarily – wicked relationships. The market sector consists of small firms in peripheral activities, 
chiefly in agriculture and the service industries, and as Professor Galbraith points out, in art. In this area 
of the economy, according to Galbraith, the level of wages, of conditions, is generally low. This reverses 
the normal findings of competitive theory that monopoly leads to inefficiency and competition leads to 
efficiency, and a great deal of his book is devoted to a survey of this particular paradox. Professor Galbraith 
says “The neo-classical model describes an ill that does not exist because it assumes a purpose that is not 
pursued.”Economics and the Public Purpose, J. K. Galbraith (London: Andre Deutsch, 1974), p. 120.
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Huxley for his vulgar attack on Darwinism, theology has ceased to be intellectually 
respectable in the great majority of the world’s intellectual centres, and religious 
practice has become a fringe activity.13 But religion has been a long time a-dying 
and since Joan Robinson’s great grandfather, F. D. Maurice, was unseated for 
heresy, a great deal of water has flowed under the religious bridge. (The reflection 
is appropriate for it was at about that time that the theory of value began to go on 
the wrong road. His point was that he did not believe in eternal damnation; her 
point is that she does not believe in eternal economic truths.) For the purposes of 
exposition, I intend to take Joan Robinson’s work as a basis of an interpretation 
of the present state of political economy, and to assume that there is an alternative 
view of economics to the neo-classical, that is intellectually respectable. The forty 
years of Mrs. Robinson’s work touches on many themes; but constant among 
them is the view that neo-classical economics, and its offspring neo-neo-classical 
economics, has had bad practical and intellectual consequences.14 
What, then is the new political economy? It arises from an increasingly 
critical view of the post-Jevons school, of general equilibrium, and proposes the 
establishment of a line from Ricardo, Marx and Marshall, through Keynes and 
Kalecki, to a modern economics which deals with genuine problems rather than 
with a series of simplified pseudo-problems, like those of Robinson Crusoe on 
his desert island dividing his time between fishing and picking up coconuts, or 
of a man faced with a series of choices between more rum and fewer cigarettes, 
or more cigarettes and fewer glasses of rum. The problems to which we want 
to know the answers are why tenant farmers earn more than milkmen; why so 
many people in Calcutta are starving and out of work; why modern governments 
 
 
13 I refer to the 1860 meeting of the British Association where Huxley said he would rather be descended 
from the apes than degrade his intelligence by ignoring inconvenient truths.
14 It may be thought that because Mrs. Robinson is a woman, a vegetarian, a student of Marx (though not 
a Marxist), and an emeritus professor, her views are academic to the point of eccentricity, but any such 
patronising doubts, frequently expressed though they are, are designed to keep their students ignorant 
of the body of her work. She was the first British economist to show the irreconcilability of competitive 
doctrines with the facts of mass manufacturing industry with its economies of scale, she was a central 
person in the debates that led to Keynes’s General Theory (as the recent Royal Economic Society volumes 
demonstrate) and her Essays in Employment drew attention to the implications of the new doctrines for 
inflation, international trade and regional policy. When Russia was all the rage and socialism on the up 
and up, she was the only serious intellectual critic of Marxist economic doctrines. She was first in the field 
in the now fashionable study of developing countries. She got to China before Kissinger. And now her 
views on wages and prices are the new orthodoxy. Not a bad record for relevance, it might be thought.
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cannot control prices – all real questions, to which it is doubtful whether any a 
priori answers, couched in loose generalisations based on the accepted forms of 
Robinson Crusoe economics, will be adequate. The nature of the new economics 
is rooted therefore in relevance and direct observation of economic and social 
life, and not in the erection of formal models. Its central points are simple. An 
historical process cannot be understood in terms of mechanical equilibrium, and 
it is necessary to take account of the social, political and economic characteristics 
of the system to which the analysis is being applied. 
It is perhaps not inappropriate to remark in parenthesis that the association 
of neo-classical economics with the defence of capitalism, and the identification 
of Cambridge economics with the defence of socialism, is accidental. Mrs. 
Robinson’s socialist convictions have probably hindered the acceptance of her 
economics, even by socialists, who have felt that their hearts must not lead their 
heads into error. Paradoxically, therefore, a socialist like Anthony Crosland will 
embrace an old fashioned economics, out of intellectual puritanism. There is an 
historical link, of course, with the development of an ideology of the Cold War, 
on both sides, but (formally) the theoretical problems would arise in any case, 
and so would the practical questions as to what should be produced by whom and 
who should get it, and the basic reasoning of the neo-classicals is either faulty or 
not, regardless of whose side you are on.15 
The answer to the first question, then – why should an empty theory flourish 
–  may possibly be that it is at last ceasing to do so, and that it is common for 
theories to flower after their roots have died. But the second question is a more 
difficult one. Does it matter that theory and practice should diverge? Christian 
morality continues, after all, though God is dead. But surely it does matter, first, 
for the cause of rationality itself, for the cause of the cultivated intelligence, that a 
subject like economics, which is about something, should continue to be so, and 
secondly, for the world at large, it is better to act on an understood basis of what is 
the case than on hunch. The declared irrelevance of economic theory is obvious to 
 
 
15 But the flourishing of the neo-neo-classical theory is undoubtedly deeply related to the political condition 
of the West; its present decline may also be associated with the faltering of the West. This would seem 
too simple an answer, which must surely lie far more in the sociology of thought; but it is probably not 
entirely incorrect.
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a Marxist –  it is part of its purpose to mask reality – but it must sadden those who 
prefer reason to unreason in human affairs. The important matter is not so much 
to get the correct answers but to find out where and how to look for the answers. 
What is the central feature of the new economics? We may take as a key text some 
concluding remarks of J. de V. Graaff in his Theoretical Welfare Economics: 
“any . . . ‘objective’ test . . . is itself in the last resort an act of faith, 
based on fundamentally ethical notions . . . it is sufficient to remark 
that more people would probably agree on the dividing line between 
the factual and the ethical, or on what constitutes an ‘objective’ 
test and what does not, than would agree on the ethical matters 
themselves . . . 
“No doubt many professional economists are reluctant to abdicate 
what they may like to regard as their traditional prescriptive role, and 
are uneasy at the prospect of becoming mere purveyors of information. 
If they are, it is up to them to show how welfare economics can be set 
upon a basis which is even reasonably satisfactory – or can be made 
to yield conclusions with which a significant number of men are 
likely to concur.’’16 
At the level of high theory, the key assertion of the new synthesis lies in 
the denial of any general theory of value. It is argued that Sraffa has resolved 
Ricardo’s puzzles, and put the rate of profits (a key element in economic theory) 
on a new basis. The reason why profits is the clue is simple. Profits are the petrol 
in the engine of the system. Without profits it won’t go. But are profits a return 
for effort, ingenuity and so on (as some undoubtedly are), or a surplus, whose size 
depends upon certain social conventions which the Marxists would refer to as the 
degree of exploitation? 
It is on this issue of profits that the argument stands or falls. “It destroys” 
Robinson argues “the presumption that the rate of profit measures the contribution 
of investment to national income” . . . “we must look somewhere else to determine 
the laws which regulate the distribution of the produce of each among the Glasses 
of the community.”17 
16 J. de V. Graaff, Theoretical Welfare Economics (Cambridge University Press, 1957), pp. 167-8, 170 and 171.
17  Joan Robinson, Collected Economic Papers, Volume IV (oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973), p. 120.
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In the new world, there are technical relationships between land and labour 
(the subject is agriculture), and the distribution of the work and the crop depends 
on different kinds of ownership and custom, which in turn affects the kinds of 
technical relationships adopted. In industry, there are capital goods (instead of land), 
and the distribution of goods depends on the level of profits in relation to money 
wages. The point is the double nature of ‘capital’ as finance and as equipment. The 
general level of output (whose shares are determined by the property relationships 
and customs just discussed) is determined by effective demand. Technical change 
occurs, and affects demand. There is then a realistic description of the way prices 
are deter mined, in different markets, where prices of commodities like wool and 
minerals fluctuate according to supply, demand and expectations, while prices of 
manufactured goods tend to be fixed in respect of demand but to vary with costs, 
which output varies with demand. The argument is then able to return to the rate 
of profit, and to the determination of relative incomes. 
There is an interesting series of studies that give some understanding of 
what actually determines the character of public expenditure. So, too, there are 
descriptions of financial institutions, and fascinating studies of the growth of 
firms, industries and nation states, in an historical (rather than a static) perspective. 
As the third and final section of the recent textbook by Robinson and 
Eatwell18 makes clear, the new economics is opposed to all-embracing attempts 
to explain the complexities of the real world in which time irresistibly moves 
onward. The chief complaint about the older system was its universality and 
timelessness. Each society, each age, has its economic system. Each system has its 
own contradictions and its own harmonies. The harmonies can be discovered and 
formulated. The error is to regard the necessary contradictions as transient flaws 
to be eradicated or patched up. Further, of course, economics is only a part of life, 
and it is what goes on in such matters as nationalism, race, social conflict, war, 
religion and the discussion of the good life which affects not only the way people 
think about economics, but the way economic agents actually act. 
18 Joan Robinson and John Eatwell, An Introduction to Modern Economics (Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill, 
1973).
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“Cambridge” economics, the body of doctrine chiefly embraced by the 
attackers, derives from Ricardo, Marx, and Marshall, via Keynes and Sraffa. It has 
in turn been subject to three major assaults: first, from the neo-classicals because 
its value premises are often explicitly built into it; secondly, because it is thought to 
be wholly destructive, and “something has to be taught” – which is the equivalent 
of teaching people to count angels on pinheads when you no longer believe in the 
heavenly host; and, thirdly, because it has seemed to be socialist in tone, direction 
and intention. This last accusation is contingently true; almost all of those who 
now expound Cambridge economics would call themselves socialists. (But it is an 
accusation, or statement, which turns itself against those who use it, of course). 
Certain major conclusions seem to emerge. The first is that in many 
respects this economics adopts the sort of position in the social sciences which 
has been adopted by analytical and linguistic philosophy in philosophy, that is 
to say, it has by a process of ruthless criticism, to the satisfaction of those who 
share its findings, destroyed a vast metaphysical construction. Its answer to those 
who enquire “what do we believe in?” is highly specified for the person who 
answers. But it will not present a body of agreed doctrines since it regards such 
a question as not being the sort of question that philosophy as such exists to 
answer. The parallel in economics is that the economist would be expected to 
have a general solution for every problem, drawn from a book of rules, whereas 
the political economist would say, “we have to proceed by the careful examination 
of individual cases, and it is improbable that there are many general principles 
that can be deduced. Certainly, it is unlikely that the general principles can be 
applied pure and simple to the complexities of real life.” 
The Cambridge theory, therefore, in a sense is a much more realistic and 
positive theory than that which it says it supersedes.19 If economics were to be 
reconstructed around the central questions of a modern functioning economy, 
it presumably would have to be organised on the basis of first of all a pragmatic 
understanding of government activities, since government activities form a large 
part of the operation of a modern economy; secondly, the determination of 
relative prices and incomes in the context of modern fiscal policy; thirdly, the 
 
 
19 See J. A. Kregel, The Reconstruction of Political Economy (London: Macmillan, 1973).
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international monetary system and its connection with the domestic banking 
and financial system; and fourthly, a detailed consideration of the process 
of technological change and innovation; and fifthly, the relation of all this to 
individual consumption of all kinds in the field supplied by “private” industry 
and the social services. It is a form of sensible pragmatism, and in that respect 
closely resembles modern medicine before the invention of antibiotics. It indeed 
represents the position long held and strenuously advocated by Lord Balogh, for 
example, that you would start from an interpretation of government economic 
activity, and proceed with questions such as what determines the exchange rate 
and changes in the exchange rate, and carry on from there. Since this is what 
economists who work for the government and business and newspapers actually 




Comparing the Industries Assistance 
Commission and Jackson Committee 
approaches to industrial development
G. Alf Rattigan1
Because the Jackson Committee states that its emphasis is on “procedural strategy 
as the means of progress on industry policy”, I will first discuss the procedural 
aspects. 
There are some basic issues which are of fundamental importance in 
determining any procedures for the formulation of advice on Government 
assistance for the development of industry. 
The benefits provided by the assistance measures tend to be concentrated 
on “relatively small areas of industry” and on a relatively small number of people. 
on the other hand, the costs of these measures are widely spread throughout the 
community, and are difficult for individuals to assess. In fact, many taxpayers, 
consumers and users are not aware that they are contributing to assistance to 
particular industries. The concentration of the benefits and the diffusion of costs 
have resulted in the relatively small number of beneficiaries being better organised 
and more able to articulate their case than the much larger number of people who 
bear the costs. Furthermore, the provision of “discriminatory” industry assistance 
has important long term significance for the distribution of the community’s 
income and for the efficiency with which the community’s resources are used and 
consequently for the long term welfare prospects for the nation as a whole. 
1 Thirty-sixth Joseph Fisher Lecture, 1 November 1976. 
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These considerations are often not considered by interests seeking – or 
opposing –  “the provision of specific assistance measures” because these interests 
are usually concerned only with their own short to medium position, rather than 
with the long term welfare effects on the nation. 
Because of the varying degrees of influence of the conflicting interest groups 
and of the long term welfare consequences of the specific assistance measures, 
formulation of advice on assistance for the development of industry should have 
the following characteristics: (1) the process should be independent, even-handed 
and impartial and “should be seen” to be so; and (2) the process should bring 
into account all the costs and benefits of the proposed assistance measures on the 
community as a whole. 
I will now explain more fully the importance of each of these characteristics. 
An independent, even-handed and impartial process
The large benefits which they can obtain through “measures of industry assistance” 
provide the incentive for particular interests to seek decisions in their favour by 
bringing strong – and usually non-public – pressure to bear on administrations. 
The problems inherent in expecting “non-independent government agencies” 
to tender impartial advice (or make impartial decisions) on such matters were 
described by the Hoover Commission in the United States in the following terms: 
“The wide latitude inherent in effective regulation opens the door to 
favoritism (and unfairness) in administration. The regulated interests 
are powerful and often politically influential. The privileges which 
the regulatory agencies can grant (or withhold) are often of great 
value, and the regulation will obviously have a tremendous impact 
on the profits, services and finances of the industry involved. This 
combination of wide discretion on the part of officials and strong 
motives ‘for influencing the officials’ on the part of the regulated 
industry, involve serious risks of corruption (and unfairness). 
“Thus, in the interests of fairness to the individuals concerned, the 
attainment of the public objectives and the maintenance of the 
integrity of government, there is a vital necessity for assuring that 
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such regulatory agencies are insulated from partisan influence (or 
control) to the maximum extent feasible.” 
The independence of the agency providing advice is thus a pre-condition to 
the impartiality of such advice. 
Further pre-conditions to the independence (and impartiality) of such 
advice are that the process should provide the maximum opportunity for 
participation by all interested parties and that the whole process should be open 
to the maximum public scrutiny. Public scrutiny is essential to; (1) guarantee 
that all parties in the process enjoy parity, and that all interests represented are 
alike in influence and importance; (2) ensure that the views of particular groups 
are exposed to the critical scrutiny of all persons who may have an interest in 
the outcome of the inquiry; and (3) guarantee to the government (and the 
community) that the agency carrying out the inquiry (and providing the advice) 
is itself impartial and free from bias or favour. 
Finally, public scrutiny has an important bearing on the qualitative nature 
of the advisory process. The government can only be assured that it is receiving the 
“highest quality analysis and advice” from its advisory agency if that analysis (and 
advice) is exposed to the critical view of all interested persons. Public “analysis and 
criticism” ensures that the advice given to government is accurate, based on correct 
premises and deals comprehensively with the effects of implementing that advice. 
A comprehensive and well-informed process
The provision of advice on assistance measures must be based on an analysis 
of what long term effects the assistance measures would have, not only on the 
recipient industry and the people in it, but also on those groups who would have 
to provide the assistance, those industries which would have to compete with the 
recipient industry for resources, and the welfare of the nation as a whole. 
It is, therefore, essential that advice to the government on industry assistance 
be provided, not only after independent and impartial public scrutiny of the 
various facts and arguments, but also within the framework of: (1) a programme 
of general research into factors likely to influence the future development of 
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industries; (2) detailed “inter-industry studies” which show the effect of such 
assistance on other industries; (3) arrangements to facilitate adjustment to changes 
in assistance for the industries (and persons) affected by such changes; and (4) a 
clear (and unambiguous) set of assistance criteria based on generally agreed long 
term economic and welfare objectives. 
Features of the IAC procedures
The IAC procedures have been carefully framed, in co-operation with a wide cross 
section of the community, to give independent, impartial and comprehensive 
advice to the government by means of a process which is as open as possible to 
public participation and to public scrutiny. 
I will not detail the procedures2 – most of you probably are reasonably 
familiar with them. I will simply emphasise two points: (1) the Commission 
extends the principle of public scrutiny to its own work. The opportunity is given 
to all interested persons to examine and comment on the analysis the conclusions 
and the recommendations of the Commission before the reports are finally 
settled. This is achieved by publishing draft reports and subsequently holding 
a public hearing; and (2) the Commission’s inquiry procedures and its research 
programme are kept under constant review with a wide cross section of the 
community. This is achieved through regular meetings with a consultative group 
on which all sectors of industry and the trade unions, the welfare organisations 
and the consumer groups are represented. 
Procedures proposed by the Jackson Committee
The principle on which these procedures are based is expressed in the Committee’s 
report in the following terms: 
“In practice, it would plainly be best, when a major policy problem 
arises in a particular industry, for representatives of the union and 
the firms involved to confer with representatives of the governments 
concerned to devise an approach reasonably acceptable to all and to 
the public interest.”
2 The important features of the IAC procedures are set out in the attachment.
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The principle then is one in which problems would be dealt with as they arise 
and resolved in a way acceptable to the existing manufacturers and trade unions 
in the industry concerned. The public interest would be what the manufacturers, 
the trade unionists and the government representatives sympathetic to the 
manufacturers’ point of view regard as in the public interest, not what the public 
might regard as “in its interest”. 
The proposal is to establish an Industry Council at the national level for 
each manufacturing industry, State Manufacturing Councils on the basis to be 
decided by the States concerned, and an Australian Manufacturing Council at the 
national level. 
There would probably be some hundreds of Councils. 
The report states: “Elements of the network (of Councils) would overlap, . 
. . cross organisational boundaries . . . would not be ordered in a hierarchy.”
Discussions in the Industry Councils would be held behind closed doors 
because the Committee states: “consensus . . . is more likely to be achieved without 
publicity”. 
In the selection of members for all the Councils, the emphasis is on ensuring 
equal representation from manufacturers and trade unions. Quite clearly, the 
intention is that each Industry Council and the National Council (and therefore, 
the whole policy making process) should be dominated by the manufacturers and 
the trade unionists. 
The report states that the recommendations of the Councils would be dealt 
with as follows: 
“Recommendations of each Council would be considered by the 
government in the manner appropriate to each recommendation. For 
example, a recommendation involving a new or varied government 
assistance would be subject to public inquiry by the IAC. If the 
recommendations affected other government policies, consultation 
with other Ministers . . . would be the normal course.” 
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The only element of public inquiry in the procedures would mean that 
a recommendation included in a scheme – which had been drawn up by a 
Council dominated by the vested interests directly involved and agreed to by 
the civil servants who would be the final advisors to the government on the 
scheme and on any IAC report-would be referred to the IAC for inquiry and 
report. 
The inquiry would obviously be a very restricted one and the procedures 
would guarantee a predominant influence to the existing manufacturing interests 
in determining the terms of reference and advising the government on the 
Commission’s recommendations. 
It will be apparent that the Jackson Committee’s proposals do not have 
the characteristics I referred to earlier, namely that: (1) the process should be 
independent, even-handed and impartial, and should be seen to be so; and (2) 
the process should be well-informed (and comprehensive) and should bring into 
account all the costs and benefits of the proposed measures on the community as 
a whole. 
It has been said that the Jackson Committee’s proposed procedures reflect a 
“more participative” style of decision making and, therefore, will make for greater 
social cohesion. But, the proposals would give a decisive role, both to the individual 
industries and to the manufacturing industry generally in the determination of 
policies which impinge directly on the welfare of all Australians. How could such 
a process contribute to greater social cohesion within the community as a whole? 
or is “social cohesion” a quality which has relevance between “employers and 
employees in a particular manufacturing industry”, but not between these and 
other members of the community who may be directly affected by the process – 
such as farmers, miners, people working in tertiary industry and the consumers 
and taxpayers generally. 
Policy for industry development
Before I outline the IAC’s approach I want to comment on the relationship 
between the economic and social objectives. 
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An important part of the welfare of any community depends on the goods 
and services available to the community and the way those goods and services are 
distributed. 
The objective of increasing the supply of goods and services to the 
community may appear to be essentially “economic” in character. But, in fact, it 
also is of vital importance for most of the government’s “social” objectives. 
These objectives are met by the provision of various services, such as 
education, health, social security, communications, improvement of the 
environment, and so on. The avail ability of such services to the community is 
just as much an output of the economic system as the more tangible goods that 
are produced. 
Both “types of need” must be met from the resources available to the 
community; and any action which increases the efficiency with which those 
resources are used will increase the economy’s capacity to supply the public 
and private goods and services considered necessary for increasing welfare. This 
will be so, regardless of what particular goods and services are preferred by the 
community; and what particular ratio of public to private goods is considered 
desirable. 
The pursuit of efficient resource use in industry development is, therefore, 
“not competitive with or contrary to” the pursuit of the community’s broad 
“social objectives” it is a pre-condition for achieving those objectives. 
The objective of improving the general distribution of goods and services 
in the community is not formally dependent on the total supply of goods and 
services available. However, this objective is easier to achieve if the total supply 
of goods and services is rising. In other words, the government will have less 
difficulty in reducing inequalities in the community if there is a reasonable rate 
of economic growth.   
There is an important distinction in the Commission’s approach between 
the goal of industry development – which is to encourage greater efficiency in 
the use of Australia’s resources – and its recommendations regarding the means 
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by which and the speed with which the goal is approached. Change will occur 
gradually. But the Commission is aware that even changes which are small 
from an economy-wide viewpoint may impose significant adjustment costs on 
particular groups in the community. In every inquiry it under takes, in which 
some reduction in assistance is contemplated, the Commission takes into account 
the short term welfare costs of that reduction in terms of the adjustment costs it 
is likely to impose on individuals and firms as well as the more general and long 
term benefits the reduction is expected to bring to the community. 
Every industry development policy will directly or indirectly involve the 
provision of assistance to some industries, and will, therefore, influence the 
movement of resources in the economy. The main reason why industries seek 
assistance from the government, and the principal basis on which it has been 
provided, is to help them to meet the competition in the markets for their 
products. But, more fundamentally, assistance helps individual industries to 
attract and hold resources. It helps them to obtain the inputs of materials, capital 
and labour which they require, and which they must bid for in competition with 
“other potential users” of those resources. If an industry is given a high effective 
rate of assistance, it is being helped to attract and hold resources at the expense of 
industries with lower rates of assistance. 
The degree to which an industry strategy can discriminate in favour of 
some industries – and against others – is shown by the structure of assistance 
which has applied to manufacturing industries in Australia. 
The average “effective rates of assistance” in 1969-70 ranged from “negative” 
amounts for 14 industries to over 100 per cent for 16 industries. There was an 
even wider dispersion of effective rates of assistance for activities within industries. 
Another way of illustrating the degree of discrimination in the structure of 
assistance for Australian manufacturing industries is to compare the “average net 
subsidy equivalents of assistance per person employed” for different industries. 
In 1969-70, these subsidy equivalents were negative for 14 industries, and 
over $4,000 per person employed for 13 industries – the average wage per person 
employed in manufacturing industries in that year was $3,023 – therefore, for 13 
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industries, the transfer payments from the community to the manufacturers were 
equal to a payment per employee of over 30 per cent higher than the average wage 
per person employed in manufacturing industries. 
The dispersion of effective rates of assistance for manufacturing industries 
was reduced as a result of tariff reductions between 1969-70 and 1973-74 but it 
has been increased again as a result of the tariff and quota restrictions imposed on 
the imports in the last two years. 
The figures I have referred to give some indication of the extent to which some 
manufacturing industries are helped – by transfer payments from the community – 
in bidding against other manufacturing industries for the use of resources. 
Choices
In arriving at the IAC’s approach to industry development, three major related 
decisions had to be taken. The choices were between: an inward-looking or an 
outward-looking approach; a narrow, “sectoral” approach or an economy-wide 
approach; and an approach which seeks to “insulate industries from change” or 
one which seeks to help adjustment to change. 
An inward-looking or outward-looking approach
An inward-looking approach is characterised by a policy of encouraging “import 
replacement” industries. Such an approach can achieve its prime objective of 
discouraging imports, but it also discourages export industries because: 
i. declining imports give rise to pressure for “exchange rate appreciation” which 
reduces the returns on exported goods and thus the profitability of export 
industries; 
ii. the assistance given to import competing industries enables them to bid 
success fully (and higher than market circumstances would otherwise allow) 
against export industries for productive resources; and 
iii. export industries and other consumers are obliged to pay more for their inputs 
when these are subject to tariffs or import restrictions.   
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An inward-looking strategy, therefore, tends to reduce both imports and 
exports and thus to impede trade with other countries. (It is worth noting that 
Australia’s external trade, as a proportion of GDP, is lower than in most comparable 
countries. Furthermore, exports and imports, as a proportion of GDP, increased at 
a slower rate in Australia than in most comparable countries over the period 1960 
to 1974; this, despite the very substantial increase in mineral exports – from 8 to 25 
per cent of total exports.) The implications for economic growth are obvious; the 
higher the levels of protection a country affords its import competing industries, 
then the greater the difficulty it will face in achieving economic growth through 
international trade. In addition, such a strategy attracts productive resources 
into import replacement industries which could not attract them without high 
levels of assistance. This clearly results in an inefficient allocation of productive 
resources and reduces the scope for general welfare gains. 
The approach recognises that, because resources are limited, it is impossible 
to en courage the development of low-cost industries without a concurrent, and 
gradual, reduction in the high assistance now being given to some industries 
which are competing for these productive resources. 
The gradual lowering of high rates of assistance to “high-cost” import 
replacement industries will encourage imports of lower priced overseas products 
and facilitate the movement of resources into “low-cost” industries. This will be 
of benefit to Australian consumers, help to lower costs generally in Australia and 
encourage the growth of export industries. This approach is, of course, quite 
consistent with the objective of maintaining a high level of employment in the 
economy as a whole. 
A sectoral or economy-wide approach
It is logical that an approach which explicitly recognises that resources are limited 
and mobile throughout the economy should be “economy-wide” in its scope. 
Equally, it is quite illogical that the community should continue to subsidise in 
the long term the use of resources in one industry or sector if those resources could 
be used “more efficiently” and with less subsidy (or no subsidy at all) elsewhere 
in the economy. 
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There are “low-cost” activities in all sectors of the Australian economy, 
including the manufacturing sector. “Low-cost” manufacturing industries have 
been disadvantaged by assistance to “high-cost” manufacturing industries in the 
same way that low-cost rural and mining industries have been disadvantaged by 
this assistance. Equally, “low-cost” manufacturing industries will be “encouraged 
to grow” as assistance to “high-cost” industries in all sectors of the economy is 
gradually reduced. The present approach recognises that the ultimate objective 
of industry policy is to improve the welfare of the whole community. It follows 
that those industries in all sectors of the economy which con tribute most to 
the welfare of the community as a whole should be encouraged – rather than 
“manufacturing” or “rural” or “mining” or “service” industries as such. 
The fact that the present system is neutral between industries, in all sectors 
of the economy, in no way means that the government should do nothing to 
assist and en courage industry growth and development. What it does mean is 
that industry policy should provide a general climate in which all Australian 
industries that use the community’s resources economically are encouraged to 
grow – rather than develop separate “climates” for manufacturing, rural, mining 
and tertiary industries. It means that an important result of having one approach 
to industry development (which is neutral between industries and sectors) is 
that it encourages individual producers to bring their own initiative, ability and 
experience to bear when making decisions about where to direct “their capital and 
enterprise”. It also means a climate (or framework) for private decision-making 
and for industry development which involves a minimum of discrimination by 
the government between individuals, industries and sectors. 
Insulation from change or adjustment to change
For the greater part of this century, assistance has been provided to many Australian 
industries on the basis of assessments of the amount of assistance “needed” to 
maintain their profitable operations in the face of foreign competition. Frequently, 
as protective needs have increased, assistance has been increased to a similar degree. 
Such a policy, not only maintains productive resources in activities which are 
becoming increasingly uneconomic, but also encourages a “hand-out” mentality 
which stifles the enterprise and initiative necessary for the vigorous growth of 
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the private sector. When assistance from the government is “viewed as a right” 
and producers assume that assistance, which is, in their view, “necessary”, will be 
provided, the incentive for producers to improve profitability and productivity by 
seeking out new markets, developing new production techniques or transferring 
resources to more economic operations is seriously weakened.  
Such effects of a policy which gives assistance on a needs basis have long 
been recognised. In 1929, the Brigden Committee, reporting on the Australian 
Tariff, included the following passage in its report: 
“The most disquieting effect of the tariff has been the stimulus 
it has given to demands for government assistance of all kinds, 
with consequent demoralising effect upon self-reliant efficiency 
throughout all forms of production.” 
In a study of industrial development policy in six countries, sponsored by 
the World Bank, a few years ago, the conclusion states: 
“the continued sheltering of domestic industries from foreign 
competition and disincentives to exporting involve a dynamic cost 
to the national economy in the form of opportunities foregone for 
improvements in productivity. on the one hand, there is little incentive 
to improve production methods and product quality; on the other, 
discrimination against exports and objectives of industrial expansion 
on a broad front limit the scope of exploiting large scale economies.” 
When a firm’s operations becomes unprofitable in the long term, assistance 
should be directed not at maintaining resources in the uneconomic activity 
but rather at inducing resources to move into other, more economic activities. 
Changes in the structure of industry are inevitable – as consumers’ tastes change, 
new technologies are developed and new industries develop in other countries. 
Industrial policy should be directed not at assisting industries to resist such changes 
but rather at facilitating change and reducing any disproportionate burden which 
may fall on any section of the community. 
It is fundamental to the IAC’s approach to industry development that the 
rate at which high levels of assistance are reduced must take account of the ability 
of the economy to sustain any structural changes that may be involved. 
G. Alf Rattigan
 199
obviously, during the current recession in the economy, there is greater 
difficulty in absorbing “policy-induced” structural changes and the timing of 
changes should reflect this. 
It is equally important to ensure that the long term development of import 
competing industries is not determined on the basis of assistance needed to achieve 
profitable production in a severe recession. (It is worth recalling that a substantial 
part of the emergency tariff measures introduced in the 1930 depression was in 
operation 40 years later – and this has contributed greatly to the inefficient use of 
resources and the high. rate of inflation in the post-war period.) 
There is a strong relationship between encouraging adjustment to change 
and encouraging enterprise, invention and innovation. 
To improve the standard of living of the Australian people, we need an 
“economic and social environment” which encourages enterprise, invention and 
innovation in the broadest sense in all sectors of the economy; which encourages 
adaption to change; which encourages Australian people in industry and 
commerce – investors, managers and workers –  to live and work much more 
comfortably in a situation where change is a normal part of their lives. 
The approach of the IAC will help create this kind of environment because 
it includes action aimed at: 
i. providing the community generally with well-researched information about 
likely medium and long term effects of naturally occurring and policy-induced 
economic and social changes; 
ii. ensuring that policy for development and industry is determined on an 
economy-wide basis; 
iii. providing assistance to industries which is less exclusively directed towards 
supporting the prices of industries’ outputs and more directed towards 
improving mobility, quality and productivity of resources; and 
iv. ensuring that the form of government intervention to assist industry does not 
stifle enterprise and innovation. 
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I will illustrate the importance of each of these courses of action in creating 
the environment I have referred to. 
Looking beyond the short term horizon
We need a situation where businessmen have the best possible information on 
which to base their investment decisions. The more information the decision-
makers have about future movements in demand and supply of capital, labour 
and materials, about costs, prices, tastes and population changes the better will be 
their decisions. The need is greatest when the decisions relate to investment in the 
development and distribution of new products and services because the planning 
and establishment of production (and distribution) spans a time horizon of a 
considerable number of years. 
At present, the only official predictions of expected change – even in the 
Australian economic situation – are those made by the Treasury for a short period 
ahead. The in formation is at a high level of aggregation and the basis on which 
the predictions are made is not known outside the government service.    There is a 
need for well-researched “medium to long term” predictions to be made and for the 
details of these predictions, the basis on which they are made and the likely effects 
of the various options which are open to the government to be made available 
to all and to be given the widest possible publicity. A project called IMPACT, 
initiated by the IAC, and commenced in the middle of 1975, will do this. The 
project is unique in a world sense in that it will enable integrated projections (for 
example, of the future structure of industry and the labour force) to be made in 
greater detail than has been possible in projects of this type undertaken elsewhere 
in the world. IMPACT will give: (1) annual information for each of about seven 
years ahead tracing out the dynamic economic and social interactions of a large 
number of variables on 100 industry groups; and (2) also information in a less 
disaggregated form for future periods of 10, 15, 20 and 25 years ahead. 
A number of government departments are combining with the IAC in 
carrying out this project. one great advantage which will flow from the combined 
work is that advice to the government on different aspects of economic and social 
policies from different departments and instrumentalities will be much more 
consistent (and co-ordinated) than it has been up to the present. 
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The first results of the IMPACT project will be available early in 1977. The 
project will be fully operational by 1978 and will, of course, be on-going. 
Since the commencement of the project, papers relating to it have been 
made available to the consultative group I referred to earlier and discussions have 
been held with the group as an early part of the arrangement to ensure that the 
results are available to all and given the widest possible publicity. 
The information available from the project will enable the government (and 
the public) to be aware of likely changes in the environment well ahead of the 
changes occuring – and to be aware of the policy options open to the government 
and the likely effects of adopting each of the options. 
Consequently, everyone should be better situated to anticipate developments 
and problems rather than, as at present, react to them as they arise. 
Policy for industry development on an economy-wide basis
If we are to make the best use of our resources, investors (and particularly 
prospective innovators) should be encouraged to consider investments in all 
sectors of the economy – and be able to compare the relative merits of the different 
potential investments. This, obviously, would be greatly helped by a long term 
“economy-wide” policy for the development of industries which uses “common 
criteria and reconcilable data” for all sectors of the economy. The establishment of 
the IAC and the development of its approach to assistance for industry has been 
an important step in this direction. 
Government assistance should be more in the direction of 
improving the mobility, quality and productivity of resources 
By far the major part of the government assistance to industry is for the support of 
prices of industries’ outputs, that is, in the direction of protection against change. 
I can illustrate this by referring to the situation revealed during the IAC 
inquiry into Consumer Electronic Goods. The Australian industry was producing 
a wider range of components than any other country in the world. All other 
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countries imported some components from countries which specialised in their 
manufacture. Some of the components made in Australia were of 1950 technology 
despite the fact that there had been important changes in technology since the 
1950s. To protect the Australian industry against changes, customs duties of up 
to 1,000 per cent were operating on components by 1973. The disastrous effects 
of this policy on innovation in the electronic industry in Australia and on the 
industrial application of the Australian innovations (and there have been some 
quite significant innovations) will be readily apparent. 
 Since the middle of the 1960s, the Tariff Board (and subsequently, the 
IAC) has been advocating the introduction of adjustment assistance measures, 
and it commenced research work, as soon as resources were available, to enable it 
to assess, foresee and explain the extent of adjustment costs. 
A range of government measures are required including provision for 
training and re training, relocation of workers and families, income support and 
compensation for unusable assets. Quite generous provisions for adjustment 
would be far less costly to the community than protecting against change. 
Let me give just one other example of the cost of protecting against 
change. Last year, the community subsidised each apple grower in Southern 
Tasmania at the rate of about $15,000 per annum, but the average income 
of the growers was something less than $6,000 per annum. The need for 
the high rate of assistance came from changes in the world trading situation 
(the development of the EEC and Britain’s entry into the Community) and 
innovations in the methods of preserving fresh fruit. Both of these changes 
developed over a relatively long period during which adjustment should (and 
could) have been made. 
The Labor government did introduce some adjustment measures in a 
piecemeal fashion and largely on a short term basis. The Fraser government 
recently introduced some measures to assist in the relocation of workers 
and their families. What is required is the introduction of a systematic (and 
comprehensive) system. Such a system would considerably reduce resistance to 
change and innovation. 
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An extensive and complex set of government measures is aimed at assisting 
research in Australian industry. These measures have been introduced in a piecemeal 
fashion over many years. For the last 18 months, the IAC has been pointing out the 
need to examine, on an economy-wide basis, the question of how best to encourage 
research and development and dissemination and application of research results. 
Form of government intervention should not stifle  
enterprise and innovation
Perhaps I can illustrate this point by comparing the effect of providing assistance 
to industry in the form of a customs duty only with the effect of a local content 
scheme such as that used to protect the motor vehicle industry. 
Where there is a customs duty only, the Australian manufacturers, the 
importers and the distributors can establish very clearly the landed duty paid cost 
of the imported article and they can then make all their commercial decisions in 
the normal way.
With the local content scheme applying to the motor vehicle industry, the 
government is involved in the normal commercial decisions affecting investment, 
specifications of the products and the distribution of motor vehicles and 
components. At a public inquiry in 1974, a leading company in the motor vehicle 
industry said that the rules had changed approximately every six months during 
the previous 10 years. This gives some idea of the difficulties any enterprising 
producer would have in trying to plan innovations. In the administering 
departments and in each of the motor vehicle manufacturers and in most of the 
manufacturers of components there has been built up a large bureaucracy which 
is necessary to maintain the consultations and negotiations continuously involved 
between the government and each of the manufacturers. All this is very costly. 
The protection now afforded the industry represents transfer payments from the 
community to the manufacturers equivalent to approximately $4,000 per annum 
for every worker in the motor vehicle and component industries. 
The Form of government intervention is very important in determining the 
type of environment in which private enterprise functions. Intervention should 
be in a form which is as clear and administratively simple as possible. Without 
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such an approach, enterprise and innovation will become increasingly stifled in 
the bureaucratic jungle which must be built up, both in the public service and in 
the business enterprises them selves. 
Jackson Committee’s policies for development of  
manufacturing industries
The general objectives referred to in the report are consistent with an outward-
looking approach and one which encourages adjustment to change. But the 
actual proposals made by the Committee would have the opposite effect. They 
would result in: (a) an inward-looking approach; (b) an approach that is narrow 
and sectoral; and (c) an approach which would insulate against change and would 
stifle enterprise and innovation. 
This difference between the objectives and the proposals has created 
considerable confusion regarding the report. 
Inward (or outward) looking approach
The proposal for tariff reductions has been referred to as an indication of the 
Committee’s adoption of an outward-looking approach. An examination of the 
proposal shows that the best which might be expected is that after a long time 
(probably 15 to 20 years in the majority of cases3), the tariff would be reduced on 
most industries (although the exceptions under the vague criteria of “capabilities 
for national independence” could be substantial) to benchmark levels which may 
be no lower than the present levels in a number of cases.4 Thereafter, the benchmark 
levels would apply indefinitely-irrespective of the cost to the community or the 
 
3 The proposal for tariff reductions appears to involve the following steps: (1) after holding a public 
inquiry, the IAC would recommend appropriate long term tariff benchmarks; (2) the government would 
allocate industrial activities to the benchmarks after reaching agreement with the industries; and (3) 
thereafter, tariffs would be reduced to thc benchmark levels by pre-determined installments over 5 to 
15 years. There would be serious problems (and certainly a great deal of time required) to get agreement 
from each of the various industries and trade unions on: the benchmark level which should apply to their 
industry; the period for reduction to the benchmark level which should apply to their industry; and that 
any tariff reduction at all should apply to their industry, because the report provides the basis for each 
industry to disagree on each of these points with any proposal put forward.
4 The report states: “In respect of some industries recent tariff reductions will have already reduced tariffs 
to the appropriate benchmark levels.” (p. 176.)
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changes which may occur. But, it is also proposed that such tariff reductions as 
are made may be replaced with other forms of assistance (for example, subsidies, 
tax concessions, etc.) if the industries are covered by vague criteria such as “having 
desirable attributes”. 
Special assistance (including high protection) is proposed for activities 
required for “national independence”. The Committee states that it is not 
specifically referring to attributes for defence. Therefore, the aim is to increase 
assistance for production for important replacement. As I have stated earlier, by 
concentrating on the development of import replacement industries, Australia 
has tended to insulate itself from international trade throughout the post war 
period. This proposal by the Committee would further insulate Australia. 
The report proposes that manufacturing industry should be insulated from 
some of the effects from exchange rate adjustments when these tend to increase 
competition for the manufacturing industries (p. 122, 181). A two-tier system 
is referred to which apparently means the use of differential ex change rates: that 
is, a deliberately under-valued rate of imports of manufacturing pro ducts which 
would provide additional protection for Australian manufacturing industries, 
and a deliberately over-valued rate in relation to other sectors which would 
reduce their competitiveness in Australia and overseas. Therefore, the exchange 
rate proposal would mean that both imports and exports would be discouraged 
and Australia would be further insulated from international trade. 
Sectoral approach rather than economy-wide
The Committee proposes: a massive injection of new capital into the manufacturing 
sector. This could only be done at the expense of capital for other sectors. Also, the 
total amount of capital available for all sectors would be reduced by some other 
proposals of the Committee, for example: “buying back the factory” and reduced 
reliance on overseas borrowings. Therefore, sectors other than the manufacturing 
sector would find it very difficult indeed to get capital. 
The Committee also proposes a large number of measures for increased 
assistance (which would enable “high cost” industries in the manufacturing sector 
to outbid industries in other sectors for Australia’s limited resources) are mentioned 
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– specifically referred to are grants, taxation concessions, concessional interest 
rates, subsidies and investment allowances – to be provided under vague criteria 
such as “socially responsible”, “to encourage desirable attributes in industry” or 
“to influence investment in appropriate channels. 
Thirdly the Committee proposes the management of the exchange rate, but 
also capital inflow and overseas reserves is proposed in a way which would assist 
the manufacturing sector and would transfer the burden of change to the other 
sectors of the economy. 
This all adds up to a formidable list of assistance to manufacturing industries 
at the expense of the development of the other sectors, and the standard of living 
of the community generally. But no attempt has been made to analyse the likely 
effects of these proposals on industries in the other sectors of the economy or on 
the community generally. 
Also, the only reach (which is substantiated in the report) as to why 
preferential treatment should be given to the manufacturing sector is that this 
sector needs to be restored to the relative importance in the Australian economy 
which it had in the 1950s. 
But the decline which has occurred in the relative importance (not the 
absolute size) of the manufacturing sector should not be a cause for concern. 
The Australian experience parallels that of most other developed countries. As 
incomes rise, the consumers tend to spend an increasing share of their incomes 
on services and a falling share of their income on manufactured goods. 
Insulation of industries from change
Although the Green Paper refers to the inevitability of structural change, the 
adoption of its recommendations would inhibit such change rather than promote 
adjustment to it. Indicative of this is the proposal that the manufacturing sector 
should be insulated from exchange rate adjustments which would disadvantage 
it, although the exchange rate adjustments would reflect changes in Australia’s 
economic and trading environment. Additionally, the kind of policy machinery 
proposed in the report – in particular, the network of Industry Councils – would 
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inhibit rather than facilitate the necessary structural change (and the adaptation) 
by industries. 
The proposed Industry Councils would be dominated by established 
manufacturers and trade unions who have most to lose from structural change 
in the short term and the greatest incentive to obstruct it. Is it not more likely 
that these Councils would be pre disposed towards perpetuating (or increasing) 
levels of assistance, rather than towards policies which would subject them to 
the problems of structural adjustment? The need for structural adjustment 
would presumably be judged solely according to its effects within the particular 
industries rather than in terms of its effects on the community as a whole. Could 
this process encourage other than a “closed shop” approach, since potential 
new manufacturers would be excluded from policy formation? Would the rate 
of change in any manufacturing industry be other than the lowest common 
denominator accept able to the existing producers in that industry? 
An impartial decision on whether the benefits of structural adjustment 
exceed the costs can only be made on the basis of an economy-wide approach to 
industry development which takes into account the effects of such change on all 
sections of the community – in the industry concerned, in other industries and 
on consumers and taxpayers generally – and which considers the effects of change 
on long term industrial development throughout the economy. 
Discouraging enterprise, initiative and innovation
one very important general implication of the proposals in the Jackson Committee 
report is that they would discourage enterprise, initiative and innovation. 
The proposals would result in a very wide range of business decisions – which 
are properly a matter of commercial judgement – being subject to concurrence 
by the government. Each Industry Council (on which the government would 
be represented and which would be “serviced and financed” by the government) 
would have the role of both developing proposals and seeing that they are put 
into effect in relation to such matters as promoting rationalisation, promoting 
mergers, altering the size of firms, improving the quality of products and altering 
the scale of operations. 
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Getting the government involved in these commercial decisions has been 
suggested by manufacturers from time to time. The advantages which some 
manufacturers see in this type of government intervention is that the government 
can later be called upon to underwrite the profitability of the operations because 
it (the government) must accept considerable responsibility for the commercial 
decisions which have been made. 
The proposed network of Councils would result in a very considerable 
increase in the bureaucracy – in government departments, manufacturing firms 
and industry and trade union organisations – all of whom would be involved in 
the normal commercial decisions. 
How could any enterprising, inventive or innovative manufacturer succeed 
when en meshed in “the tangled mess of bureaucracy” that would exist? 
Social problems
In discussions about the report a lot has been said about the Committee’s emphasis 
on the social aspects – on such matters as the conditions of work, the education 
(and living conditions) of the workers and their families and the relations between 
employers and employees. Existence of problems in these areas has been used 
to reinforce the need for “massive preferential treatment” for the manufacturing 
sector. 
Undoubtedly, there is considerable room for improvement in these 
matters and this is cause for concern. But the problems are not restricted to the 
manufacturing sector. Similar problems exist in the other sectors of the economy. 
Relations between employers and employees are equally difficult in the mining, 
rural and tertiary sectors. Working conditions, education, the living conditions of 
families are problems relating to industries in all sectors. 
Whilst these matters are very important, they are separate issues from 
“policy for industry development” and should be processed consciously and 
effectively as separate issues – in a way which applies to, and benefits, all sectors 
of the workforce. 
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If non-economic goals were introduced directly into the criteria for industry 
development – as a primary determinant – the resulting confusion of priorities 
and decline in efficiency of resources used would actually reduce the economy’s 
capacity to achieve these non-economic goals. It would also reduce the scope for 
all sections of the community to have equal opportunity to share in the welfare 
gains. 
We are only likely to make major progress in remedying the wide range 
of social problems throughout Australia when the level of real income of the 
community generally is rising at a reasonable rate. 
To get a reasonable rate of increase in the level of real incomes, Australia 
must make better use of its resources. The Jackson Committee’s proposals would 
certainly not achieve this because the proposals would: 
1) stifle “enterprise and innovation” in the manufacturing sector through the 
operations of the network of Industry Councils; 
2) hamstring development in the mining, primary and tertiary industries – 
by giving the manufacturing industries “massive preferential treatment” in 
obtaining resources; and 
3) stimulate and protect uneconomic activities in the manufacturing sector 
which would be covered by vague criteria such as “capabilities for national 
independence”, “socially responsible”, “wisely conducted” or having “desirable 
attributes”. 
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Appendix
Features of IAC Procedures
The IAC’s inquiry procedures reflect the efforts made by the Commission to:
•	 explain clearly the assistance criteria, based on the policy guidelines in the 
IAC Act being used in the formulation of the Commission’s advice, by setting 
out the criteria and the information and analysis supporting it in documents 
published by the Commission;
•	 encourage the participation in each inquiry of all the interested parties, by 
advertising widely the inquiry, by contacting parties likely to be interested 
and by the selection of suitable locations for the hearings;
•	 identify the main issues of each inquiry early in its life and promote 
worthwhile discussion of those issues at the Commission’s public hearings, 
through the publication and distribution before the public hearings of the 
relevant statistical information and of staff papers on important issues;
•	 provide ample opportunities for both the presentation of all facts, views and 
arguments and also any rebuttal of information and arguments, by the timing 
of the stages of the hearings;
•	 ensure that all information provided by interested parties is accurate, by 
taking such information on oath and carefully analysing it for objectivity and 
consistency; 
•	 record, clarify and publicise the arguments and factual evidence, through the 
public questioning of the submissions by the Commissioner(s) and through 
the publication of a transcript of the public hearings;
•	 give all interested parties an opportunity to examine and comment on the 
analysis, conclusions and recommendations of the Commission before the 
reports are finally settled, by publishing draft reports and subsequently 
holding a public hearing;
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•	 carry out a continuing research programme into industry assistance and 
development, so that the recommendations which are made in specific 
inquiries are able to take into account the long term effects on all sections of 
the community; and
•	 keep under constant review with a wide cross section of the community 
the Commission’s inquiry procedures and its research programme, through 
regular meetings with a consultative group on which all sectors of industry and 




Australian economics, 1967 to 1977
Fred H. Gruen1
Judging from the statistics available from two major employers of economists 
(the Federal Government and Australian universities) Australian economics 
has been one of the pronounced growth industries over the last seven to ten 
years. The number of Federal public servants (third division) with economics 
degrees has increased by around 11.5 per cent per annum over the last eight 
years with considerably greater percentage increases in those holding Honours 
and higher degrees (14.6 per cent and 22.3 per cent respectively). The number of 
university students enrolled for a Bachelor’s degree in economics, commerce and 
government, has increased by around 5.25 per cent per annum over the last ten 
years, with very much greater increases for Master’s and Doctorate students (11 
per cent and 9.75 per cent per annum respectively – since 1970 – the first year 
for which this information was available). The number of academic university 
staff in “economics, commerce and government” has also grown rapidly – by 9.25 
per cent per annum, with the slowest rate of growth among professors – 7.65 per 
cent per annum, and the highest among assistant lecturers and teaching fellows – 
slightly over 10 per cent per annum (i.e. over the period 1967-77). 
A large part of the increase in academic staff in these disciplines is the result of 
the expansion of academic staff generally. Economics, commerce and government 
attracted an increasing proportion of undergraduates from 1967 to 1971 (from 
12.5 to 14.2 per cent); since then the proportion has again gradually declined to 
earlier levels (1977 – 12.9 per cent). on the other hand an increasing proportion 
of graduate students in Australian universities study economics, commerce and 
 
1 Thirty-Seventh Joseph Fisher Lecture, 10 october 1978. The author is grateful for helpful comments 
on an earlier draft from his academic colleagues Bob Gregory Trevor Swan, Tom Valentine, Bryan Haig, 
Peter Scherer, Don Challen and from a number of his previous colleagues and friends in the "official 
family".
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government. (In the case of Master’s students the proportion has increased from 
15.1 per cent in 1970 to 17.6 per cent in 1977 and for Doctorates from 4.4 per 
cent to 6.6 per cent over the same period.) How ever both universities and the 
Federal Public Service face a period of distinctly slower future rates of growth, if 
not actually declining numbers in some cases. 
A further impression one gets is that a great deal of extra writing and 
research work is being done. At the first Conference of Economists in Melbourne 
in May 1970, 35 papers were read and discussed. At the Fourth Conference in 
1974 the number had increased to 75, whilst at the most recent Conference in 
Sydney (1978) the number of papers fell one short of 100. Roughly two-thirds of 
the papers at all three Conferences were given by academics. 
At the same time there has been a substantial up-grading of university 
staff in terms of professional qualifications. An examination of qualifications 
of tenured teaching staff in economics departments in six of Australia’s largest 
universities (Adelaide, Queensland, Sydney, Melbourne, New South Wales and 
Monash) shows that the proportion without higher degrees has declined from 
32 per cent in 1967 to 13 per cent ten years later, whereas the proportion with 
doctorates has increased from 32 per cent to 57 per cent. The United Kingdom 
remains the most important single post-graduate training centre for tenured 
academic staff, although it has slipped relatively, with an increasing proportion of 
such staff having US and Australian doctorates.2 
Again an increasing number of Australian academic economists now 
frequently con tribute to the international literature – with Corden, Harcourt, 
Kemp, Ng and Turnovsky being perhaps the best known but by no means the 
only examples. 
Partly because of this growth of the literature, because of pressures of time 
and partly, no doubt, because of my own limitations, I have not persevered with 
 
2 Tenured staff in Economics Departments in these universities increased from 119 to 149 over this period 
(the figures for the University of NSW refer to 1975 rather than 1977). The number without higher 
degrees declined from 38 to 19, the number with PhD.s increased from 38 to 85 with particularly large 




my original intention of providing a Corden-type survey of Australian economic 
policy discussion[3] . Instead I have concentrated on three areas, areas where I am 
relatively more familiar with Australian economics. 
The changing climate of Australian economic opinion, 1976-77
In spite of the impressive numerical growth in the profession (at least within 
universities and the Federal Public Service), and the increasing technical 
competence of at least these two important groups of economists, there has 
been a growing disenchantment both with the discipline itself and with such 
traditional indicators of economic success as economic growth, price stability 
and full employment. This disenchantment was evident both from outside and 
from within the profession and has occurred both in Australia and overseas. In 
this respect, as in others which we will be recording here, Australian views have 
been largely derived from overseas intellectual trends. Since this disenchantment 
pre dates the traumatic economic events of 1974-75 and of later years, it was 
largely rising expectations rather than falling standards of performance which 
were responsible. Groenewegen [9] has summarised the series of events and 
the intellectual trends in the late sixties and early seventies which led to this 
increasing disenchantment. The critics raised a long list of issues ranging from 
degradation of the environment and of the quality of life generally, to Vietnam 
and growing awareness of poverty and of discrimination against such groups as 
Aborigines, migrants and women. They regarded these as resulting inherently 
from the prevalent economic organisation of society. Further study of existing 
modes of economic organisation (without encompassing major institutional 
changes of such economies) was unlikely to be rewarding. 
The radical critique ensuing from these issues has been equally wide 
ranging. Although, as Groenewegen points out, Australian radical left economists 
are a diverse group and often hostile to one another, there is agreement on one 
underlying, even if sometimes only implicit, proposition: whatever the issue 
under consideration, existing defects/problems could be alleviated, if not cured, 
by the abolition of the private ownership of the means of production, or at least 
by the substantial subordination of private interests to public guidance, regulation 
or dictation. or, as some of the radicals would put it, in equality, alienation, 
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discrimination and imperialism are inherent in the nature of capitalism. This view 
is, of course, the result of the Marxist intellectual heritage of the radical revival. 
To an outsider the attempted demonstration of the causal connection between 
capitalism and these evils is not very rigorous. Many non-radicals would argue 
that in equality, alienation and discrimination may be inherent in the minute 
division of labour which is common in all wealthy societies (whether capitalist, 
socialist or different degrees of “mixed”). Again these evils may be inevitable, 
though they can hopefully be mitigated, when an economy is characterised by 
decentralised decision-making and a reliance on economic incentives. Finally, 
they may be inevitable to some degree in any economy because of the limited 
changeability of human nature. “Maoist man” appears as much a myth as was 
“Soviet man” in the 1920s. 
The radical emphasis is largely on critiques.3 The inherent difficulties of 
their implicit or explicit solutions tends to be skated over (though this is a 
trait common to many critiques, not only to those emanating from radicals). 
Thus at least the newer radical groups, both in Australia and elsewhere, have 
tended to be critical of both markets and of co-ordination of economies 
through bureaucratic planning techniques, without suggesting any alternative 
coordinating mechanism which is known to be viable. The impact of radical 
critiques was probably at its greatest during the late sixties and early seventies, 
i.e. during the closing years of the Vietnam War, and before the election of the 
Labor government in December 1972.4
A good deal has been written about the Labor government’s style and 
about its economic performance; here I shall be concerned with its impact on 
economic attitudes in the country. In this connection, the following aspects 
require reference here. 
3 In terms of their wider impact, perhaps the two most important critiques of the economy emanating 
from Australian radical economists concern the piecemeal nature of planning by McFarlane (1968) 
and the growing importance (dominance?) of foreign ownership by Wheelwright (Wheelwright and 
Miskelly I967; Wheelwright 1974).
4 on the other hand, in terms of conferences and radical magazines there is a good deal of continuing 
activity. Three Australian Political Economic Conferences have been held, each attracting large numbers. 
Two sizeable and active conferences have also been held by Labor Economists. Again there are a number 
of active journals such as the Journal of Australian Political Economy, Arena, Intervention; apart from 
papers by radical economists appearing in the non-radical literature.
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First there was the liberating influence of the Labor government. This 
was especially felt by artists and writers, but also by many social scientists. A 
large number of academic and other “outside” economists became interested in 
using their skills for the solution of practical problems and were commissioned 
by the Labor government to re-examine the various economic and social issues 
confronting the country. The contrast was particularly great with the prevalent 
pre-Labor (and post-Labor?) practice of avoiding open (i.e. non public service) 
investigations of such problems whenever possible, or alternatively setting up 
“semi-amateur” committees of inquiry with no professional membership, or 
strictly minority representation of professional economists. Corden referred to 
this anti-intellectual tendency in his earlier survey [3, pp. 49-59]. 
Whether this plethora of Labor-sponsored enquiries, task forces and 
commissions contributed to better decision-making by government is another 
question, one gathers that some political scientists and students of public 
administration have some misgivings on this point [e.g. 14]. 
only a small minority of the economists thus involved were committed 
ALP sup porters, of two dozen names of economists which readily come to 
mind, only about half a dozen stand out as committed ALP supporters.5 The 
much beloved jobs-for-the-boys criticism applied to two or three prominent 
appointments which were probably relatively unrepresentative of the whole. 
Secondly, there was the basic orientation of Labor’s programme towards 
equality of opportunity. To quote a recent summary of it by Ralph Willis, MP, the 
present Labor Shadow Treasurer: 
“ . . . we argued that people of all income levels should have the right 
to decent education, proper health care, efficient transport, adequate 
recreation facilities, and a non-polluted environment, and that the 
only way that such rights could be guaranteed was for the State to 
play a much greater role in their provision than hitherto” [38]. 
5 The names of those who were involved in government during this period include: Brennan, Brogan, 
Cochrane, Deeble, Gates, Gregory, Gruen, Hancock, Holmes, Ironmonger, Isaac, Karmel, Keating, A. 
G. Lloyd, Mathews, Mauldon, Parish, Pincus, Porter, Scotton, Selby-Smith, Snape, T. W. Swan, and 
Wheelwright.
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But, as Edwards [5] pointed out:
“Labor also arrived in office with an unresolved, almost unrecognised, 
conflict over the means by which it would promote equality.” 
on the one hand there was the increasing role for the State in the provision 
of services; on the other hand there was need for extra public revenue to finance 
transfer payments for more adequate social services; yet again, the trade union 
members of the government expected to greatly improve their members’ real 
after-tax incomes and living standards, not to mention the share of GNP going 
to wage earners. Squaring this very round circle was an impossible task for any 
government. Critics, and perhaps even the electorate as a whole, may indulge 
in the luxury of espousing mutually inconsistent policies, but a government’s 
inconsistencies are inevitably exposed publicly. After two and a half years in office 
Prime Minister Whitlam recognized some of these problems in his 1975 Chifley 
Memorial Lecture:
“. . . In a sense the party of Reform in a democratic system carries a 
self-created handicap as a reforming Government. In opposition, its 
essential task is to raise the public perception of the need for change, 
the need for reform. That is, its task is to raise expectations. The 
nature of politics, founded as it is on human nature itself, is that 
there will always tend to be a gap, a shortfall, between expectations 
aroused and expectations met.
“A conservative Government survives essentially by dampening 
expectations and subduing hopes. Conservatism is basically 
pessimistic; reforming is basically optimistic. The great tradition 
which links the American and French revolutionaries of the  Age of 
Reason with the modern Parties of Social Reform is the tradition of 
optimism about the possibility of human improvement and human 
progress through the means of reason. Yet inevitably there will be 
failures, and the higher expectations rise, the greater the likelihood 
of at least temporary failure to meet them.”
In the event, even if there had been no world recession, these unavoidable 
conflicts would have needed to be faced, and would inevitably have led to some 
disillusionment among Labor supporters. As it turned out, the impossible 
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task Labor set itself considerably aggravated subsequent levels of inflation 
and unemployment. Whilst high rates of inflation and unemployment were 
shared in part (though not to the same extent) by all other oECD countries, 
they were to provide a very potent impetus to the ensuing widespread 
disillusionment with Labor. This is not the place for a detailed discussion of 
the Labor government’s economic policies, or of what we can learn from this 
particular episode.6 The emphasis here is restricted to the effect of this period 
on the climate of economic opinion.
Paralleling the earlier history of American disillusionment with President 
Johnson’s “Great Society“, there has been a similar disillusionment with 
government here, coupled with a very rapid growth in libertarian economics, 
or what one might term, alternatively, the economic philosophy of Milton 
Friedman, George Stigler or Fredrich Hayek (if we can, for the purpose of broad-
brush characterisation, ignore differences between their respective philosophies).
Both at ANU and at Monash (and perhaps at other universities) the 
libertarian stance has become, if not the new orthodoxy, at least the predominant 
intellectual movement among the younger members of the discipline. In addition 
a new libertarian organisation, the Centre for Independent Studies, sponsored an 
impressive professional conference on “What Price Intervention“ at Macquarie 
University in April 1978 (e.g. the papers by McGregor, Parish, Porter and Sieper 
listed in the references).
The libertarians regard their basic stance as protective to the maximum 
extent possible of the liberty of the person. (In addition, there is a basic negative 
stance, i.e. against government, of which more below). Power over a person 
should be exercised only to protect others, not to protect man from himself or to 
achieve any other social goal. If freedom and the satisfaction of consumer wants 
are regarded as the most important ends which public policy should serve, the 
predominant prescription of the libertarians, rely on the market in practically 
every situation, follows logically. Those of us who believe that the world is more 
complicated, that government needs to bear in mind other considerations as well, 
 
 
6  I have contributed elsewhere to this type of exercise [10].
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find it less easy to endorse such universal remedies. Thus, to take one example, 
the health of the community is often regarded as a legitimate concern for 
governments which might, for instance, justify publicly financed anti-smoking 
campaigns, or discriminatory taxes on such products, or even the prohibition 
of tobacco advertising.7 However, to the true libertarian this type of do-good 
public meddling is deeply suspect and, at least one prominent libertarian – 
Milton Friedman (in his Newsweek column) – has attacked both governmental 
anti-smoking campaigns (“Government has no business using the tax payer’s 
money to propagandize”) and prohibition of tobacco advertising as “hostile to 
the maintenance of a free society” [cited in 25, pp. 160-161].    
Again, there is the awkward question: At what age does the individual become 
a sufficiently good judge of his welfare to make his freedom such a paramount 
goal? Perhaps of greater basic importance is Rawls’ question, whether society 
(and by implication policy) can be adequately judged in terms of the fulfilment 
of given wants since society (i.e. the interaction of groups and individuals) has 
an important role in influencing and shaping these wants. The criterion of the 
maximum satisfaction of given wants is necessarily a partial criterion. 
“Everyone recognizes that the form of society affects its members and 
deter mines in large part the kind of persons they want to be as well 
as the kind of persons they are. It also limits people’s ambitions and 
hopes in different ways, for they will with reason view themselves in 
part according to their place in it and take account of the means and 
opportunities they can realistically expect. Thus an economic regime 
is not only an institutional scheme for satisfying existing desires and 
aspirations but a way of fashioning desires and aspirations in the 
future” [33, p. 160].
7 For the economist who wants to maintain the supremacy of freedom and of consumer choice as goals, 
the externalities of smoking can be used as valid grounds for interfering with consumer’s choice (i.e. 
the nuisance to others and the additional public health costs). But this does not meet the (paternalistic) 
argument that there is a case for discouraging patently impulsive and unwise choices which will often be 
regretted in the future when the consequences of the, often irreversible, choices become apparent (e.g. 
smoking, the non-wearing of seat belts or safety helmets on motor bikes).
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The libertarians’ deep suspicion of government is probably a useful antidote 
to the previous implicit view of many economists that governments could be 
relied upon to per form the role of Platonic guardians who, in a disinterested 
fashion, determined the best course amongst alternative possible outcomes for a 
particular economy. 
Whatever one may think of the libertarians’ suspicious (value) judgements 
about government, a great deal of valuable work on both the theory and the 
empirical consequences of governmental regulation of private economic affairs 
has resulted from this general orientation, though even here non libertarian 
economists will not follow them all the way. 
Thus there is now a general consensus among (non-Marxist?) economists 
that nothing good can come of governmental attempts to regulate those 
competitive industries giving rise to neither externalities or informational 
deficiencies; but when confronted with such situations or with natural 
monopolies, we are in the realm of the second best. Here general principles 
remain elusive and case-by-case examination and (uncertain) judgements about 
optimal policies are still required.
As Joskow and Noll point out in their excellent and comprehensive overview 
of the US literature on regulation in theory and practice:
“ . . . the inherent inefficiencies of regulation that flow from these 
theories have no natural normative consequences, although one would 
not deduce that from the tone of the literature. That regulation fails 
to reach a Pareto optimum is fairly uninteresting if no institutions 
exist which can reach a point that Pareto dominates regulation. For 
regulatory interventions that deal with empirically important market 
imperfections, the departure of regulatory equilibrium from perfect 
competition is not normatively compelling” [18, p.61]. 
Wages policy
over the period of our survey, Australian wages policy has passed almost 
full circle, from a fairly centralised policy enforced by sanctions to an almost 
completely decentralised policy of collective bargaining, and then back to the 
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most centralised wage fixation system in our history: this time “enforced” or at 
least kept under central control by record levels of unemployment. 
The 1967-1977 decade started with the Metal Trades work value decision 
which caused a spate of protest strikes and, indirectly within two years, eliminated 
the use of sanctions and fines to enforce Commission awards. By october 1971 
Keith Hancock [13] felt that one could no longer reasonably speak of Australia 
having a wage policy 
“Although the market and the wage-fixing institutions have always 
been to some degree rival forces in the determination of pay levels 
and relativities, and the domination of either has never been absolute, 
the shift towards the market over the past two years has been so 
pronounced as to transform the relation. Control of wage movements 
has not been more slender at any time since before World War I.” 
This diagnosed loss of control was to be amply demonstrated within the 
next three years when, assisted by a variety of economic and political forces, 
Australia experienced a massive acceleration of nominal wage growth. Different 
observers have assigned differing relative importance to the economic, political 
and institutional forces responsible for the wage explosion. However this 
necessarily inconclusive debate need not detain us here.8 What is important is 
that the Commonwealth Arbitration Commission gradually regained control 
over the growth of money wages after 1975, no doubt considerably assisted 
by the mounting level of unemployment. The current position is that the 
Commonwealth Commission has “managed to establish the most centralised 
system of wage determination ever to prevail in Australia” [36] 
However, both highly centralised and completely decentralised systems of 
wage fixation possess different but possibly equally grave drawbacks. on the one 
hand the move towards decentralisation and allowing more room for collective 
bargaining is almost inevitably associated with increased wage pressure, followed 
by a more highly differentiated pay scale. This differentiation is not necessarily 
 
8  See, for instance, J. P. Meuwenhuysen and J. Sloan [30], as an example of placing great emphasis on the 
role of the Labor government in the genesis of the wage explosion. I am on record for placing relatively 




in accordance with economic criteria but more in accordance with industrial 
bargaining strength. Although bargaining strength has some influence in any 
system of wage fixation, it looms much larger under free collective bargaining. on 
the other hand a completely centralised system has usually produced stresses and 
strains which tend to make the system fray at the edges at first and then to break 
down, perhaps especially under the weight of the odd inevitably unsustainable 
Arbitration decision. 
The Australian profession discussed the respective merits and drawbacks 
of compulsory arbitration versus collective bargaining at some length fifteen 
to twenty years ago.9 Intermittently, and in various forms, the discussion has 
continued to the present day. During the period under review here, a good deal 
of academic support built up for an incomes policy, perhaps as a kind of mid-way 
house between the market and compulsory arbitration with sanctions. 
According to Hagger [11] between 1973 and 1974 Australian academic 
economists reached an impressive consensus on the desirability of a prices and 
incomes policy: 
“. . . accompanied by a variety of suggested ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’. The 
carrots proposed usually included a guarantee that wage restraint of 
the required degree would be rewarded by substantial tax concessions 
varying from a reduction in excise charges and sales taxes on essential 
items to personal tax indexation. Good examples are to be found in 
Sheehan and Ironmonger (1973) and Sheehan (1974). Among the 
suggested sticks one commonly found amendments to the company 
taxation arrangements designed to penalize firms which agreed to 
excessive wage increases, e.g Sheehan (1974), Nevile (1974), adoption 
of a modified form of the Wallich-Weintraub scheme for a tax-based 
incomes policy, e.g. Henderson (1972), and other such fiscal devices” 
[11, p. 175].
9 See, for instance, the three contributions by Hancock, Laffer and Isaac, in: Australian Labour Relations, 
Readings, J. E. Isaac and G. W. Ford (eds), Melbourne: Sun Books Ltd., 1966, pp. 442-470, and the 
literature referred to by the three authors.
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At the time this consensus of publicly committed academics was reached, 
I had temporarily deserted academia and worked as Economic Consultant to the 
Prime Minister’s Department on these and related issues. In particular I was one 
of six members of a Committee appointed by Cabinet in August 1974 to enquire 
into the possibility of penal taxes on excessive wage increases. Having served on 
that Committee, which I entered as a believer in such taxes, I am now much 
more doubtful, basically because of the administrative and “political” problems 
associated with such taxes. Let me summarise some of the points the Committee 
made: 
“It would of course be necessary for the government to lay down 
a norm for permissible wage increases. The Australian Bureau of 
Statistics estimates each month Average Weekly Earnings using 
payroll tax statistics and a similar method is used in the formula for 
Reimbursement Grants to the States. 
“But greater difficulties arise in an attempt to produce a corresponding 
figure for individual firms which might be used to determine what 
are “excessive” wage and salary payments. While such a figure could 
be produced for each firm there would be many anomalies and the 
Government would be en forcing penalties which in many instances 
would clearly be unjust. This is because it would be impossible from 
award determination, or from other sources, to determine how 
changes in pay rates, occupation by occupation, will affect payrolls, 
firm by firm and quarter by quarter. . . . Even if no wage rates increase, 
the average payroll might rise because of a different mix of skills and 
because of variations in overtime, holiday pay, etc. A firm could be 
penalised for a pay increase which did not arise from any excessive 
change in rates because of accidental factors such as weather, strikes, 
shortages of material or power, etc. . . . 
“No doubt some of these defects could be set right in the course of 
administration but it would be impossible to hope for more than 
the roughest of justice. It may be that rough and ready justice can be 
tolerated if it is the price of coping with the inflationary situation. 
But if the injustices were sufficiently common and glaring there 
would be widespread resentment against the scheme even if it would 
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help keep prices down. There might also be industrial unrest and 
unexpected failures of business . . . 
“But it would be possible to give effect to such a measure, and if 
applied as part of a total programme it could help contain cost 
inflation. It would, however, be impossible to sustain such a plan 
for any considerable period of time. If employed it should be seen 
essentially as a short-term measure.”   
I have dealt at some length with the various considerations which were 
raised in the Committee to illustrate the kind of Hobson’s choice which 
democratic governments the world over have increasingly faced in the last four or 
five years, and which have given rise to demands for tax-based incomes policies 
in other countries as well. on the one hand governments have been expected to 
reconcile (painlessly) irreconcilable income claims. on the other the community 
is becoming increasingly suspicious of government and less and less willing to 
back government in trials of strength with various sectional pressure groups. 
It would have been perhaps especially difficult for Labor. As Dr Barry Hughes 
observed recently, large sections of the Labor party believed that any restraint on 
the ability of trade unions to secure maximum wage increases represented high 
treason against the working classes. 
If government cannot (or is not willing to) enforce fines or sanctions against 
trade unions, is there any reason to believe that it can enforce penal tax provisions 
against firms which agree to treat their workforce more generously than rival firms? 
Government also needs to consider not only the effect of proposed measures on 
inflation but also other aspects of the proposed changes, such as their effect on 
the acceptability of the tax system generally. My academic colleagues can and no 
doubt do retort that the alter native fiscal and monetary methods of coping with 
inflationary pressures and the horrendous cost and misery they imply in terms 
of greatly increased unemployment made it worth trying untested and possibly 
unworkable remedies and paying the price of administrative foul-ups and even 
of bringing the tax system into disrepute. These are judgements which different 
individuals will make differently. However, one got the impression during these 
years that the recommendations of outside economists were often made without 
a full awareness of all the possible pitfalls of the courses of action they were 
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advocating. As Henry Kissinger once put it, comparing the policymaker and the 
outsider: 
“As an outsider you can paint the best consequences of your proposed 
actions and you are not responsible for its failure because it isn’t being 
implemented. As a policymaker you are responsible not only for the 
best but also for the worst that can happen.”10
The net effect of the last ten years of Australian wages policy is that we are 
now no nearer to a solution to the problem of securing wage restraint if tight 
labour markets should return. our centralised wage fixation system is no more 
likely to survive a return to full employment now than eight or ten years ago. one 
possible way out of this dilemma favoured at one time by Mr Clyde Cameron, 
but subsequently repudiated by the 1971 Labor Party Conference, may be worth 
reviving. Cameron suggested that, provided a union-management agreement was 
ratified by the workers affected, it might include clauses providing for civil damages 
in the event of breach by either party. Such agreements might be more genuinely 
respected by both parties and could provide a more predictable industrial relations 
climate for the longer term. This is obviously desirable, partly for its own sake 
and partly to allow and encourage those longer-run investment and development 
decisions which determine a good deal of the growth in our living standards. Some 
more progressive private companies are attempting to negotiate agreements with 
their workforce which provide monetary incentives for continuing operation; this 
is obviously an example of private initiative in this direction. 
Econometric modelling of the Australian economy
one important difference between Australian economic policy discussion when 
Max Cordon wrote ten years ago and the current position is provided by the 
operation and continuing refinement of sizeable econometric models of the 
Australian economy. Such modelling began with a series of individual academic 
efforts by Nevile (1962), Kmenta (1966), Zerby (1969), and Evans (1972). 
While academic modelling of the present Australian economy (Haig & Wood, 
1977, Nevile, 1975) and of such relevant past periods as the 1930s depression 
 
 
10 Interview with Henry Kissinger in the London Observer, 19 July 1977.
Fred H. Gruen
 227
(Valentine, 1978) is continuing, particular attention is focussed here on the 
considerably larger and more elaborate models constructed by econometricians 
working either directly for government or for such statutory organisations as the 
Reserve Bank and the Industries Assistance Commission. 
There are at least four such models. First the National Income Forecasting 
(NIF) model originally designed by Chris Higgins and Vince FitzGerald and 
now operated by a team from Treasury and the Australian Bureau of Statistics led 
by Neil Johnston. Then there are the Reserve Bank models, in particular RBA 1 
originally designed by a team led by Bill Norton, and RBA 76 designed by Peter 
Jonson and his co-workers. Finally there is the IMPACT project, headed by Alan 
Powell and Peter Dixon and a group assembled under IAC auspices.    
Developing and maintaining the larger models requires sustained team work 
as well as gifted individual research efforts. This type of research work is done more 
easily within governmental organisations than in universities, at least as presently 
structured. But it must be a source of regret that all regularly used and publicly 
documented models are operated by government and/or statutory organisations 
(though one should mention the Melbourne Institute’s annual model – not as yet 
publicly fully documented but operated for some of its clients). 
Models can, of course, be classified in a variety of ways. one obvious 
criterion is size, with the number of equations in the model being a common 
measure. By this criterion the IMPACT system is by far the largest, followed 
by the NIF model (with, at present, 14 around 130 equations); RBA 1 (with 
about 100 equations); while RBA 76 is the smallest, being in fact described as a 
“minimal” model with “only” 20-odd equations. However this is really a pretty 
unsatisfactory type of classification; by stressing numbers it ignores a lot, such as 
completeness of modelling, in particular whether the relevant interdependencies 
and relationships are adequately allowed for, etc.
More interesting questions about the models concern their characteristics, 
their uses and their limitations. Broadly speaking there are three major purposes 
of models; to increase understanding of the structure of the economy, to 
provide conditional forecasts and to evaluate the effects of possible proposed 
policy changes (including ex post assessments of actual policy changes). To some 
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extent these aims may be conflicting; a model designed primarily for forecasting 
may have unsatisfactory features from the point of view of consistency or of 
economic theory; whilst a model for policy simulations may give relatively worse 
predictions. Like policy makers, model builders often have to choose between 
alternative ends and settle for trade-offs which can then be attacked by those with 
different aims and priorities. I will elaborate further on the various purposes and 
likely limitations below. It may be desirable first to continue with some further 
characterisation of the official and semi-official models although, for reasons of 
space, only sketchy characterisation is possible here.11
As one would expect, the Treasury and Reserve Bank model concern 
themselves particularly with short run macroeconomic questions they are 
quarterly models used both for forecasting and for policy analysis. New forecasts 
are produced every quarter as new sets of quarterly national accounts statistics 
become available. on the other hand the IMPACT system is designed basically 
for medium term (say 5-7 years) and longer term (over 10 years) policy analysis 
and projection. It focusses primarily on such longer term questions of resource 
allocation as tariff policy, manpower and immigration programmes. Since I will be 
concerning myself below mainly with macro-economic questions the remaining 
discussion will deal with these types of models.12
The NIF and RBA 1 models have strong Keynesian features, gross national 
product is mainly determined by effective demand, but there is considerable 
treatment of inventories in a buffering role and also of capacity constraints, 
especially in the longer run. As one might expect from a model developed within 
the central bank, RBA 1 has a more detailed modelling of the monetary sector than 
in the NIF model (at least so far, but see below). RBA 1 is also more “monetarist” 
in the sense that real wealth and price expectations tend to have more influence 
on expenditure than in the NIF model.
11 For a detailed discussion of the various models, the reader is referred to “Modelling the Australian 
Economy“, by D.W. Challen and A.J. Hagger [1]. I am indebted to the authors for an early copy of their 
book in manuscript form.
12 For a short overview of the IMPACT project see P.J. Lloyd [22, pp. 274-5], for a more detailed 
description see First Progress Report of the IMPACT Project, vols. I & II, Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Canberra, 1977.
Fred H. Gruen
 229
Comparisons of the predictive errors of the two models suggest that the 
predictive performance of the NIF model is generally superior.13 There have been 
seven annual re-estimations (and partial re-specifications) of the NIF model so 
far which have no doubt added considerably to the realism and sophistication of 
the model. The model as it stands now is a good deal different from the original 
Higgins-FitzGerald model. 
Some of the major changes made to the NIF model over the years include: 
(a) a more fully elaborated model of public-private sector interactions enabling 
fiscal policy changes to be analysed more adequately, (b) investment relationships 
have been studied intensively and probably modelled more satisfactorily, (c) the 
influence of real wage changes on unemployment has been included in the model 
in various forms since 1975, (d) expression of relevant flows at constant prices 
with the provision of the appropriate national accounts data, (e) the elaboration 
of a more fully developed incomes sector. 
Work on a fully fledged model of the financial sector was reported at 
recent professional conferences and will be incorporated in the next (1978) re-
specification of the model. Inadequate monetary-real sector interactions have 
been a subject of some past criticism [see 19, 20].    
RBA 76 is, in many respects, a very different type of model to the successive 
NIF versions and RBA 1. It pays more attention to long-run consistency and is 
primarily de signed for medium and longer run policy analysis than for short-
term (conditional) fore casting. RBA 76 is more “neo-classical” and monetarist. 
Demand for commodities and assets are modelled in two steps; equilibrium or 
long-run levels depend on relative prices and the relevant constraints, whilst actual 
demands gradually adjust to these (changing) long-run equilibrium levels. Buffer 
stocks, consisting of money in the case of households and of goods inventories in 
the case of firms, play an important role in the model and smooth the adjustment 
paths in the face of unforeseen disturbances. RBA 76 is estimated using more 
sophisticated full information maximum likelihood techniques than the models 
 
 
13 D.J.P. Jüttner [201]. However, as Jüttner points out. His comparisons are not conclusive, partly because 
the NIF forecasts are wholly within the sample period whilst about 10 per cent of the RBA 1 forecasts 
are for an out-of-sample or post-sample period.
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discussed earlier. It has been the subject of open discussion; for this discussion 
selected outsiders’ experimentation with the model has been encouraged.14 
Some effects of econometric modelling
It is probably too early to assess the full impact of official and semi-official 
econometric modelling of the economy, either on government or on policy, or 
on the economy itself. However, since I am one of the few academic economists 
who has had the regular opportunity over a period of 2 1/2 years or so to read 
the quarterly NIF model-based forecasts, some personal speculations on this 
topic may not be inappropriate. My impression is that the development and 
continuing operation of these models has considerably advanced understanding 
of the economy, in particular the understanding of those who operate the models 
and those who see the conditional forecasts and the policy simulations. This is 
basically because the models attempt in a systematic and precise way to trace 
through and to represent the relevant interactions and interdependencies within 
the economy. Regular quarterly operation continually throws up questions as 
to why certain unexpected events occur. This presents challenges and gradually 
improves understanding. The formal nature of the models means that this 
understanding can then be passed on to others, whilst the informal and intuitive 
knowledge of other “economy watchers” is less readily transmittable. 
one should, of course, not overstate the advances in understanding which 
are possible as a result of the development and operation of these models. The 
available data often will not allow us to choose conclusively between rival models, 
models which might have very different policy implications. Model building will 
always contain a skill which is not wholly subject to scientific rules. As FitzGerald 
and Higgins [7] put it in their discussion of the RBA 76 model: 
“The nature of the data with which our profession must work 
requires the imposition of a high degree of prior specification if the 
facts are to be dis covered. on the other hand, if the imposition of 
specification is taken too far the modeller is in danger of ‘discovering’ 
only what he did.”
14 Peter Jonson and the Bank should be commended for these endeavours. The papers and proceedings of 
a two-day conference on RBA 76 in December 1977 are published as “Conference in Applied Economic 
Research”, Reserve Bank of Australia, December 1977.
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Again official forecasting with models can never be complete or self-
contained; the models can only predict how the economy is likely to behave once 
a large number of exogenous variables are specified and fed in to produce forecasts, 
forecasts which are then conditional on the values of the exogenous variables 
having been correctly specified. Every national econometric model forecast has to 
be based on some international trade and external price assumptions; normally 
the National Wage decision of the Arbitration Commission and farm output are 
also assumed to take on certain values. 
In practice the number of variables to be thus specified is large, in the case 
of the NIF model there are over 100 exogenous variables. However, many of 
them are policy variables, e.g. the company tax rate, etc. In the case of some very 
large econometric models like the Norwegian MoDIS IV, there are no less than 
2,000 exogenous variables. Hence forecasting with econometric models is always 
conditional. Cynics might argue that since one can never get the future paths of 
so many variables right, one is never really likely to get the forecast right. Whilst 
it is true that the future is really unknowable, governments and other economic 
agents act (either explicitly or implicitly) on the basis of a likely future. Models 
then provide them with an explicit efficient information tool, a systematic storage 
and processing framework for the large quantities of information used by fore 
casters, whatever method they might wish to use. 
The economic structure the model builders are trying to capture is a 
changing one, so that understanding can never be complete. There is a good 
deal of evidence that the Australian economic structure changed rapidly during 
the seventies, no doubt partly in response to the much higher rates of inflation 
and the much lower levels of economic activity experienced. To give just one 
example, Davis and Lewis [4] cite a good deal of evidence suggesting that the 
demand for money functions estimated with data of the 1950s and 1960s 
exhibited considerable instability during the 1970s. A change or evolution in 
the parameters creates considerable problems for statistical estimation. Also, the 
structure could change just because different policies are followed.15
15 Lucas has argued that these changing structures cannot in principle, be estimated sufficiently accurately 
to enable us to provide policy makers with useful information as to the actual consequences of alternative 
economic policies. (Cf: Robert E. Lucas, “Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique”, in Volume I of 
the Carnegie Rochester Conferences on Public Policy, North Holland 1976). For one possible reply, see 
Robert J. Gordon’s contribution in the same volume.
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In spite of these drawbacks, the econometric models have firmly established 
their role both in forecasting and in policy simulation, both in Australia and in 
many overseas countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, Norway, and so on. According to otto Eckstein, a leading US 
model builder and academic, virtually all serious national economic forecasting 
in the US is now done with the aid of large scale econometric models. Just as 
politicians rightly consult fallible public opinion polls as giving them the best 
available information, so economic policy advisers consult fallible econometric 
models before either making their own forecasts or recommending appropriate 
policy stances. 
Partly as a result of the development and operation of these large scale 
models, I believe there is a substantial gap in understanding and expertise on 
the Australian economy between the economists in the central policy making 
departments (the members of the “official family” as they sometimes call 
themselves) and those outside who do not have regular access to these and other 
internal applied economic research and policy memoranda. I believe a good 
deal of this gap is unnecessary for protecting the formulation and the giving of 
confidential advice from senior public servants to Ministers. In fact, the gap may 
often be counterproductive for achieving a government’s goal and for enabling 
the community at large to understand the limitations on a government’s ability 
to manage the economy. 
If I were to be thoroughly impractical and consider how best to run such 
a national econometric model, for the purposes of applying what intelligence 
and resources we can to the solution of our economic problems, I would place 
the model in a semi-autonomous organisation where its policy simulations could 
be carried out on behalf of not only those charged with giving macro-economic 
policy advice, but also on behalf of other groups. other departments also have a 
need for such policy simulations (e.g. Environment, Housing and Community 
Development, Employment and Industrial Relations, etc.) as may others such 
as the Arbitration Commission, the ACTU, Employer’s organisations, the 
opposition, etc. of course, this is all very fanciful, naive speculation which 
neglects the realities and the intensities of both bureaucratic and party politics 
in this community. It only seems worth mentioning because other countries, not 
too dissimilar, have managed to order their affairs in such an apparently sensible 
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fashion. In Norway, for instance, large scale public econometric models have been 
used to assist policy formulation for almost two decades (since 1960). Model 
development and operation is undertaken by a servant of Parliament and not of 
the executive, the Central Bureau of Statistics, with the Ministry of Finance as the 
largest but by no means the only user of the model.16 Nor is Norway unique. The 
Netherlands Central Planning Bureau, though officially a government agency, 
is given a great deal of latitude in conducting and publishing applied economic 
research including model-based conditional forecasts.17 In large economies, such 
as Britain and the US the question of access to officially operated models is less 
pressing, since resources devoted to such studies are greater and there are several 
alternative private, or at least non-official, models available. In fact, in these 
countries the private models may often be in the lead. 
In popular discussion of models in Australia undue emphasis has been placed 
on getting the official forecasts going up to government published. It is probably 
one of the less important consequences of the 1975 Constitutional Crisis that the 
forecasts are not published. Under Treasurer Hayden’s explicit instructions, a set 
of forecasts were pre pared for publication at the end of october 1975 and, but 
for the Senate’s delay of Supply, it is likely that they would have been published 
in November 1975. 
Although I attempted unsuccessfully during 1973-75 to get these forecasts 
published, other members of the “official family” put up a number of cogent 
counter-arguments. These were basically that the professional, non-political 
quality of the forecasts would probably suffer and thus government could be 
deprived of the best possible information for its decisions. 
16 It was, and is, used for instance by all parties in centralised income negotiations, by other groups such as 
the Ship Research Institute of Norway to analyse the impact on the Norwegian economy of an expansion 
and a change in the product-mix of the shipbuilding industry (towards construction of oil and gas 
exploration platforms), etc.
17 Australian officials using the models are sceptical of their mechanical use without judgemental 
adjustments of models where the linkages are known to be weak (e.g. expectation linkages in the case of 
NIF). The Norwegians cope with this type of problem by having officials in their Ministry of Finance 
who have operated the model at an earlier time and who are thoroughly familiar with its strengths and 
weaknesses. In Australia, Treasury, Prime Ministers and the Reserve Bank have a number of senior policy 
advisers in an identical position.
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Whilst I still believe that it would be desirable that sets of conditional forecasts 
be prepared and published, this should probably not be done by those charged with 
giving macro-economic policy advice, but perhaps by some more independent 
group (as it is in other countries). What is more important than such conditional 
forecasting is the public availability of policy simulations and of other applied 
economic research work. Whilst there has been a welcome increase in the publication 
of technical economic papers of professional public servant/economists at various 
professional fora, it is surely ironic that the only regular quarterly Commonwealth 
government publication of technical economic material for many years was the BAE’s 
Quarterly Review of Agricultural Economics. A good deal of applied economic analysis 
and research work is done which could safely see the light of day without betraying 
confidential policy advice: in many cases it would aid public understanding and 
might even make acceptance of unpopular policy stances easier. 
What the public studies with the models say – a modest sample
A great deal of information and applied research work has been done on the 
various models which one cannot hope to summarise within the space available. 
Comments here will be restricted to the more central economic issues of wages, 
taxes, inflation and unemployment and even within this broad area, the focus is 
on some of the more topical issues. 
The comments refer mainly to three papers: (1) The Jonson-Taylor 
simulation of Australian inflation during 1971 to 1975 using RBA 76; (2) the 
FitzGerald-Higgins comparisons of alternative policy simulations with NIF7 and 
RBA 76; and (3) Paul Coghlan’s recent simulations with the NIF7 model. 
Jonson-Taylor used RBA 76 to ascertain the effects of “steadier” trend 
policies on inflation and unemployment over the 1971 to 1975 period. The 
alternative policies included a managed float of the exchange rate, tighter money, 
government spending growing at 1966 to 1970 average rates and award wages 
growing at the same rate as productivity. If these policies had been adhered to, the 
unsatisfactorily high levels of inflation and unemployment during 1971-75 could 
have been substantially avoided.18 
18 According to the simulations, inflation would have averaged 5 per cent and unemployment less than 2 
per cent with this bundle of policies over the period 1971-75.
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Gregory has pointed out that while it is not possible, on the basis of the 
Jonson-Taylor simulations, to be certain, the simulations appear to indicate that 
the single policy change which could have made the greatest difference to the 
performance of the Australian economy during the early ‘70s was a lower path of 
award wages.19 
Again, as shown in the FitzGerald/Higgins simulations with RBA 76 and 
NIF7, award wage increases lead both to output and to employment reductions, 
whilst Coghlan’s NIF7 simulations suggest a wage pause for three quarters from 
May 1975 to February 1976 would have reduced registered CES unemployment 
by more than half over the next 2 1/2 years – i.e. by the June quarter of 1978. 
None of these simulations are conclusive, in each case one can point to 
certain unsatisfactory features which cast doubts on the results.20 But while 
academic economists can take the time to examine these and other puzzles 
regarding the real wage/employment nexus (such as the apparently slight female/
male employment responses after the introduction of equal pay), policy makers do 
not have this luxury, they must act on the basis of the best information available, 
even when it remains uncertain. 
19 R. G. Gregory [8, p. 232]. (I will put to one side whether such a lower path was politically or institutionally 
a possible option.)
20 Thus in the case of RBA 76, an aggregate production function is assumed (not estimated) with the 
demand for labour adjusting to close the gap between the marginal product of labour and the real wage 
rate. The speed of this adjustment is estimated empirically, but the assumption of a long-run decline 
in the demand for labour when its price rises .faster than labour productivity is not satisfactory for this 
type of policy simulation. In the case of the NIF model, Coghlan has pointed to the unsatisfactory 
nature of the output/employment response’ in the present version of the model. Based on 1959-76 
data the elasticity of employment with respect to product is about 0.9; but on the basis of 1974-78 
experience, an elasticity of around half that level may be more correct at the present time (cf. Coghlan 
op. cit., p. 7). There are other unsatisfactory features about the State and local government employment 
response to slower growth of award wages in the NIF model which need to be mentioned. State and 
local government outlays are fixed in nominal terms; thus any cut in inflation results in correspondingly 
higher real government outlays-with consequent effects on real output and employment. Thus of the 
increase in real GDP in the twelfth quarter of the simulation, no less than 45 per cent is the result of 
extra government output. Such modelling of State and local government expenditure seems unrealistic, 
at least in the second and third years. Some reduction in nominal outlays under these circumstances 
would probably model the real world more accurately. 
 on the other hand, as Coghlan points out, the NIF7 model probably does not fully reflect the monetary, 
expectational and balance of payments effects of reduced inflation. These would tend to increase the 
stimulatory effects of such a slower rate of growth of money wages. 
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It seems to me, therefore, that the Fraser government’s attempt to argue 
before the Arbitration Commission for a substantially lower rate of increase in 
award rates is justified economically, both to reduce inflation and to gradually 
improve the employment position. This does not imply that other policy stances 
by the present Government could not also be used to improve the employment 
situation. For instance, the reduction of government expenditure and of personal 
income taxes has probably reduced employment appreciably. From an economic 
point of view, the best time to reduce the absolute or the relative size of the public 
sector is during a boom, not in the depth of a serious recession. According to 
the Coghlan simulations, the likely combined effects of a simultaneous decrease 
in current Federal government expenditure and in personal taxes is to reduce 
significantly the level of employment, whilst the price level is barely affected.21 
Also there are other economic policy stances of the government which 
not only make no contribution towards alleviating the twin evils of inflation 
and unemployment but probably aggravate them. I refer particularly to two 
policy stances, first, the overwhelming preference for direct versus indirect tax 
reductions, and secondly the various attempts by government to reduce the price 
of capital relative to labour. 
The Coghlan simulations show clearly that, according to the NIF model, 
indirect tax reductions have a more favourable effect on both inflation and jobs 
than direct tax cuts of the same magnitude.22 In this respect, they confirm Nevile’s 
simulations in November 1977 [29, pp. 32-39]. 
Coghlan’s simulations enable us to compare tax cuts costing $100 million 
per quarter (in 1966-67 prices, or around $1,000 million annually in 1977-
78 prices). An indirect tax cut of this size in the third quarter of 1975 would 
 
21 Combining a decrease of $100 million (1966-67 prices) per quarter of personal tax collections and $122 
million (1966-67 prices) of government expenditure (or around $1,000 million annually in 1977-78 
prices) leaves the government deficit unchanged after three years, but reduces employment by between 
66,000 and 78,000 over the three years and increases CES unemployment by some 27,000 to 36,000. 
The implicit consumption deflator as a result of such simultaneous reductions in taxes and government 
expenditure would be reduced by half a per cent after three years.
22 Here too it is necessary to enter a qualification about possible inadequate linkages in the NIF model. 




have given us 2.5 per cent lower consumer prices by mid-1978 than a cut in 
personal income taxes costing the same, whilst the demand expansionary effect 
on employment would have given us about 50,000 extra jobs.23 There are, of 
course, other reasons which can be advanced for preferring to reduce direct taxes, 
but it behoves an outside observer to point out that such a preference implies a 
relative downgrading of the inflation/unemployment objectives.   
Recent work on the labour market sector of the NIF model by Johnston, 
Campbell and Simes suggests that relative capital/labour price movements “have 
resulted in sizeable amount of substitution of capital for labour” [16, p.16]. 
Relative capital/labour price movements depend not only on the movements in 
wage costs, but also on the cost of capital. The provision of the 40 per cent 
investment allowance and of accelerated depreciation allowances, not to mention 
the government’s attempt to reduce interest rates have also played some part in 
encouraging such capital/labour substitution. one cannot therefore “blame” the 
current level of real wages for all the capital/labour substitution which seems to 
be taking place at present. 
While I believe the models have given us some important order-of-
magnitude estimates of a number of possible policy changes, one should not claim 
too much for them. For instance they are probably not able to shed much light 
as yet on one of the current central problems of economic management, namely 
whether traditional Keynesian pump priming methods would still predominantly 
stimulate output and employment or whether an increasing proportion of such a 
stimulus would be dissipated by higher prices, or again whether such a stimulus 
would set off unfavourable capital account movements. This is probably the most 
basic and contentious issue separating the expansionists from those who back the 
very cautious approach of the present government. But the mere fact that models 
are unlikely to answer all our questions is of course no justification for not using 
them to shed what light they can. 
23 However the inflation rate is affected mainly in the first year (according to both the Coghlan and Nevile 
simulations). According to Coghlan the control inflation rate between the 1st and 4th quarters is 10.9 
per cent; with indirect tax cuts this would be reduced to 8.8 per cent. In the second year, (i.e. between 
the 4th and 8th quarter) the inflation rate is reduced from a control 11 per cent to 10.8 per cent and in 
the third year (i.e. from the 8th to the 12th quarter) from 8.7 to 8.4 per cent. (I am indebted to Paul 
Coghlan for drawing my attention to an error on this point in an earlier draft.)
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Conclusion
In my concluding comments I want to revert briefly to the disenchantment with 
economics referred to earlier. originally this disenchantment was partly the result 
of rising expectations; growth of living standards, full employment and price 
stability became taken for granted; while lifting our horizons we managed to 
forget that these achievements could be lost if we didn’t go on working at them. 
Since then our unsatisfactory economic performance and the spectre of 
economists disagreeing about the solutions have no doubt accelerated this 
disenchantment. I believe some of the disenchantment is unjustified. Whatever 
may have been the mistakes of economists and of economic policy advisers, 
political and institutional failures have loomed large in recent inadequate 
economic performances. This inadequate performance started with the failure to 
appreciate in 1971, against the predominant professional advice at the time. The 
unduly expansionary fiscal policy stance in 1972-73 (essentially to avoid losing 
an election) and in 1973-74 (to keep election promises) set the stage for many of 
the subsequent difficulties. 
on the other hand, inadequate economic growth rates, high levels of inflation 
and unemployment have been shared in greater or lesser degree by most if not 
all other oECD economies. Economic problems have become more threatening 
and are therefore more challenging than in the sixties. Can economic analysis 
come up with worthwhile solutions or are the political constraints too restricting? 
The dissatisfaction with the development of the discipline felt by many leaders of 
the profession internationally has been documented by Groenewegen [9, p. 31] 
. In a recent survey of the current state of economics, Thurow is agnostic about 
the future intellectual progress of economics. He believes that the development 
of the profession proceeds 
“. . . in a manner similar to gold mining. Some great, or lucky, 
prospector strikes a vein of high grade ore in the form of a new 
paradigm, technique or vision . . . ordinary miners go to work to 
mine much of the actual gold. Eventually the miners must work 
harder and harder . . . The intellectual rewards of further research 
along that line get smaller and smaller. In the last half century 
the great intellectual gold strikes have been the national income 
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accounts, Keynesian economics (a development that also allowed 
monetary economics to be rebuilt or rediscovered), mathematical 
economics and econometrics. Lesser gold strikes include the analysis 
of oligopoly, growth, human capital, and the random walk. Some 
of these strikes are still being worked in the last half of the 1970s, 
but most of them seem to have reached relatively low grade ore. The 
last decade has not witnessed a major or even a lesser gold strike. To 
rejuvenate its internal intellectual growth the profession needs a gold 
strike, but as with all actual gold strikes, no one knows where, or if, 
it will occur.”24
of course economists themselves could contribute to their professional 
standing by not being quite so opinionated and appearing certain on the basis of 
scanty and often inscrutable evidence. Let me close with Robert Solow’s recipe for 
public statements by economists: 
“Can anything be done? Your guess is as good as mine. I would 
like to see us stick to fundamentals in public, and to robust, well-
established empirical relationships. Understanding about supply 
and demand, and marginal cost and discounting, and the national 
income identity, and stocks and flows, and substitution, and the 
simpler macroeconomic models, and the limitations of those models 
– all that already gives us a comparative advantage over others. Why 
not stick to it? Tomorrow the world.”25
24 Lester C. Thurow: Economics 1977, Daedalus, Fall 1977, p. 93/4.
25 Challenge, March/April 1978, p. 40.
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Work and welfare in the years ahead
Robert G. Gregory1
Macro economic policy since World War II has been dominated by the notion of 
a Phillips curve, whereby the rate of inflation and the level of unemployment are 
linked together so that more of one implies less of the other. These two variables 
are among the six major objectives of economic policy as listed in the terms of 
reference to the Vernon Report [5]. 
It is interesting to look back over the Fisher Lectures since they began in 
1904 to see the extent to which the role of these two objectives of present day 
governments were reflected in the choice of subject matter discussed. 
Inflation has always had a presence. In his 1921 Lecture, Professor D.B. 
Copland included the following quotation in his first paragraph: “The rise and 
fall of the general price level is one of the greatest evils that can affect a commercial 
nation.” [7, p. 5]
Such sentiments were expressed in other lectures between 1904 and 1944 
and there was a much discussion of the relationship between inflation and gold, 
the money supply, national debt and government deficits in a vein similar to the 
discussions that are occurring today. In 1934, during the depths of the Depression, 
 
 
1 Thirty-eighth Joseph Fisher Lecture, 9 December 1981. Since published in (1982) "Work and 
Welfare in the Years Ahead" Australian Economic Papers, 21(39): 219-43; (1983) “The Slide into Mass 
Unemployment: Labour Market Theories, Facts and Policies”, Annual Lecture, The Academy of Social 
Sciences in Australia; and “Wages Policy and Unemployment in Australia” Economica, 1986, 53: 553-
741. Much of the research reported was undertaken with W. Foster, P. Stricker and P. Sheehan of the 
Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, University of Melbourne. The author is grateful 
for their help. The author also received comments from J. Pincus, F. Gruen, L. Edwards, A. Hall and 
M. Gray. The analysis of Parts III and IV is developed in more detail in Foster and Gregory [8, 9]. The 
research was financed in part by the Utah Foundation and the Bureau of Labour Market Research. 
Neither are responsible for the views expressed.
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when trade union unemployment in Australia was about 30 per cent Sir Leslie 
Melville began his Fisher Lecture with the statement: “Today, in English-speaking 
countries, the price level has come to be the chief pre-occupation.” [22, p. 5]
There is virtually no discussion of unemployment. A surprising omission 
given that throughout the pre-World War II period unemployment was generally 
much higher than it is now. 
It is not until forty years after the first Fisher Lecture that an address is 
specifically directed towards employment and unemployment. In 1944 H.C. 
Coombs begins his lecture with the statement: “Governments of democratic 
countries during the war have accepted a new responsibility – that of maintaining 
a high, stable level of employment within their borders.” [6, p. 5]
For those of you who may be starting to lose faith in the ability of 
governments to control the level of economic activity and who yearn for a simpler 
world, I recommend this lecture to you. It is a good lecture to read during these 
troubled times for it embodies the spirit of the brave new world that I remember 
when I was first taught macro economics. Coombs talks of how governments will 
manage the economy to maintain full employment and thereby increase human 
welfare. In the future “There will be a few more jobs available than men and 
women to fill them, (so) that there will be a slight but persistent shortage of 
labour”. [6, p. 7]
Coombs mentions very briefly an inflation-unemployment link similar to 
that which made Professor Phillips famous and discusses the fact “that a high 
employment economy always carries within it the seeds of inflation” [6, p. 29]. 
However, little attention is given to this topic and he comments that the difficulties 
for macro economic policy that are presented by any inflation-unemployment 
link should not deter us. The emphasis is clearly on full employment and not on 
inflation. A new era seems to be beginning. Coombs comments upon the 10 per 
cent unemployment rate of 1940 and thought that full employment might mean 
4 per cent unemployment for males and 2 per cent for females. 
As we all know, after World War II and until very recently full employment 
policies appeared to be very successful. Recessions were short and unemployment 
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was so low that three decades passed before unemployment of males rose above 
the level that Coombs called full employment. 
After Coombs, inflation and unemployment disappeared from the Fisher 
Lectures until 1971 when Professor Henderson began his lecture by introducing 
the notion of stagflation: “the combination of a stagnant level of activity combined 
with a rapid rise in prices.” [16, p. 1]
Like Coombs before him, Henderson focussed on what was to become the 
central issue of economic policy through the coming decade: low growth rates 
and high levels of unemployment and inflation. 
I have drawn these lectures to your attention to help explain my choice 
of topic. Looking back over the Fisher Lectures in the period before World War 
II it is remarkable how little regard was given to unemployment. Not only was 
unemployment not in the centre of the stage but it also did not appear to be in the 
cast of players. In some respects we are stepping back towards a world more like 
that of pre World War II. The change in the price level is increasingly becoming 
the centre of attention and the degree of responsibility that governments feel for 
full employment, as measured by their policy actions, is gradually being reduced. 
Because I feel so uneasy about this transition process, most of this lecture is 
devoted to observations on the nature of employment and unemployment in 
Australia today. These observations are made in the hope that eventually they 
will make a small contribution towards the design of government policies that 
will lead to higher levels of employment and lower rates of inflation than we have 
experienced over the last six or seven years. They focus on the labour market, rather 
than the Australian economy as a whole: because of this and the complexity of 
achieving full employment and stability of costs and prices these observations do 
not offer a simple and clear panacea for the problems we now face. They are more 
in the nature of a beginning of an attempt to redirect the economic discussion 
away from the increasing emphasis that is being placed on the control of inflation 
by tight monetary policy, reduced government spending and deficits and slow 
economic growth. Disquiet with the current stance of policies in many western 
economies and similar ideas to those developed here can be found in okun [25], 
Solow [30], Akerlof [1], Hicks [17], and Clark and Summers [4]. 
38 Work and welfare in the years ahead
246
The basic themes of the lecture relate to a search for answers to the following 
two questions: 
1) Why do real and nominal wage increases – and therefore price increases – 
appear to be only loosely related if at all, to excess demand and supply in the 
labour market? 
2) How is employment and unemployment allocated among people in the 
Australian economy. 
To a large extent these are relatively new questions, brought to the forefront 
by the very poor performance of the Australian economy over the last decade. 
Australia has shared this poor performance with other countries but as Gray and 
Gruen [11] and Norton and McDonald [23] have shown, the relative deterioration 
in Australia is among the worst in the oECD countries. 
I have posed two questions because I want to suggest that to a significant 
extent the answer to the first is related to the answer to the second. Since most of 
the research to be described is new and possibly unfamiliar to you let me present 
a brief outline of the analysis to follow. 
In section II I argue that real and nominal wages are only loosely related 
to excess demand and supply in the labour market, particularly in the long term. 
Then in sections III, IV and V the data are assembled which will be used to 
explain why the price of labour is less flexible than other prices in the economy. 
The message of section III is that although many people experience 
unemployment, most of the unemployment weeks incurred are concentrated on 
a very small group. Thus, during 1980-81, the 4.6 per cent of all unemployment 
spells that lasted more than a year accounted for 32 per cent of all the weeks 
of unemployment during that year. This concentration of long unemployment 
spells upon a small group means that a lengthy period of unemployment is a rare 
event for most of the labour force. 
In section IV I show that although job turnover is high (a new job lasts 
on average 2-3 years) most employed people are in jobs which last a long time. 
The expected length of a job for the currently employed is about twelve years. 
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Consequently for most of the employed labour force there is a small probability 
of leaving their current job and incurring unemployment. 
In section V data are presented to show that at any point of time more than 
half of the unemployed have either not held a full time job in the last eighteen 
months or have held a job of short duration. The long term employee who works 
full time has a very small probability of becoming unemployed, even during a 
very slack labour market. 
From these facets we develop two closely related themes. First, a steady 
but higher rate of unemployment does not offer firms a significant reserve army 
of unemployed persons from which they can draw good workers. Much of the 
unemployment is concentrated upon the long term unemployed who, as a result of 
a sorting process, appear to employers to have low productivity. Nor does a steady 
but higher rate of unemployment pose a serious threat to most of the employed 
work force. After one or two years in the job the probability of experiencing a 
long period of unemployment is very low. For these reasons a higher but stable 
level of unemployment will not significantly affect the rate of growth of money 
and real wages. It is suggested that the rate of growth of real wages is determined 
primarily by implicit long term agreements between the firm and its work force 
as to the allocation of productivity gains. The size of the unemployment pool is 
largely irrelevant for the striking of these agreements. 
The second theme is more of an aside in tonight’s lecture. If it is in the 
mutual interests of firms and employees to have long job tenure and implicit 
contracts are an efficient means of cementing career relationships between 
workers and employers then there is considerable scope for conventions, customs, 
fairness and equity in the wage determination process. It is a result of this view of 
labour markets that many economists have been recently expressing sentiments 
similar to the following from R. Hall [14]: “There is no point any longer in 
pretending that the labour market is an auction market cleared by the observed 
average hourly wage. In the extreme case, wages are just instalment payments 
on a long term debt and reveal essentially nothing about the current state of the 
market.” [14, p. 120].
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The Phillips curve
Figure 38.1 presents a Phillips curve2 for the years 1967-1981. Since I am 
primarily interested in labour markets the vertical axis measures the rate of 
growth of average weekly earnings per employed male unit rather than the rate 
of increase of the price level. It is obvious that there is no stable relationship 
between wage increases and the level of unemployment. If a trade off between 
wage increases and unemployment exists then it has shifted to the right and 
become worse. Relative to the late sixties, and indeed the whole post World War 
II period, Australia is now experiencing both higher rates of inflation and higher 
rates of unemployment. 
Figure 38.1: Unemployment and annual change of average weekly earnings
Source: ABS, Average Weekly Earnings, Cat. no. 6302.0. ABS, The Labour Force, Cat. no. 6204.0.
2 Phillips published his important article in 1958. He was Professor of Economics in the Research School 
of Social Sciences, Australian National University, between 1967 and 1970.
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It does appear to be true, however, that initially an increase in unemployment 
is associated with some reduction in the rate of increase of money wages. The 
moderation of the wage increases during the 1971-72 and the 1975-78 period 
appear to be evidence of this. But when the labour market improves and 
unemployment begins to fall a new relationship appears to emerge with higher 
rates of wage inflation at each unemployment level. The period since 1979 is very 
marked in this respect. Unemployment, which is still at record levels for the post 
World War II period, has fallen slightly but the rate of increase of money wages 
during 1981 has been exceeded only in three of the last fifteen years. 
A similar story may be told with respect to real wages (Figure 38.2). The 
initial rise in unemployment checked the rate of growth of real wages quite 
dramatically during 1975 but recently real wages have begun to increase again 
and at rates which are only slightly less than those of the pre 1975 period. There 
is an obvious move to the right of the real wage-unemployment relationship. The 
recovery of the rate of growth of real wages after each initial shock of an increase 
in unemployment is also evident. 
Figure 38.2: Unemployment and the rate of increase of real wages
Source and Definitions: Average Weekly Earnings (male unit basis) deflated by the Implicit Price Deflator of 
Gross Non-Farm Product. Average Weekly Earnings, ABS, Cat. no. 6302.0. Australian National Accounts, 
ABS, Cat. no. 5201.0.
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The original idea underlying the Phillips curve and the real wage-
unemployment diagram is that the labour market is similar to a market for any 
other commodity in that the rate of change of the commodity price depends 
upon excess demand or supply. Unemployment is the measure of the gap between 
the demand and the supply curve. If this were an accurate description of the 
workings of the labour market the rate of increase of money wages should still be 
falling and real wages should not be increasing.3 
Before we look more closely at the nature of the current levels of 
unemployment and some reasons why it is not affecting real and nominal wages to 
the extent that might be expected it is worth establishing the relative importance 
of demand and supply influences which have given rise to the increased level of 
unemployment. 
Figure 38.3 plots the employment-population ratio (labour demand) and 
the labour force participation rate (labour supply) for the period 1966-81. It 
is evident that the rise in unemployment since 1973 has been the result of a 
collapse of labour demand. For seven of the last eight years the employment-
population ratio has fallen. There has been no comparable drawn out recession 
since before World War II. In each of the previous recessions employment has 
recovered reasonably quickly. (oECD [24], Gregory and Duncan [12]). Between 
1979 and 1980 the employment-population ratio increased at a rate comparable 
to the previous best years of employment growth but between 1980 and 1981 the 
decline has begun again. 
A particularly depressing feature of Figure 38.3 is that the employment 
decline has not been concentrated in one or two bad years. Although the 1974-
75 and 1977-78 recessions are evident the decline in the employment population 
ratio has been fairly steady and is beginning again. 
3 The Phillips curve has generated a large literature. In that literature the shifting Phillips curve is 
‘explained’ by adding additional variables to the equation that links wage increases to unemployment. 
The most important of these variables is the rate of increase of past consumer prices. We have placed 




Figure 38.3: Employment and labour force participation:  
All persons, 1966-1981
Source: ABS, The Labour Force, Cat. no. 6204.0.
It is especially interesting that the demand history over the recent seven 
or eight years is not faithfully reflected in the unemployment data. There have 
been unusual changes in labour supply. The 1974-75 employment falls were not 
matched by supply reductions and unemployment increased markedly as we 
saw in Figure 38.1. Since 1977, however, labour supply has varied closely with 
labour demand so that the employment declines of the employment-population 
ratio during 1978, 1979 and 1981 have not led to significant increases in 
unemployment. 
The parallel movement of employment and labour force participation 
over recent years have led many economists to suggest that considerable hidden 
unemployment has been created in the Australian economy over the last few 
years (Stricker and Sheehan [29], Gruen [13], Gregory and Duncan [12]). If 
employment were to grow rapidly the hidden unemployed would return to 
the labour force. This phenomenon suggests that unemployment, as measured, 
is unlikely to fall quickly even if employment continues to grow quickly. 
Consequently in the absence of large falls in labour supply, it appears that there is 
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little prospect for a significant decline in the high unemployment rates of recent 
years. For unemployment to return to 2 per cent of the labour force, three or 
four continuous years of employment growth would be needed at rates which 
have only been achieved in isolated good years over the post war period. The 
probability of three or four good years occurring together must be slight. of 
course, the employment situation could continue to deteriorate as now seems 
likely and unemployment may increase further. 
We now turn to consider how this higher burden of unemployment is 
allocated in our community and whether that allocation has any bearing on 
unemployment as a measure of excess demand and supply of labour? In considering 
possible answers to this question our focus will be primarily on unemployment as 
measured by the ABS. We put aside the concept of hidden unemployment. 
Unemployment
Incidence of unemployment: 1981
Employment opportunities are not spread evenly in our society. It is common 
knowledge that the unemployment rate of teenagers is, on average, four times 
that of adults, that the unemployment rate of teenage girls is greater than that of 
teenage boys and that the unemployment rate of the low skilled and less educated 
exceeds that of the skilled and educated workers. Now that the unemployment 
rate is three times that of the sixties and appears likely to remain that way for 
some time, the incidence and concentration of unemployment looms more 
importantly as an economic and social problem. 
It is usual to analyse the incidence and concentration of unemployment by 
documenting the dispersion of the unemployment rate across social, economic 
and demographic groups. I will adopt a different approach and analyse the 
incidence of unemployment by focussing upon the length of the unemployment 
spell that individuals experience. 
over the last few years the rate of unemployment has averaged about 6 
per cent. over a 12 month period this could mean at one extreme that 6 per 
cent of the labour force were without work for a whole year, or at the other, that 
Robert G. Gregory
 253
every member of the labour force was unemployed for about 3 weeks and, as a 
result, incurred a loss of annual income of approximately 6 per cent. It obviously 
matters which situation more closely characterises the actual experience. Under 
most circumstances the more widespread a given level of unemployment the 
more equitable the burden of this unemployment4 and certainly the greater the 
degree of understanding by society at large of the nature and ramifications of 
unemployment. The narrower the incidence of unemployment the more likely it 
is that society will generate a wide range of myths and general intolerance towards 
the unemployed. It is often useful therefore to think of the unemployment rate 
as the product of two factors – the rate of inflow to unemployment and the 
duration of the completed unemployment spell. Thus, the unemployment rate 
may increase because more people experience unemployment or because the 
unemployed remain without work for longer periods. 
During 1981, 16.0 per cent of those who were in the labour force at 
some time experienced a period of unemployment.5 The ABS does not publish 
information as to the completed duration of the unemployment spell of these 
people but there are a number of ways of estimating it. 
The ABS publishes comprehensive data on the interrupted duration of 
unemployment of those measured as unemployed by the Labour Force Survey. 
The interrupted or current duration of unemployment is the number of weeks 
of unemployment experienced to date by those unemployed at the time of the 
sample. At August 1981, the average current duration of unemployment was 
35.2 weeks. When these data are adjusted they can provide the foundation upon 
which a thorough and comprehensive analysis of the incidence of unemployment 
can be built.
For those in the ABS sample, duration refers to the length of the 
unemployment spell to date. They will have a further period of unemployment 
before their spell terminates. It can be shown (Salant [27]) that under steady 
state conditions these data will understate the average completed unemployment 
 
4 The circumstances referred to relate to individual attitudes towards work and unemployment. The 
argument that equity is increased if unemployment is less concentrated presupposes that individuals 
experiencing unemployment are not those with the weakest preference for work.
5 Labour Force Experience During 1981. ABS, Ref. No. 6206.0.
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experience of the currently unemployed by a factor of two because, on average, 
the currently unemployed will be halfway through their unemployment spell. 
Consequently for those measured as unemployed at August 1981 the average 
completed spell of unemployment will be 70 weeks. This is a very long time indeed 
and it suggests that the unemployment experience is very concentrated. The 
magnitude of the number is worth repeating: The 377,000 unemployed who 
represent 5.6 per cent of the labour force at August 1981 will, on average, be 
unemployed for between 16 and 17 months. This suggests a particularly serious 
unemployment problem. 
You may be puzzled by this figure because it may be difficult to reconcile 
with your own experience of unemployment, or the length of the unemployment 
spell of those you know. I would guess that most of this audience believed that 
the average completed spell of unemployment was less than this. Further, you 
may ask the following question: if about 16 per cent of the labour force looked 
for work during a year and the average completed duration of unemployment, of 
those unemployed at August 1981 is 70 weeks, how is it that the unemployment 
rate is as low as 5.6 per cent? Should it not be much higher? These are good 
questions – the answers to which have only become clear quite recently (see the 
excellent article by Clark and Summers, [4]). The answers relate to the differences 
between the completed unemployment spell of those measured as unemployed at 
a point of time and the completed unemployment spell of all those who become 
unemployed during a year.6
The ABS survey measures the current unemployment experience at a 
point in time. It is a cross section sample and consequently not everyone who 
becomes unemployed during a year is included. Those who begin and end their 
unemployment between sample dates are excluded. In fact, the cross section is 
biased with respect to the length of all unemployment spells that occur during 
a year because the longer the spell of unemployment the more likely it is to be 
included in the cross section. The shorter the unemployment spell the greater 
 
6 There are differences in definition involved in the measurement of the 16 per cent on the one hand 
and the 5.6 per cent and 70 weeks on the other. But these differences are not an important part of the 
answer to the question posed. The 16 per cent is taken from the Labour Force Experience where the 
unemployment concept used is “looking for work”. This is a wider definition of unemployment than 




the under representation of spells of this length. This suggests that the length of 
the average completed spell of all who become unemployed will be less than the 
length of the average completed unemployment spell of those in the sample. 
For our purposes of measuring the completed spells of unemployment 
there are two biases7 at work in the ABS data. The first, as indicated above, is 
an “interruption bias” which states that for those in the sample the completed 
spell length is greater than the spell length to date. The second, is a “spell length 
bias” which states that the average completed spell length of those in the sample 
exceeds that of all those who become unemployed. The two biases operate in 
different directions. Is it possible to say which will predominate? Salant [27] has 
shown that the crucial factor is the relationship between the probability of leaving 
unemployment and the length of the unemployment spell. If the probability of 
leaving unemployment is unrelated to the length of the unemployment spell then 
the two biases exactly offset each other and the average length of the completed 
spell of unemployment is equal to the average length of the interrupted spells 
of unemployment as published by the ABS. If the probability of leaving 
unemployment declines as the duration of unemployment lengthens then the 
average completed spell of all who become unemployed will be less than the 
average interrupted spell of those in the cross section at the time of the survey. 
In Figure 38.4 we plot the probability of leaving unemployment within 
the following month against spells of differing lengths, for August 1981. In 
the first month the probability of leaving unemployment is 0.29. After one 
year of unemployment the probability of leaving unemployment in the next 
month has fallen to 0.16. A similar relationship has been found in other western 
economies.8 The probability of leaving unemployment declines as the length 
 
7 These ‘biases’ are not to be taken to imply that there is something wrong with the ABS sampling 
procedure. It is only for our purpose of identifying the distribution of completed unemployment spells 
through time that the cross section data of incomplete spells at August 1981 is inappropriate
8 We are not sure why this phenomenon occurs. It is also evident in other countries and is thought to be 
the outcome of: (1) a sorting process – those who are most employable are employed first; (2) behaviour 
changes on the part of the unemployed – long periods of unemployment create either increasingly 
dispirited and unemployable people or people who adjust to their situation by reducing their desire for a 
job; and (3) the hiring policy of firms – the length of unemployment is used as a screening device. Hiring 
personnel believe that the long term unemployed are. on average. Less productive than the short term 
unemployed. For an analysis of the US, UK and Canadian data, see Clark and Summers[4], Main [21] 
and Hasanand de Broucher [15] respectively.
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of the unemployment spell increases. Consequently the average length of the 
completed duration of unemployment will be less than the average length of the 
interrupted period of unemployment as published by the ABS. 
Figure 38.4: Probability of leaving unemployment: All persons, 1981
Source: Calculated from ABS, The Labour Force, Cat. No. 6204.0.
Table 38.1 presents the expected completed duration of an unemployment 
spell for all who entered unemployment during 1981. Upon entering 
unemployment the expectation was that the completed spell would be 16 weeks. 
This is considerably less than the 70 weeks referred to earlier and is a 
reflection of the fact that the long term unemployed leave unemployment at a 
slower rate than the short term unemployed. It is the 16 weeks that should be 
closer to your experience of the unemployment duration rather than 70 weeks. 
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Table 38.1: Unemployment duration: All persons
Duration to date 1974 1978 1980 1981
0 weeks 5 15 17 16
26 weeks 10 24 30 32
65 weeks nc 49 68 86
nc= not calculated 
Source: Derived from The Labour Force, ABS Cat. No. 6204.0, see Foster and Gregory [8].
We also provide estimates of the expected number of weeks of unemployment 
yet to be experienced for those who have currently incurred spells of different 
lengths. Thus, after 26 weeks the expected number of additional weeks of 
unemployment is 32 weeks. This means, on average, that the completed spell will 
be 58 weeks long. After 65 weeks there is, on average, 86 weeks of unemployment 
yet to be served and, the completed spell will be 151 weeks long. There is a 
clear pattern. The longer a person remains unemployed the longer the period of 
unemployment yet to be served. 
Another implication of the fact that the probability of leaving unemployment 
declines as the length of the spell increases is that there is a considerable difference 
between the distribution of completed spells of unemployment and the distribution 
of unemployment weeks attributable to spells of different lengths (Table 38.2). 
Thus, during 1981, when the expected duration upon entry to the unemployment 
pool was 16 weeks, 28.5 per cent of those who became unemployed left within 
4 weeks and 63.6 per cent left within 13 weeks. For most people the completed 
unemployment spell is considerably shorter than the average. At the other extreme 
4.6 per cent left after a completed spell of 12 months. 
Table 38.2: Unemployment experience during 1981: All persons (per cent)
Completed spell length Spells Weeks
< 4 weeks 28.5 3.3
4 to less than 13 weeks 35.1 16.9
13 to less than 26 weeks 20.4 23.0
26 to less than 52 weeks 11.4 25.2
52 weeks and over 4.6 31.6
Source: Foster and Gregory [8].
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We also present the distribution of unemployment weeks attributed 
to spells of different lengths. The distribution of unemployment weeks is the 
opposite to the distribution of spells. The 28.5 per cent of spells which terminate 
within 4 weeks account for 3.3 per cent of the total weeks of unemployment 
experienced during 1981, and at the other extreme of the distribution, the 4.6 
per cent of spells which last for more than a year account for 31.6 per cent of the 
total number of unemployment weeks. 
It is the declining probability of leaving unemployment as the spell increases 
that enables the following statements to be true at the same time. During 1981: 
63.6 per cent of unemployment spells terminate within 13 weeks. But for all 
spells that occur the average length of a completed spell is 16 weeks; the average 
completed length of an unemployment spell of all who become unemployed is 
16 weeks but the completed spell of the currently unemployed is, on average, 70 
weeks; and 28.5 per cent of unemployment spells last less than 4 weeks but 31.6 
per cent of all weeks spent in unemployment is accounted for by the 4.6 per cent 
of unemployment spells which last for more than a year. 
once these points are understood – and the concepts are difficult – a 
number of potentially important observations follow:
a) It is possible to have a very serious unemployment problem – 31.6 per cent of 
the total unemployment weeks that occur last more than a year – and yet the 
people you meet who have been unemployed will typically have experienced 
a very short unemployment spell. Consequently, the view that will be widely 
held in the community, based on experience, will be that there is no serious 
unemployment problem. After all, 28.5 per cent of the unemployment spells 
end within four weeks. 
b) Welfare workers, and those who work with the unemployed will tend to 
meet the small proportion of all who become unemployed who account for 
most of the total weeks of unemployment that occurs in the community. The 
perception of unemployment shared by those who work with the unemployed 
will be different from the perception of the community at large. Consequently, 
as unemployment increases and the duration of unemployment lengthens we 




c) Unemployment measured in terms of the number of people who experience 
unemployment is very concentrated in our society. As indicated earlier 
about 16 per cent of those in the labour force at some time during the year 
experience on average 16 weeks of unemployment during an unemployment 
spell.9 However once allowance is made for the way in which the length of 
the unemployment spell is shared among the unemployed the concentration 
of unemployment is even more marked. Approximately three quarters of 
one per cent of those in the labour force at some time during 1980-81 will 
account for 31.6 per cent of the unemployment weeks that occur during the 
year. Two-and a-half per cent of those in the labour force at some time will 
account for half the unemployment weeks experienced in our society. 
The changes since 1968
Between August 1968 and August 1981 the unemployment rate increased from 
1.6 to 5.6 per cent of the labour force – a rise of 250 per cent. The number 
of people unemployed during the year as a proportion of those who were in 
the labour force at some time during the year increased by 120 per cent from 
7.4 to 16.0 per cent. Consequently, although a wider range of people now 
experience unemployment during a year – one in six rather than one in fourteen 
– this change, in proportionate terms, is less than the increase in the rate of 
unemployment. As a result the duration of unemployment has lengthened and 
the unemployment experience has become more concentrated upon particular 
individuals. It is evident from Table 38.3 that those currently unemployed for 
more than 9 months have increased their share of unemployment from 4 per cent 
to 25 per cent. 
It is not possible from the data available to calculate over all this time period 
the completed duration of unemployment of all those who become unemployed 
during each year.10 We therefore utilise data as to the interrupted unemployment 
 
9 We have not yet extended the analysis to encompass multiple spells of unemployment. As about 20 per 
cent of those who become unemployed incur more than one spell, the average length of time spent in 
unemployment per person will exceed the average length of a spell. Since delivery of this lecture this 
phenomenon has been analysed by Trivedi and Baker [31].
10 E. Khoo [19] attempted to measure changes in the completed duration of unemployment over the 
period 1962 to 1975. He uses data from the Commonwealth Employment Service.
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duration of the stock of unemployed at August of each year. over the period 
1968-81 the average interrupted duration of unemployment for persons counted 
in the ABS Labour Force at August of each year, increased from 8.9 to 35.0 
weeks – an increase of 290 per cent. If we use the doubling rule discussed earlier, 
the average completed spell for those counted as unemployed by the ABS has 
increased from 18 to 70 weeks. Furthermore, and this is particularly disturbing, 
although employment growth has been fairly buoyant since 1979 – and as a result 
the employment-population ratio has increased marginally – there is no sign of 
a reduction in the interrupted duration of unemployment. This disturbing fact 
should be investigated in a little more detail.
In Table 38.1 presented earlier, we calculate the expected completed spell 
of unemployment over the last few years. Although the expected completed 
spell upon entry to unemployment has not changed very much since 1978 
the probability that the longer term unemployed will leave unemployment has 
continued to decline. For those unemployed 26 weeks the expected spell has 
increased from 50 to 58 weeks and for those unemployed 65 weeks the expected 
spell has increased from 104 to 151 weeks. 
Table 38.3:  Current duration of unemployment: All persons, 1972 to 1981a 
(‘000)
Current duration of 
unemployment
1968 1972 1974 1976 1978 1981
Under 3 months 67 115 123 175 187 178
3 months and under 9 months na 23 15 81 132 105
9 months or more na 6 3 37 77 94
Total 81 144 141 293 396 377
Under 3 months 83 80 87 59 48 47
3 months and under 9 months na 16 10 28 33 28
9 months or more na 4 3 13 19 25
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Mean duration (weeks) 8.9 9.7 6.5 17.5 26.2 35.1
Unemployment rate 1.6 2.5 2.4 4.7 6.2 5.6
a) At 31 August  
na= not available 
Source: ABS, The Labour Force, Australia, various issues, Cat. No. 6204.0.
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These results suggest that over the last few years as unemployment has 
marginally decreased the composition of unemployment is steadily changing 
towards an increasing number of long term unemployed.11 
Employment
Employment can also be analysed in terms of inflows to employment ar completed 
employment spells. Interestingly we find the same kind of picture employment 
as of unemployment: although job turnover is high it conceals the fact that most 
jobs are held for very long periods of time. 
It is often argued that the Australian labour force is extremely mobile. 
There are number of statistics that are often quoted to support this view. For 
example, the  employment separation rates reported by industry indicate a very 
high degree (labour mobility. These typically show a turnover rate of labour of 
between 50 and 7 per cent per annum and an implied average completed job 
tenure of between one an two years. These data refer to job changes rather than 
to leaving employment.12 
With respect to leaving employment the gross flow data recently published 
by the ABS13 suggest that, on average, four per cent of those employed at the end 
of on month are no longer employed at the end of the next month, implying 
an annual rat of leaving employment of 47 per cent. These facts suggest a great 
deal of labour mobility, a very short job tenure and considerable scope for high 
incidence of new labour contracts between the firm and new hires. They raise the 
question as to why wages are not more responsive to excess demand or supply as 
measured by the unemployment rate. The answer lies, in part, in the nature of 
job tenure and the misleading impression that can be created by labour turnover 
and gross flow statistics.14 
11 For a fuller analysis disaggregate by age and sex, see Foster and Gregory [8].
12 See ABS, Labour Turnover. Cat. No. 6210.0.
13 ABS, The Labour Force, August 1981, Cat. No. 6203.0.
14 There are very few studies of labour turnover in Australia. The most comprehensive is IAC [18].
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For a number of years the ABS has collected the job duration to date of the 
employed. These data are available for a number of years since 1972 and from 
our perspective they indicate very little change in job tenure over the last decade. 
These data are the job duration counterpart of the unemployment duration 
data and may be utilised in the same way to reveal the inflow into new jobs and the 
expected length of stay. It should be remarked, however, that the data refer to jobs 
and not t employment.15 To the extent that job changes can occur without leaving 
employment they understate the length of continuous employment experience. 
The data for 1975 are given for all persons in column 1 of Table 38.4.16 We could 
have chosen data from any of the other years for which they are available without 
any significant change in our conclusions. 
The average current job tenure at the end of 1975 was 6.3 years but most 
people had held their job for less than 5 years (63 per cent). only 20 per cent of 
those employed had been in their current job for more than 10 years. If we utilise 
the fact that on average the currently employed are sampled half way through 
their completed job tenure these data indicate an average completed job tenure 
of about 12 years – a statistic which at first sight is difficult to reconcile with the 
high employment turnover figures quoted earlier. The reconciliation lies in the 
changing probability of leaving the job as the job duration increases.
The probability of leaving a job of different current tenure can be derived 
from column 1 of Table 38.4. In a steady state the distribution of employment in 
column 1 implies the distribution of the probability of leaving a job of column 
2. It is evident from column 2 that the probability of leaving a job within the 
next twelve months declines the longer the person has been in that job.17 The 
probability that those employed in their current job for less than a year will leave 
 
 
15 A job is defined with respect to a particular employer and locality. Consequently, a change in job locality 
without a change in employer is regarded as a job change. Thus employees can change their job but 
remain with their employer so increasing the length of continuous employment with one employer 
beyond that indicated by the data.
16 These data disaggregated by age and sex are analysed in detail in W. Foster and R.G. Gregory [9].
17 There are a number of ways of estimating the relationship between job tenure and the probability of 
leaving a job and each will involve some approximation. our method is reported in Foster and Gregory 
[9]. Preliminary calculations suggest that the results of this method are likely to understate the rate at 
which people leave jobs of short tenure.
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that job within the next 12 months is estimated to be 0.58. For those in the 
job duration category of 20 years and over the probability of leaving within 12 
months is 0.10. 
Table 38.4:  Job tenure and the probability of leaving a job: All persons, 1975




leaving a job 
during the next 
year for a person 














Per cent Per cent Per cent Per cent
<1 year 23 .58 60 9
1-less than 5 years 40 .20 24 23
5-less than 10 years 17 .16 10 24
10-less than 20 years 12 .13 5 23
20 years + 8 .10 2 20
Source: ABS, Labour Mobility, February 1976(1), Cat. No. 6.43. Foster and Gregory [8].
Since the probability of leaving a job is not constant as the length of tenure 
changes, considerations similar to those discussed with respect to unemployment 
arise. For example, job spells of short tenure will be under represented in the 
sample of the currently employed, the expected completed job tenure will change 
as the length of tenure increases and there will be a difference between the average 
length of time in the current job and the completed job tenure. 
Column 3 of Table 38.4 presents the estimated job tenure for new jobs 
created during 1975. New jobs typically have a short life: 60 per cent of jobs 
begun in a year will terminate within 12 months.18 only 2 per cent of new jobs 
will last 20 years or more. 
Column 4 presents the distribution of the expected completed job tenure 
of those employed at the end of 1975. It takes account of the fact that all those 
currently employed can expect to remain in their job for a longer period. The 
 
18 It is likely that the population of new jobs that terminate within a year is even higher than this. See 
Foster and Gregory [9].
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long length of expected job tenure may come as a surprise. Twenty per cent of 
the currently employed can, on average, expect to remain in their current job for 
more than 20 years and 43 per cent for more than ten years. only 9 per cent of 
the currently employed will complete a job tenure of less than 12 months. 
The data in column 4 indicate that the currently employed can expect a 
period of very long tenure and the particular definition of a job that is used 
by the ABS suggests that employees may in fact stay longer with their current 
employer. Furthermore, since it is possible to change jobs without experiencing 
unemployment the average length of continuous employment without 
unemployment will be even longer. 
Table 38.5 is the job tenure counterpart to the distribution of unemployment 
duration in Table 38.2. It shows in column 1 the estimated completed tenure 
distribution of all those who began a new job in 1975, and in column 2 the 
proportion of completed employment years that will be associated with them. 
Table 38.5:  Expected completed tenure and years of further work associated   
with the existing work force and new jobs: 1975
Completed job 
tenure







Extra years of 
work for persons 
employed at Dec. 
1975
Per cent Per cent Percent
<1 year 60 9 9 0
1-less than 5 years 24 23 23 7
5-less than 10 years 10 27 24 19
10-less than 20 years 5 27 23 36
20 years + 2 15 20 38
Source: Foster and Gregory [8].
These data indicate that the typical new job length is very short. During 
1975 it was 3.2 years – a number which is larger than that calculated from 
labour turnover data. They also indicate that most work will be done by those 
employed in new jobs that will be of long duration. Thus, at one extreme of the 
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distributions, 60 per cent of the new job starts will account for 9 per cent of the 
employment years worked and, at the other extreme, 2 per cent of the new jobs 
created will account for 15 per cent of the work years. In columns 3 and 4 we 
show comparable data for the currently employed. Here a similar phenomenon 
arises. The 32 per cent of the currently employed who will terminate their job 
within five years account for only 7 per cent of the work to be delivered by 
the current work force. Seventy-four per cent of the extra years of work to be 
delivered by the existing work force will come from those who will complete 
more than ten years of tenure. 
These results suggest, where hiring costs are substantial and firm specific 
human capital is important, that firms will have a strong interest in their present 
work force relative to those newly hired. The existing work force will deliver in 
the future twice as many years work per worker as an average new hire. It will pay 
the firm to attempt to hoard its existing labour force during economic downturns 
and to develop employment contract terms and conditions that keep the existing 
employment stock intact. 
The overlap between job tenure and unemployment
There is one more building block to construct.19 Is it possible to relate job tenure 
to the probability of experiencing unemployment? If upon leaving a job the 
probability of experiencing unemployment were independent of job tenure then 
the results of the previous section would suggest that those with long tenure are 
unlikely to become unemployed because they are unlikely to leave their job. 
Table 38.6 presents data that can be used to throw some light on the 
relationship between job tenure and unemployment. During May 1976, twenty-
three per cent of the unemployed had not been employed in a full time job in the 
previous 18 months. of those that had been employed the completed duration of 
their last job was typically very short. Forty-nine per cent of this group had held 
 
19 0f course, if the building is to be grander we need more building blocks. one in particular would be very 
useful. Recent work in the USA, see Clark and Summers [4] and some of our earlier work, see Foster 
and Gregory [10] suggests that a considerable amount of unemployment ends not in finding a job but in 
leaving the labour force as defined by the ABS. We need data as to job finding success as unemployment 
duration lengthens rather than the data we have analysed here which refer to the rate at which people 
leave unemployment as unemployment duration lengthens.
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their last job for less than 26 weeks and sixty-five per cent had held their last job 
for less than 12 months. 
At any point of time, therefore, the unemployed come overwhelmingly from 
those who have not held a job or whose previous job was of very short duration. 
In the third column of Table 38.6 we have divided the number unemployed, 
classified by current job tenure by the number employed in each job tenure group. 
The approximate “unemployment rate” thus calculated diminished very quickly 
with job tenure, from 11 per cent for job tenures of less than 26 weeks to 0.78 per 
cent for job tenures greater than 5 years. Those with long tenure therefore face a 
very low probability of becoming unemployed. 
Table 38.6:  Completed duration of last job of the unemployed:  
All persons, May 1976
Completed job duration Duration Unemployment rate
Per cent Per cent
< 26 weeks 49 11
26-less than 52 weeks 16 5
1-less than 2 tears 13 3
2-less than 5 years 14 1
5 years + 8
Note: The Table includes those persons unemployed at May 1976 who finished working in their last job 
in 1975 or 1976. 
Source: ABS, Persons Looking for Work, Cat. No. 6.60.
Implications for the Phillips curve
The above description of the labour market stresses that the employment and 
unemployment experiences are very different for different groups of individuals. 
With respect to the unemployed it was argued that as the level of 
unemployment increased and is now being maintained at a relatively high level, 
the nature of the unemployment pool has changed so that an increasing fraction 
of the pool consists of the long term unemployed. over the period 1974 to 1981 
those unemployed for more than 9 months have increased their share of the 
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number unemployed, as measured by the ABS, from about 3 to 25 per cent. 
About 2 per cent of those who were in the labour force at some time during 1981 
account for about 50 per cent of all the weeks spent in unemployment. 
one outcome of the changing nature of the unemployment pool is that an 
increasing fraction of the unemployment pool is exerting very little influence on 
possible wage outcomes. on the demand side of the labour market the evidence 
suggests that the employability of the longer term unemployed is very low. In 
the employment stakes they certainly come a poor third behind the short term 
unemployed and those seeking employment from outside the labour force. In 
other words they do not serve as an effective reserve army. on the supply side of 
the labour market it is unlikely that the longer term unemployed are an important 
force acting upon the consciousness of the employed because (i) the long term 
unemployed represent such a small proportion of the labour force; (ii) the experience 
of the long term unemployed is atypical of all those who become unemployed; and 
(iii) those with current job tenures exceeding a few years have a low probability of 
becoming unemployed. Under these circumstances the employed are unlikely to 
have encountered those who have been unemployed for long spells. 
With respect to the employed a picture of remoteness from potential 
unemployment has been built up. Forty-three per cent of the currently employed 
will remain in their current job for more than ten years. Long term job tenure buys 
advantages for both firms and employees. After an initial period, during which 
workers and the firm learn about each other and during which a high proportion 
of the newly employed leave, most of the remaining workers will stay with a firm 
a long time. By staying with the firm the risk of unemployment is reduced and the 
high probability of further costly job changes which are associated with beginning 
a new job is avoided. Furthermore after the initial learning period the worker 
may begin to reap the benefits of the specific skills that will have been acquired. 
For their part firms will want their workers to stay with them because of the high 
cost of hiring new workers. There is a very high probability that workers will leave 
during the initial phase of the job and the greater the degree of firm specific skills 
to be acquired the greater the cost imposed by this turnover. The interests of the 
existing work force and firms therefore mean that at any point of time the bulk 
of the employed are in the process of completing a job of long tenure. Even today 
when the average unemployment rate is about 6 per cent, the “unemployment 
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rate” for the 40 per cent of the labour force that has been employed in their current 
job for more than 5 years is less than 1 per cent. A stable rate of unemployment of 
about 6 per cent is not a serious threat to these people. 
These points can be put together to capture many of the important elements 
of the wage determination process and to throw some light on why real and 
nominal wage increases are loosely related, if at all, to excess demand and supply 
in the labour market. The existence of firm specific capital and the difficulties 
that workers experience in settling into a new job means that both labour and 
the firm have a stake in a stable, durable relationship. The long tenure that 
exists suggests that the firm and its work force will deal with each other on the 
assumption that there will be a long term relationship between them. The long 
term relationship and the efficiency gains that stem from this relationship will 
establish the preconditions for social customs and conventions to be important 
in the wage process. As Solow remarked in this context: 
“There is a difference between a long-term relationship and a one 
night stand, and acceptable behaviour in one context may be 
unacceptable in the other”. [30, p. 10].
It is not surprising that under a long term relationship money or real wages 
are not flexible to clear markets and that customs, fairness and equity exert such 
an important role in the determination of wage levels and relativities. Under 
these circumstances it has been suggested that firms and workers will establish 
implicit contract or what okun [25] has called invisible handshakes (see Hall 
[14], okun [25], Solow [30], Hicks [17]). The implicit contracts that evolve 
become an understanding between the parties which, it has been argued by these 
authors, is to explain the following observed behaviour. over the long term the 
firm will deliver a reasonable rate of growth of real wages and share the wealth 
that is generated. They will not reduce real wages during recessions or threaten 
tenured employees by hiring new workers during economic slumps under 
conditions which are less advantageous than those currently enjoyed. Bonnell [3], 
for example, has recently documented that real wages generally increased in the 
great depression of the thirties in the UK, USA, Sweden and Germany. The firm 
will attempt to hoard labour during the slump and as far as possible allow profits 
to absorb as much of the short run economic fluctuations, see okun [25]. This 
behaviour generates the familiar pro-cyclical variation of labour productivity. For 
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their part workers agree to moderate real wage demands during the profit slump 
and to allow their work effort to vary in the short run in a way that helps the firm. 
An analysis of the variability of average hours worked and labour productivity 
over the cycle suggests that most adjustments of labour input occur on the job 
rather than between employment and unemployment. See Hall [14]. 
As a result of these understandings there will not be a close relationship 
between the real wage and the value of the marginal product of labour in the 
short run.20 Workers and firms build up a notion, based on past experience, 
as to what a reasonable rate of real wage increases should be in the medium 
and longer term and money wage increases are the mechanism to bring the real 
wage increases about. When there is a sudden fall in aggregate demand and a 
decline in firm profitability, the employed workers forego their real wage increases 
because the ability of the firm to pay real wage increases has been impaired. As 
a result, nominal wage increases are seen to be moderated at the same time as 
unemployment increases in response to the fall in aggregate demand. Hence, 
there appears to be a short run Phillips curve relationship and the rate of increase 
of real wages is reduced. But the change in the unemployment rate does not itself 
lead to the reduced rate of growth of real and money wages. The association is not 
causal. It is the profitability of the firm that matters. 
If the labour market recession is a long one, as has been the case since 1974-
75, firms are gradually able to re-establish their profitability by the continuation 
of productivity growth during the recession and by the adjustment of the capital 
stock that comes about by the reduction of investment during the slump. As a 
result of the restored profitability the elements of the implicit contract that relate 
to the understanding that real wages will increase when profits increase come 
back into play. Real and money wages begin to increase although unemployment 
is much greater than before. Some empirical support for this view was given in 
Figures 38.1 and 38.2 and is also discussed in Scherer [28]. 
20 These remarks are not to be interpreted as stating that market forces have no influence. If social customs 
and implicit contracts get too far out of line with the market for too long they will begin to break down. 
Throughout the text the term implicit contract has been used in a wider context than the class of models 
which have developed from M.N. Bailey [2].
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From this view of the wage determination process a number of important 
conjectures may be made as to the current stance of macro economic policy. 
First, short sharp shocks to aggregate demand will increase unemployment 
and moderate money and real wage increases. But it is not the unemployment per 
se that leads to the reduced rate of wage increases. Both are primarily the result 
of the reduced profitability of firms which invokes the implicit understanding 
between workers and firms that real wage increases will be moderated when firm 
profitability is low. 
Second, long drawn out periods of unemployment and low real economic 
growth are not very effective anti inflation weapons. In the longer run the 
correlation between firm profitability and unemployment begins to breakdown. 
As unemployment is maintained through the years, less and less is gained in 
terms of lower wage claims (see Figure 38.1 and Figure 38.2). As soon as firm 
profitability is restored the real and money wage increases begin again. 
The result is that a great danger stemming from long periods of sluggish 
output growth and high unemployment is a ratchet effect upon the unemployment 
pool. The number of long term unemployed and their expected period of 
completed unemployment duration increases. This analysis suggests that with 
respect to moderating nominal wage increases the crucial period is the beginning 
of the recession. It is during this time that the largest possible range of policy 
instruments should be brought to bear on nominal price increases. As the period 
of slack in the labour market lengthens the effect of excess supply on wage and 
price increases is reduced. 
Third, it seems inevitable that a solution to the current crisis of low 
economic growth and high inflation must involve a change of attitude on the 
part of firms and the currently employed. The major thrust of the analysis of the 
labour market developed above suggests that the pursuit of low economic growth 
and the creation of large scale unemployment will not be sufficient to change 
these attitudes.21 The economic position of most of the employed work force is 
21 The world is more complex than that. To underline this point Solow explains why individual employers 
do not want to cut wages during recession “if employers know that aggressive wage cutting in a buyers 
market may antagonise the remaining work force. and make it harder to recruit high quality workers 
when the labour market tightens. they will be less inclined to push their short run advantage” [30, p. 8].
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not seriously undermined by high and stable unemployment Consequently it is 
not useful to think of price and output effects of macro economic policy as the 
outcome of a two person game between a monolithic wage setting union and a 
central bank. The key players are the firms and their workers, most of the members 
of which have long job tenure. Therefore, despite the difficulties associated with 
income and wages policies of various sorts, perhaps we have to go down that road 
even if we are not optimistic as to the outcome. Income and wages policies cannot 
substitute for managing aggregate demand but given the insensitivity of nominal 
wages to high unemployment in the longer term it is likely that they must be a 
part of good economic policy. The more than can be done to affect the attitudes 
that are built into implicit contracts the better. 
Fourth, there is probably a special need for policies that reallocate jobs 
towards the long term unemployed. Given that the long term unemployed are 
to be with us for quite some time, that their numbers are swelling and, if as 
I have argued above, they do not contribute significantly to the reduction of 
inflation or to the moderation of real wage increases there is a case for policies 
that do nothing more than reallocate job opportunities towards this group. As the 
level of unemployment and the expected length of unemployment increases, the 
welfare objectives of manpower policies should increasingly come to dominate 
the efficiency objectives. 
Further, it might be argued that policies which widen the incidence of 
unemployment by reducing its duration may even contribute to the ability of 
macro policy to impinge on wage settlements. We have manpower policies that 
discriminate in favour of long term unemployed youth. Perhaps they should be 
extended to encompass adults.22 
22 These programmes primarily reallocate jobs. There are two important facts which should be known. 
Who gets a job as a result of the programme (the target group) and who loses a job as a result of 
the programme. It needs to be shown that those who lose a job. in turn, do not join the long term 
unemployed.
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Concluding remarks
The performance of the Australian economy since 1974 has been the worst for 
thirty-five years. The fall in the growth rate has been considerable. Between 1966-
67 and 1973-74 the growth of real GNP averaged 5.4 per cent. Between 1974-75 
and 1980 81 the average rate has been 2.2 per cent. No-one appears to believe 
that the restoration of a fast rate of economic growth is likely in the near future. 
The negative effects of this slow growth have been large. I have focussed 
upon the increase in unemployment but I could also have drawn attention to 
the very large numbers of people now receiving sickness, invalid and service and 
widows pensions which in many respects act as a substitute for unemployment 
benefits. (See Stricker and Sheehan [29].) To date, on the positive side, the slow 
economic growth has brought us only a temporary respite from inflation. Since 
1978 the inflation rate has begun to steadily increase and the forecasts are for no 
significant improvement. 
In this lecture I have attempted to explain why the employed will not 
be aware of the seriousness of the unemployment problem and why restrictive 
policies, leading to low economic growth and unemployment, can only be 
expected to have a major effect on the wage bargaining process in the short run. 
In the longer run the effectiveness of restrictive policies is reduced as ‘normal’ 
behaviour is re-established on the part of both firms and the employed. 
In sketching out the behaviour of the labour market with respect to job 
tenure and unemployment duration I have not had the time to tie down all the 
loose ends. only a start has been made on the integration of the labour market 
flows material with the inflation process, good economic policy and the generation 
of attitudes towards wage increases in our society. The theory of implicit labour 
contracts is also not well developed nor is its empirical relevance fully established. 
Nevertheless, it seems clear that the history of the seventies indicates that a steady 
level of excess supply in the labour market will not lead to a substantial reduction 
in the rate of increase of money and real wages. Nor does it appear that the 
creation of excess supply by government policy is the obvious way back to a fully 
employed economy with a low rate of inflation within a measurable time scale. 
There is a need for a better economic policy. 
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We must not abandon the objective of full employment even though there 
will be a strong temptation to do so. That temptation stems from the difficulties 
inherent in the achievement of full employment and low inflation, the natural 
unwillingness to face the failure of current macro policies, and from the fact 
that most of us, being employed, belong to the group that can expect long job 
tenure. We are insulated from the worst effects of low output growth. Under 
these circumstances it is all too easy for most of us to shrug off the consequences 
of attempting to fight inflation by the application of restrictive policies alone.
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I am grateful to be invited to your country a second time – forty years after my 
first invitation was withdrawn. That earlier invitation was from the US Navy, in 
which I was a language officer with the exalted rank of Lieutenant Junior Grade 
and an urgent invitation to report to beautiful Brisbane. But before I left the 
US, the Navy withdrew that invitation and invited me somewhere else instead. 
Perhaps they noted that my linguistic qualifications did not extend to “Strine”. 
In preparation for this present visit, I read the new Brookings Institution 
study of the Australian economy and became an instant expert. That volume left 
me certain, that I would find Australia suffering, consciously or otherwise, from 
a serious brain drain of many sorts of talent. As has been said of many American 
States, “Many good men come from there, and the better they are, the faster 
they come”. But I have now been here for ten full days, and the people who 
stayed in Australia – and some who have come here from abroad – have been 
assuring me that they are every bit as good as those who have left! Perhaps your 
way of life – including your climate and the Adelaide drinking-water supply – 
outweighs the aggressiveness of your tax system, the inefficiency subsidised by 
your protectionism, and the power of your trade-union movement. And so I 
am quite confused, Mr. Chairman – the usual plight of the “airport economist” 
who remains as long as I have – and had best revert to the topic of my remarks 
this afternoon. 
As the subject of these remarks, I hesitated between “Japan faces Affluence” 
and “Japan and the Affluence Disease”. The question is this: Can Japan, in its rise 
to the position of first-class economic power, manage to avoid certain difficulties 
 
1 Thirty-ninth Joseph Fisher Lecture, 14 March 1985.
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which have plagued other world economic powers like Britain and America – and 
perhaps Australia as well? 
I want to begin by describing the symptoms of what used to be called “the 
English disease” or “the Anglo-American disease” and which I propose to call 
“the affluence disease”. (Syphilis, you may know, was earlier called “the Spanish 
disease” and “the French disease”.) I wish I might have created a title which 
combined stagnation-near-aspiration level disease” with “more-to-lose-than-to-
gain-by-change disease”, but it is less pedantic and more manageable than either. 
(The trouble with “affluence disease” is that far-from affluent medieval guildsmen 
and contemporary Welsh and Scottish coal miners have suffered it as acutely as 
anyone else.) I hope nobody uses “Bronfenbrenner’s disease” as the title for the 
ailment I have in mind. 
one of the great books of development economics in the early 1960s was 
Walt Whitman Rostow’s Stages of Economic Growth. of this volume little remains 
a generation later beyond the catch-phrase “take-off into self-sustained growth”, 
but I want to talk about the other (later) end of the development process according 
to Rostow. Antiquarians among you will recall that “take-off” was followed by a 
rather mechanical “drive to maturity.” once “mature”, however, Rostow’s country 
came to a tri-furcation in the development highway; the choice among the three 
forks was presented as a matter of free political will rather than Marxian-type 
determinism. one fork was military expansion à la Third Reich or Greater East 
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. A second fork was the population explosion along the 
lines of all too many Latin American countries of today.2 Rostow’s third and last 
fork is “high mass consumption”, which seems to be his economic equivalent for 
“living happily ever after” and the choice all developing countries should make. 
our disease, whatever we call it – let us be content with “affluence disease” 
– is a set of conditions which leads many “high mass consumption” societies to a 
fate more like arthritis or arteriosclerosis than “living happily ever after”. 
2 The problem is not the level of such countries’ population, but its rate of growth. As a non demographer, 
I incline to accept the proposition that the world may eventually be able to support at present levels 
two or three times its present population. At the same time, I fear that “eventually” is further off than 
the optimists suppose. And meanwhile, the most pressing problem is one of growth rates rather than 
absolute numbers (as I have said).
Martin Bronfenbrenner
 279
The set of conditions comprising the “affluence disease” I classify 
unsatisfactorily under six overlapping heads. These are, in a language which I 
hope will become clearer as we proceed: (1) restrictions in general; (2) credentials 
in particular; (3) entitlements; (4) underclasses; (5) attenuations of property 
rights; and finally (6) retaliations from abroad. A couple of examples may explain 
the terms, their inter-relations, and some distinctions between them. 
Illustration 1: Physicians in Japan, as in many other countries, claim to be 
facing a “doctor glut”, meaning that the present real prices of doctors’ services 
will increasingly exceed market-clearing levels. To become a medical practitioner 
in Japan, the aspirant must both graduate from a Medical University and pass a 
national examination. A panel of physicians has recently recommended to the 
Welfare Ministry not merely that the examinations be made more difficult but 
that only the top n candidates pass each year, regardless of high scores obtained 
by others. This entire system of professional licensure I consider credentialist. The 
addition of the numerus clausus, which now seems likely, I consider restrictionism 
pure and simple. 
Illustration 2: American textile manufacturers may not lease machines 
for installation in workers’ homes for piecework. This is because factory work 
rules and safety regulations may be violated, minimum wage laws evaded, and 
“unqualified persons” permitted to operate the machines. I should classify this 
prohibition, good thing or bad thing, as an attenuation of property rights in 
machinery, although the oppression of an underclass – housewives and hirees 
excluded from part-time home work – can be read between the lines, and although 
the concept of “unqualified worker” suggests credentialism. 
Restriction and restrictionism are portmanteau words, including “practices 
not elsewhere classified”. I need not tell this audience that real income and real 
growth are measured as nearly as possible in physical quantities, so that reduction 
of physical output in order to raise or maintain money prices is injurious to 
economic progress however profitable or even “necessary” it may seem to the 
restrictionists themselves. Nor need I add that the fixing of a price too high to 
clear a market, with production or sales quotas fixed to avoid any visible surplus, is 
equally restrictive – just as contraception may have the same demographic effects 
as abortion. But it is hard to convince even the most intelligent of audiences that 
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if they and their organisations are “good guys”, their “raising of standards” and 
policing of “price chisellers” can be just as restrictive as similar activities of “bad 
guys” and just as decelerative of economic growth. 
Let there be no mistake about this. Trade associations, farm organisations, 
labour unions, and professional bodies all can be (and usually are) agencies of 
restriction, along with their other activities. Public ownership makes no difference 
either; consider oPEC with its “socialist” members. My own profession (academia) 
is no exception either. our “academic freedom and tenure” rules are restrictions, 
at least in their American form which includes an “up-or-out” provision designed 
to prevent accumulation of untenured full time instructors and lecturers at 
the bottom of the pyramid. During my Graduate School days in the “hungry 
thirties”, a labour economist from one of our best-known universities proposed to 
alleviate unemployment among older academicians by suspending all fellowships 
and assistantships for youngsters like myself! 
Except perhaps in my examples, I have told you little that is new. What 
may be less hackneyed is its relation to the basic question of why even high-mass-
consumption nations decline. on this topic, I owe a debt to Professor Mancur 
olson, whose Rise and Decline of Nations has received much less attention than I 
think it deserves. Please pardon me for paraphrasing, compressing, and perhaps 
even distorting his argument. 
olson’s starting point, developed in earlier work on The Logic of Collective 
Action, is that to establish and maintain an effective restrictionist (or credentialist) 
pressure group is not easy. (Labour historians among you can bear this out from 
the history of the trade union movement in your own country.) one important 
obstacle is the “free rider” who seeks to share the advantages of restriction without 
joining the organisation, paying dues, going on strike and in general avoiding 
the costs and opprobria of the restrictive effort. Britain and Mexico, for example, 
may be classified as oPEC “freeriders”. Another obstacle is the “chiseller”, the 
ostensible member of the cartel who shades prices down or output up, as Nigeria 
and Iran have apparently been doing within oPEC. The historical record indicates 
that, despite these obstacles, restrictionism can be established over long periods in 
economies which are relatively stable and fundamentally placid while operating 
at levels close to the membership’s aspiration levels of prices and incomes. once 
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a union or a set of unions fastens closed-shop or union-shop tentacles upon an 
industry, this octopus position can be maintained for however long the members’ 
wages and incomes are good – when compared with what they were last year, with 
what similar workers are making in other industries, with what similar unions 
achieve abroad, and so on in so-called “compulsive comparisons”. 
But let the fundamental stability or placidity be shattered, as by a lost war 
and/ or a foreign occupation, and “things fall apart”. Most or all of the organising 
activity must be done over again, often under a new set of “rules of the game”. 
With nearly all of the country’s pressure groups weakened and some fatally 
wounded, the competitive market is free to operate, and the economy enjoys a 
period of “miracle” growth as compared with other economies which, whether 
they have won the war or remained neutral, return to or remain at something like 
the status quo, restrictive pressure groups included. Such is the olson explanation 
of both the West German and the Japanese cases in the post-1945 –  and to a 
lesser extent of the “British”, “American” and “Australian” diseases as well. In 
Schumpeterian terms, what we have called the shackling of the pressure groups 
appears as the unleashing of the entrepreneur. (There is no conflict, so far as I can 
see, between Schumpeter and olson on these points.) 
Miracles, however, seldom last very long. Japan, in particular, was officially 
concerned with something undefined but called “excessive competition”, as early 
as 1960, and was providing special treatment for “recession cartels”. The pressure 
groups reorganise, or perhaps emerge in new forms. In Japan again, the pre-war 
zaibatsu is dead but long live the keiretsu – which is much the same thing with 
one or more giant banks replacing the old ruling-family and holding-company 
structure. And sometimes more pressure groups are added to the new witches’ 
brew. In Japan once more, the union of farmers’ co-operatives called Nokyo, whose 
political clout closes the market to both American and Australian grain and beef, 
was of no pre-war importance. once the pressure groups recover their strength, 
in the olsen view, restrictionism takes over and miracles fade. The country enters 
into a relative decline, either in a position of affluence (the Japanese case) or 
without ever attaining affluence (as in Italy). Not that this is not a business-cycle 
theory in the usual short-term or medium-term sense, where a recession carries 
within it some bases for recovery. It is rather a theory of long-term decline broken 
by occasional revivals. 
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So much for restrictions in trade in general. Credentialism is the special 
set of restrictions which prevents people directly from using their human capital 
most effectively. Here the academic community is a favourite accessory where 
it is not a major culprit. one cannot teach full-time at most US universities 
without a Ph.D. degree (or equivalent), although that level of scholarship can be 
and often is an impediment for elementary teaching.3 one cannot teach in an 
American public school system without a certain number of education courses of 
questionable value. (To extend Bernard Shaw’s epigram from Man and Superman: 
He who can, does; he who cannot, teaches; he who cannot teach, teaches how to 
teach.) Nor can Americans practice law without law degrees, which themselves 
have come to require university training – even when legal secretaries with no 
degree at all can and do perform all the routine tasks of the law office with only 
the pretence of supervision. And these remarks about the schools and the law 
apply likewise to medicine, engineering, accountancy: “And other professions in 
which men engage, The Army, the Navy, the Church and the Stage.”
But the allegedly-learned professions have no monopoly on credentialism. 
The apprenticeship rules of the skilled trades do equally well or badly without 
formal academic degrees. So far as I am aware from American experience, the 
building, printing, and entertainment trades are the worst offenders. on the 
one hand, none may perform the simpler tasks of a trade unless his ability to 
perform more complex ones has been certified by completion of formal training 
or apprenticeship, with trainees limited in numbers by one or another craft 
union. And on the other hand, the skills of the master craftsman are squandered 
in dismantling or replicating work done by outsiders – non-union men, members 
of other locals, or with the aid of unsanctioned machinery. 
I await the day when we may not touch up the paint on our houses without 
Art School certificates, and when our children may not annoy the neighbours 
by practice on musical instruments (or the human voice) without guarantees 
from a Conservatory of Music that their performances qualify for them for the 
 
3 I know much more English than my Japanese-born wife does. She began learning English seriously only 
after our marriage, and has had little formal university education of any kind. But in teaching English 
as a second language, the fact of her having learned it that way makes her much better than I am, or (I 




Musicians’ Union. But I rejoice that the railroad preceded the canal Boatman’s 
Union, the telephone the messenger boys’ union, the automobile the rickshaw 
pullers’ union. 
our next symptom is entitlement. In developed societies, and also in some 
less developed ones, a minimal living level is supposedly guaranteed by public 
authorities, both for those who cannot or will not work and for those who want 
more time to search out good jobs, without the necessity to accept whatever may 
be offered. I know of no proposals to scrap these “safety nets”, although proposals 
to privatise or localise them may come close. Four substantial problems are: how 
high the support level should be; how long one should be protected from forced 
acceptance of low-paid, low-status, dead-end jobs; what forms subvention should 
take – money income, cheap food, cheap housing, or the Roman “circuses”; and 
finally, what obligations the recipient must accept – conscript labour, subsequent 
repayment, confinement, disenfranchisement, even sterilisation have been 
proposed. 
I must confess no personal experience of anything approaching real poverty. 
It therefore seems hard-hearted, to me as well as to you, when I call your attention 
to the dangers inherent in entitlements becoming too generous even for countries 
as advanced as yours or mine. The danger is not that the price of “dirty work”, 
is raised, or that some “superior” people like ourselves are underemployed when 
forced to do it. The danger is the tendency of the definition of “dirty work” to 
expand over time to include an increasing proportion of the humble, low-skill, 
but essential (and difficult to robotise) jobs that need doing if the society is to keep 
running. The eventual amount of such work can itself fall below an acceptable 
social minimum. The garbage and rubbish accumulate; the sewers overflow; the 
inmates of prisons and hospitals are uncared for; the army, navy and police are 
“all officers and no privates”; nothing is serviced or repaired efficiently. Already 
no “real American” will accept “stoop labour” on farms or personal service jobs 
in households – our famous “servant problem”. Also, the enlisted ranks of the 
American military, particularly the US Army, are turning black. 
Meanwhile, it may be objected, the dirty work does get done, and sometimes 
even at “reasonable” economic prices. But who does it, if “real Americans” do 
not? Members of one or another under-class, whose presence raises the social 
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cost of getting that work done at the same time that it lowers the private cost. 
In American colloquial one finds the revealing phrase “nigger jobs” applied to 
what I have called dirty work. Indeed blacks do occupy such positions and do 
such work – along with Puerto Ricans, immigrants legal and illegal from other 
Latin-American countries, and various persons whose common denominators are 
poor English or low I.Q. Who does not do them? Real Americans, meaning white 
Anglo-Saxon Protestants, sometimes call WASPs, take increasing pride in their 
immunity. In Britain, the Indian sub-continent and the West Indies now supply 
the dirty workers, having replaced the Irish; in France, Africa, both Arab and 
black, supplies them; in much of western Europe, the “guest workers” came from 
Turkey, the Balkans and the Iberian Peninsula. 
In all these “underclass” cases, there is resentment. Less resentment, I 
suppose, when the “greenhorns” like my parents and their children like myself 
can do better merely by learning a majority language like English, French, or 
German. More resentment, I am sure, when linguistic disability is not the basic 
problem. The social cost of fostering and depending on an underclass, and of 
controlling its resentments, is greatest when, as in South Africa, the underclass 
comprises the majority of the whole society. It is high enough in America, where 
several underclasses now add, or soon will add, to a full third of the population. 
(The estimate depends on one’s guesstimate of the stock of our illegal immigrants.) 
Also, to hear certain feminists talk, housewifery and motherhood include a 
number of the dirtiest jobs of all, making women the largest underclass segment 
of both the American and the Japanese labour force. 
There is another underclass too, not associated with dirty jobs or indeed 
with any regular employment whatever. These are largely age-segregated, barred 
(or enticed) from employment by high minimum wages, high school-leaving 
ages, high relief standards (the entitlement problem), and broad definitions of 
the terms “students” and “trainee”. Most are either “too young” or “too old”. 
Some are handicapped, as by injury, by illness physical or mental, by some form 
of addiction, or by a criminal record. Some are beggars, some are “layabouts”, 
some are tramps, hoboes, and bums, and a minority are active criminals. All are 
alienated from society and “the system”. During my stay in Britain, some sought 
to organise a Conference Against Youth Unemployment (CAYU) which called 
itself a second or alternate trade union movement. But they stopped short of 
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opposing the restrictionism of the “first” trade union movement (and splitting the 
working class). I believe their movement has petered out into mindless terrorism. 
our fifth major symptom of affluence disease is a continuous attenuation 
of people’s rights as property owners, meaning primarily their rights to retain and 
to enlarge the income streams they can obtain from the physical assets which they 
own. The attenuation process has been called “socialisation of the flow” by Dr. 
Shigeto Tsuru – who favours its acceleration. The label is apt, since he wants the 
income flow generated from these assets to go to others than the owners, who still 
retain what lawyers call “bare legal title” to these assets – plus, I presume, some 
obligation to maintain those assets in trust for society. 
The main points under the “attenuation” head were pointed out most 
effectively in Joseph Schumpeter’s Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. They 
have included progressive taxation, price controls under a broadened “public 
utility” concept, co-management by union representatives, and competition with 
subsidised governmental agencies. I shall not dwell on these; we all know about 
them; many of us have made up our minds in particular instances how far we 
support or oppose them. (I am afraid that some of us favour each and every 
instance that comes up, while opposing the process “by and large and on the 
whole”.) 
The subset of attenuations which concerns me particularly in 1985 are 
connected with rights to shift resources from one business to another, from one 
locality to another, from employment of one input (usually labour) to another 
(usually machinery), or to discontinue a business operation altogether. At their 
worst, these extensions hold enterprises and their assets for ransom to a given line 
of business, a given country or town, and of course a given set of trade unions. The 
stakes transcend the quantitative issues of severence pay by a footloose company 
to a work force it leaves stranded in a community it deserts. They encompass 
the qualitative issues of whether the firm has any right whatever to move, or 
whether the workers have the right to occupy the plant to keep it doing what 
it does, where it does it, and with the same labour force. An Englishman will in 
this connection think immediately of Mr. Arthur Scargill and the Coal Board – 
already a socialised agency whose economic losses taxpayers have unconsciously 
undertaken to subsidise “from here to eternity”. As an American, I think rather 
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of the defence, by the President of the US Steel Corporation, of that company’s 
decision to buy an oil company in ohio rather than renovating steel plants in 
Western Pennsylvania: is US Steel in business to make steel or to make money? 
Among Western economies West Germany, Israel, and the Scandinavian 
countries have travelled furthest along the attenuation highway. German 
Mitbestimmung in its more extreme forms gives to labour, meaning elected 
union representatives, veto power over enterprise decisions in general. Sweden’s 
Meidner Plan of Entrepreneurial hara-kiri provides for a percentage of each year’s 
profits to be transferred to unions and public representatives – not to individual 
workers! – to buy shares of profitable concerns, thus bringing about socialisation 
by the stock market! Meanwhile, if I may quote a Stockholm report of November 
1984 as reported by the London Financial Times:4
“The Swedish government launched a new scheme of compulsory 
corporate investment funds aimed at forcing companies to increase 
investment in employee training and research and development. 
Companies will have to transfer an amount equivalent to 10% of 
1985 profits into so-called “renewal funds”. The capital will be placed 
in non-interest bearing accounts at the Swedish central bank. 
The scheme will give Swedish trade unions an increased say in the 
allocation of companies’ financial resources, as the funds will only 
be released for R and D and training projects that have received the 
prior approval of the individual company’s work force.” (my emphasis) 
This means, if I read correctly between the lines, that labour-displacing R 
and D will not pass. Neither will the skilling of enough youngsters in skilled trades 
to threaten established differentials. The report goes on to claim that the Swedish 
companies think they got off easy, because they will get their unspent funds back 
after only five years at negative real interest rates (given Sweden’s inflationary 
economy). A certain cynicism compels me to add, although I know Sweden only 
as a tourist, the suspicion that this “eventual return” feature may not last long. 
4 Reprinted in Japan Times (Tokyo), 16 November 1984.
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Let me put the issue raised by this passage – the mundane macroeconomic 
issue, not the ethic or the politics – in elementary Keynesian terms. Here we are, 
modifying institutions in ways which lower the marginal efficiency of investment, 
at least the marginal efficiency of domestic investment “above ground”. (Marginal 
efficiency is a potential investor’s estimate of the annual post-tax net income 
over the lifetime of the investment, discounted back to the present time, as a 
percentage of the investment’s cost.) We are doing nothing to lower marginal 
propensities to save, to export capital by purchase of foreign assets, or to “invest” 
in tax “sheltering”. The Keynesian result, other things equal? Planned investment 
now equals planned saving at a lower income level and a higher measured 
unemployment rate than would prevail otherwise. 
More generally, I believe, following Schumpeter, that the attenuation of 
property rights tends to be overdone in affluent economies – not only in Sweden. 
It produces either Keynesian under-employment or what Schumpeter himself 
called “capitalism in an oxygen tent” of public deficit financing of make-work 
and make-profit projects of all kinds, decidedly including the military. 
our sixth and last symptom of affluence disease is the foreign resentment 
and retaliation the affluence attracts. Both the resentment and the retaliation 
are consequences of affluence, possibly inevitable ones, although the ethical 
responsibility of the affluent country is questionable and envy is not regarded as 
a virtue. 
In past ages, before the vogue of formal trade and immigration laws, 
retaliations took obvious forms like raiding, piracy, and invasion. (“The Assyrian 
came down like a wolf on the fold”; “From the fury of the Northmen, o Lord, 
deliver us!”.) Sometimes invasion was quick and complete, as with the First 
“Frankish” Crusade, the Mongol Tartars, or the Spanish Conquistadores. At 
other times, it seems to have begun with trading in harbour of frontier areas, 
spread to immigration and residence in the affluent country’s underclass, and 
expanded only later to the full-fledged seizure of power and loot. The original 
“barbarian invasions” of the Roman Empire followed some such pattern. So did 
that branch of the Viking raids which conquered Normandy and then, from 
Normandy, England. 
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But now we have immigration restrictions and international cartels, while 
the volume and variety of protective devices in international trade and capital 
movements increase without visible bound. The affluent countries may be hobbled 
for decades by arbitrary increases in the prices of their basic imports, as oPEC has 
shown the Western world and Japan since 1973. An interesting feature of the two 
oil crises has been the attitude of the non-affluent oil-importing LDCs. Many 
of them suffered more, proportionately speaking, than any industrial country 
did. In 1973-74 I expected them to make common cause with the West against 
oPEC, shattering the LDC “united front” in such United Nations agencies as 
UNCTAD. Instead they made common cause with oPEC, and the “North-
South” controversy has increased in intensity. 
one could explain such irrationality at first by these countries’ hopes of 
achieving for coffee or cocoa or copper the same advantages oPEC was achieving 
for crude oil. But after these hopes faded for a variety of reasons, the continuing 
non-oil LDC attitude could hardly be explained without reference to satisfaction at 
the discomfiture of the so-called First World. Such pervasive resentment, coupled 
with ability to express it in some meaningful way, illustrate the international 
aspect of the affluence disease. 
In addition, a country can only import if it can export, attract foreign aid, 
or attract foreign capital. An import-dependent affluent country can be unhinged 
as readily by discrimination against its exports as by raising the prices it pays for 
imports. As we shall see, this may become the major problem for Japan. 
Beyond these legitimate concerns is a popular view, supported by much 
journalistic economics, that a country can decline from a position of opulence 
by reason of nothing more than foreign competition (and foreign imitation) 
under an essentially free-trade regime. But this is almost, although not quite, 100 
per cent wrong. The so-called “British climacteric” of 1870-1914 is a supposed 
example. But is actually meant only that Britain’s new rivals, primarily Germany 
and the US, grew more rapidly than Britain and surpassed Britain’s own affluence. 
It did not make Edwardian Britain a poor country in any sense. Britain’s absolute 
decline, insofar as it has been more than relative, can be traced to the human-
capital and foreign-asset losses of two World Wars plus the “English disease”. 
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What can competition-plus-emulation do to an affluent country? As we 
have said, they can lower its relative ranking. They can also wipe out whatever 
gain it has achieved from a position of monopoly in the sales of its exports or 
monopsony in the demand of its imports, either worldwide or within some 
trading bloc. (Free trade in petroleum, for example, would end whatever affluence 
countries like Kuwait and Abu Dhabi may have achieved). There may also be 
entire broad classes of factor incomes, for example even wages, which free trade 
can lower: suppliers of such inputs can lose as the result of competition, although 
the remainder of society gains. Thus there is not doubt that maintenance of the 
present American real wage level in manufacturing requires protection – but not 
the real per capita income of the US population. 
Before passing from general principles to the Japanese case, perhaps I 
should digress sufficiently to assure some of you that Japan really is an affluent 
society, although probably not the “welfare superpower” that Professor Yatsuhiro 
Nakagawa once called it. It is far from the unhappy collection of “workaholics in 
rabbit-hutches” that oECD critics of 1979 vintage claim to have observed. 
The casual visitor to Japan is usually confined to a couple of touristic 
enclaves and the transport arteries that connect them. The largest enclave is the 
Ginza and Shinjuku districts of Tokyo, with tentacles extending to Mt. Fuji, the 
Izu peninsula, and the ski country around Nikko. Another enclave is the temples 
of Kyoto, with one tentacle extending to Nara and another through Kobe or 
the Inland Sea to the Peace Park in Hiroshima. The first venture outside these 
glittering enclaves can be a shock. The venturesome tourist often sees urban Japan 
as one vast slum, or semi-slum at best, broken by occasional specks and streaks of 
something better. It is easy to make this mistake about “household Japan”, but I 
shall try to convince you that it reflects the peculiarities of the country’s price and 
tax structure rather than its real income. 
Population density and mountainous geology have combined to make 
land scarce in Japan, and to raise its price and rental relative to the general price 
level. The profits from selling land are also taxed at high rates, which express the 
common resentment of the general populace against the passive land speculator. 
However, the pecuniary savings and psychic incomes which result from holding 
land out of use (or in economically-inferior uses) are not offset significantly by 
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real-property taxes. So land is held in small parcels; block after block of single-
family houses, mama-papa stores, parking-lots, even (alleged) farms. This raises 
still further the price of land transferred to more efficient uses – and also the tax 
penalties for transferring it there. 
Given the high price of land, the Japanese use less of it (relative to other 
things) than Australians or Americans of similar real incomes would do. And at 
the same time, they spend more for its use, either as rent or as mortgage payments, 
both absolutely and as proportions of their incomes. They also have less income 
(or assets) to spare for improving whatever real estate they own. (In economists’ 
language, the ordinary price elasticities of both the demand for raw land and 
the demand for improvements are low, but the cross elasticity of the demand for 
improvements with respect to the price of unimproved land is high). The result 
of all these elasticities and inelasticities is the aforementioned prairie of semi-
slums which shock and disappoint so many visitors to Japan. A shabby house on 
a postage-stamp lot any passer-by can see. What the passer-by often misses are 
the contents of the house, the occupant’s life-style, and the sizes of the occupant’s 
bank account and investment portfolio. 
We can now consider at long last our half-dozen symptoms of affluence 
disease in their Japanese environment, and attempt prognoses of their future 
“progress”. 
Restriction and restrictionism Japan certainly has, most substantially, in its 
agricultural sector and (to a decreasing extent, perhaps) in credit rationing by its 
financial sector. These are, however, offset by two freedoms which Japan’s rivals do 
not share. one of these is the weakness of its trade union – particularly its craft 
union – movement. The other is its low defense burden, most of the “Japanese” 
defense expenditures being paid by the US. 
For 20 years after 1945, I thought the second offset the more important. 
I accordingly believed both South Korea and Taiwan to be developmentally 
hopeless, because so high a percentage of each country’s prime-age human capital 
was absorbed in the country’s armed services and police forces. The record, I 
fear, has proved me wrong; it may be worth noting that in both these countries 
organized labor is even weaker than in Japan. I am compelled to believe, therefore, 
Martin Bronfenbrenner
 291
that Japan’s resistance to restrictionism, at least outside agriculture, is stronger on 
balance than the resistance of other affluent countries, and that Japan is unlikely to 
dissipate its advantages to the care and feeding of an organized-labor aristocracy. 
(I wish I could say the same for its organized-agriculture aristocracy). 
Some Japanologists of eminence will tell you that the peculiar Japanese 
“enterprise union” structure, and indeed the entire Japanese industrial-relations 
system, has almost mystical roots in Japanese feudalism, in the philosophy of 
Confucius as interpreted by Chu Hsi, and in the racial homogeneity of the 
Japanese people. All of this implies that Japanese advantages in the labor area 
cannot be exported to or imitated by other countries to any significant degree. 
Without venturing too far beyond my shallow depth in cultural 
anthropology, let me suggest that this view may be only a half truth. Japanese 
racial homogeneity seems to be a relatively recent matter, since the country’s 
proto-history and legend can be interpreted in terms of centuries of conflict 
(and intermarriage) between Ainu aborigines and rival waves of later invaders 
from Korea, China, Southeast Asia, and the East Indies. Much later, in the 
first generation of light-industry mechanization (1870-1905 approximately), 
the Japanese of the Meiji Era replicated the horrors of the European industrial 
revolution, being brought up short mainly by the scarcity of the labor skills 
needed to progress further. Later still, after the end of American supervision in 
1952, Japan experienced a wave of long private industry strikes. In these strikes 
Leftist-led unions sought to infuse something like German or Scandanavian co-
determination into the adolescent enterprise unions. These strikes failed; two 
famous ones were in the Mitsui coal mines and the Nissan automotives works. 
Similar strikes succeeded in other countries; in the form of slow-downs, they also 
succeeded in Japanese public enterprises like the National Railways and the Post 
office. I wonder how much of the “miraculous” growth of Japan’s private sector 
could ever have occurred had the Mitsui, Nissan, and other strikes come out 
the other way – and whether it might not have been duplicated in Europe and 
America, and their postwar strike waves ended as the Japanese strikes wave did. 
We pass on to entitlements. These are already a live issue in Japan, affecting 
both the youth and the elderly at both ends of the range of working ages. The 
problems are expected to get worse as time passes. As a university lecturer, I think 
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I encounter the entitlement psychology among my own students. Affluence has 
opened both senior high schools and universities to academically under-qualified 
and uninterested youth, who could not previously have afforded the tutoring and 
coaching required to squeeze them through demanding entrance examinations on 
the basis of brute memory without understanding. And as a reward for surviving 
“examination Hell”, they feel entitled to university degrees after four years of Ike-
nuki (or “breaking room”) – forgetting whatever they had learned in high school 
or crammed for examinations.5
Many students also talk as though their entitlement is for life. With “good” 
degrees, they are entitled to white-collar “salary-man” jobs in “good” companies. 
once employed, they are further entitled to ride up a corporate escalator as years 
pass, to positions of power and prestige. They need not work nearly so hard as 
their fathers and elder brothers worked, and they need not become “company 
men”. Some students even profess entitlement to public support at whatever 
artistic, creative, or meditative endeavor or non-endeavor they choose to pursue, 
without becoming salary-men or housewives at all! A question I cannot answer on 
my own, and about which I get varying answers from sociological investigators, is 
this: How serious is this “lifetime-entitlement” bluster and bravado in the newly-
affluent Japanese middle-class youth, and what are its chances of surviving in the 
world off campus? Perhaps we can get reliable answers to such questions before 
the end of the present decade. 
Entitlements for the aged to live without working, if they so desire, may 
be an even more substantial problem. Such people’s post-retirement “second 
jobs” not only pay much less than the jobs they held before retirement at 55 
or 60 or 65, but account for a considerable fraction of the routine, menial, and 
part-time work done in Japan – even at the purely physical level! If the old-age 
 
 
5 An alternative explanation of students’ academic lassitude stresses screening by companies over 
entitlements of students. For a respectable white-collar job, the new graduate must satisfy employers 
than he or she is not too dumb to learn the business, and simultaneously, that he or she is not likely to 
become any of the 57 varieties of trouble-maker (yakkaimono). one should particularly avoid seeming 
a potential political militant or psychiatric problem child. To satisfy the first requirement, the entrance 
examinations have been relied upon; to satisfy the second, one engages in a wide range of meaningful 
or meaningless collective activities – clubs, teams, etc. Assiduous devotion to one’s studies, on the other 
hand, is a danger signal, especially in an isolate or “loner”, as in Julius Caesar’s comment on Cassius: “ 
He thinks too much; such men are dangerous”.
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pension entitlements increase sufficiently, thanks to the voting power of the aged, 
the consequences will be some choice between and among higher taxes, higher 
interest rates, accelerated inflation, and reduction of public services other than 
pensions – along with reductions in both human capital input and final product 
output. It lies within the prospect of belief that technology can again come to the 
rescue more rapidly than resource exhaustion and the welfare state sink society 
into the mire. The mid-1980s however, find the Japanese population aging faster 
than any other population I know about, and the Japanese public deficit already 
higher than the Finance Ministry and the Bank of Japan would wish, so that 
the mainstream factions of the ruling Liberal Democratic party are resisting the 
pension lobby even as the aging process accelerates. 
A way out of any future human-capital crisis arising from excessive 
entitlements would be the build-up of a substantial economic underclass of cheap 
immigrant labor. Western Europe did this in the first quarter-century after 1945. 
As we have said, Japan has no large economic underclass, and the great bulk 
of its dirty work is done by ethnic Japanese. Japan has thus been spared the 
social conflict and disruption such an underclass produces, not to mention the 
increased inequality in the distribution of wealth and income. 
Japan’s existing minority problem, small but noisy, is Korean. The Korean 
community in Japan is indeed a small underclass. Most Japanese “Koreans” were 
born in Japan of Korean parents, but Japanese birth does not confer Japanese 
citizenship, and many Japanese-born Koreans have no desire for such citizenship. 
Resident aliens in Japan are fingerprinted as special protection against the criminal 
proclivities of transient foreigners like myself; the Japanese-born Koreans are 
presently campaigning against this alleged infringement of their human rights. 
Another quasi-underclass, the burakumin, are ethnic Japanese whose ancestors 
engaged in activities considered unclean in Buddhist theology – butchering, 
leather-work, sandal-making, funerary trades, and so on. They are more numerous 
than the Koreans, especially in the Kansai area around Kyoto and osaka, but 
their economic assimilation is progressing better than that of the Koreans. 
Japan is now under humanistic pressure to create another potential 
underclass by admitting substantially more than the current trickle of Indochinese 
refugees. Japan is passively resisting on nationalist, not to say racist, grounds. 
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This resistance makes economic sense, however (taking Japanese nationalism and 
racism as givens), if one agrees that potentially long-term economic underclasses 
are undesirable things to foster or cultivate. 
our summary thus far makes it seems at least premature to diagnose Japan 
as suffering the early symptoms of affluence disease on the British or American 
model. But the problem of foreign reaction may reverse this tentative decision. 
Let us begin with some counterfactual economic history. Suppose that, in 
the period 1955-1970, Japanese exports had been barred as effectively from the 
North American market as they were in fact from the Western European one. 
The question is, just as we have seen it for the great strikes of the 1950s, could 
the Japanese miracle have occurred under these counterfactual conditions? And 
again my answer is no, because without easy access to the US market for Japanese 
exports, Japan could not have financed the raw materials and capital equipment 
imports needed for rapid growth, while simultaneously feeding a population 
which was then growing more rapidly than it now is. 
The broader implications of this negative conclusion still apply. The main 
threat to Japanese affluence still comes from abroad. To put the matter differently, 
the principal “disease” of Japanese affluence seems to be its capacity to stir up 
resentment and envy overseas, particularly in the other industrialized countries. 
And what of the “squeeze” from Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and the 
other NICs of the Third World? What will happen when and if the Chinese 
mainland “comes on line?” Is not Japan’s main overseas problem an Eastern and 
Southern rather than a Western one? I think not – unless the “affluence disease” 
of entitlement psychology eventually prevents the necessary adjustments to 
competition from low-wage countries. (These adjustments, I admit, will involve 
unwelcome shifts away from higher wages, shorter hours, and easier jobs in the 
interest of higher productivity. There may also be a declining labor share in the 
national income, and a rising non-accelerating-inflation-rate-of-unemployment, 
known in Britain as NAIRU). None of this is pleasant, but it is quite consistent 
with rising affluence for the remainder of the population and a firmer safety net 
for the unemployed and under employed. 
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And so I think foreign protectionism – in which I include raw material 
oPEC-ism – is the main direct threat to Japanese opulence. And if this is not 
enough, perhaps low-age LDC competition may trigger the latent “entitlement” 
symptoms of a purely domestic “affluence disease”. 
What can Japan do about this foreign threat, either in advance or as it 
materializes? Reactions thus far have taken three contradictory and I think 
effectual directions: liberalization, import-substitution, and the export of capital. 
Liberalization has been grudging, spotty, and slow here and there on the 
market. It has aimed at pacifying, or rather postponing, American protectionism 
at the rate of five minutes per concession. This runs counter to the specific interests 
injured by the concessions, and more importantly, to the national interest as seen 
by the Japanese man in the street, especially if the “street” is a rice paddy! Japanese 
are as instinctively xenophobic and mercantilistic as anyone else – possibly more 
so, echoing Tokugawa-era isolation, wartime experience of the consequences 
of dependence on foreign food supplies, and resentment of American postwar 
occupation and continuing military presence. In its minimal, attenuated, 
and frequently-sabotaged forms, recent Japanese liberalization measures have 
accomplished little to offset either foreign protectionism as a whole or American 
“Japan-bashing” as its most acute manifestation. 
The second Japanese reaction has been to insure the viability of key 
industries and whole economic sectors, even after the outside world does its 
worst, by import-substitution and high protection – quotas rather than tariffs. 
Such a policy may also involve an increase in Japan’s convertible-currency reserves 
for insurance purposes, but I am not sure either that this has been done or that 
such accumulation would be an optimal use of Japan’s international receipts. I do 
know that import-substitution and market-closing have proved excellent ways 
to lose friends, alienate people, and enhance foreign protectionism. At the same 
time, unfortunately, they have been good domestic policy for the government 
party, securing the so-called Liberal Democrats the crucial support of rural regions 
which are over-represented in the Japanese Diet.
The third Japanese expedient, and the most important in recent years, has 
been first the permission and then the encouragement of capital exports. These 
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balance payments, but not trade and not the current accounts.6 Capital exports are 
purchases of foreign assets, including “tariff factories” operating behind the back 
of local protectionists. They have sometimes been costly to domestic industry in 
Japan, since funds have gone abroad which the MITI of the 1950s would have 
directed into expansion and modernization of Japanese plant and equipment, 
the acceleration of Japanese productivity growth, and the maintenance of low 
Japanese interest rates. They might be used advantageously for the same purposes 
today. Furthermore, at least three factors have prevented the capital export from 
burnishing the Japanese image internationally. 
Insofar as the capital flows are speculative – in land, in bonds, in commodities, 
any employment effects outside Japan are too distant and too indirect to offset 
Japanese trade surpluses with their accompanying “exports of jobs”. 
When the capital flows do increase employment directly, it is often in the 
“wrong” places, the “wrong” industries, and under conditions which menace 
employment or working conditions elsewhere in the capital-importing country. 
Japanese automobile companies, in exporting capital to found American 
subsidiaries, have sought to avoid the United Auto workers’ strongholds in 
metropolitan Detroit, where unemployment is concentrated. And the Nissan 
plant in Britain was delayed by the fears or organized labor that its efficiency 
might displace more workers at older plants of other companies than Nissan 
would itself provide. 
Foreign purchases of domestic assets, land, and natural resources are 
almost sure to be resented. They may, for example, raise the price of farm land for 
ambitious rural youth. In Southeast Asia, and perhaps also in Australia, they result 
in ore shipments to Japan in raw or semi-processed states, for much less than its 
potential and undiscounted future value had it been processed fully in the host 
 
 
6 A country’s balance of trade includes only exports and imports of goods. It has the most direct bearing 
on employment. The country’s balance on current account adds the exports and imports of services like 
shipping and tourism, factor payments like interest and dividends, and international transfers like aid. 
The country’s balance of payments goes even further, to include the balance on private capital accounts. 
Here a capital export represents a demand for foreign assets and is a negative item, while foreign demand 
for domestic assets is a capital import and a positive item. In the Japanese-American bilateral case, Japan 
has a large trade surplus, a smaller current account surplus, and a large deficit on capital account.
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country. Truth to tell, the export of raw or semi processed resources is resented 
under almost any terms whatever. Since it obviously benefits the foreigner, it 
must hurt us. (This illustrates what has been called the zero-sum fallacy, one 
of the most important, and at the same time most intuitive and most popular, 
fallacies of pop economics). 
Before taking leave of Japan’s foreign economic relations, I want to ask 
a hypothetical question and give a pessimistic answer. Suppose that in some 
sequence of miracles, Japan’s Ministries of Agricultural and Forestry, Posts and 
Communications, and “notorious MITI” were to roll over and play dead, together 
with their networks of supporting lobbyists. Suppose that, as a result, Japanese 
markets were to become as free and open to American, European and Australian 
exports as even Senator Danforth could desire.7 My question is, would “Japan-
bashing” movements in American, Europe, and Australia be satisfied by such 
exemplary and possibly sacrificial Japanese behavior? 
The answer must, I am afraid, be a resounding No, since in fact the “fair 
trade” arguments and the calls for opening for the domestic Japanese market 
are largely smokescreen and red herrings. The reason can be stated simply. The 
disemployed auto workers in Detroit or steel workers in Cleveland have no 
desire to grow rice for export, to work for Nissan in Tennessee, or even to subject 
themselves in their own home towns to retraining in new skills or for multiple 
jobs. No matter what Japan does or does not do, it will remain much easier for 
them, and their political spokesmen, to campaign for more and more protection, 
wreck more Japanese cars on the streets and parking lots, and beat up more 
oriental looking people in neighbourhood bars. 
How to end a disjointed ramble of this kind? Well, Japan is not yet suffering 
seriously from the affluence disease. But neither has Japan yet manifested immunity 
to the purely domestic strains of this disease. Should I remain alive, active, and 
Japanological five or ten years hence, I might be able to offer you a better estimate of 
Japan’s resistance than I can today. But when it comes to the indirect, international 
strain of the affluence disease, five or ten years will not suffice. 
7 Senator John Danforth (Republican of Missouri) is the leading Congressional advocate of “reciprocity” 
in American commercial treaties, to replace the standard most favoured-nation clause”.
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Protectionism and cartelization are ordinary if not inevitable causes of 
shocks and “growth recessions” in the countries victimised. Japan remains 
particularly vulnerable to both foreign protectionism and foreign cartels, to 
both demand shocks and supply from abroad. Japan may continue to withstand 
with relative ease the next (m-1) such demand shocks and the next (m-1) supply 
shocks, only to fall victim to the nth or the mth. This is why there is no single 
number of years after which one can be positive that Japanese prosperity is (or is 
not) secure enough for the guard to be let down. All I can do is admit to being 
worried, especially on the demand or export side, about the reception permitted 
Japanese products. 
In present-day, mildly euphoric Japan, this makes me a pessimist and 
indeed I have been a pessimist on Japan for most of the last generation, and 
usually have been wrong. But having warned you of my fallibility, must admit 
to being back in my old pessimistic groove. And, again as usual, I must admit 








To be successful, economic ideas must satisfy two audiences. They must convince 
academic economists of their a priori theoretical reasonableness, and of their 
empirical content as well. They must also persuade those concerned with the 
formulation of economic policy of their relevance and usefulness. Since the 
latter group contains many individuals who have little or no academic training 
in economics, a successful economic idea must be simple and easily grasped by 
the intelligent layman. In the light of these formidable requirements, it is hardly 
surprising that successful economic ideas are few and far between. Moreover, to 
be successful is not necessarily to be correct. It is one thing to convince academic 
economists of the logical coherence of an idea, and of its explanatory power over 
past events, and to persuade policymakers of its usefulness; it is quite another to 
have policies based on it work out as expected. 
This lecture is concerned with one particular economic idea that was, 
beyond any shadow of a doubt, successful by the above mentioned criteria, but 
whose correctness has been opened up to question by recent experience with its 
policy application. The idea to which I refer is Milton Friedman’s proposition 
that the aggregate demand for money is a stable function of but a few arguments, 
and the policy application in question is the last ten years experience with those 
 
1  Fortieth Joseph Fisher Lecture, 16 July 1986. The first draft of this essay was prepared during a visit to 
the Stockholm School of Economics in the spring of 1986, the final version being written while visiting 
the Flinders University of South Australia prior to the Fisher Lecture. The author is grateful to Johan 
Myhrman and Staffan Viotti for helpful discussions of many of the issues dealt with, and to Milton 
Friedman, to Peter Jonson and Peter Howitt, for reading and commenting on earlier drafts.
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monetary policies more or less related to it.2 In this lecture, I shall set out the 
idea in question, ask how well it has held up in the face of sustained contact 
with reality, and draw some tentative conclusions about the future conduct of 
policy. I shall not attempt specifically to relate my argument to current Australian 
conditions. This audience is far better equipped than am I to do that. Rather I 
shall put it in general terms, though the listener and reader will readily discern 
the influence of the recent histories of Canada, Britain and the United States on 
my thinking.
II
The theoretical ingredients of Friedman’s propositions about the nature of the 
demand for money are to be found in his celebrated (1956) paper “The Quantity 
Theory of Money – a Restatement”. There he argues, first of all, that the aggregate 
economy can be modelled “as if ” made up of individuals, any one of whose 
behaviour may be treated as “representative” of the economy as a whole. Second, 
he argues that any such typical individual will desire to keep on hand a certain 
stock of money. Third, he argues that the size of this desired stock will depend 
upon just a few easily observed economic variables. Specifically, it will vary with: 
the individual’s income; the costs to him of holding assets in the form of money 
rather than other assets, which can be represented by the level of nominal interest 
rates; and in proportion to the general price level.3 Finally, and crucially, he argues 
that in the real world, the quantitive nature of the dependence of the demand for 
money upon these few variables is stable over time; that there are no other factors 
systematically affecting the demand for money; and that random variations in 
the demand for money are very small relative to those variations attributable to 
fluctuations in the above mentioned variables.
2 of course Friedman’s propositions about the demand for money from the basis from his case for a 
monetary policy “rule” as set out in a Programme for Monetary Stability (1960) This matter is discussed 
below pp 13 et seq
3 The reader who is familiar with Friedman’s essay will recognise that I am simplifying its content a little 
here I am not mentioning its analysis of the subtle interrelationship of income and wealth, and I am 
ignoring the role of an array of interest rates on various assets both real and nominal, as well as expected 
inflation, as separate measures of the opportunity cost of holding money. Instead I refer only to nominal 
rates in general. In the present context, I hope it will be agreed that these simplifications are harmless.
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The theoretical coherence of these ideas of Friedman’s was never contentious. 
Economists were reasoning in terms of the behaviour of “representative agents” 
long before Alfred Marshall (1890) made them self-conscious about doing so. 
Furthermore, in formulating monetary theory as a particular aspect of the theory 
of asset choice, Friedman was developing an already well established line of 
enquiry whose roots can readily be traced to the Marshallian tradition in monetary 
economics. This, however, does not mean that his ideas were uncontroversial. 
The pre-Keynesian Quantity Theory, which Friedman invoked in the title of his 
article, had indeed treated the quantity of money as an economic variable of 
strategic importance, particularly for the determination of the general price level, 
but the Keynesian revolution had shifted the focus of macroeconomics, and by the 
1950s economic orthodoxy attached little significance to this variable.4 To argue 
as Friedman did that money mattered was, in the 1950s, a radical step in and of 
itself. Moreover, neither Keynesian monetary economics, nor the earlier Quantity 
Theory tradition, had ever suggested that the demand for money function could 
be treated as stable over time. The second radical element in Friedman’s work lay 
in his controversial empirical assertion that it could be so treated. 
Until the 1930s, the very idea of any economic relationship being empirically 
stable was regarded as highly unlikely. However the success of Keynesian 
economics, based as it was on the idea of an empirically stable consumption 
function, combined with the development of econometrics as a sub-branch of the 
discipline, meant that by the 1950s there could be no objection on grounds on 
principle, as there would have been in the 1930s, to Friedman’s contentions about 
the demand for money. Their truth or falsity was open to econometric testing, 
and by the end of the 1960s, the empirical issue seemed to have been settled in 
Friedman’s favour, Test after test for a wide variety of times and places appeared 
to confirm the stability of the demand for money function, and hence to establish 
the importance of the quantity of money.5   
4 The relationship between Friedman’s work, the Quantity Theory tradition and Keynesian monetary 
economics is contentious Relevant contributions to the discussion of this issue include Patinkin (1969), 
(1986), Parkin (1986) and sections of Gordon (1974).
5 Lionel Robbins’ (1935) Nature and Significance of Economic Science expresses great scepticism about the 
stability over time of empirical relationships in economics, a scepticism which was widespread (though 
not universal) among his contemporaries. The first (1969) edition of my own Demand for Money . . . 
gives, I hope, a reasonable account of how the evidence on the demand function for money appeared at 
that time.
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By the end of the 1960s, then, Friedman’s fundamental idea about the 
demand for money had become academically successful, but in the course of 
the academic debate it had also developed in a particular direction. During the 
course of the debate, notions about the importance of money as a determinant 
of the behaviour of the general price level that came directly from the Quantity 
Theory tradition became more prominent than they had been in Friedman’s 
original (1956) essay, (though this idea had been central to the other essays of 
the volume to which it formed an introduction). The relationship between the 
demand for money and interest rates was downplayed, so that real income and 
prices (or their product money income) were presented as the critical variables 
determining the demand for money. Moreover, Friedman argued that, as a first 
but frequently empirically relevant approximation, real income was determined 
by factors on the supply side of the economy. Thus, the general price level was left 
as the principal variable in the demand for money function that could change in 
order to maintain equilibrium when the supply of money varied.6 
By about 1970 an academically successful proposition about the demand 
for money had thus been transformed into the notion that price level fluctuations 
were to be attributed to variations in the money stock too great to be absorbed by 
real income growth. In this form it had acquired the simplicity required to make 
it successful in the policy arena too; and this at the very time when inflation was 
becoming the central problem for macroeconomic policy. The early 1970s saw a 
number of attempts to cure what was widely thought to be “cost push” inflation, by 
a combination of wage and price controls and expansionary demand side policies 
designed to reduce the social conflicts that were believed to underly that cost push 
inflation. When they failed, “Monetarist” notions, derived from Friedman’s work, 
were already available to underpin the design of alternative policies based, as 
everyone knows, on the implementation of target rates of growth for the money 
supply. In short Friedman’s monetary economics had become a thorough success, 
in the sense described at the outset of the lecture, in a little less than two decades.
6 This is not the place to write a history of the development of Friedman’s monetary thought Nevertheless, 
the interested reader will find the role of interest rates downplayed in (1959), the emphasis shifted from 
the demand for money per se to money – money income relationships in Friedman and Meiselman 
(1963), and the suggestion that holding real income constant is often a useful first approximation, in 
Friedman’s contribution to Gordon (1974). It should be pointed out explicitly that the revival of interest 
in money was not solely the result of Friedman’s efforts In this context, the work of Karl Brunner and 
Allan Meltzer, e.g. (1963) is also particularly worthy of notice.
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As I remarked earlier, to be successfully is not necessarily to be right, and 
many would argue that the ideas under discussion here have not fared too well 
over the last decade. on the policy front, a worldwide economic slowdown more 
or less coincided with the implementation of monetary policy regimes based on 
money growth targets, and critics of such policy regimes have been quick and 
persistent in attributing this slowdown to them. on a more fundamental level, the 
stability of the demand for money function, which provided the scientific basis 
for the policy regimes in question, has proved to be a good deal less robust than 
many would have believed possible fifteen years ago. As a result, the close linkage 
between the behaviour of money and prices upon which “Monetarist” policies rely 
has been opened to question; and, closely related, widespread doubts about the 
ability of the authorities to control the money supply accurately enough to exploit 
such a linkage have also arisen. Policymakers, who were never too comfortable 
in the first place with the degree of pre-commitment implicit in the adoption of 
money growth targets, have offered this instability and its apparent implications 
as reasons to downplay money growth targets or to abandon them outright. This 
reason has appeared to be a good one to many academic commentators, because 
previously stable empirical demand for money functions in many countries have 
been shifting around. This is a well established result coming from a wide variety 
of studies. It is not just a claim advanced by those who were uncomfortable with 
the new ideas about money from the outset, however pleased they may be to see 
their discomfort apparently vindicated.
All in all, the stable demand for money function has given many signs 
of suffering the same fate as another successful post-war economic idea, the 
stable inflation unemployment trade-off. Like the Phillips curve the demand for 
money function began to disappear the moment it was made the basis of real 
world economic policy. If this interpretation of the evidence is the whole story, 
then the only answer that we could give to the question “What do we really 
know about monetary policy” would have to begin with some such phrase as 
“Precious little . . .”  My own preferred answer, however, begins “Not a much as 
we thought we did ten years ago, but still quite a lot that is useful . . .” and I shall 
devote the balance of this lecture to explaining why. 
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III
I noted earlier that, somewhere in the process of becoming thoroughly successful, 
the idea of a stable demand for money function became simplified and transformed 
into proposition about the relationship between money and inflation. Though 
the transformation in question may well have been necessary for the idea to make 
an important impact in policy debate, that simplification was nevertheless an 
oversimplification. This fact lies a the root of much popular disenchantment with 
“Monetarism”. 
In economic analysis, the purpose of a demand function is to enable us 
to predict the consequences of supply curve shifts. If the demand for money 
depends only on the price level, the highly appealing result that reducing the 
rate of growth of money will reduce the rate of growth of prices is immediately 
implied. If the demand function takes the form originally proposed by Friedman, 
the likely implied effect of a slowdown in the rate of monetary expansion is 
some combination of rising interest rates, falling real income growth, and falling 
inflation. Just what combination however, and with what timing, cannot be 
deduced from consideration of the demand for money function alone. It must 
be derive, from an analysis of a complete model of the economy in which all the 
factors determining the interaction of these four variables (at least) are specified.7 
Perhaps some of the advocates of a monetary attack upon inflation were 
overoptimistic about its capacity to work without significantly affecting interest 
rates, real income, and employment, because of their beliefs about the nature of 
these other interactions. Beyond doubt any such overoptimism was undermined 
by events. Even so, the fact remains that the behaviour of interest rates, real income, 
and prices in the last ten years has been quite compatible with the existence of a 
stable demand for money function of the type originally proposed by Friedman. 
Furthermore, it is now possible to argue that the lasting effects of the monetary 
slowdown have indeed been concentrated on the inflation rate. Its influence on 
interest rates has proved temporary, though long lasting enough to be a matter for 
 
7 The reader’s attention is drawn to the use of the word “likely” in this discussion. I have described here a 
response in which each argument in the demand function moves in the direction that it would have to 
take if it alone was to restore equilibrium to the supply and demand for money. of course a richer array 
of possible responses than this is logically conceivable. For a further discussion see Ch. 1 of the (1985) 
edition of my Demand for Money . . .
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serious concern, and recently there has been a considerable resurgence of economic 
growth. Even though unemployment rates have remained uncomfortably, and 
from the point of view of Monetarist economics, inexplicably, high, this evidence 
suggests that even the simplified version of Friedman’s idea has some long run 
validity. The monetary cure for inflation did after all work, though at a greater 
cost than many of its advocates expected. Moreover, it was much more effective 
than the earlier medicine of demand expansion combined with price controls. 
That treatment actually made the disease a good deal worse. 
Popular reasons for disenchantment with “Monetarism” do not, that is 
to say, stand up very well to scrutiny. The experience of the last few years has 
taught us a few things about the conduct of monetary policy, which I shall discuss 
in due course, but it has not demonstrated that money does not matter. on 
the contrary, manipulation of the quantity of money has been shown to be a 
powerful, perhaps a dangerously powerful, policy tool. However these popular 
reasons for disenchantment are not the only or indeed the main ones which we 
must discuss. The fragility of empirical demand for money functions, even quite 
complex ones, provides a much more serious challenge to the ideas which I am 
discussing in this lecture. 
Empirical tests of demand for money functions carried out in the 1960s 
seemed to establish a quite remarkable stability in the relationship, not only 
over time in specific economies, but across economies as well. By the late 
1970s, however, beginning with Steven Goldfeld’s (1976) paper on the United 
States function, things were seen to be going wrong. As with the success of the 
relationship, so its breakdown was not confined to one country. In country 
after country in the late 1970s, it appeared that the demand function for 
whatever particular aggregate had been chosen as the basis of monetary policy 
had begun to shift around. Goodhart’s law – that any monetary aggregate 
chosen for policy manipulation will immediately become unreliable for that 
purpose – began to give every indication of becoming a successful economic 
idea in its own right.
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There have, I believe been three sets of reasons for this problem.8 
First, there is a simple matter of myopia. The original studies which seemed 
to establish the stability of the demand for money were carried out with long time 
series of data. Though the goodness of fit of the relationships in question was high 
it was by no mean perfect. All studies produced occasional runs of data that did 
not lie on the predicted functions. The latter were right on average, but not year 
by year. If the demand for money function had been used as a basis of policy in the 
past (which of course it was not) policy would have been in considerable trouble 
in those badly predicted years. Such errors do not matter with the hindsight that 
the econometrician brings to them, but they do to the policymaker who lives 
through them. To put it simply, in going from the econometrics of the demand 
for money to its policy application, too many people forgot about the error term. 
They should not have been surprised when it reminded them of its existence. 
There is, though, a second matter to discuss. A significant number of 
recently observed shifts in the demand function have been of a once and for all 
type. The culprit here seems to have been institutional change in the financial 
sector which has changed the economic significance of the aggregates treated 
as dependent variables in studies of the demand for money, and used as policy 
tools. This change, as Jonson and Rankin (1986) have argued, in turn, seems 
to have three interconnected causes. In part it is a spontaneous development 
in the private sector of the economy, in part it is the response of the private 
sector to particular regulatory environments, and in part it is a result of policy 
induced changes in those environments. Whatever its cause, that institutional 
change could affect the demand for money is an intuitively obvious idea, and yet 
early studies of the relationship seemed to demonstrate its stability independently 
of any consideration of this factor. In this respect it is now clear that they were 
misleading. 
8 The law is named after its originator Professor Charles Goodhart, now of the London School of 
Economics but formerly of the Bank of England. It represents a special case of Robert E. Lucas’ (1976) 
general scepticism about assuming the stability of empirical relationships in the face o changes in the 
conduct of policy. For recent discussions of the stability of the demand for money function see Judd and 
Scadding (1982) and Laidler (1985).
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To begin with, the data which they used were constructed, with benefit of 
much hindsight, after the period to be studied. Those who constructed the data 
took into account the effects of evolving institutions in deciding which financial 
assets should be included (and when) in a consistent-over-time series for money.9 
Thus, the early studies to which I have referred did after all make allowance for 
institutional changes. They did so, however in the construction of the data they 
utilised, and not by including variables measuring such developments in regression 
equations. In interpreting the results of these studies economists overlooked the 
role played by institutional change in generating them. It was predictable, then, 
(but not predicted) that in policy experiments based on measures of money 
selected ex ante rather than ex post, the ongoing fact of such change should make 
its presence known.
Recent studies have shown that not all of the effects of institutional change 
on the demand for money were in fact incorporated in the process of data 
construction. Such change is a continuing process, and because studies of the 
demand for money carried out for lengthy time periods are dominated by trends 
in both money and income data, those of its effects on the demand for money, 
not already incorporated in the relevant data, tend to be attributed to the income 
variable by regression equation. Bordo and Jonung (1981) have made an extensive 
study of this matter using data from five countries, and have been able to show, 
in each case, that the demand for money is indeed a stable function of a few 
arguments. According to Bordo and Jonung however, among those arguments are 
variables measuring institutional developments. Moreover, quantitative measures 
of the parameter linking the demand for money to income are erroneous if these 
factors are ignored.
Now we must be careful how we interpret this evidence. It does appear to 
show that, once institutional change is allowed for, it is still possible to maintain 
the idea of a stable aggregate demand for money function. But that does not 
mean that earlier views about the relationship between the demand for money 
and monetary policy need no alteration. Institutional change is hard to predict; it 
 
 
9 The relevant source to consult for details of the construction of US money statistics is, of course, 
Friedman and Schwartz (1970).
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can, and sometimes probably does, occur as a response to policy measures.10 These 
two factors in turn imply that the route from the postulate of a stable demand 
for money function to the derivation of principles for the conduct of monetary 
policy is a good deal less direct and easily navigated than most of us through ten 
or fifteen years ago. l shall take up the implications of all this for policy issues in 
more detail below, but, before doing so, I must discuss a third source of demand 
for money instability. 
The theory of the demand for money tells us about the relationship between 
the quantity of money demanded and the factors determining it; but the quantity 
of money demanded is not itself a directly observable magnitude. The quantity 
of money in circulation is observable, however; conventional empirical studies 
of the demand for money have assumed that all money in circulation is willingly 
held, and hence have used the supply of money to measure the demand for it. 
Now to obtain satisfactory results with empirical demand for money functions, it 
is necessary to postulate the existence of time lags in the relationships, and much 
recently observed instability in demand for money relationships has occurred 
in the parameters measuring those time lags. one possible resolution of this 
problem, which I find appealing, is cast in terms of the so-called “buffer-stock” 
approach to analysing the demand for money.11 
This “buffer-stock” approach notes that agents hold money as an inventory 
of readily available purchasing power, and that they permit the size of that 
inventory to vary as it acts as a buffer between fluctuations in the value of their 
receipts and outlays. The “quantity of money demanded” on this interpretation is 
the average or target value which agents attempt to maintain over time for their 
money holdings. It is not an amount which they ensure they have on hand at 
each and every moment. In this view, fluctuations in the quantity of money in 
circulation will, in the first instance, simply be absorbed into temporary buffer 
stocks of money, and will only slowly affect expenditure as agents attempt over 
time to move their cash holdings back towards their long run average target 
 
10 That is to say, if Goodhart’s law is not universally true, it certainly is sometimes.
11 A number of Australian economists and economists who have worked in Australia, notably at the 
University of Adelaide have made important contributions to this strand of monetary analysis. See Artis 
and Lewis (1976j, Lewis (1978), Jonson (1976a) (1976b), Jonson et al. (1976) for examples. I have 
attempted to survey its salient features in (1984).
David Laidler
 309
value. Moreover, though the individual can get rid of money by spending it, 
the economy as a whole cannot do so if the money supply is indeed under the 
control of the monetary authorities. Hence, when the money supply fluctuates, 
the economy will be “off” its demand for money function until the arguments 
of that relationship, interest rates, income and prices, move to re-equilibrate the 
supply and demand for money. 
All this, however, means that, in studies which treat the quantity of money 
in circulation as an accurate measure of the demand for money, fluctuations in the 
supply of money induced by policy will erroneously be interpreted as fluctuations 
in the quantity of money demanded. Moreover, if the lag effects picked up by 
such conventional studies are in fact the result of interest rates, real income, and 
prices responding to the efforts of agents to restore their cash holdings to some 
target level in the wake of supply induced disturbances, these lag effects too might 
be expected to show instability when the quantity of money in circulation is itself 
fluctuating by a significant amount. In fact the monetary contractions of recent 
years have been far from smooth processes. Money growth has varied a great deal 
around a downward trend. According to the buffer stock approach, this very fact 
ought to have been responsible for the appearance of instability in conventionally 
measured demand for money functions. 
As in the case of institutional change, we must be careful with the 
interpretation of this argument. If it is true, it does imply that the demand for 
money function is not as unstable as the results of conventional studies would 
suggest. However, it also implies that the relationships, between the supply of 
money and the variables upon which the demand for money depends, are more 
complicated than straightforward supply and demand analysis would lead one to 
believe. Since it is precisely these relationships that must lie at the heart of any 
monetary policy experiment, the “buffer stock” interpretation of the apparent 
instability of the demand for money function does require us to modify our views 
about what is and is not a feasible set of tasks for monetary policy to undertake. 
I will now turn to a discussion of these policy issues. 
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IV
Though the 19th century Quantity Theory treated money as of critical importance 
for the determination of the general price level, and though its adherents attached 
great importance to price level stability, they did not advocate that the quantity 
of money be actively manipulated by some policy authority with the aim of 
achieving such stability. In part this was because 19th century economists had 
a healthy scepticism about the willingness of anyone in authority to act in the 
public, as opposed to his own private, interest; but it was also due to their belief 
that the velocity of circulation was an unpredictably unstable parameter. They 
preferred a policy regime in which the price level was stabilised by other means 
and the quantity of money enabled to fluctuate in order to meet the public’s, as 
they saw it, volatile demand for money (though 19th century economists would 
not have used this phrase): hence their support for the gold standard. 
The First World War effectively destroyed the gold standard, though its 
final demise was not to come until 1931. Even so, proposals to place control of 
the quantity of money at the centre of things were rather rare in the 1920s and 
early 1930s. The literature of this period typically discussed the means whereby 
the rate of interest could be manipulated in order to maintain a stable price level 
by ensuring that (to put it in modern language) the full employment level of 
investment was kept equal to the full employment level of saving.12 A by-product 
of the successful implementation of such a policy would be a time path for the 
behaviour of the money supply compatible with the economy’s demand for 
money. In this sense, money mattered to the contributors to this literature, but 
not as a policy instrument. The importance of money was further downgraded 
as a result of the intellectual revolution which followed the (1936) publication of 
Keynes’ General Theory, which replaced the price level by the level of employment 
as the central concern of macroeconomic policy. Keynesian analysis, to the extent 
that it accorded any importance at all to monetary policy, always treated it as 
subsidiary to fiscal policy as an income stabilisation device. 
12 American quantity theorists working in the tradition of Irving Fisher (1911) are something of an 
exception here. It is in comparison with this type of policy analysis that Friedman’s work has its strongest 
claim to continuity with the Quantity Theory tradition.
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When the revival of interest in the quantity of money began in the 1950s, it 
was, as we have seen, accompanied by the radically new idea that the demand for 
money was a stable function of just a few arguments. This new idea implied that 
the velocity of circulation, though not constant, was reliable enough to provide 
a basis for a monetary policy which did indeed involve controlling the money 
supply with a view to achieving price level targets. Along with the new theoretical 
idea, went a new policy idea also developed by Friedman (1960): namely that price 
level (and indeed general macroeconomic) stability could be greatly enhanced by 
putting the quantity of money on a predetermined growth path from which it 
would not be allowed to deviate. This policy idea, the “money supply growth 
rule”, provides a useful focus for any discussion of the policy implications of the 
evidence about the demand for money generated over the last ten years. 
The first thing to be clear about here is that policies of setting medium 
target growth rate ranges for the money supply, the actual form in which the 
new ideas about money discussed in this lecture found their way into the policy 
arena, were somewhat removed from Friedman’s proposals completely to replace 
discretionary policies by a rule. Such policies were, by their very nature, open 
to change in the future, and because they involved target ranges for money 
growth, instead of a well defined path, they left considerable room for short term 
manipulation of the money supply into the bargain. 
That “Monetarist” ideas should be translated into policy actions in this 
way had a great deal to do with the state of the economy at the time at which 
those ideas became fashionable. When Friedman proposed a money supply 
growth rule permanently binding upon central bankers, the economy (or at least 
the US economy about which he was writing) was to all intents and purposes 
inflation free. His proposal was thus one for ensuring continued stability in an 
already stable economy. By the time his ideas became popular, the economy was 
in an altogether different condition. In the mid-1970s inflation was both high 
and rising in the US and elsewhere. The policy problem was not to maintain, 
but to restore stability; and an immediate move to a rate of monetary expansion 
compatible with long run price stability would have had devastating effects on real 
income and employment. That rate of expansion had to be approached gradually 
from above, and for this purpose medium term growth targets, open to revision 
in due course, seemed to be required. Nevertheless, now that inflation is on the 
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verge of acceptable ranges in a number of countries, it is not inappropriate to ask 
what the implications of the evidence generated over the last decade might be for 
the pursuit of a monetary growth rate rule. 
As we have seen, even what was at least supposed to be a gradualist policy 
seems to have had serious effects on interest rates and real income, and the 
straightforward hypothesis of a stable demand for money function has been badly 
battered. Though I shall not end up defending a simple growth rate rule in this 
lecture, l shall argue that the evidence referred to above is less damaging to such a 
proposal than is often imagined; and I shall argue that medium term growth rate 
targeting is still both feasible and desirable. Though such a policy regime stops 
far short of a rule, it is still a good deal closer to it than to any monetary policy 
regimes that were thought desirable before the 1950s. 
My basic reasons for taking this position are to be found in my 
interpretation of the evidence on the outcome of monetary policy over the last 
ten years and on the instability of the demand for money function in particular. 
I readily agree that much of the real slowdown that we have seen, particularly in 
the early 1980s, should be attributed to monetary policy; but surely this argues 
for avoiding the kind of monetary policy which produced the problem. Two 
properties characterise money growth between the mid 1970s and 1983. Its 
rate was on average below the growth rate of nominal income, and it was also 
very volatile. If we are to avoid further real contractions induced by monetary 
factors (and I would not wish to rule out the possibility of contractions traceable 
to other sources) it would seem that a falling and volatile money growth rate is 
to be shunned. To set money growth targets within rather narrow ranges, and 
with a positive trend roughly equal to the economy’s underlying long-run real 
growth rate, would accomplish this. 
But what about instability in the demand for money? If the money 
supply behaves itself, cannot demand fluctuations nevertheless have disruptive 
effects? In principle they certainly can. I have argued above that some of the 
apparent instability we have observed in the demand for money function has 
been attributable to the kind of random fluctuations that are present in any real 
world economy. I have also argued that some of it has been due to instability in 
the behaviour of the money supply. Such sources of instability in the demand 
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function as these are very damaging indeed to the case for using monetary policy 
as an active tool of short run stabilisation policy, such as advanced by Modigliani 
(1977), but not the case for gearing monetary policy to medium term objectives.13 
Random errors do tend to cancel out over time, and if money growth is not 
volatile, then money supply fluctuations cannot disturb the relationship between 
the quantity of money and the variables affecting the demand for it. 
If random errors and supply of money shocks were the only causes of recent 
instability in empirical estimates of the demand for money function, it would still 
be possible to make the case for basing policy on a simple money growth rate rule. 
However, they are not. 
There is still the matter of institutional change to consider. New financial 
assets do get created, old ones do change their signficance in the structure of the 
economy, and such changes are difficult enough to recognise as they happen, 
let alone to predict. A money growth rule that was supposed to be binding ever 
afterwards on the authorities would have to embody a particular definition of 
money in its formulation. If it didn’t, the authorities could evade the discipline 
of the rule by changing that definition as it suited their purposes. But, in the 
presence of institutional change, someone somewhere has to have the freedom 
to make such changes, otherwise the effects of the rule on the time path of the 
economy will deviate from its framers’ original intentions as the institutional 
background changes. If they are to maintain a stable monetary environment 
by controlling the “money supply”, the relevant authorities must as Jonson 
and Rankin (1986) argue, have discretionary power. Binding rules are not 
technically feasible, but medium-term targets, which permit a little discretion 
in the short run, and more in the long run as they are updated and revised, are. 
 
13 In the Keynesian tradition, to attempt to use monetary policy for short run stabilisation purposes 
is almost entirely an American idea. British Keynesians, and those working in other countries with 
parliamentary systems, have accorded monetary policy the rather minor role of accommodating fiscal 
policy so as not to get in its way. The difference here stems from the fact that, given United States 
political institutions, it is impossible to vary fiscal policy fast enough to make it a credible tool of short 
run stabilisation policy. It is a sad commentary of economics as a discipline that this almost exclusively 
American problem has been allowed to colour a world-wide debate about monetary policy. 
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This implication of recent experience has caused a number of commentators 
to go one step further, and to argue for gearing monetary policy to the pursuit of 
a stable target range for the growth rate of money income rather than the money 
supply per se.14 on an abstract and purely technical level, these two proposals amount 
to very much the same thing. After all, the purposes of choosing a particular target 
for money growth is to attain a more distant, but a nevertheless ultimately more 
important, goal for the behaviour of the price level; and hence, if real income is 
supply-side determined, of money income. Jonson and Rankin’s (1986) discussion 
of the use of a “check list” of variables in the conduct of monetary policy shows 
this procedure to be more closely related “targetting” than may appear at first 
sight. They argue that, at times of rapid institutional change, the growth rate of 
any monetary aggregate is an unreliable indicator of the stance of policy, and that 
information about the likely future behaviour of money income is available in 
current data on such variables as interest rates, the exchange rate, inflation rate, 
and so on. They then argue that such information can be used in the design of 
policy intended to stabilise money income growth without the need to specify 
targets for the behaviour of any specific intermediate variable. 
There can be no strong arguments against these procedures on ground of 
theoretical principle. However in practice, l still prefer policy targets to be set 
in terms of the quantity of money rather than money income or as a function 
of some “check list”. The time lags between policy actions and their effects 
on money income are long and badly understood, as are the relationships 
among income growth and any “check list”. Also money income is susceptible 
to shocks from sources other than monetary policy. A policy geared either 
directly to money income growth, or indirectly through a check list, is 
therefore more difficult for outsiders to monitor and criticise on a continuing 
basis than one based on money growth. Given that policymakers must be 
given discretion over monetary policy, and given the many pressures to act 
irresponsibly to which they are inevitably subjected by political processes, 
the more easily monitored and criticised they are, the better. This argument 
does not, of course, preclude the authorities from using a “check list” of 
 
14 Among the proponents of stabilising money income growth as opposed to money supply growth are Sam 
Brittan (1982) and Robert Gordon (1983). For a penetrating survey of the theoretical issues involved 
here see McCallum (1985).
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variables in choosing where, within their target range, money growth should 
actually be; nor does it preclude the deployment of data on the behaviour 
of other variables in the defence of a change in policy towards money 
growth, should that be deemed desirable. Its intent is to ensure that policy 
goals are stated clearly in advance, and that any change in policy be quickly 
visible and subject to public debate. The simplicity of using money growth 
targets as the centrepiece of policy has much to recommend it in this respect. 
Now not everyone reads the evidence in this way. Some commentators, 
while agreeing that institutional changes make it impossible to take discretion 
away from monetary policy makers by imposing a monetary growth rule upon 
them, note that there are alternative ways of tying them down which do not 
suffer from this defect. In particular, requiring the monetary authorities to stand 
ready to convert money at a fixed price into some stable valued item – some 
non-inflationary foreign currency for example, or some commodity, of which 
gold is of course the archetype – would take away their discretionary powers. It 
would also effectively tie down the behaviour of the price level and permit the 
money supply to fluctuate in whatever way is necessary to satisfy the demand for 
it. Therefore, they propose that we return to a regime very like that which ruled 
in the international economy before the First World War. Though well enough 
conceived in principle, I believe that there are important practical objections to 
these proposals. 
To begin with, to remove the authorities’ freedom of action, an exchange 
rate would have to be really fixed. An adjustable peg system would simply open 
up the possibility of discretionary policy by another route. Bearing this in mind, 
and even setting aside the problem of finding some currency or commodity 
stable enough to make a desirable standard, we must not forget that real shocks 
as well as monetary shocks impinge on the world economy. Adherence to a fixed 
exchange rate requires an economy which suffers an adverse terms-of-trade shift 
to adjust by forcing down domestic money wages. The alternative, under a 
money growth target regime, is to allow the depreciation of a flexible exchange 
rate not offset by money wage increases, to bear the brunt of adjustment. of 
course the ultimate real consequences of either adjustment must be the same, 
and of course, in a fully rational world, one form of adjustment would be as 
easy as the other. However, we should design monetary policy institutions with 
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the real world in mind, and an exchange rate depreciation, which indirectly 
affects everyone at once, is more likely to be absorbed by an economy without 
disruptions than the alternative of a series of piecemeal and unco-ordinated 
money wage reductions.15 
Second, for a fixed exchange rate regime to be viable for the world economy 
as a whole, or for a substantial segment of it, macro-economic policies in general, 
and monetary policies in particular, would have to be co-ordinated among 
participating countries. I have nothing against the international co-ordination of 
policies, quite the contrary; but policy authorities with sufficient self-discipline 
to co-ordinate their policies with those of other countries so as to maintain their 
exchange rate fixed on some stable valued currency or commodity, could surely 
also be trusted with the more modest task of setting and sticking to sensible 
domestic money growth targets. To put the same point in another way, the first 
task is to induce discipline in domestic policies. If this is accomplished, stability 
of exchange rates will take care of itself. If it is not, then a fixed exchange rate 
regime will prove impossible to implement and sustain. It is not, therefore, a 
viable alternative to money growth targeting as a basis for policy. 
This is not, though, to argue that the international monetary system 
imposes no discipline on the conduct of domestic policy. The theoretical ideas 
of Russel Boyer about “currency substitution” under flexible exchange rates, 
first written up in 1973 (but not published until 1978) have been amply borne 
out by recent experience. As Melvin (1985) has shown, using European data, a 
country whose domestic monetary policy is volatile will make agents engaged 
in international trade unwilling to hold its currency, and hence will find its 
international transactions complicated by a weak and fluctuating exchange 
rate. International monetary mechanisms, that is, encourage the pursuit of 
stable domestic monetary policy even in the absence of fixed exchange rates. 
 
15 I emphasize the effect of deteriorating rather than improving terms of trade here for the simple reasons 
that one cannot have a terms of trade change in the world economy without it adversely affecting 
some country; and it is the adversely affected country that faces the greater adjustment problems. The 
literature on the monetary approach to balance of payments theory, particularly the earlier literature 
abstracted from terms of trade effects, and hence gave a misleadingly simple impression of the case for 
permanently fixed exchange rates.
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The question of whether the domestic money supply is indeed controllable 
does, of course, still arise, and there is not space to discuss it in detail here. Suffice 
it to make the following observations. First, the experience of the 1970s and early 
1980s does show that attempts to control the money supply, by first monitoring 
income and prices, and then directly manipulating interest rates in the hope that 
the economy’s efforts to stay “on” its demand for money function will keep the 
money supply on track, are misconceived. As Howitt and Laidler (1979) argued, 
such a policy package ignores the links between interest rates and the behaviour 
of credit markets, and the strategic role of bank credit creation in the generation 
of money, independently of the demand for money per se. 
Second, and more generally, it is impossible to lay down mechanical 
formulae whereby the money supply can be controlled without referring to the 
institutional framework. However, if this is variable, the discretion which must be 
accorded the authorities in setting money growth targets will also have to extend 
to their choice of monetary control techniques. My own preference would be 
for some type of monetary base control applied to a rather broad aggregate, but 
precise operating procedures for its successful implementation must inevitably 
depend upon the structure of any particular financial system. Given the degree 
of discretion for the authorities implied here, and given the many pressures to 
which they are subject, the need for constant monitoring of their actions, already 
referred to above, is all the more pressing. The case for money, as opposed to 
money income, targeting is thus further strengthened by questions about the 
controllability of the money supply. 
V
What then do we really know about monetary policy? As a matter of logic, we 
know that, if the time path of real income is, in the long run, driven by supply 
side factors, the interaction of the supply and demand for money determines the 
behaviour of the general price level. We know, also as a matter of logic, that, if 
the demand for money is indeed a stable function of but a few arguments, then 
keeping the money supply on a stable growth path will stabilise the behaviour of 
the price level. Shocks induced by the money supply itself would clearly be ruled 
out in this case, and steady money growth will act as a useful built in stabiliser 
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against the effects of other shocks. The trouble, as we have seen, is that logic does 
not tell the whole story in this particular case. There are a few awkward facts to be 
considered too. Though the evidence does seem to be bearing out the prediction 
that money affects mainly prices in the long run, experience has been less kind to 
the postulate of a stable demand for money function. 
The existence of random fluctuations in the demand for money is not 
in and of itself an insuperable difficulty. They do imply that steady money 
growth will not deliver perfect price stability on a quarter by quarter or even 
year by year basis, no matter how carefully its rate is calibrated to the rate 
of growth of real output. However, their influence will tend to cancel itself 
out over time. As to fluctuations, in the relationship between the quantity of 
money and other variables, which are the results of variations in the quantity of 
money itself, these can obviously be no problem in the context of steady money 
growth, toublesome though they may be for the interpretation of historical data 
generated when policy was unstable. 
Institutional change, however, does present real difficulties. It has long 
been a complaint of the critics of “Monetarism” that, in modern economies, 
with their complex financial systems, it is far from clear just what is and is not 
“money” for purposes of designing policy. It used to seem possible to answer 
such criticism by conceding its logical validity while denying its empirical 
importance. It no longer is, and this fact has important implications for 
monetary policy, as I have argued. Its conduct must either be placed in the 
context of a set of constraints involving fixed exchange rates and some form 
of commodity convertibility, or must permit a good deal of discretion to the 
relevant national monetary authorities both in their choice of which aggregate 
to control, and the means whereby that control is achieved. Since I do not 
believe that the former alternative is viable, we seem to be left with the second. 
How then should the monetary authorities use their discretion? I have 
suggested that they should do so in such a way as to keep whatever shifting 
definition of money may be appropriate to a given time and place on a time path 
that is consistent with the pursuit of long run price stability. Such a policy would 
appropriately be implemented in terms of a public commitment to target ranges 
for “money” growth, revised at regular intervals. I make this second suggestion 
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not because of the potentially stabilising effects of money growth targeting 
on agents’ expectations. These effects have surely been shown to be of minor 
importance in the last few years. Rather I advocate medium term money growth 
targeting because it seems to me to provide the best way to expose the authorities 
to monitoring and criticism. 
Real economic variables do get subjected to troublesome shocks. There 
is, and will remain, a political demand for “effective” short-run stabilisation 
policy. Though monetary policy clearly can have powerful real effects in the 
short run, so that there is always a temptation to use it for such stabilisation, l 
have argued in this lecture that the timing of these effects is too uncertain for 
it successfully to be used in this way. A key problem, then, is to prevent the 
monetary authorities responding to demands for stabilisation measures and, in 
attempting to meet them, rendering the economy less, rather than more stable. 
If binding rules are not viable, then continuous public monitoring presents an 
alternative way of attempting to constrain the authorities to behave responsibly. 
Providing for it, therefore, is no light matter. A policy regime that forces them 
to state their intentions for money growth ex ante and hence permits their 
performance to be continuously observed and criticised in the light of those 
intentions, will make it more difficult for them to succumb to the temptation 
to aim at more ambitious goals. 
Another defence against the misuse of monetary policy, complementary 
to this one, would involve the availability of alternative means for stabilising 
the real economy. Here one’s mind naturally turns to fiscal measures. I would 
be willing to argue that these are useful tools of short run stabilisation, 
provided they are used against the background of a monetary policy regime 
that is unequivocally devoted to the pursuit of price level stability. Moreover, 
in parliamentary systems, such tools can be deployed and implemented quite 
rapidly. In the United States it is another matter, and it is surely no accident 
that so much of the opposition to abandoning the idea of using monetary 
policy for short run stabilisation arises in a country whose institutions render 
fiscal weapons unsuitable for this purpose. 
There is not time now to enter into a detailed discussion of fiscal policy. 
Suffice it to say that there are, as I have said, good reasons why there should be a 
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political demand for short run stabilisation policy; and my purpose in this lecture 
is not to argue that this demand should not be met, but only that it should not be 
met by monetary means. As should by now be apparent, l say this because my one 
sentence answer to the question “How much do we really know about monetary 
policy?” boils down to “Enough to prevent it doing harm, but not enough to use 
it to do good”. I hope for all our sakes that this answer does not prove to be too 
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Pacific challenges to the United States
Paul R. Krugman1
In a sense any US issue is a Pacific issue, and indeed almost any world economic 
issue is largely Pacific. More to the point, the principal counterpart of the US 
trade deficit lies in the surpluses of Asian Pacific nations – primarily Japan but also 
Taiwan and Korea. In that sense the issue of international payments imbalances 
is largely one of imbalances across the Pacific. 
It is also true that if we ask about the possible consequences of the US trade 
deficit. The potential effects on the Pacific as an economic community loom large. 
The biggest danger of the persistent US trade deficit, as I think is now widely 
appreciated, is that it will lead to a protectionist reaction in the United States. 
Whatever the real economic evaluation of the effects of the US trade deficit, 
the persistence of a situation in which Imports exceed exports by 50 per cent or 
more makes preservation of a more or less open US market a constant rear-guard 
action. The forces in favour of a liberal economic system are weak relative to those 
in favour of protection, simply because more producers face import competition 
than those that perceive export opportunities. (Consumers, as always in trade 
policy, do not get anything like an equal voice.) 
What would happen if the United States were to experience a protectionst 
reaction? The most likely answer is that the world would break up into trading 
blocs. And one of these trading blocs would almost surely be a Western Pacific 
bloc, centered on Japan, and including Australia. So the protectionist threat from 
the US trade deficit is very much a Pacific issue. 
1 Forty-first Joseph Fisher Lecture, 29 July 1988. Revised version published as ''The Persistent US Trade 
Deficit'', in Australian Economic Papers, 27 (51): 149-58, December. 
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Also, there is another growing issue that is an indirect consequence of 
the US trade deficit that is, in its way, largely Pacific in character. This is the 
growing role of foreign investment in the United States. Increasingly, the US 
accumulation of foreign debt that is the counterpart of persistent trade deficits 
takes the form not simply of paper debts – treasury bills owned by Japanese 
pension funds – but direct foreign investments. US corporations, factories, land, 
and office buildings are increasingly being controlled by foreign corporations. 
again very largely Japanese. In the great scheme of things there may be nothing 
wrong with extensive foreign investment in the US, but in the current political 
context this growing foreign role raises all kinds of issues of nationalism. If and 
when the United States reacts against the feeling of growing dependence on 
foreign investors, all the rest of the world including especially the Pacific rim will 
feel the consequence.
Finally, there is an issue which is a little subtle but very important. The 
efforts to do something about the US trade imbalance and the counterpart 
surpluses on the part of Japan and other Asian countries have been the 
centrepiece of recent movements toward international economic cooperation. 
The one piece of serious forward motion that the governments of advanced 
industrial economies have made on cooperation has been the series of meetings 
on exchange rate policy from the Plaza in September 1985, when they agreed 
that the dollar needed to fall, to the Louvre in early 1987, when they agreed 
that the dollar should stop. These meetings have probably not had nearly as 
much effect on the world economy as has been claimed, but they have had 
great political importance as a demonstration that governments really can get 
together and thus as a precedent for cooperation in other areas. If the effort 
seems to fail, if progress grinds to a halt on rectifying the enormous imbalances 
among the Pacific economies, then this will poison the atmosphere for all future 
cooperative actions Pacific or otherwise. 
I hope that I have managed to make the case that the US trade deficit really 
is a Pacific issue, or at least has a strong Pacific aspect. Let me now turn to the 
issue of the trade deficit itself. 
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The puzzle of the persistent US trade deficit
The important thing about the US trade deficit since 1985 is not what has 
happened, but what hasn’t. What hasn’t happened is a convincing reversal of the 
great surge in the deficit between 1981 and 1985. In the last year we have finally 
begun to see some downward movement in the trade deficit, which is currently 
running at an annual rate of about 130 billion dollars. This is better than the 
$170 billion annual rate of 1987, but it is still a number that would have been 
inconceivable in the 1970s. Indeed, the 1987 trade deficit was six times as large 
as any deficit we ever had before 1981. 
Now the persistence of the US trade deficit poses not only political and 
economic problems but also analytical ones, because it wasn’t supposed to happen. 
The rise of the trade deficit in the first half of the 1980s was no mystery because 
it was clearly caused in large part by the rise of the dollar. This persistence of the 
deficit, however, has occurred in spite of one of the greatest currency movements 
in history – the great fall of the dollar from its peak in 1985. While the numbers 
keep on shifting – the yen went from 121 to 137, then back to 121 between the 
time I was asked to give this lecture and the time I revised the final draft – the 
round number is that the dollar has fallen about 50 per cent in terms of its major 
counterpart currencies, the yen and the mark, since its peak (or, equivalently, the 
yen and the mark have doubled in terms of the dollar), currency depreciation is 
supposed to lead to an improvement in the trade balance, especially when the 
depreciation is that large. 
one way to put this in perspective is to realize that we are dealing not with 
a run-of-the-mill currency movement, but with a depreciation that makes all 
the textbook cases, the famous currency realignments around which one builds 
university education look trivial by comparison. Consider when John Maynard 
Keynes inveighed against the economics of Mr. Churchill, by which he meant 
the foolishness of returning to the gold standard after the First World War, he 
calculated that the resulting overvaluation of the pound sterling was perhaps 10 
per cent – which he regarded as a terrible thing. In 1967 Britain, after much 
turmoil and after years of desperate measures to avoid the awful step, decided 
to devalue sterling from $2.80 to $2.40 – a 14 per cent devaluation. When the 
Bretton Woods international monetary system was broken up in 1971, it was 
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because the United States felt that the dollar had become overvalued and the US 
resorted to extreme actions (an illegal tariff) to force other countries to realign 
their currencies upward – by 10 per cent.
Now look at recent events: in the two months following the october stock 
market crash the dollar fell 20 per cent against the yen and the mark. During 
1988 the dollar rose 13 per cent against the yen, then fell back to its previous 
level. We have been accustomed to eat for breakfast every day exchange rate 
changes of a magnitude that it used to take years for nations to swallow. And the 
overall change in the value of the dollar since 1985 is just unprecedented. No 
major country has ever reduced the relative prices of its goods, services and labour 
as far and as fast.
Yet the trade deficit remains, and is drifting downward only slowly. So the 
key issue, or at least the key starting point for a discussion of where the world 
economy is headed, has to be the question of why more has not happened, why 
this unprecedented depreciation has not done more to reduce America’s trade 
deficit. In the course of discussing this issue we will, I hope, also gain some insight 
into some broader aspects of the world economy.
Some incorrect explanations of the persistent deficit
Before I discuss what I believe to be the correct explanations of the persistence 
of the US trade deficit, I want to begin by discussing some popular but incorrect 
explanations. This may be a bad pedagogic style – you may end up remembering 
the wrong explanations instead of the right ones – but there has been so much 
misguided and often deliberately misguiding discussion about the US trade 
deficit that it is important to spend a little more time on what isn’t right before 
turning to what is.
There are three important false stories that have been circulating in the 
last two years about why dollar depreciation isn’t working. The first is that the 
dollar’s depreciation never happened; the second is that the problem is that 




The argument that the dollar hasn’t really declined remains surprisingly 
influential, in spite of years of careful refutation. The argument goes like this: 
although the dollar may have gone from 260 yen to 120 yen, there are many Third 
World countries whose currencies have depreciated against the dollar over the 
same period. Put these currencies into the basket, and the average hasn’t changed 
much. A great deal of attention was given two years ago to the publication by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas of a broad-based index of the US dollar against 
130 countries that showed a depreciation of only 4 per cent from its peak instead 
of 50 per cent depreciation that we’ve had against the mark and the yen. I still 
find myself encountering businessmen and journalists who cite that index arguing 
that the dollar is still wrong.
The reasons why such comparisons are nonsense should, of course, be clear 
as soon as one thinks about which countries have continued to depreciate against 
the dollar. The list includes Brazil, Mexico, Bolivia, Ecuador, the Philippines – it 
includes, in other words, countries that have high rates of inflation. But because 
of the high rates of inflation in these countries the large decline in their currencies 
has not produced any comparable improvement in their competitiveness 
against the US. There has been some change in real exchange rates – Mexico, in 
particular, has had a depreciation of the peso that makes it more competitive in 
manufacturing than it wad five years ago – but it is simply misleading to use the 
uncorrected number. on a real exchange rate basis adding developing countries 
changes the numbers slightly, so that the dollar may appear to have depreciated 
by say 40 per cent in real terms instead of 50 per cent but the basic point of a 
massive and indeed historically unprecedented exchange depreciation remains. 
We might also want to notice that to the extent that developing countries 
have depreciated their currencies in real terms the appreciation of the yen and 
mark are even larger than the comparison with the dollar suggests. We should 
always realize that the puzzle of the persistent US deficit has as its counterpart the 
puzzle of the persistent surpluses elsewhere especially in Japan: this counterpart 
puzzle becomes even worse once one allows for the role of developing countries. 
The second false story about the persistence of the US deficit is one that 
Americans, and especially government officials, tend to like, because it makes 
the trade deficit a badge of success instead of failure. This is the argument that 
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the trade deficit is persisting because of the relative strength of the US economy, 
that because of the growth of demand in the US we are pulling in imports, while 
because of slower growth in the rest of the world there has not been a counterpart 
expansion in our exports. Leave aside the fact that faster growth in Japan and 
Germany this year has still not delivered the anticipated trade turnaround. This is 
an argument that should have been obviously wrong from the beginning. 
Not that the argument is completely without validity. It is right in principle, 
but just wrong on arithmetic. It is true that since 1982 the US economy has on 
average taken up its slack capacity faster than the rest of the world so that the US 
is probably operating closer to full capacity than most other industrial countries. 
This differential growth has contributed to the US trade deficit. But even a simple 
back of the envelope calculation will tell you that growth cannot be much of 
either the cause of the deficit or of its solution. Suppose that we could somehow 
persuade all of the rest of the world to expand their economies by 5 per cent over 
and above their trend rate of growth. This would be a very large number, since it 
would be possible only if they had 5 per cent usable excess capacity. Since nobody 
believes there is that much usable excess capacity in the rest of the world as a 
whole (as opposed to the few most depressed economies), looking at this thought 
experiment will give us a very high upper bound on what growth can do. 
Suppose then that we could get this unlikely 5 per cent excess growth 
in all US export markets. Then this would indeed increase the demand for US 
exports. Since in general a country’s exports rise more than in proportion when 
its economy expands, the expansion in US exports would be more than 5 per 
cent – say 10 per cent. But US imports have been exceeding US exports by about 
60 per cent in recent months. So even if we had a massive and totally unlikely 
improvement in growth performance in the rest of the world. The US trade 
deficit would fall only modestly probably less than 20 per cent. This would help, 
but it is clear from this sort of example that differential growth can’t be much of 
the explanation of why cutting the value of the dollar in half hasn’t done much 
for our trade deficit. 
Finally let me turn to the third argument which is a somewhat insidious 
one, because it is hard to explain what’s wrong with it. It is a familiar proposition 
that a trade deficit is not simply the difference between what a nation imports and 
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what it exports; it is also the difference between what a nation spends and what 
it earns, which is in turn equal to the difference between investment and saving. 
The insidious argument runs as follows: since the trade deficit is the 
difference between investment and savings, the exchange rate has nothing to do 
with it. Savings in the US are at historic lows in part because of the budget deficit 
while investment remains reasonably high. So why, this view asks, should one 
expect the trade deficit to decline? 
The problem with this view is that it fails to acknowledge that while the 
trade deficit is indeed the difference between savings and investment, it is also 
the difference between what we buy and what we sell. No appeal to the amount 
of capital we need to import can explain why a tremendous cheapening of our 
goods has not increased the demand for these goods. That is, how can it be that 
US goods are half the price in foreign currency that they were three years ago, 
yet the demand for these goods has not increased? If the demand for US goods 
had increased without a rise in our savings, then that would be a different issue; 
I’ll come back to that in a little while because one of the problems we may have 
is that when our trade deficit does begin to come down we won’t be ready for it. 
But that hasn’t happened yet; the US is still a long way from a situation where 
the world is clamoring for our goods but we are unable to supply the demand. 
Instead despite the enormous cheapening of US goods and services, we have so 
far seen only a moderate increase in demand. 
These, then are the easy explanations of the persistent US trade deficit 
all of them false. The dollar really has declined despite some claims to the 
contrary. Slow growth abroad is only a minor factor in the persistence of the 
deficit. And the argument from the savings investment balance while important 
doesn’t explain why making US goods cheaper doesn’t seem to make them more 
attractive. 
The persistence of the US trade deficit: The truth (maybe)
I have now argued that the dramatic fall in the relative prices of US goods and 
services that appears in exchange rate indices is indeed a real fact, not something 
that can be defined away; that differences in growth rates don’t explain much 
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about the trade deficit; and that appeals to capital flows are a diversion from the 
central issue. So why hasn’t the dollar’s decline worked? 
I reject out of hand the idea that relative prices don’t matter – that US 
goods are so shoddy that nobody will buy them no matter how low the price, 
or that world markets are so protected that prices are irrelevant. The US trade 
deficit emerged suddenly in the 1980s, when the dollar rose, there was no sudden 
loss of quality or technology that explains this deterioration. I do not regard 
elasticity pessimism, the belief that prices don’t matter in international trade, as a 
sustainable position in the modern world. 
That logically leaves two possibilities. one is that these things take time: 
purchasers who shifted away from US goods and services when the dollar was 
strong will not shift back until it has been weak for an extended period. The other 
is that something has made US goods and services permanently less attractive 
to buyers both at home and abroad than they used to be. That is, we may be 
experiencing the effects of long lags with substantial trade improvement still in 
the pipeline: or there may have been a decline in the equilibrium dollar so that 
the declining dollar has in fact been chasing a moving target. A case can be made 
for either view. 
The case for lags starts with the observation that the US appears at current 
exchange rates to be a low-cost place to produce. Real exchange rate indices all 
show the US at a historical low. Some attempts have also been made at absolute 
unit labour cost comparisons: these seem to suggest that the US is a dramatically 
cheaper place to produce than the rest of the oECD. The assertion is that this 
must eventually show up in a relocation of manufacturing production lo the US. 
Now econometric estimates of trade equations do not show this. They 
typically find lags of only two years or so, and by and large predict that the US 
current account deficit will begin to widen again in the near future. However the 
lags allowed for in standard trade equations are much shorter than seems reasonable 
if one considers the underlying economics of trade adjustment. The fall in exports 
and the rise in imports associated with the strong dollar were not simply a matter of 
consumers switching from US goods to foreign goods that were already available. 
Much of the deterioration in trade involved longer-term actions: construction of 
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new capacity abroad and scrapping of capacity in the US. Long term changes in 
sourcing decisions, development of distribution networks etc. Given the long-
term nature of the decisions involved in adjusting to an exchange rate change, we 
would expect the full response to take a number of years. Yet econometric trade 
estimates seldom allow for more than a two-year lag. There are good reasons why 
it is difficult to capture the longer-term effects based on historical data, yet it is 
unlikely that the short lags in standard equations measure the full effect. Almost 
certainly there is still considerable US trade adjustment in the pipeline. Thus a 
reasonable case can be made that the puzzle of the failure of US trade to improve 
will disappear in a couple of years, even at current exchange rates. 
on the other hand, a case can also be made that the equilibrium dollar 
has in fact declined sharply since the beginning of the decade. There are four 
developments in particular that can be used to justify the need for a lower dollar. 
First, the Third World debt crisis has forced both substantial real depreciations and 
sharp cuts in domestic demand on the part of a number of developing countries. 
This tends to worsen the US current account, other things equal. It is important 
to note however, that the debt crisis affects industrial countries other than the US 
as well. While debt problems thus help explain part of the puzzle of persistent 
US external deficits, they make the persistent German and Japanese current 
surpluses even more puzzling. Second the 1980s have been marked by somewhat 
slower growth than the 1970s in industrial countries other than the US, especially 
in Europe. “Eurosclerosis” has presumably had some effect in depressing the 
demand for US exports. Third, there is the broad issue of US “competitiveness”, 
in terms of such matters as technological leadership and the perceived quality 
of US goods. The 1980s have been marked by an unmistakable decline in US 
technological leadership, as well as increased competition in traditional goods 
from newly industrializing countries. In the 1960s the US was able to maintain 
external balance with much higher unit labour costs than other industrial nations 
due to superior technology and quality, while in the 1970s the US was compelled 
to have rough parity. If this represents a trend rather than a one time convergence 
the US may now need lo have a labour cost advantage in order to sell competitively 
on the world markets. Finally, the series of current deficits since 1981 have made 
the US a net debtor, with an adverse effect on overseas investment income. In the 
early 1980s the US could offset trade deficits of $20-30 billion with net earnings 
from overseas investments: now the investment account is in deficit. This means 
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that the US must run a smaller trade deficit to achieve any given current account 
target, and thus that the dollar must be low enough to give US producers an extra 
cost advantage.
These four effects combined can be used to argue for the need for a 
considerably lower dollar in real terms than in 1980 and perhaps lower than the 
current level. 
My own guess is that while there has been some secular decline in the 
equilibrium dollar, there is still a lot of trade adjustment in the pipeline. I would 
not be surprised if the current level of the dollar were to turn out to be sustainable 
for a long time. Indeed, I would expect the most immediate strains on the US 
– and hence on the world economy – to come from a trade deficit that declines 
rapidly, rather than a persistent trade deficit that refuses to go away. 
The risks of a declining US trade deficit
No discussion of the US trade deficit can be complete without a scenario for 
a “hard landing” in which US chickens come home to roost with a vengeance. 
The usual hard landing story begins with a crisis of confidence that sends the 
dollar into a tailspin, followed by sharply rising interest rates and a hair-raising 
recession. I’d like to conclude his lecture by offering a different scenario. 
This scenario starts from the proposition that the loss of confidence that 
provokes the crisis is not something in the future – it is something that has already 
happened. The hard landing is the result of the working through of forces that 
are already in motion. 
As a starting point it is important to realize that financial markets do not 
actually determine the rate of capital inflow into the United States at any given 
point in time. The rate of capital inflow is by definition equal to the current account 
deficit, and the current account reflects the decisions of firms and households – not 
financial markets – that is, it reflects decisions about which products to buy where 
to source, supply or locate production, and so on. Furthermore, as the experience 
since 1985 has shown, the real decisions that underlie the current account are 
not changed quickly. For the most part, the decisions that will determine the US 
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current account over the next two years have already been made. Even if financial 
markets become very pessimistic about the United States. They cannot do much 
to make the US current account decline faster over the next two years, and thus 
they cannot reduce the rate of capital inflow very much. Conversely, optimism 
about the United States cannot do much to increase capital inflow in the near 
future. 
This may seem like a paradox: capital markets cannot determine capital 
movements. What keeps it from being paradoxical is the role of the exchange rate. 
Suppose that foreigners decide that US assets are a poor investment at current 
prices. What will happen in the short run is not that foreign investment in the 
United States stops, but that the dollar falls until US assets appear to be good 
bargains. or to put it another way the dollar must fall until it is cheap enough 
to induce foreigners to invest enough there to cover our current account deficit. 
This is, of course, not the end of the story. If foreigners lose confidence 
in the United States, and the dollar falls as a result, this will lead over time to 
a reduction in the current account deficit, and therefore to a fall in the rate of 
capital inflow. over time, then, a fall in confidence will be reflected in a decline 
in capital inflows. The process is, however, one that takes place over time. An 
unwillingness of foreigners to invest here shows as a decline in the dollar, and 
only much later as a decline in foreign investment. Putting the issue this way casts 
recent experience in a very different light from the usual. 
Many people have wondered when foreign investors will become unwilling 
to finance the US external deficit, and have marvelled at the fact that large capital 
inflows have continued in recent years. But in fact the loss of confidence has 
already occurred – and it shows in the value of the dollar. We all too easily forget 
that the decline in the dollar since its 1985 peak represents one of the largest real 
exchange rate declines ever experienced by an industrial country. Four years ago 
some economists were arguing that the dollar had moved to a permanently higher 
plateau than its levels of the 1970s, now the dollar is, in real terms weaker than 
at any time in history. 
Arguably, the improvement in the US trade position that we have seen since 
1987 is only the beginning. If the dollar is really weak enough to make the US a 
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highly favourable place to produce then there should be large trade improvements 
still in the pipeline. Some evidence can be found to support this view. US trade 
improvement, according to anecdotal evidence, has been increasingly limited by 
capacity constraints: but high capital goods imports show that domestic firms 
are increasing their capacity and further declines in the trade deficit will follow 
when this capacity comes on line. Foreign direct investment in the US will add 
considerable capacity in many import-competing and some export industries; 
when this capacity comes on line, if the dollar remains weak the result will be 
more an improvement in trade than a displacement of US-owned firms. Although 
econometric models do not suggest dramatic improvement in US trade from here 
on, many economists – myself included – think that the lags in these models are 
far too short and that a large further decrease in the US trade deficit is in prospect 
even at the current exchange rate. 
We now come to the basic problem: US domestic demand is too high 
to be consistent with any large closure of the trade gap. During the 1980s US 
domestic demand has risen rapidly considerably outstripping the rate of growth 
of domestic productive capacity. This was not inflationary precisely because the 
movement of the US into external deficit prevented this rise in demand from 
being translated into an excess demand for domestic goods. In effect, the trade 
deficit provided a safety valve that let out the steam created by rising domestic 
demand, preventing the economy from overheating.
The problem now is that if the dollar has indeed fallen to a level that will 
bring about a substantial further reduction in the trade deficit this safety valve 
will be closed off. Thus there is a substantial risk of inflationary pressures arising 
ironically from too much success on the trade front. 
The point may be made almost as a syllogism. From 1980 to 1985 there 
was a sharp rise in US domestic demand relative to productive capacity, but this 
was accompanied by a rise in the dollar that insured that the excess demand was 
diverted to foreign goods and services. Since 1985, the dollar has fallen sharply, to 
below its 1980 level, but demand has not. Thus the economy is now in a region 




There have been some signs of growing inflationary pressures this year, and 
the US economy is arguably operating at an unemployment rate below the level 
consistent with price stability. However, thus far the effects of the dollar’s decline 
have been mild. The reason is precisely that the declining dollar has had only 
mild effects on the trade deficit, presumably because of the long lags discussed 
above. In fact, we have been lucky not to have had the results we hoped for from 
a declining dollar: had the dollar had a quicker effect there would have been an 
early confrontation between external adjustment and the problem of excessive 
domestic demand. 
I have argued however that there may well be substantial further trade 
adjustment in the pipeline even as the current value of the dollar. If this is right, 
this means that the immediate problem is going to be how to cope with the 
inflationary risks posed by a falling trade deficit. If the US economy is not going 
to risk throwing away the hard-won reduction in inflation achieved during the 
1980s, domestic demand will have to be restrained to make room for the trade 
improvement in progress.
How will this restraint of domestic demand be accomplished? The sensible 
answer is through fiscal restraint. But unfortunately that does not look likely. The 
President-elect has pledged in the crudest of terms not to do anything sensible 
– not to raise taxes, not to rethink the structure of military spending. He will 
eventually probably break these promises, but only under duress, and in the 
atmosphere of crisis. So the burden will fall on monetary policy.
So here is my unconventional hard landing scenario: a crunch brought 
on by the need to restrain the effects of a trade deficit that falls too fast, using 
monetary policy alone. The point is, or course, that this would mean high interest 
rates – easily several percentage points higher that the current rates, pushing 
nominal rates into double digits.
At this point we can again invoke the problem of US internal debt. In 
an environment of much higher interest rates, how will the highly leveraged 
corporate sector of the late 1980s fare? A financial crisis is certainly not 
outlandish.
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It is important to note, however, that this particular hard landing does 
not necessarily involve a recession. Domestic demand would be hard hit by high 
interest rates, but net exports would be high, indeed it is an overheated economy 
that causes the problem, and it would be peculiar if overheating should translate 
into reduce employment. Individual groups – notably those sectors closely tied 
to construction – but on average the employment picture would remain strong. 
If there is a financial crisis, it might be peculiarly divorced from the real economy 
– we might have workers performing on overtime for companies that are being 
administered by the courts.
For what it is worth this is my own guess at the most likely hard landing 
scenario. It could be a difficult situation financially, and if mishandled could 
be turned into a recession, but it is not as unambiguously a catastrophe as the 
speculative attack scenario that has dominated popular discussion.
Some concluding remarks
I’m not sure if this talk has a moral. I’ve tried to describe and explain as best I 
can one of the key problems – perhaps the key problem – of the current world 
economy. I can only hope that the discussion I have provided helped to make 
some sense of an issue that is often surrounded by fog.
Let me conclude, however, on an upbeat note. If there is a silver lining 
to the US trade deficit, it is the fact that it has given the world a crash course 
on interdependence. In 1980 few important politicians in the US thought hard 
about international economics: few Japanese leaders took seriously the need form 
Japan to op-en itself to the world and to take on a leadership role comparable to 
its economic importance. The huge and persistent trade imbalances have changed 
all that – forcing the US to realize that it does not live alone in the world, forcing 
Japan to open its markets for capital and manufactures. We will probably face a 
good deal more economic stress as we try to work our way out of this situation, 
but I don’t expect that the results will be very bad in the long run. Meanwhile, 
with some luck the policy mistakes of the 1980s will have inadvertently created 
the climate for a more cooperative world in the future.
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How convincing is the evidence linking 
education and income?
Orley Ashenfelter1
In recent years the value of our expenditures on schools and colleges has become a 
source of considerable controversy. At one level every politician expresses a belief 
in the importance of the American system of education as an investment in the 
future. For example, Senator William Bradley introduced his recent proposal for 
“Self-reliance Scholarships” by stating (in the Congressional Record, July 25, 1991) 
“. . . a college graduate will earn about 60 percent more than someone with just 
a high school diploma. our economy rewards college graduates because we need 
their skills so deeply.” 
But there is nothing that brings out education’s detractors like proposals 
to spend more money. The most famous recent critic of school expenditures 
has been William Bennett, who was quoted (in USA Today) when he was US 
Secretary of Education three years ago as saying that “Money doesn’t cure 
school problems. We cannot show a strong, positive correlation between 
spending more and getting a better result.” Bennett’s comments were based on 
a survey article by economist Eric Hanushek who concluded, “ . . . increased 
expenditures by themselves offer no overall promise for improving education. 
Further, the components of these expenditures offer little promise. Thus, a simple 
recommendation: Stop requiring and paying for things that do not matter.” 
Such controversy suggests that a review of the evidence on the link between 
education and income may be of more than academic interest at this time. 
1 Forty-second Joseph Fisher Lecture, 12 october 1993. Reprinted in his Labour Economics and 
Productivity, Vol. 6, 1994. The author is indebted to David Card, Alan Krueger, Tom Lemieux, and 
David Zimmerman for discussions and assistance in the preparation of this paper. 
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I must also admit at the outset that I have an ulterior motive in selecting 
this topic. The recent research on the link between schooling and income provides 
a fascinating example of the new emphasis on credibility in empirical economics. 
This new research style began with the study of problems in the labour market, 
but it has also influenced other social scientists and even some policy makers. As 
we shall see, this research style emphasises the importance of collecting new data 
and of finding and creating actual or natural experiments that will permit us to 
make some credible inferences about the effect of public policy changes. 
Schooling and income: The simple relationship 
No one doubts that college graduates earn more than high school graduates, or 
that high school graduates earn more than high school dropouts. In 1987, for 
example, the average weekly earnings of white males between the ages of 26 and 
65 who had 16 years of education was some 40 per cent to 50 per cent greater 
than the average weekly earnings of those with exactly 12 years of schooling. 
Figure 42.1 shows the relationship between weekly earnings and age for 
high school graduates (H) and college graduates (C) in 1987. It is obvious that 
college graduates earn more than high school graduates at all ages, but this 
difference is especially great in the years of middle age. 
Figure 42.1  The relationship between weekly earnings and age of high school   
and college graduates 
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But how are we to interpret these differences in earnings? Is it not possible 
that those who obtain high school or college degrees would earn more than other 
workers even if they had not taken the time and spent the money to obtain them? 
Schooling and income: The ideal experiment
In principle the only way to answer this question definitely is to perform an 
experiment. In such an experiment different groups of students would be 
randomly assigned to different educational levels without regard to their ability or 
general background. Years later we would compare the incomes of these students. 
on average the only differences among the students would be the level of their 
schooling. Contrasts of the earnings of the various groups would, with a large 
enough sample, provide an entirely credible estimate of the effect of schooling 
on earnings. 
of course, the experiment I have described has not been performed, 
and so we do not have any entirely credible estimates of the effect of schooling 
on earnings. Some people will object that such an experiment would, even in 
principle, be morally objectionable because it would deny a potentially valuable 
education to those who might otherwise have obtained it. The way to meet this 
objection, of course, is to make sure that no one is denied access to anything. For 
example, in most developing countries inadequate finances make it impossible 
to educate all those students who wish to attend secondary schools. If students 
were admitted to secondary schools, in part, on a randomised basis it would 
be possible to perform a credible experiment that would not be objectionable. 
When people must be denied access to educational opportunities in any case, 
why not use a randomised allocation system so that we may learn from their 
experiences? 
Although many people are not aware of it, there has been a quiet revolution 
in the extent to which randomised trials have been used to evaluate the role of 
education and training in the determination of earnings in the US. The National 
Supported Work Demonstration in the mid-1970s showed that worker training 
programs could be implemented using a classical randomised design and that the 
resulting data provided very credible evidence of the success (and failures) of these 
programs. Indeed, the results from these classical experiments have served as an 
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impetus to develop more credible econometric methods for evaluating the impact 
of training programs on worker earnings.2 
Despite these advances, however, we do not yet have any evidence on 
the role of education in the determination of earnings that is based on the 
classical experimental methods. Instead, we must necessarily look elsewhere for 
convincing non-experimental evidence. one way to look for this evidence is to use 
comparisons between workers who have similar genetic and family backgrounds, 
but who differ in educational levels. A systematic correlation between the 
educational differences and income differences of such workers is one place to 
look for evidence of the link between income and schooling. 
Intra-family schooling-income relations: Fathers, sons, brothers
In some recent research David Zimmerman and I have studied differences in 
the schooling level of fathers from the schooling levels of their sons and the 
relationship of these schooling differences to income differences between fathers 
and sons. Figure 42.2 is a scatter diagram that shows this relationship. on the 
vertical axis is a measure (in ratio or logarithmic scale) of the difference between 
the hourly wage rate of each father and his son. on the horizontal axis is the 
difference between the years of schooling of the father and his son. Each point 
on the diagram represents one father-son pair, and there are 232 such pairs in the 
National Longitudinal Survey that we have used. 
As one would expect in an economy where the average schooling level has 
been growing, fathers have about four fewer years of schooling than sons. As one 
would also expect in a society which has imperfect generational mobility, fathers 
with higher education levels tend to have sons with higher education levels. (The 
correlation coefficient is about .4.) This suggests the possibility that the simple 
correlation between the income and schooling of the sons may be the result of 
the fact that better educated sons also have better connected fathers. If this were 
the only reason for the correlation between the income and schooling of sons we 
would know that the returns to schooling were negligible. 
2 See Robert Lalonde (1986), “Evaluating the Econometric Evaluations of Training Prams with 
Experimental Data”, The American Economic Review, 76 (4): 604-620, September.
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Figure 42.2: The relationship between the difference in wages & the difference   
in schooling of fathers and sons
As Figure 42.2 indicates, however, this cannot be the entire story. After all, 
the diagram indicates that there still remains a substantial correlation between the 
difference in the education level of the father from the son and the difference in 
their incomes. If we compare two sons who both have well educated fathers, the 
son who is better educated has the higher income. In short, more education for 
the son increases the son’s income regardless of the father’s education level. (The 
slope of the best fitting line in these data indicates that a one year difference in 
the education levels of father and son translates into about a 5 per cent difference 
in wages rates.) This implies that the returns to schooling are not simply a result 
of the fact that sons with more schooling have fathers with more schooling too. 
Zimmerman and I have also studied the correlation of differences in the 
incomes of brothers with differences in the schooling level of brothers. When 
we compare two brothers from the same family we find that the better educated 
brother’s income averages about 5 per cent more for each extra year of schooling 
he has. In short, although some part of the correlation between income and 
schooling may be due to family background characteristics, the intra-family 
correlation between income and schooling indicates that most of the relationship 
between income and schooling must be due to something else. 
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Intra-family schooling-income relations: Identical twins
Although there have been surprisingly few attempts to measure the returns 
to schooling by the comparison of education and income differences within 
families, there is one study of identical twins which remains the most important 
effort to date. In this work Behrman, Hrubec, Taubman, and Wales find that 
the simple relationship between schooling and income in their data suggests 
that each additional year of education adds about 8 per cent to the income 
of a twin. However, a comparison of the twins alone indicates that the better 
educated of two twins earns no more than 2 per cent extra for each additional 
year of schooling. In short, Behrman, Hrubec, Taubman, and Wales find 
that the differences in education levels between identical twins are virtually 
uncorrelated with the differences in their income levels. This finding, if correct, 
is the single most important piece of empirical evidence suggesting that the 
observed relationship between schooling and income may be a result of genetic 
or family background differences and is not a result of any real increase in the 
skills of better educated workers. 
The Behrman, et. al. research has been criticised on the grounds that 
schooling differences between twins are likely to be very small. As a result, the 
measured schooling differences between twins may be a result of measurement 
error.3 To see the effect that this will have on the results of a comparison of 
schooling differences with earnings differences, consider the case where all twins 
have identical education levels. In this situation any measured differences in 
the education levels of twins will be entirely a result of measurement error. The 
result will be that measured schooling differences will be unrelated to earnings 
differences. Instead of indicating that true schooling differences are unrelated to 
earnings differences, this result would only indicate that the data on twins do 
not provide the right natural experiment for examining the issue. In sum, the 
Behrman, et. al. results may be consistent with a considerable effect of schooling 
on earnings, but this issue cannot be resolved at the present time because there is 
no independent measure of the error in the Behrman, et. al. survey data. 
3 This point is due to Zvi Griliches (1979), “Sibling Models and Data in Economics: Beginnings of a 
Survey”, The Journal of Political Economy, 87(5): 537-564, october.
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It appears that the only way to resolve this issue is to obtain new data 
on twins and to attempt some independent validation of the reliability of the 
measured education data. During the past summer my colleague Alan Krueger 
and I organised a team of graduate students to collect new data on twins in 
order to settle this issue. To do this at reasonable cost we participated in the 
research group that gathered data from the twins who assemble each year for the 
National Twins Festival in Twinsburg, ohio. Much to our surprise we are able 
to administer the Current Population Survey to nearly 500 twins in a brief, but 
intensive, three day period. In order to validate the data on the education level 
of each twin we separated the twins for the purposes of our interviews and asked 
each twin about his (or her) own education level as well as the education level 
of his (or her) twin. 
our main findings are displayed in Figure 42.3. As before, this is a scatter 
diagram where each point represents a single pair of twins. The vertical axis 
represents the difference (in ratio terms) between the incomes of identical twins, 
while the horizontal axis represents the difference between the schooling levels 
of the twins. As one would expect, the diagram indicates (by the concentration 
of observations at zero on the horizontal axis) that in the most typical case the 
twins have the same education level. The diagram also makes clear that there is 
a considerable correlation between income differences and schooling differences. 
In these data the better educated twin earns about 7 per cent more for each extra 
year he (or she) attains compared to his (or her) twin. 
We also find considerable evidence of measurement error in the data 
on education levels. (overall, the schooling level reported by one twin has 
a correlation of about .9 with the schooling level reported by the other twin.) 
Using a standard procedure, Krueger and I find that the return to schooling 
estimated by a comparison of intra-family education differences for twins may be 
as small as one-half the return that would be estimated with data that contained 
no measurement error. In short, the results of our new study of twins indicates 
that, on average, an additional year of education has a very sizeable effect on the 
earnings of twins and may be as large as 14 per cent for each additional year. 
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Figure 42.3: The difference in the LN wage versus the difference in education:   
Identical twins
Schooling and income: Natural experiments 
The evidence from the study of intra-family differences in education and their 
correlation with intra-family differences in income strongly supports the hypothesis 
that additional schooling is responsible for increases in worker earnings. Despite 
the consistency of this evidence, none of it represents the equivalent of an ideal 
experiment. In the past few years Joshua Angrist and Alan Krueger have attempted 
to find a natural experiment that would provide the kind of information that 
an ideal experiment would provide. To do this they have attempted to locate 
exogenous events that might be expected to alter the schooling decisions of some 
people, but which would not be expected to independently alter their income. 
Naturally, finding such events is difficult. 
In one paper Angrist and Krueger4 observe that there is a relationship 
between the quarter in which an individual is born and the mean level of schooling 
that the individual attains. Angrist and Krueger argue that compulsory schooling 
laws are a natural explanation for why individuals born in the first quarter of the 
 
 
4 Joshua Angrist and Alan Krueger, “Does Compulsory School Attendance Affect Schooling and 
Earnings?” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 1991.
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year attain fewer years of education than individuals born later in the year. They 
observe that school districts typically require that students turn age six by January 
1st of the year they enter school. Thus, students born early in the year enter school 
at an older age. Since compulsory schooling laws permit students to drop out as 
soon as they attain age 16 students born early in the year may drop out of school 
with fewer years completed than is the case for those born later in the year. 
In fact, Angrist and Krueger find that workers born in the first quarter of 
the year typically average about one-tenth year less schooling than workers that 
are born in the other three quarters of the year. Remarkably, these same workers 
also typically earn about one per cent less per week than other workers. In short, 
the accident of being born in the first quarter of the year is typically associated 
with a lower schooling level and a lower earnings level. The implied return to 
schooling is about 10 per cent per additional year of education attained. 
Conclusion
of course, compulsory schooling laws affect primarily high school completion 
rates and may be of little assistance in evaluating the returns to a college education. 
In a subsequent paper Angrist and Krueger5 explore the role that the Vietnam era 
draft lottery had on education levels. During the Vietnam era a public lottery 
was used to randomly assign eligibility status for the draft to different birth dates 
during the year. Individuals were thus eligible for the draft according to their 
birth dates. Angrist and Krueger find that the relationship between birth date and 
schooling level is the same as the relationship between birth date and earnings. 
Again, it appears that an event likely to be independent of the determination of 
earnings (an individual’s date of birth) has influenced both worker schooling levels 
and worker earning levels in the same direction. This is still further evidence that 
the relationship between schooling and income results from a casual connection 
between education and the determination of earnings. 
5 Joshua Angrist and Alan Krueger, “Estimating the Payoff to Schooling using the Vietnam-era Draft 
Lottery”, unpublished paper, August 1991.
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I began this paper with the question, how convincing is the evidence 
linking education and income? Here is my answer: Pretty convincing. If I had to 
bet on what an ideal experiment would indicate, I would bet that it would show 
that better educated workers earn more. 
There is, however, a great deal more to be learned about the role of 
education in the determination of income. For one thing, relatively little is 
known about how the quality of education determines earnings. This is an area 
were the experimental method can be used extensively to study the role of class 
size and other educational innovations on learning. Indeed, it already has been 
used in Tennessee, where students (and teachers) were randomly assigned to 
different class sizes within the same schools and then differences in the scores of 
these students on standardised tests were studied.6 The results of this experiment, 
which are strikingly credible in an area dominated by work that is not very 
credible, indicated that class size was clearly linked to test performance. Whether 
this result can be duplicated elsewhere, and whether the costs of such alterations 
are worth the benefits, are important topics for further research. 




The role of the NAFTA debate in  
US trade policy
Anne O. Krueger1
one of the main driving forces in the economic history of the past millennium 
has been the increasing integration of the world economy. Not only have 
technical discoveries and innovation led to greatly reduced costs of transport and 
communication, but those reduced costs have in turn led to an increasingly global 
market place. Further integration has permitted increased productivity in a wide 
range of industries: specialised parts and components can reduce assembly costs 
in many lines of activity; when specialised parts can be made for a wider market, 
costs of production fall; and increased competition in a larger market spurs many 
firms on to greater technical and economic efficiency. 
The subject of this paper is US trade policy, and the role of the NAFTA 
debate in it. While that subject might seem far removed from long-term trends in 
world economic growth, it is not. Economic growth and productivity increases 
have depended, and will continue to depend, on an open multilateral trading 
system. And, the United States is important enough in the world economy that 
American trade policy is crucially important to the viability of the entire trading 
system. 
My thesis is that the world economy (in part because of American 
schizophrenia, but also in part because other countries are insufficiently convinced 
of the importance of commitment to the open multilateral system) is dangerously 
close to the brink – the open multilateral trading system is in danger, and the 
 
1 Forty-third Joseph Fisher Lecture, 7 october 1994. Reprinted in Australian Economic Papers, 34(65): 
5-16, June. The author is indebted to Professor Richard Snape for valuable discussions on many of the 
issues raised here, and also for comments on a draft of this lecture. She is also grateful to the American 
Enterprise Institute which financed some of the research on which this lecture is based.
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threat is protectionism, hiding behind regionalism. Should the threat become 
reality, all will be losers, and an engine of growth that has served the world very 
well, especially for the past half century, will be lost. But the biggest losers will 
be the smaller trading countries, whose bilateral bargaining power with the large 
trading nations will be small. 
one of the propositions on which there is most unanimity among 
economists is that, in almost all circumstances, interventions with trade do 
not increase economic efficiency or well-being. Many of the cases for which 
protection (or support of export industries) is advocated are self-serving pleas by 
vested interest groups. Even when there is a legitimate purpose – such as national 
defence – being advocated, measures (such as storage of critical materials or 
mothballing factories) are usually found to be low-cost in comparison with the 
costs of maintaining ongoing production. 
Despite the continuing validity of that proposition, the GATT (whose 
Articles were written largely by economists), which has underpinned the open 
multilateral trading system for the past half century, was founded on brilliant 
principles of political economy, but relatively poor economics. That is, the GATT 
has operated to liberalise the world’s trading system by facilitating rounds of 
multilateral tariff negotiations in which each country reduced its own tariffs in 
order to gain ‘concessions’ from other trading nations. 
This was brilliant political economy because the promise of reduced tariffs in 
other countries put pressure on each country’s export interests to provide political 
support for the results of each round. It was poor economics, because tariff reductions 
benefit most those in the country where the tariff is being reduced. However, the 
rhetoric of multilateral tariff negotiations was and is that of ‘concessions’: each 
country is said to ‘gain’ insofar as markets for its exports are open. Unfortunately, 
over time, people – including trade negotiators themselves – began to believe it. 
The simplest approach to an understanding of the present situation and 
current dangers confronting the open multilateral trading system is to start 
with the Great Depression, and review the evolution of the system from that 
point through the establishment of the GATT, and successive rounds of trade 
liberalisation, to the present. 
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Although it is certainly true that nineteenth century economic progress 
was spurred by the liberalisation of trade (with the adoption of free trade first 
by England and then by France), for present purposes I can start with the Great 
Depression. After the recovery from the First World War and the economic 
growth of the 1920s, the world plunged into the Depression of the 1930s. The 
Depression was certainly intensified, if not caused, by ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ 
policies of increasing tariffs and competitive devaluations. In the United States, 
the infamous Smoot-Hawley tariff act of 1930 raised tariffs in the United States to 
extremely high levels contrasted with tariffs earlier. And, as country after country 
abandoned the gold standard, currency devaluations ‘exported’ depression from 
one country to another. 
When those British and American economists charged with providing 
a blueprint for the post war economic system set to work during the Second 
World War, their memories of the Great Depression were vivid, and they viewed 
their task in large part as ensuring that there could not be a repeat of the 1930s. 
Their vision, as set forth in Bretton Woods documents,2 was that an international 
organisation3 would serve to coordinate trade and other policies in such a manner 
that the competitive devaluations and ‘beggar thy neighbour’ policies of the 1930s 
could never happen again. 
The GATT system was to be one in which all signatories would adhere to 
the principles of an open multilateral trading system. The system was to be non 
discriminatory (although 100 per cent preferential trading agreements ‘across 
substantially all’ sectors of the economy were to be countenanced). Countries 
agreed in almost all circumstances (the exceptions being short-term emergencies 
and developing countries’ difficulties) to avoid quantitative restrictions on trade; 
tariffs were to be virtually the only form of intervention with imports except 
 
 
2 The Bretton Woods conference in fact produced blueprints for the International Monetary Fund (to 
coordinate exchange rates and the international monetary system) and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (to provide an institution to support international capital flows). The 
ITo charter was not completed until a later date, but it was certainly contemplated at Bretton Woods, 
and it (and GATT) was regarded as essential for maintaining an open trading system.
3 This was initially intended to be the International Trade organization, but in fact only part of the ITo 
charter was used. The GATT – General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade – was approved to deal with the 
trading system; its articles were a subset of the ITo charter, which covered a much wider range of issues 
than the final GATT.
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in exceptional circumstances. Countries would come together to negotiate 
reciprocal tariff reductions, and then ‘bind’ those reductions under international 
law, agreeing not subsequently to raise tariff rates except in unusual circumstances.
The United States was the pre-eminent economic power in the immediate 
post-war years, with an estimated 43 per cent of world GDP, and a quarter of the 
world’s trade. As such, American leadership and support for the open multilateral 
system was crucial to the emergence of the system. And US policy was entirely 
supportive. Motivated in part by foreign policy concern especially the belief that 
recovery of the economies greatly damaged by war was essential for Cold War 
reasons, America supported the GATT and led successive rounds of multilateral 
trade negotiations. Although foreign policy was the dominant motive, however, 
there was little domestic opposition to free open liberal trading policies in the 
United States. Indeed, the US had the most open trading system in the world, 
one of the very few convertible currencies, a relatively low tariff contrasted with 
other countries in the decade after the Second World War. 
A first round of multilateral tariff reductions took place almost immediately 
after GATT was established. Thereafter, seven successive rounds of tariff reductions 
gradually reduced tariffs among all the industrial countries. From an estimated 
average level of 40 per cent in the late 1940s, the average tariff rate on imports 
into developed countries is estimated to have dropped around six per cent by 
1980. Regrettably, until the 1980s, trade liberalisation was confined largely to the 
developed world, as the developing countries initially chose to attempt to promote 
the economic development through inward-looking policies and protection of 
domestic industries against competition from imports. It was only in the 1980s 
that developing countries in large numbers began reversing trade policies and 
started reintegrating with the world economy. 
Starting in the late 1940s, there followed a ‘golden era’ of expansion and 
growth in income and living standards enjoyed by much of the world. Despite 
their failure to liberalise their own economies, developing countries benefitted 
from the buoyant state of the world economy and their own efforts to increase 
educational attainments and social welfare so that their growth accelerated. 
Meanwhile, industrial countries’ growth reached rates never before witnessed over 
a sustained period. The quarter century from 1948 produced a rate of growth of 
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real world GNP faster than the rate estimated to have been realised in the single 
most rapidly growing country in the nineteenth century! 
There was under way a ‘virtuous’ circle. Rapid economic growth created 
an atmosphere in which further trade liberalisation was politically relatively easy 
and economically painless; further trade liberalisation in turn spurred further 
economic growth. 
Before turning, to subsequent developments that paved the way for 
the present difficulties, it is useful for later reference to note the evolution of 
preferential trading arrangements during the ‘golden era’. The international 
trading system evolved almost entirely along multilateral lines. Although, 
as noted, there was a GATT provision for 100 per cent preferential trading 
arrangements, most efforts at such arrangements met with little success. The only 
exception was the European Community (and EFTA). The United States, which 
staunchly opposed most preferential arrangements, supported the formation of 
the EC and European integration on the theory that economic integration would 
reduce the likelihood of further hostilities among European nations. Moreover, as 
trade barriers among the EC members were reduced, the US also supported tariff 
reductions through GATT rounds, so that tariffs on imports of manufactures 
from outside the Community were falling as internal trade barriers were falling 
even more rapidly. And it was not until the 1980s that the protectionism inherent 
in European agricultural policies became highly visible and costly in the world 
economy. other preferential trading arrangements basically failed. Latin America, 
East Africa, and a number of other preferential groupings commenced, but some 
were disbanded and others languished. Consequently, the open multilateral 
trading system appeared secure and academics and policy makers alike turned 
their attention to aspects of the international system other than preferential 
arrangements. 
Turning then to the 1980s, the decade began with a highly integrated 
economy. Although the first and second oil price increases had been major shocks 
to the system, economic growth had resumed in the late 1970s, albeit with 
high rates of inflation, and when the second oil price increase occurred, most 
developed nations took anti inflationary measures (in contrast to policies after 
the first increase). 
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The world entered the decade with a degree of integration between national 
economies much greater than at any earlier time in history. As already mentioned, 
tariffs had averaged around 40 per cent in the immediate post-war years, while 
transport costs had averaged around 25 per cent of the f.o.b. value of exports. In 
all, this amounted to an average level of protection for each country’s import-
competing industries of around 65 per cent. By 1980, average tariffs were around 
ten per cent (and still falling), while transport costs had fallen to an average of 
eight per cent. Adding the two together, the total insulation averaged around 18 
per cent, representing a drop of more than two thirds over three decades. 
That drop had, of course, facilitated the growth in trade and productivity. 
It also, however, made producers in national economies much more sensitive to 
developments in the global economy. 
Two critical changes had already begun to take place, which had strong 
effects on American trade policy. America had been entirely successful in her 
post-war goals, in that Europe and Japan had achieved very rapid growth and re-
established their place in the global economy. Their very rapid growth, however, 
had naturally meant the declining relative importance of the US, to which there 
was already some degree of political reaction. Although America was still the pre-
eminent economic power, the degree of pre-eminence had greatly diminished, as 
Japanese and German exports were almost as large as the American, and the US 
share of world GNP had dropped from the 40 to the 20 per cent range. Related 
to that change, the fixed exchange rate system, which many had termed a ‘dollar-
standard’ system, had been abandoned in the early 1970s, as differential rates of 
inflation made it impossible to maintain the fixed-rate system. 
When the 1980s began, these events had several interrelated consequences. 
First, there was a severe worldwide recession which began after the second oil 
price increase. Second, the US dollar began to appreciate significantly in both 
nominal and real terms vis-à-vis major trading partners. Dollar appreciation 
put tremendous pressure on US tradeable industries, while at the same time, 
employment was rising rapidly. 
The major factor leading to appreciation of the dollar was the fiscal-
monetary mix of US macroeconomic policies after the Reagan tax cuts of 1981. 
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Those cuts had left a large fiscal deficit, while at the same time monetary policy 
was tight. The result was a sizeable capital inflow (so that the fiscal deficit was in 
effect financed in large part by foreigners through the current account deficit). 
With the severity of the recession, surging imports and high interest rates, 
many Americans clamoured for protection, instead of recognising the situation 
for the macroeconomic phenomenon that it was. At first, this increase in 
protectionist pressure went largely unheeded because the Reagan administration 
was widely believed to be supportive of free trade. 
However, many members of the American Congress were under severe 
pressure from their constituents and genuinely distressed at the burgeoning 
current account deficit. Believing the Reagan administration unwilling to counter 
the flood of imports, and viewing increase protection as the logical answer, they 
began seeking ways in which they could address the problem. 
Like other countries, the US had long had a trade law which provided for 
the imposition of duties in cases where other countries’ exporters were deemed 
guilty of ‘dumping’ or where foreign governments were subsidising exports. Anti-
dumping (selling below cost) and countervailing duty (against subsidised exports) 
law was referred to as ‘administered trade’ law and there were provisions within 
GATT for anti-dumping and countervailing duty processes. In the American 
case, individual firms, industry representatives, or the government itself could 
register a complaint, under which the US Department of Commerce4 entered 
into an investigation of the ‘dumping’ allegation while the US International Trade 
Commission had the responsibility of ascertaining whether imports had been the 
‘major cause’ of material injury to the import competing industry. 
Administered trade law had been occasionally, but infrequently, used in 
the 1950-80 period. Congress, in its impatience with imports, and believing 
that foreign competition must be ‘unfair’, began amending the law to make the 
standard of proof for injury weaker, while simultaneously the procedures used to 
ascertain foreign firms’ costs came to be regarded as biased. 
4 The US Treasury had been charged with investigating costs. However, perhaps believing that the Treasury 
was ‘too sympathetic’ to foreign producers. Congress shifted that responsibility to the Department of 
Commerce when it was seeking to make anti-dumping and countervailing duty procedures more restrictive.
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The threat of administered trade law was sufficient to make firms in other 
countries willing to seek other solutions, while the US administration also viewed 
the trade remedies with suspicion. What resulted was a series of ‘voluntary export 
restraints’ (VERs), under which foreign governments agreed to restrict the volume 
of their exports of automobiles, steel, machine tools and other products to the 
US market in exchange for the withdrawal of the administered trade complaint. 
over time during the 1980s, US trade law was further modified. In 
addition to negotiating VERs, the administration began negotiating – especially 
with Japan, Korea and Taiwan – with respect to market opening, demanding that 
there be a designated target share of imports in that country’s market. In 1988, 
Congress enacted a trade law in which USTR was instructed to examine other 
countries’ trading practices, to ascertain whether countries were systematically 
‘unfair’. When they were, USTR was to designate the country an ‘unfair trader’, 
indicating the objectionable practices. Were those practices not changed within 
a specified time period, USTR was instructed to impose retaliatory trade barriers 
against imports from the offending country. Congress also asked USTR to 
examine other countries’ treatment of intellectual property rights, and to designate 
countries with unsatisfactory and inadequate protection for intellectual property. 
These moves, it should be noted, diverged further and further from the 
notion of an open multilateral trading system. Anti-dumping and countervailing 
duty procedures might be administered with something of a bias, but they were 
authorised within the GATT charter. Voluntary import expansion agreements 
were bilateral, and there were a number of factors (including the US’s ability to 
choose the industry it wanted to support) that resulted in the process being tilted 
toward favouring American over other countries’ exports. Bilateral bargaining 
with Japan and Korea was clearly outside the GATT arrangement, and Super-301 
was of highly doubtful GATT legality and certainly bilateral in its approach. 
Thus, the US was increasing its protection and diverging further from GATT 
norms throughout the 1980s. A widespread popular belief that there were ‘unfair’ 
trading practices on the part of America’s trading partners gave political support 
for these actions. While that was happening, another set of events was also to have 
important ramifications for the evolution of trade policy. Late in 1982, there had 
for long been scheduled a Ministerial meeting of GATT. The new United States 
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Trade Representative and his delegation went to that meeting advocating a new 
round of multilateral trade negotiations, without having previously persuaded 
other countries’ representatives of its desirability and of an appropriate agenda. 
The rebuff received by the US delegation led the USTR to announce that the US 
would proceed with other ‘like-minded’ countries further to liberalise trade, and 
form a club of ‘Super-GATT’ members who would openly support the GATT 
but engage in further integration among themselves. It was his stated belief that 
the benefits of further liberalisation would be evident to all, and would result in 
pressures for other countries to join. This proposal was seen as a way around the 
roadblock perceived at GATT to further negotiations through that forum. 
USTR therefore enunciated US policy as consisting of a ‘two-track’ 
approach, under which the US would work through and support the open 
multilateral system as much as possible, and then go further with countries 
wishing to enter into free trade agreements with it. At the time, little attention 
was paid to this pronouncement, although, virtually unnnoticed by the rest of the 
world, Israel did sign a free trade agreement with the US in 1985. 
Finally, in 1986, delegates met in Montevideo, and agreed upon an 
ambitious agenda for a new round of trade negotiations – the Uruguay Round. 
A number of items not previously considered by GATT were to be included in 
the negotiations – a protocol for trade in telecommunications, all services, and, 
indeed, even agriculture (which had long been neglected in trade negotiations, 
after the important initiative of Australia and the Cairns group). 
There were, thus, three strands to US trade policy by the late 1980s. on one 
hand, there was the stated commitment to the open multilateral trading system 
and the Uruguay Round. There was also the enunciated principle of willingness 
to negotiate free trade agreements with ‘like minded’ free traders. Finally, there 
was the protectionist pressure that was increasingly manifest in bilateral trade 
negotiations. 
As these three, somewhat conflicting, strands were evolving, the Canadian and 
American authorities agreed to negotiate a bilateral free trade agreement. Such an 
agreement certainly appeared consistent with the USTR notion of ‘Super-GATT’, 
and at any event appeared to be between two countries with a long common border, 
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already very low tariffs, and very complimentary trade patterns. Seventy per cent 
of Canada’s exports were destined for the US, and most were primary commodities 
for which American tariffs were in any event very low. A major Canadian motive 
for seeking an FTA with the US was to avoid the damages of the administered trade 
remedies in US law – an objective which was at best partially achieved under the 
agreement. But an FTA agreement with Canada did not appear at all inconsistent 
with the Uruguay Round and the strengthening of the GATT. 
Then came the surprise! Mexico had until the mid-1980s had inward-
looking trade policies like many other developing countries. Starting around 
1985, however, the Mexican government undertook a series of major and dramatic 
policy reforms, including the elimination of quantitative restrictions, joining 
GATT, reducing tariffs, and overhauling incentives and government interventions 
in the domestic market. For years, the official (and unofficial) attitude toward the 
United States had been one of deep suspicion, and it had been unthinkable that 
Mexico might seek closer trading ties. 
However, for a variety of reasons, President Salinas reversed that position, 
announcing the desire of the Mexican government to enter into negotiations with 
the US and Canada to join the free trade area. For foreign policy reasons, the US 
immediately agreed. 
To understand what followed, it is necessary first to review some of the 
underlying economics. From a Mexican perspective, more than 70 per cent each 
of exports and imports were with the United States, and there was no doubt it 
would be to Mexico’s advantage to join the FTA, in large part because it would 
‘lock in’ the policy reforms already made. The average height of remaining 
Mexican tariff protection was around ten per cent. Additional Mexican motives 
for seeking membership in the FTA included the desire to attract more foreign 
direct investment at a time when investors appeared to be paying more attention 
to the economies in transition in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
From the US perspective, about five per cent of US trade was with Mexico. 
Although Mexico has a much greater population than Canada, with about 80 
million people, the low per capita income in Mexico meant that the Mexican 
market was about the same size as the Canadian one. The average US tariff on 
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Mexican goods was around four per cent, so there it was difficult to believe that 
there could be any serious ‘threats’ to US industries from an FTA with Mexico. 
Based on the observed average tariff rates on each others’ goods – ten per 
cent for Mexico and four per cent for the US – it appeared that there could 
be little additional competition for American goods in the US market, while 
American producers would gain somewhat more in Mexico. Comparison of unit 
labour costs (wage rates divided by productivity) showed US costs to be about five 
per cent lower than Mexican. While quite clearly there would be some differences 
across industries, there was little reason to believe that Mexican competition 
could in any macroeconomic sense give US firms major adjustment problems. 
Moreover, if as the Mexicans expected, foreign direct investment into Mexico 
was spurred by the FTA, then the US current account vis-a-vis Mexico should have 
turned more positive – with positive impetus to the US macroeconomic balance. 
To the extent that the rate of Mexican economic growth would be accelerated by 
joining the FTA, it could be expected that that additional growth would be a net 
benefit for US industries. 
Thus, economic analysis strongly suggested that the net impact of an FTA 
with Mexico on US industries would be positive, but probably relatively small.5 
When, after the NAFTA agreement was negotiated, it was to be ratified by 
Congress, a heated political debate of major proportions arose. 
From the viewpoint of international economists, the proper subject of 
debate should have been the consistency of NAFTA with the open multilateral 
trading system. The desirability of a preferential trading arrangement within the 
western hemisphere might have been questioned, unless assurances were given 
and there was a clear understanding that such an arrangement was well embedded 
within the GATT.6
5 Many Americans had been concerned by the presence of many illegal Mexican immigrants in the United 
States. It could be argued that the true American choice was between permitting Mexican goods into 
the US, or having large continuing flows of migrants. In fact, this fundamental choice was never well 
articulated during the NAFTA debate. Thus, while it probably should have been the compelling issue, it 
is ignored for present purposes.
6 There were a number of reasons for there to be misgivings on this score, including the ways in which 
certain sectors were exempted from the FTA and also the way in which rules of origin were negotiated.
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In fact, however, the political protest to NAFTA arose from those same 
protectionist pressures that had resulted in Super-301, the relaxation of criteria 
for anti-dumping and countervailing duty findings, and bilateral bargaining with 
Japan, Korea, and other countries. opposition to NAFTA was strong among 
those in the labour movement (despite the fact that all except one of over 200 
studies of the impact of NAFTA showed net – small – employment gains in 
America), those concerned with the US current account deficit and who thought 
that the US ‘could not compete against low wages’, those who believed that there 
would be ‘unfair’ trade, environmental groups, and others. 
Instead- of constituting a debate over the desirability of an open multilateral 
system relative to preferential (and therefore more bilateral) trading arrangements, 
therefore, the NAFTA debate became one in which those supporting open 
multilateral trade were in support of NAFTA. In the final analysis, the NAFTA 
debate was the first time in the post-war period that there had been a major, head-
on, confrontation between free traders and protectionists. And, as you know, the 
free traders won by a small margin, although President Clinton conceded some 
key issues to protectionist lobbies (especially in Florida) in order to obtain the 
necessary support. 
Having debated the free trade-protection issue, rather than the preferential 
trading arrangement issue, there still remains the key question as to how NAFTA 
will evolve. Will it be the GATT plus arrangement that the USTR envisaged in 
1982? or will it be a preferential trading arrangement in which the US diverges 
further and further from its commitment to an open multilateral trading system? 
Before addressing that issue, however, the second strand in the complex 
evolution of the trading system must be considered. That is, the conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round. Even as the NAFTA agreement was being debated, and finally 
passed, by the American Congress, the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations was 
finally concluded late in 1993. 
There can be little question but that the NAFTA negotiations were at 
the least a distraction to the Round. And the American Congress’ passage of 
‘Super-301’ certainly signalled the ambivalence of the American government 
to the GATT. Nonetheless, in the end, the results of the Round provide much 
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promise for the future of the world trading system. It is estimated conservatively 
that world GNP will be increased by $500 billion annually by 2002 as the effects 
of the Round’s agreements are felt in international markets. 
Further tariff cuts are to bring the average tariff level among the industrial 
countries to 3.8 per cent (from the present six per cent level). Agriculture is for 
the first time to be brought under GATT discipline, and agricultural subsidies 
are to be constrained. A number of services agreements were reached. Agreements 
were reached covering trade-related investment measures and intellectual property 
rights. Dispute settlement procedures within the GATT were streamlined and 
strengthened. Finally, a World Trade organization, with a strengthened Secretariat, 
is to be established, encompassing GATT and also the other agreements reached 
in the Uruguay Round. 
An optimist could, therefore, conclude that the reassertion of the 
importance of the open multilateral trading system embodied in the Uruguay 
Round documents provided the basis for optimism that world economic growth 
could resume the virtuous circle that was witnessed in the 1950s and 1960s. 
That is certainly a possibility. NAFTA and the EU could evolve along 
outward-looking lines, becoming ‘GATT-plus’ organisations along the lines 
initially envisaged by USTR. But there are dangers that events could proceed 
in different directions. There are fears, for example, that any significant surges 
of imports from Mexico might be met by the application of administered trade 
law to imports from East Asia and other countries. In that case, increased trade 
with Mexico, especially when it occurred in sensitive products, would be offset by 
reduced trade with other countries. Aside from the economic inefficiencies that 
would result, such trade diversion would surely be a source of friction between 
the US and East Asian traders, and would increase their motivation to form a 
regional trading bloc as a defensive measure against US protection. 
Aside from such an outright protectionist scenario, there are also dangers 
that the existence of NAFTA – especially if it is widened to include more Latin 
American countries – would serve as a ‘diversion of attention’ for the United 
States from the open multilateral system. US frustration with trading partners 
who no longer feel impelled to placate the US at every turn could lead to the false 
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conclusion that the US could ‘go it alone’ in the Westem hemisphere. That, of 
course, cannot happen overnight, but the risk of gradual erosion over time should 
not be overlooked. 
There are also concems about the future evolution of NAFTA. Questions 
have been raised about the emergence of a ‘hub-spoke’ system, whereby each 
new potential entrant to NAFTA must negotiate a deal with the United States, 
with even less bargaining power than the preceding entrant. In that scenario, the 
US would become the ‘hub’ country, with free trade agreements with Canada, 
Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Caribbean countries, and potentially many others. But 
if each of those countries had a bilateral agreement with the US,7 the effects would 
be significantly different than if an extended NAFTA is multilateral. Confusion 
would result for the US (with different rules of origin and conditions of access for 
imports from each of many countries) but the rest of the world would also lose. 
Each prior ‘concession’ to the US would become less valuable as new entrants 
were accepted, although presumably each new entrant’s terms of access would be 
less favourable than earlier entrants. 
There is also concern about the protective effect of some NAFTA provisions. 
Rules of origin were a focal point of contention during the negotiations, and can 
be used to restrict imports from the rest of the world and favour imports from 
union members. This certainly seems to be the case with autos and auto parts, 
and textiles and apparel, in the NAFTA agreement. 
There is no danger that the world will split immediately into trading blocs. 
Rather, the risk is one of continued gradual erosion of the multilateral trading 
system, as East Asian and Pacific countries respond to trade diversion to Mexico 
and other NAFTA members by forming their own regional agreement. Such an 
agreement would doubtless be launched within the context of GATT, but it is 
plausible that, over time, trade disputes with NAFTA members would become 
increasingly acrimonious. If disputes of ever-increasing intensity, with threats, 
counter threats, and occasional imposition of retaliatory tariffs, were to start, 
it is not unthinkable that a mounting history of disputes could eventually lead 
 




to miscalculation and possibly trade war. Certainly, those supporting efforts to 
create or strengthen regional trading blocs should be alert to this danger. 
There is also a question as to whether the existence of NAFTA and the 
Uruguay Round Agreement can stop the American tendency toward increased 
bilateralism. The bilateral demands for quantitative ‘indicators’ for Japan and 
continued bilateral ‘demands’ on other countries offer no reassurance. President 
Clinton’s reinstatement of ‘Super-301’ was likewise discouraging. Even more 
worrisome, perhaps, is that US trade disputes with Canada do not seem to 
have lessened despite the FTA. Not only are Americans contesting imports of 
Canadian wheat, but the US placed Canada on the ‘watch list’ in connection with 
‘Super-301’ in September 1994. 
Meanwhile, in order to obtain Congressional approval of the NAFTA 
agreement. President Clinton bowed to Congressional pressure and sought ‘side 
agreements’ on labour and the environment. Even after the completion of the 
Uruguay Round, the US insisted that, as a condition for its signature on the 
agreement, future consideration would be given to environmental and labour 
codes within the GATT/WTo. 
There are, to be sure, legitimate environmental concerns, although many 
in developing countries believe that, given the history of despoilation of its 
own environment as a route to riches in the nineteenth century, the west is 
now attempting to prevent developing countries from taking the same route to 
development. Labour standards constitute a similar threat, in that developing 
countries’ comparative advantage understandably lies in labour-intensive goods. 
To insist upon measures that raise labour costs (either by raising wages, or, 
equivalently by raising costs of safety equipment or otherwise of hiring labour) 
is to deny developing countries of their comparative advantage and therefore of 
the opportunity in many cases for rapid economic growth. Experience in East 
Asian countries, as well as others, has demonstrated that a period during which 
unskilled workers are working in low-productivity labour intensive industries 
may be a prerequisite for ‘learning’ and experience to move up the scale to more 
highly productive types of employment. If opportunities for exporting labour 
intensive products are greatly reduced, growth of other poor countries will be 
greatly inhibited. 
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Advocates of ‘labour standards’ assert that there is deliberate suppression 
of wages in developing countries. If that were correct, we ought to observe excess 
demand for labour as employers queued for the available workforce. What we 
observe instead is a rapidly growing labour force, with lengthy queues of young 
people seeking work. Their existence is simply inconsistent with the view that 
wages are suppressed and that there is ‘exploitation’. 
Even when it comes to questions of ‘child labour’, the question is by no 
means clear. Parents do not want their children to work, but in many developing 
countries, they are so poor that the alternative is a family income so low that 
chronic malnutrition would result. In some countries, the opportunity for factory 
employment provides young girls with an alternative to an early marriage, or 
worse – an altemative that some eagerly accept. 
Whether labour standards are an appropriate response or not, there are 
surely legitimate desires for children in all countries to be enabled to attend 
school and avoid long hours in factory jobs, although that may not be the relevant 
alternative to their employment. Past history indicates that, as soon as incomes 
rise, parents enter their children in school and the incidence of child labour falls. 
Choking off opportunities for growth may, therefore, serve to increase, rather 
than decrease child labour. 
one fears that much of the support for ‘labour standards’ and environmental 
standards originates, not from environmentalists or those concerned with labour 
practices, but as an appeal for public support for protection. A highly restrictive 
labour or environmental code attached to the Uruguay Round agreement could 
in fact be highly protectionist and exclude especially the developing countries 
from the benefits of the open multilateral trading system. 
When there are environmental spillovers, there are legitimate grounds for 
international concern. But whether these should be tied to trade policy is a much 
more difficult matter. Certainly, means need to be found to insure that measures 
taken in the name of the environment are truly environmental in their effect 
and, in addition, represent economically effective and low cost mechanisms for 
achieving the desired environmental results. 
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There are, then, a large number of conflicting cross currents in the 
international trading system today. on one hand, the passage of the Uruguay 
Round offers the promise of further strengthening of the open multilateral system. 
on the other hand, tendencies toward regionalisation, reinforcing protectionist 
pressures, present threats to the system. 
The Uruguay Round has now been ratified and the World Trade 
organisation has commenced operations. With the scope that that offers for 
bringing additional aspects of international exchange of goods and services under 
an open multilateral regime, and the gains to be exploited with the liberalisations 
already agreed to in the Uruguay Round, there are good reasons for optimism. 
The attention of the world, and especially of trade officials, should be focussed 
on doing everything possible to strengthen the organisation and its prospects for 
success. 
To strengthen those prospects will be to resist pressures for protectionism 
and regionalism. It is to be hoped that smaller nations will eschew bilateral or 
regional approaches and emphasise the importance of multilateral solutions to 
trade difficulties. Efforts to strengthen the WTo, and move the US away from 
bilateral pressures on Japan and other trading partners and toward reliance on the 
WTo may have very great rewards. 
For the smaller trading nations, expressions of disapproval at bilateral 
approaches, and efforts to support the multilateral system are clearly called for, 
both in the interest of the system as a whole, and in the individual interest of small 
countries that are clearly better off with a system than in bilateral bargaining with 
large countries. 
This conclusion has clear implications for APEC. An APEC without Japan 
and the United States makes no sense as a free trade area: it simply creates another 
regional arrangement, but this time one in which the countries involved even 
taken together are sufficiently small that their bargaining power as a group is 
minimal with respect to the large trading nations. Formation of such a group 
would reinforce the tendencies toward regionalism and bilateralism – the very 
factors it is in the interest of the countries to avoid. 
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If, on the other hand, the US and Japan were willing to join into an FTA, 
almost all of the barriers to increasing multilateral liberalisation would disappear. 
An effort on the part of APEC countries to induce the US and Japan to resolve 
their trade differences through the WTo, rather than in bilateral bargaining, is 
surely much in the interest of the smaller countries in APEC. 
While the temptation to enter regional arrangements is understandable, 
if the very nations that have gained the most from the open multilateral trading 
system in the past now fail to support it vigorously, just when it is at a crossroads, 
the prospects for a resumption of the virtuous circle that served the world so well 
in the 1950s and 1960s will greatly diminish. The rewards for a resumption of the 
virtuous circle are potentially enormous. It is greatly to be hoped that the lures 
of much smaller, but more immediately visible, accomplishments do not detract 
political attention from the crucial issues. 
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Protection and liberalization  
in Australia and abroad
W. Max Corden1
I have the honour of being only the second person so far who has been invited to 
give the Joseph Fisher Lecture twice – not the same lecture, of course. My subject 
twenty eight years ago was “Australian Tariff Policy”. It was a lecture that attracted 
much attention at the time, both in the press and in official circles. I reviewed 
Tariff Board reports and tariff changes that had taken place in the preceding two 
years and various possible principles for tariff-making, ending with proposals of 
my own. In re-reading this lecture now, I am amazed at my pragmatism and 
moderation, which no doubt helps to explain why the lecture was influential at 
the time. In the present lecture I want to compare the situation in 1967 with 
that in 1995, to review changes in Australian trade policies that have taken place 
during these 28 years – noting especially the motivations for these changes – and 
to put all this in an international perspective. This is an opportunity to look back 
on developments in which my writings played a role, so that at various points I 
shall be somewhat autobiographical here.
1967 and 1995 compared
The position in 1967 was that Australian protection was primarily in the form of 
tariffs. Quantitative import restrictions were removed in 1959. Tariffs protecting 
manufacturing industry were in significant cases very high, and also varied greatly 
between products, so that the tariff structure was thoroughly non-uniform. This 
was true in terms of nominal rates and even more in terms of effective rates. 
 
1 Forty-fourth Joseph Fisher Lecture, 26 September 1995. . Reprinted in the Australian Economic Review 
June 1996: 141-54, and as chapter 8 in Corden, W. M. (1997) The Road to Reform: Essays on Australian 
Political Economy, Sydney: Addison-Wesley.
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My 1967 lecture cited many nominal tariff rates of over 40 per cent and far 
higher effective rates. Rattigan (1986), drawing on Tariff Board reports, notes 
that “the average rates of effective protection available to individual Australian 
manufacturing industries in 1967-68 ranged from 0 to 120 per cent, and the 
average rate for manufacturing industry as a whole was 46 per cent.” Because 
of the local content scheme for motor cars, the average effective rate for motor 
vehicles and components was 67 per cent. The Industry Commission has 
calculated effective rates for 1971 averaging 35 per cent for all manufactures but 
much higher for particular categories (See 44.1). Times have certainly changed. 
By 1995 all nominal tariffs were on a predetermined downward path, with many 
to reach 5 per cent by 1996. In the year 2000 the general level of nominal tariffs 
will be 5 per cent for most products, with motor vehicles and most textiles and 
footwear getting 15 per cent, and clothing 25 per cent. The average effective rate 
of assistance will be about 5 per cent.
It is certainly interesting to reflect how this remarkable change – one that 
I would have welcomed but never forecast twenty eight years ago – came about. 
It is also worth examining to what extent there has been anything special about 
these and related changes in Australia when they are compared with the trade 
liberalization process in other countries.
Looking back
In order to pursue this matter, one must really go back further, at least back 
to another Joseph Fisher lecture. In 1936 L. F. Giblin, the Ritchie Professor of 
Economics at the University of Melbourne, lectured on “Some Economic Effects 
of the Australian Tariff”. He had been a member of the Committee which produced 
the famous Brigden Report, and in his lecture he discussed its calculations of the 
cost of protection and how these were borne by different sectors of the economy. 
It is an interesting lecture to reread. It certainly raised or expounded important 




Table 44.1: Average effective rates of assistance for manufacturing – selected   
 years (per cent) 
Subdivision
1971 1974 1977 1983 1989 2000
ASIC Description -72 -75 -78 -84 -90 -01a
21-22 Food, beverages and tobacco 19 21 10 6 4 2
23 Textiles 45 39 47 69 53 17
24 Clothing and footwear 86 87 141 227 113 34
25 Wood, wood products and furniture 23 18 18 18 15 4
26 Paper, paper products, printing and 
publishing
52 31 24 16 9 2
27 Chemical, petroleum and coal 
products
32 23 19 12 8 3
28 Non-metallic mineral products 14 11 5 4 4 2
29 Basic metal products 29 16 10 10 9 4
31 Fabricated metal products 58 39 30 25 19 4
32 Transport equipment 50 45 48 65 37 13
323 Motor vehicles and parts 49 54 73 129 52 19
33 other machinery and equipment 44 24 20 22 19 6
34 Miscellaneous manufacturing 32 27 30 26 20 7
21-34 Total manufacturing 35 27 23 22 15 5
a Projection based on 1989-90 base year production. Source: Industry Commission (1995).
Giblin’s practical attitude to protection, as that of the Brigden Report, was 
somewhat ambiguous. It is worth quoting one passage from his lecture. “There 
is, then, little disagreement about the necessity of the protective policy today. 
The general principle is admitted, but its application is still controversial. How 
hard should the policy be pushed? And in what directions? How can we get the 
greatest advantages at the least cost?” He did not answer these questions, but the 
questions posed the key issue that faced Australian policy makers in the early 
sixties when, owing to the removal of quantitative import restrictions (which had 
been imposed for balance-of-payments reasons), tariff policy became important 
again.
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The conventional view in the fifties and early sixties was that the Brigden 
report had provided a justification for Australian protection. It is certainly true 
that there was “little disagreement about the necessity of the protective policy.” 
The Brigden argument is well known, so I shall not expound it here. It did not 
explain why tariffs were imposed or raised at various times in Australia’s history, 
especially in Victoria before Federation, and then, particularly, in 1908 and 1920. 
Rather, it provided an ex-post rationalization. But Professor Giblin did focus on 
the huge intellectual gap that remained. The Brigden argument provided no 
guidance at all on the criteria for the details of tariff-making. Which industries or 
sections of industries should be protected and, how much?
It thus provided no help at all to the Tariff Board which had the responsibility 
of advising on this very matter.
The Tariff Board did state its criteria (“economic” and “efficient”), but these 
were quite empty of content, at least as stated. In my own studies of Tariff Board 
reports and tariff practices (Corden, 1962), I deduced more thoroughly what “the 
logic” must have been concluding that the “existence principle” (my term, not that 
of the Board or the government) seemed to govern the choice of which industries 
to protect, while the “made-to-measure principle” determined how high a tariff 
rate to provide. But even to suggest the existence principle was to highlight the 
nature of the problem. Which industries or activities should come into existence? 
And what protection could such new activities expect? The language of the Tariff 
Board seemed to have no relation to standard economic theory. It is this gap that 
my 1967 lecture sought to fill, though actually the story goes further back. This 
brings me to the Vernon report.
once the tariff had again become the principal or almost only means 
of protection, namely, from 1960, some members of the Tariff Board became 
gradually aware that their existing principles – insofar as there were any – were 
unsatisfactory and that decisions were being made on a piecemeal basis. There 
is quite a long story here about different points of view on the Board and the 
conversion of the celebrated Alf Rattigan (who became Chairman of the Board in 
1963) to the view that new, more rational principles needed to be adopted. I shall 
not repeat this story here, but just note that a key role was played by the Vernon 
Committee’s report on the Australian economy.
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The Vernon Report (1965) contained a key chapter on tariff policy 
(possibly the only chapter that eventually had any influence), and a pioneering 
appendix where effective rates and subsidy equivalent calculations were made. In 
this field the Committee was much influenced by my own work and submissions. 
In particular they developed the idea of a tariff “benchmark” – a rate of tariff of 
about 30 per cent which would be provided readily, and towards which existing 
higher tariffs would gradually be moved.
This “benchmark” approach harked back to a lecture I had delivered – also 
in Adelaide and published as Corden (1958) – where I proposed first that import 
restrictions should be replaced by tariffs (as they were in 1960) and then that 
there should be a gradual movement to a uniform ad valorem tariff rate. To cut a 
long story short, the Tariff Board, and especially Mr. Rattigan and his right-hand 
man, Bill Carmichael, were much influenced by the Vernon Committee report, 
which thus played a key role in the conversion of the Tariff Board both to use of 
the effective protection rate as a criterion for tariff policy – broadened later to the 
effective rate of assistance (ERA) – and, more generally to the application of what 
would now be called economic rationalism to tariff policy. This conversion process 
was just underway when I wrote my 1967 Fisher lecture. In particular, several 
members of the Board, and subsequently Mr. Rattigan, were much attracted by 
the benchmark approach.
In this 1967 lecture I aimed to sort out and explain the policy choices. 
I chose to assume a fixed exchange rate and rule out overnight changes. I was 
definitely not a shock therapy man. I shall come back to discussing the exchange 
rate assumption later.
What were my concluding recommendations? I should mention here that, 
while my writings on tariffs were quite widely read, many real-world practical 
down-to-earth people regarded me as a typical, somewhat unrealistic, academic 
and (dirty word) a free trader. This last characterisation was correctly deduced 
from my 1958 uniform tariff paper, since I had made it clear there that the 
movement to a uniform tariff should be an intermediate or second-best step, free 
trade (with appropriate exchange rate adjustment and some exceptions) being 
first-best. In the 1967 lecture I proposed two benchmarks. There should be a 
benchmark in nominal rate terms of 30 per cent for new activities and another 
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benchmark of 45 per cent for existing activities. of course, “the benchmark for 
existing activities would involve lopping of the substantial high protection areas, 
an operation which would have to be gradual, perhaps in steps announced 
precisely in advance.” Let me repeat these figures: 30 per cent for new activities 
and 45 per cent for existing activities. So these were this free trader’s very radical 
recommendations. (Laughter).
Progress and some retreat: 1967-75
The developments which I shall now summarize very briefly all happened after I 
had left the Australian National University for oxford, though I really have to go 
back to 1965 or even earlier. Essentially there were three developments.
First, the Tariff Board under Mr. Rattigan asserted its independence – or, 
more precisely, Mr. Rattigan asserted his independence, a process that involved 
some conflicts within the Board. There was a well-known conflict between the 
powerful Minister for Trade, John McEwen, and Mr. Rattigan on the role of 
the Board and on Mr. McEwen’s attempt to by-pass it, to limit its scope for 
independent assessment, or to ignore it in various ways.2 This story has been 
written up in various places.3 Mr. Rattigan’s commitment to transparency, his 
courage, and his political skills were impressive. The matter was resolved with the 
election of the Whitlam government, Gough Whitlam proclaiming himself “a 
Rattigan man”. 
At this point I should like to mention that a South Australian Liberal 
member of the House of Representatives, Bert Kelly, had been a prominent but 
lone parliamentary critic of high tariff policy from well before 1967. This did not 
make him popular with the government or other members of his own party, but 
by his persistence he contributed to greater awareness of the issue. Mr. Kelly was 
in my audience at the 1967 Fisher Lecture, and I am happy to note that he is 
here, in the front row, now (applause). 
2 John McEwen, the leader of the Country Party and therefore Deputy Prime Minister, was Minister for 
Trade, and later for Trade and Industry, from 1956 to 1971. He was succeeded in these positions by 
Doug Anthony, who had a similar attitude towards the Tariff Board. 
3 See Glezer (1982), Anderson and Garnaut (1987), Capling and Galligan (1992), and Bell (1993). By 
far the most thorough and fascinating account, at least of the “inside” politics, is that by the star actor, 
Rattigan (1986). All these accounts go back to 1963, and sometimes earlier.
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It is worth noting that the issue of the role of the Board relative to the 
government was an old one. In his 1936 Fisher lecture Professor Giblin complained 
that the government had taken certain trade policy action (protection of textiles 
from Japanese competition and the protection of motor car manufacture) without 
referring “these highly technical questions” to the Board. In my 1967 lecture I 
dealt with the same issue, remarking in my usual cautious way that, if decisions 
are made in a political way: “it becomes at least possible that contributions to 
party funds would have some effect on actual policies” (Surprise, surprise!). I 
stressed the value of the Tariff Board system of public enquires. I proposed that 
the Tariff Board be attached to the Prime Minister’s Department, rather than, as 
it was at the time, to the Department of Trade (which represented the interests 
of secondary industry). This proposal was later implemented by the Whitlam 
government.
The second major development in the period was the 25 per cent uniform 
tariff cut of the Whitlam government in 1973.4 This was motivated, or at 
least influenced, by the macroeconomic situation at the time – inflation and a 
balance-of-payments surplus. An increased supply of imports was expected to 
reduce inflation. I shall come back to discussing the relevance of the balance-of-
payments situation later. The decision came as a great surprise and was, of course, 
heavily criticised, especially later. Quite wrongly, it was blamed for the increase in 
unemployment that came with the recession of 1974-75 (though it must have had 
some localised effects). The recession actually led to the reimposition of quotas 
on imports of textiles, clothing, and footwear (the so-called TCF group) and of 
passenger motor vehicles and parts (PMV), this being the “retreat” to which I 
referred in the heading.
The third development of the period was, in a long-run perspective, the 
most important. Thanks to Mr. Whitlam and the initiative of Mr. Rattigan, the 
Tariff Board was replaced by the Industries Assistance Commission (IAC), with 
Mr. Rattigan the chairman of the new IAC. Its mandate was much wider than 
that of the Tariff Board, and it was conceived on a much more ambitious scale. 
This was the beginning of an important and remarkable organization, one which 
 
4 See Gruen (1975), and also Rattigan (1986, pp. 162-71). A 25% tariff cut meant that, for example, a 
50% tariff would be cut to 37.5%.
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acquired a world reputation and which, through its careful empirical work and 
strong and consistent “economic rationalist” analysis, undoubtedly influenced 
informed thinking and policy-making in the broad area of industry assistance 
subsequently. There is really a remarkable contrast between the Tariff Board reports 
of the early sixties (and some of the reports reviewed in my 1967 lecture) which 
were empty of serious economic analysis, and the highly professional reports of 
the IAC, backed up with effective rate and subsidy equivalent measures and the 
use of general equilibrium modelling resulting from the IMPACT project.
An international perspective up to 1975
Right through the sixties and up to the world recession of 1974-75, developed 
(oECD) countries other than Australia and New Zealand went through a 
reciprocal trade liberalization process. The most important trade liberalization 
exercise was the establishment, in stages, of a European customs union through 
the European Economic Community and the associated European free trade 
area. In the case of manufactures (but not agriculture) there is little doubt that 
trade creation far outweighed trade diversion. In addition, there was world-wide 
reciprocal trade liberalization of manufactures under the auspices of the GATT 
through the various multilateral negotiating rounds.
Australia and New Zealand did not take part in these rounds. our 
government saw Australia as essentially a developing country with an infant 
manufacturing industry. Furthermore – and this was the main reason for 
Australia not participating – given that Australia was an exporter of agricultural 
products (with no immediate prospects of significant exports of manufactures), 
it was perceived that we had nothing to gain from reciprocity when the rounds 
excluded agriculture. of course, since the tariff reductions were on a most-
favored-nation basis, so that they applied to all members of GATT, Australia was 
still a potential beneficiary. (Australia was a member of GATT even though we 
did not participate in the rounds). Thus, we opted out of the whole postwar trade 
liberalization process.
From the point of view of protection policy, the more relevant comparison 
for Australia is not with advanced industrial, but with developing countries. 
Almost all of these – notably India, Indonesia, and the major countries of 
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Latin America – were highly protectionist, with levels of nominal and effective 
protection (implicit and explicit) higher – sometimes far higher – than those of 
Australia. More important, most of the developing countries used quantitative 
import restrictions and the associated licensing of imports as the main method 
of protection. Incidentally, this also was true of New Zealand which, unlike 
Australia, maintained its quantitative restrictions for many years after 1960. 
The histories, motivations and popular arguments for protection in many of 
the developing countries, notably in Latin America, were quite similar to those 
applying to Australia. But there were two differences. 
The first I have already mentioned. In almost all developing countries the 
primary method of protection was through quantitative import restrictions. 
While Australia did reimpose some quotas at the end of the period (1974-75), it 
was, in fact, the only country (so far as I am aware) which was high protectionist 
but from 1960 used tariffs as the main instruments of protection. of course, the 
developing countries did all have tariffs, mostly very high ones, but the protective 
effect was dominated by quantitative restrictions. 
Second, only Australia had a semi-independent advisory institution like 
the Tariff Board – an institution which was designed from its beginning in the 
nineteen twenties to put some distance between the politicians and the tariff-
making process, and which, above all, was designed through its public enquiry 
process and its published reports, to ensure transparency. The concept and 
process were always under attack and governments often by-passed the Board, 
but to a considerable extent the system worked. All this meant that in developing 
countries there was no counterpart to the Australian debate or battle over Tariff 
Board independence. Certainly no other country had an independently-minded 
and highly professional advisory institution in this field like the IAC.5 
5 I have to be a little cautious in generalizing here. As far as I know, none of the developing countries have 
had such bodies dealing in detail with protection measures and having some degree of independence. 
of course, the United States has an independent economic advisory body of high professional quality in 
the Council of Economic Advisers, and Germany and Canada also have such bodies. None of them are 
comparable with the IAC.
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The extensive discussion about the optimal level and – more important – 
optimal pattern of protection was at this time (up to 1975) unique to Australia. In 
Australia the focus was on unilateral liberalization or (more precisely) second-best 
optimization subject to constraints, while the other oECD countries were focused 
on reciprocity. Most developing countries (with the notable exceptions of Korea and 
Taiwan) were still very comfortable with their import-substituting industrialization 
and not concerned very much with the pattern-of-protection issue.
The rest of the story: 1975-95
I base (and paraphrase) the following account primarily on Industry Commission 
(1995). See also Table 44.1, from that report. The main point is that the period 
from 1975 can clearly be divided into two parts by the landmark year 1988. 
The radical Australian trade liberalization process really began with the Hawke 
government’s decisions announced in that year.
As I have already noted, import quotas on the textiles-clothing-footwear 
(TCF) and passenger-motor-vehicles-and-components (PMV) categories were 
reintroduced in 1974 and the result was that the implicit effective rates on these 
greatly increased. on the other hand, there were widespread tariff reductions 
in 1977 on other categories following an IAC report on the multilateral trade 
negotiations (in which Australia was now participating) and in response to the 
devaluation of the Australian dollar at the end of 1976. But mostly, these tariff 
reductions involved the removal of unused assistance (water in the tariff). The net 
result of these and some further changes resulting from IAC reports on particular 
industries, was that the average level of protection for manufacturing (in terms of 
effective rates) fell somewhat in 1977 and then stayed fairly constant, while the 
degree of non-uniformity of the structure of protection greatly increased. (The 
Industry Commission measured non-uniformity – or “disparities” – by standard 
deviations).
The very important May 1988 Economic Statement announced a general 
program of phased reductions in nominal tariff rates for most imports (excluding 
TCF and PMV), tariffs above 15 per cent to be brought down to 15 per cent, and 
tariffs between 15 per cent and 10 per cent to be brought down to 10 per cent 
by 1992. The March 1991 Industry Policy Statement announced the continuation 
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of this program of tariff reduction with most tariffs to be phased down to 5 per 
cent by 1996. It is remarkable that the 1991 Statement came in the midst of a 
recession. Quotas for PVM were ended in 1988 and for TCF in 1993. In 1991 
tariffs protecting TCV and PMV were substantially reduced. 
By July 2000 PMV and most textile and footwear industries will be 
protected by tariffs of 15 per cent, while clothing imports will have tariffs of 25 
per cent. All these figures refer to nominal tariff rates. Average effective rates of 
assistance are given in Table 44.1, and more detailed information and calculations 
of these remarkable changes can be found in Industry Commission (1995).
It is certainly interesting to reflect on the reasons for these developments. 
The motives for changes in Australian protection up to 1988, and especially for 
the imposition of TCF and PMV quotas in the seventies, have been discussed in 
Anderson and Garnaut (1977). They stress the importance of pressure groups. 
The background and motives of the liberalization since 1988 are discussed in 
Garnaut (1994)6. Garnaut underlines the importance of political leadership 
when the government is in a strong electoral position, and that Mr. Hawke 
“was predisposed to internationally oriented and market-oriented solutions” 
(something that is also evident from Hawke’s memoirs).
Here one should note that the biggest reductions in Australian tariffs 
have taken place under the Whitlam and Hawke Labor governments. Is that a 
coincidence? It is true that the 1973 uniform tariff cut and the 1988 Statement 
came at a time of boom, but the 1991 Statement which ensured a continuation of 
the tariff reduction program came in a recession, suggesting that by that time, the 
direction of policy was firmly set. I have hypothesized that Labor governments 
are generally prepared to be more radical, once in pursuit of more interventionist 
or welfare-oriented policies, and now also in pursuit of policies which they have 
come to believe would raise national efficiency or productivity, and thus also 
make both higher real wages and improved welfare provision feasible. But it is 
also relevant that the 1988 and 1991 programs were undoubtedly helped by the 
fact that the opposition was in general sympathy with the policy direction.
6 See also Keating and Dixon (1989), Capling and Galligan (1992), and Bell (1993), for discussions of 
motives for Australian trade liberalization since 1988.
44 Protection and liberalization in Australia and abroad
376
At this point, the important role of the IAC (which is now, with a broadened 
mandate, the Industry Commission) must again be noted. Quite apart from the 
specific recommendations, usually involving reductions in tariffs, that came out 
of particular IAC reports, its information and educational role must have been 
immense. All these changes have taken place in Australia in a quite exceptional 
context of transparency. of course, the IAC has not been a decision-making body, 
its recommendations have often not been accepted, and it has had to cope with its 
unpopularity with various politicians (including Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser 
and his Deputy, Doug Anthony). It is only an advisory, and not a regulatory 
agency. Nevertheless, for many years its work and status have depended primarily 
on the existence of an elaborate tariff (and subsidy) system, so one might expect, 
on the basis of Stigler’s generalization based on US experience of “regulatory 
capture” that it would have been captured by the protectionists. But, quite to the 
contrary, it has been a consistent proponent of orthodox (“rational”) economics, 
with an emphasis on maximizing national (Pareto) efficiency).7
An international perspective again: The new liberalization
The Australian unilateral trade liberalization process since 1988 has close 
parallels with many developing countries. This is by contrast with the Australian 
developments of the sixties and early seventies, which were unique. The arguments 
against import-substituting industrialization and high protection were spread in 
the seventies and gradually influenced elite thinking in developing countries, 
notably Latin America. Nevertheless, the reaction to the shocks and the debt 
crisis of the early eighties were in some cases still protectionist. When there was a 
balance-of-payments crisis it had been a traditional reaction (as also in Australia) 
to increase protection – usually by imposing or tightening quantitative import 
restrictions. But already in the 1981-83 recession it was noticeable that many 
countries did not react in this way. 
7 As in all countries, the Australian government department or office that is specifically responsible to 
advise on industry policy and maintain contact with industrialists (carrying various names during the 
period) has always been more than sympathetic, and sometimes has been completely captured, by the 
protectionist interests. This is evident particularly from Rattigan (1986) and other references cited earlier.
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Subsequent to the recession, many developing countries started on a process 
of unilateral trade liberalization. In some cases this was very sharp, and the parallel 
with Australia was quite close. In particular three major oil-exporting countries 
– Indonesia, Mexico, and Nigeria – reacted to the severe 1986 drop in the price 
of oil, leading to balance-of-payments crises, with adjustment programs that 
included drastic trade liberalization. In historical terms it was certainly unusual 
for countries to react to balance-of-payments crises with trade liberalization. In 
Little et. al.(1993) this has been called “the new liberalization”, and episodes are 
fully documented there. of course, such policies were part of broader structural 
adjustment programs that, above all, included exchange rate devaluations.
Chile, Sri Lanka and Turkey already were “new liberalizers” in the seventies. 
I have already cited the three oil exporters, Indonesia, Mexico, and Nigeria. 
Argentina and Brazil followed later, more in reaction to hyper-inflation than to 
balance-of-payments crises. India is the most recent case, clearly reacting again 
to a balance-of-payments problem, and still having a long way to go. By the 
early nineties, unilateral trade liberalization had become quite conventional in 
almost all developing countries. This audience does not need to be reminded of 
New Zealand, a country which was still imposing widespread quantitative import 
restrictions at a time when every other oECD country had abandoned them. 
Its Labor government reacted to its inflation, growth and balance-of- payments 
crises in the “new liberalization” way.
What were the reasons for the new liberalization? First, there was the 
possibility of exchange rate adjustment. I shall come back to this later. Second, 
the view had spread (influenced by the crises of the early eighties, and sometimes 
before) that the old model of import substituting industrialization, leading to 
heavy dependence by uneconomic domestic industries on imported components 
and materials, had not worked, or at least had reached its limit. Third, the growth 
success of the East Asian, especially Korean, export-oriented outward-looking 
model, was contrasted with the apparent failures of the import-substitution 
model. Fourth, crises made countries ready for change. Fifth, countries that 
received assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank had usually to accept conditions (“conditionality”) that included some trade 
liberalization. Sixth – and this was undoubtedly important – the staff of the IMF 
and the World Bank had vigorously and successfully spread the same “economic 
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rationalist” message that economists had been spreading in Australia, so that it 
was not just conditionality but also the convictions of key policy makers that 
help to explain the new trend. Finally, in the case of Latin America, the increasing 
number of US-educated “technocrats” (often with Ph.D’s in economics from 
leading US universities) began to attain positions of power, and were naturally 
inclined to free-market approaches, sometimes in extreme, at other times in 
moderate, ways.
When one goes through this list, one can see that the explanations for 
Australian liberalization in the eighties were quite similar. our “technocrats” were 
not necessarily US-educated, and the educational or conversion process did not 
depend on the IMF or the World Bank, but came from within Australia. I shall 
also come back to this later. Furthermore, while our terms-of-trade deterioration 
of 1985-86 was perceived as a kind of crisis (the “banana republic” crisis), its 
impact and magnitude were not comparable with the crises of many developing 
countries. Hence we could embark on more gradual reforms. Unlike New 
Zealand, we did not need shock treatment. But we also looked to the success 
of East Asia, comparing ourselves unfavorably, and a view gradually developed 
in Australia that our protectionist model had not worked, as reflected in our 
relatively low measured long-term per capita growth rate. 
The crucial role of exchange rate policy
Substantial trade liberalization needs, in general, to be associated with depreciation 
of the exchange rate if unemployment and a deterioration in the balance of 
trade are to be avoided. I say “in general” because there are assumptions and 
qualifications to be noted. A key assumption is the essentially Keynesian – and 
realistic – one that, normally, the general level of nominal wages is inflexible 
downwards, and that the rate of labor productivity growth is not so high as to 
allow a sufficient decline in unit labor costs even with constant nominal wages. 
Another qualification is illustrated by the uniform tariff cut of 1973. The 
balance-of-payments situation had improved owing to a striking terms-of-trade 
improvement, and there were domestic inflationary pressures. Hence, a broad 
tariff cut was possible even with a fixed exchange rate (and the Australian dollar 
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had actually been appreciated).8 I foreshadowed this kind of circumstance in my 
1967 lecture. In that lecture I simply assumed a fixed exchange rate, and then 
remarked: “Thus some significant downward movement in existing tariffs would 
be practicable only when (with a given tariff level and full employment) balance-
of-payments trends were favorable. Such an opportunity would result from an 
improvement in the export situation.”
I have already noted that tariff reductions in 1977 were associated with 
devaluation. of the greatest importance for Australia was the decision to float the 
Australian dollar in 1983. one cannot say that an explicit decision was made to 
reduce tariffs and induce an associated depreciation. Rather, the market sharply 
depreciated the dollar in 1985 and 1986 owing to the decline in the terms of trade. 
This made import-competing and export industries much more competitive, and 
thus made possible and politically acceptable the phased tariff reductions initiated 
in 1988 and later. The depreciation came first and tariff reductions followed. 
Some import-competing activities have no doubt come under greater pressure as 
a result of the tariff cuts, but this has been offset both from a balance-of-payments 
and political pressure-group point of view by the striking boom in manufactured 
exports and in services that has been caused, at least in part and with a lag, by 
depreciation.
The evidence adduced in Little et. al. (1993) clearly shows that almost 
all major trade liberalizations in developing countries have been associated with 
devaluations of the exchange rate. The “new liberalizations” have usually involved 
very sharp devaluations sufficient not only to deal with the consequences of 
balance-of-payments crises but additionally sufficient to counteract the balance-
of-payments effects of trade liberalization. In Corden (1993) I have stressed that 
it is undesirable for a developing country to commit itself to a fixed nominal 
exchange as an anchor against inflation when there is still a need for trade 
liberalization. 
8 See Gruen (1975).
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Coming back to Australia, it is clear that any determined commitment 
to a fixed exchange rate in the early nineteen-eighties would not only have led 
subsequently to a balance-of-payments crisis of Latin American proportions but 
also – as long as the exchange rate was indeed kept fixed – would have been an 
overwhelming obstacle to any large-scale program of trade liberalization. Even if 
the balance of payments and employment effects of liberalization had been minor 
– as is quite possible, given that the tariff reductions have been implemented 
gradually and given that some real depreciation might have been brought about 
by wage restraint combined with modest productivity growth – substantial 
liberalization as has taken place would not have been politically acceptable. of 
course, there might have been a real crisis in 1986, and then a big devaluation 
associated with trade liberalization.
The exchange rate issue always played a big role in my own writings on 
Australian tariff policy from 1958 to 1967. In various places, notably Corden 
(1958, 1966), I stressed the need for devaluation if tariffs were to be removed or 
reduced. When it came to practical proposals I regarded the fixed exchange rate 
commitment as given, and thus worked out proposals of a second-best nature 
which inevitably involved maintaining a general level of positive protection. 
This led me to the uniform tariff idea and, later, its several “benchmark” variants 
discussed in detail in the 1967 Fisher lecture. Thus, in that lecture I was not a 
“free trader”. Rereading this lecture, I find that it is not only very protectionist 
but also that it goes into second-best complications which appear quite irrelevant 
now. A single assumption explains this. “I shall assume a fixed exchange rate 
and rule out “overnight” changes.” Then followed a footnote. “To assume a fixed 
exchange rate is not, of course, to advocate that it should be fixed. But for various 
reasons it seems a reasonable assumption.”
Political economy: Role of economists, climate of opinion
I have already referred to the motivations for unilateral trade liberalizations both 
in Australia and in developing countries. Notably, there were shocks, and there 
was the sense that protectionist policies had failed and had just led to low growth 
rates and contributed to rigidities which had made adjustments to crises more 
difficult. Exchange rate flexibility was important. Then there was the changed 
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international climate of opinion in this field. Here I want to discuss more fully 
the role of professional economists, or as they are called in Australia, “economic 
rationalists” and in developing countries, “technocrats”.
over a long period the climate of informed or “elite” (that is, politically and 
economically interested and active) opinion on free trade and protection changed 
in Australia. I am referring to politicians, bureaucrats, the financial and business 
community, officials of trade (lobbying) organizations, and trade union officials. 
The case against protection – or at least high and variable protection – came to be 
more widely understood. Particularly important have been financial journalists. 
A crucial explanation of this change is, in my opinion, the boom in economics 
training in Australia. Academics have complained about the large numbers in 
their classes, but this has borne fruit in producing a more economically-literate 
community. The pass economics degree has indeed been a passport to success, and 
the basic messages of our profession (even when taught often with unnecessary 
complications) have become widespread through teaching and textbooks. 
Economics has indeed played a key role in Australia, similar to that of law in 
many other countries, and this has certainly raised the economic literacy of our 
community. I hope that, with the ascent now of business studies, this situation 
will not change.
A particularly important role has been played by senior bureaucrats in 
key departments, notably the Treasury and Prime Minister’s Department, who 
have (almost all) been qualified professional economists. I suspect that they 
were the key initiators of the tariff reduction programs of recent years. They are 
the equivalents of the “technocrats” in many developing countries whose role 
has been widely discussed internationally (Williamson, 1994). The technocrats 
have usually been ministers deep in politics (as in Indonesia, India, Mexico and 
Argentina) or central bank governors, and in this respect there has been a contrast 
with Australia.
Academics acting as temporary advisers have also had some role in Australia, 
but because of the high professional quality of the senior bureaucrats, I think the 
academic-on-leave role here is much less than in many other countries. In the 
field of tariff policy, the two names that come to mind are Fred Gruen, who 
played a key role in (indeed produced the idea of ) the 25 per cent tariff cut while 
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economic adviser in the Department of the Prime Minister under Mr. Whitlam, 
and Ross Garnaut, who influenced policy as economic adviser to Mr. Hawke, 
1983-85.9
Going back to 1958-67, my own role in influencing tariff policy was quite 
different. Primarily, leaving aside technical advice, I operated as a straightforward 
academic in the public arena. I wrote my articles, published them, and they 
were read and had influence. It helped that they were pragmatic. In this way I 
influenced my academic colleagues, who then passed on these ideas in their classes 
and through their reading lists, and later officials with economic training who fed 
them into the policy arena. In the same way my writings influenced the staff of the 
Vernon committee, and also Sir John Crawford, the Deputy Chairman, who was 
the author of the Committee’s tariff chapter. My personal contact with persons 
of importance was near-zero, aside with Sir John.10 I gave technical advice about 
the various new measurement concepts (effective rates, subsidy equivalent) to the 
Vernon Committee staff, and subsequently to Mr. Carmichael of the Tariff Board.
Did it matter: What are the costs of protection?
The standard analysis of protection is concerned with the costs of resource 
misallocation – the costs of departure from Pareto-efficiency. This can be called 
the standard orthodox approach. The costs that used to be emphasized were 
the misallocation between import-competing and actual and potential export 
production, as well as the costs of distorting the pattern of consumption between 
importables and exportables. The Australian discussion brought in additionally 
the costs of distortion within the import-competing sector – that is, the costs of 
non-uniformity of the tariff structure.11 In the nineteen sixties this latter emphasis 
 
9 His subsequent published report, Garnaut (1989), has also been influential. This report proposed 
(among other things) a movement to complete free trade. These remarks should not be understood to 
underplay Mr. Hawke’s own outward-looking and free trade-inclined views developed over the years.
10 The exception was my friendship from 1959 with the late Dick Boyer, who was already a member of the 
Tariff Board (representing the rural community) before Mr. Rattigan became Chairman and who stayed 
right into the early seventies. He was a solid “free trader”, reluctant, possibly excessively so, to make 
compromises. When Mr. Rattigan joined the Board in 1963, he asked members how they approached 
their work. “Boyer, however, differed from his colleagues; he was interested in the underlying economic 
issues” (Rattigan 1986, p. 12).
11 There are complications here about effective and nominal tariff rates, and qualifications to the uniform 
tariff approach when the exchange rate is fixed that I have analyzed in various publications.
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was new by international standards. My various proposals were all concerned with 
reducing these costs, and this approach formed the basis of the Tariff Board and 
IAC advocacy of a level playing field both between exportables and importables, 
and within the import-competing sector. of course, the orthodox approach 
is subject to qualifications which have to do with externalities, terms-of-trade 
effects, and constraints that call for second-best policies. In partial equilibrium 
analyses, the costs are expressed by the familiar Marshallian triangles.
on the basis of many back-of-the-envelope calculations, these costs 
calculated for various countries have turned out to be only a small proportion 
of the gross national product (GDP), say 1-2 per cent. Similar calculations for 
Australia would lead to rather larger figures, but still a relatively small proportion. 
In any case, they would not explain a relatively low growth rate. one has to 
bear in mind, in particular, that in the sixties the protected manufacturing sector 
accounted for about 15 per cent of the Australian workforce.12 
Supposing that protected manufacturing value-added also made up 15 per 
cent of GDP when calculated at free trade prices, that the average effective tariff 
protecting the sector was 50 per cent, and that the excess resource costs were 
50 per cent of the production subsidy equivalent (the other 50 per cent being 
producer surplus), we get a production-distortion cost of 3.75 per cent of GDP. 
That is a generous back-of-the envelope estimate, since a part of the protected 
sector would no doubt have survived under free trade, so that for that part there 
would be no excess cost. Hence, the excess cost might be well below 50 per cent 
of the producer’s subsidy equivalent, say 40 per cent. Furthermore, the average 
effective rate for all manufacturing was estimated by the IAC as 35 per cent for 
1971 (before the uniform tariff cut), and perhaps it might be a better figure 
to use. Using these two lower percentages, the production-distortion cost of 
protecting manufacturing at the time comes out at 2.1 per cent of GDP. In any 
case, there may be much better estimates available, and these figures are plausible 
but purely illustrative.
12 This was my estimate in Corden (1963, p.174).
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Using this type of approach, one might conclude that the cost of protection 
was not really very large and that the emphasis on protection as a cause of Australia’s 
rather modest economic performance has been overdone. Protection did not matter 
so much. But there are some important qualifications here, even while adhering to 
the orthodox static resource allocation approach. First, there are also the familiar 
consumption-distortion costs of protection, including here the distortion in usage 
of protected inputs by industries, whether manufacturing or otherwise. Second, 
the distortion costs of non-uniformity of tariffs, which I tended to emphasize and 
on which the IAC has focussed so much, are not included. Third, economies of 
scale (including potential economies of scale resulting from expansion of exports of 
manufactures) are likely to raise the costs – that is, increase the gains from free trade. 
Finally, it has to be emphasized that 2-3 per cent of GDP is not a small amount and 
is well worth having. It is, after all, 2-3 per cent of GDP every year. 
When I used to talk about these matters to students and in various public 
or business forums, I would say that you can build plenty of schools and hospitals 
every year with 2 per cent of GDP. An additional motivation for seeking reform 
was, simply, that the tariff system as it existed in the sixties and early seventies was 
fundamentally irrational, other than as explainable in political or pressure group 
terms. There was really no sound basis from a national interest point of view 
for protecting one industry, or particular activity within an industry, relative to 
others, for favoring sales to the home market over export sales, and for providing 
such a non-uniform structure.
Looking back, it is true that the effects of the tariff system must be put 
in perspective. Moving to near-free trade for manufacturing will not necessarily 
transform the economy, but only limited parts of it. This is particularly true because 
the importance of manufacturing relative to services has, in any case, declined, not 
because of tariff reductions but because of well known worldwide trends. Trade 
liberalization represents one significant element in a microeconomic reform process 
that has been much needed. In recent years attention in Australia has shifted in 
other directions, and this is as it should be. But yes, tariff policy reform did matter, 
both for its own sake and as a precursor of more general microeconomic reform. 
In addition to the standard resource misallocation costs just discussed, 
there are also the costs of rent-seeking. These have been emphasized in the more 
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recent theoretical literature. Resources, especially labor-time, are used up in 
the process of potential gainers trying to obtain import licences, getting tariffs 
imposed or increased, or preventing their decrease. Potential losers from tariffs 
– especially industries using inputs protected, produced by protected industries, 
also need to engage in such activities designed to avoid losses. Costs of this type 
have certainly arisen in Australia, especially because the tariff system was made-
to-measure, though they may not have been large. Since 1960, import licensing 
has fortunately been limited to a few cases. It is worth stressing that, if tariff rates 
were firmly fixed, with no potential increases or decreases (and if formulae for 
allocating licenses were immutable), this kind of rent seeking would disappear. 
The more flexible the system, the greater the scope for rent seeking. Currently, the 
main costs of this type are associated with anti-dumping cases. 
There is another aspect of rent seeking. A flexible tariff system based on 
no firm principle provides an inducement for interested parties to contribute to 
political parties with the expectation of rewards. I hesitate to call this corruption 
(though many would) since parties must be financed and since the money need 
not go to individuals. But it leads to corrosion of the political system. of course, 
there are many possible rewards other than the ones that governments can give 
through the tariff system. Undoubtedly, in the McEwen era this was a significant 
effect of the system, and it is generally accepted that the Country Party was a 
principal beneficiary. Interest group pressures on governments and the Tariff 
Board were quite blatant. It is this consideration, and not only a concern with 
the orthodox resource allocation effects, which particularly influenced both 
Mr. Rattigan and Mr. Whitlam. They wanted to reform the system, to ensure 
independence and thus freedom from pressure for the Tariff Board and IAC, 
and to make the processes transparent. of course, the resource allocation motive 
was there: they wanted tariff-making to be guided by principles focused on the 
national interest and not sectional interests.
The case for free trade is often put as a case for making the country more 
competitive (especially in exporting manufactures) and for raising its growth rate. 
Certainly arguments for trade liberalization in the nineteen-eighties were often 
put in broader terms than the orthodox resource allocation argument that was 
used in the sixties and seventies and that the Rattigan Tariff Board, the IAC and 
I focused on. In particular, it has often been suggested that Australia’s relatively 
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low growth rate is at least partially explained by its protectionist policies. I cannot 
discuss this in detail here, but, while there are broader issues, one can to some 
extent relate the orthodox approach to these other approaches. 
First, removing tariffs and devaluing will indeed make manufactures (and 
other exports) more competitive in world markets. Domestic resources will thus 
be reallocated within the manufacturing sector from selling in the home market to 
selling abroad, and on orthodox grounds this yields a net gain. Such an emphasis on 
improving the competitiveness of exports of manufactures is simply another way of 
putting the standard resource allocation argument. on the other hand, industries 
that were previously highly protected become less competitive on the home market. 
Second, reducing protection will increase import competition on the Australian market 
and thus will reduce domestic monopoly or oligopoly power. This, in turn, may raise 
incentives for productivity improvements which will eventually also benefit exporting 
and possibly raise the growth rate. Third, improving resource allocation in the static 
sense will improve the productivity of investment and thus raise the growth rate.
The position now
As noted earlier, in five years protection for most Australian industries will be 
negligible. This assumes that the tariff reduction program as planned will indeed 
continue. There is no reason to expect otherwise since both the Government and the 
opposition are committed. There are three exceptions. First, there will still be 15 per 
cent tariffs protecting motor vehicles and components (PMV), with no quotas. This 
is a vast drop from earlier protection. Second, clothing, textiles and footwear (TCF) 
will still be protected, most textiles and footwear at 15  and clothing at 25 per cent. 
Clearly, clothing protection will have to be further reduced in time. Finally, there 
is an active anti-dumping system which is really a loophole in the tariff reduction 
process and certainly the biggest potential threat to effective trade liberalization.13
13 I have not discussed the anti-dumping issue here. Australia has been one of the biggest users of anti-
dumping measures. Fortunately, the requirement for a five-year “sunset” clause somewhat reduces their 
impact. on the other hand, threats of anti-dumping action can be a powerful restraint on competition 
from imports. Contingent protection can be as effective a protective device as actual protection. The 
impact of anti-dumping legislation cannot be measured just by looking at actual tariffs imposed. Annual 
Industry Commission reports contain relevant information on anti-dumping activity. Incidentally, the 
1993 report notes that the chemical and petroleum products industry has been the dominant initiator 
of anti-dumping and countervailing action; this brings back memories, since a huge Tariff Board report 
on the then highly protected chemical industry received much attention in my 1967 Fisher lecture. 
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Let me conclude. The protectionist instinct is universal, and opinion 
polls suggest that Australian public opinion is by no means fully won over. 
Nevertheless, one would like to think that the issue is settled now in Australia, 
and that the battles must not be fought over and over again. Perhaps we are 
approaching the end of a chapter in Australian political and economic 
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Population, food and trade
D. Gale Johnson1
The past two centuries and especially the last half century have witnessed 
dramatic improvements in the wellbeing of the world’s population. The positive 
changes have been unparalleled in human history. The increases in per capita 
food consumption may have been greater than in all previous human history. 
other measures of wellbeing, such as life expectancy and freedom from famine 
have shown great improvement. Yet during recent years claims have been made 
that the world was overpopulated or soon would be. Some have claimed that the 
growth of world demand for food will soon outpace the growth of supply. The 
fact that such claims made over the past three decades have all proved to be false 
seems always to be forgotten.
The competent professional studies of prospective food supply and 
demand conclude that there will be continued improvement in per capita food 
consumption, especially in the developing countries (Islam 1995). Yet projections 
of doom and gloom receive headlines and media attention. The potential accuracy 
of such projections seems irrelevant, notice depends solely on the emphasis on 
possible disaster. The sober and well documented studies have received little 
attention in the world’s press.
What did Malthus really believe?
The above point is well illustrated by how Thomas Malthus is remembered. He 
is remembered for his illustrative statement that food production increased in 
an arithmetic ratio while population, if unchecked, increased at a geometric 
rate and thus population always had the potential to outrun the food supply. 
 
1 Forty-fifth Joseph Fisher Lecture, 18 September 1996. Reprinted as "on the Resurgent Population and 
Food Debate", Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 41 (1): 1-17, March 1997.
45 Population, food and trade
390
Population could only be held in check by vice and misery – starvation, disease 
or war. This is the Malthus of the first edition. But Malthus very soon revised his 
views but hardly any one noticed or remembers. After noting the recent growth 
of population in Europe, he wrote: “....fewer famines and fewer diseases arising 
from want have prevailed in the last century than in those that preceded it. on 
the whole, therefore, though our future prospects respecting the mitigation of the 
evils arising from the principle of population may not be so bright as we could 
wish, yet they are far from being entirely disheartening and by no means preclude 
the gradual and progressive improvement in human society which, before the 
late wild speculations on the subject, was the object of rational expectations.” 
(Malthus, pp. 330-31) In other words, he came to agree with those who, before 
the first edition of An Essay on the Principle of Population, believed that there 
could be and would be continuing improvement in the wellbeing of people.2 
Thus my paper is Malthusian, but Malthus of the revised editions. The fact 
that the conclusions of the revised editions have been remarkably perceptive, in 
contrast to the lack of congruence between the pessimism of the first edition and 
the actual experience of the last two centuries, has had absolutely no effect on 
what Malthus is remembered for.
2 The principle of population is that, if unchecked, population will grow faster than the means of subsistence. 
After noting that “...everything depends upon the relative proportion between population and food, and 
not on the absolute number of people” he adds that he believes “...that countries which possessed the 
fewest people often suffered the worst from the effects of the principle of population...” (p. 330)
 The fundamental change introduced in the revised editions was that Malthus added a check to population 
growth; vice and misery were not the only checks. The preface to the 1803 and all subsequent editions 
included the following: “Throughout the whole of the present work, I have so far differed in principle 
from the former, as to suppose another check to population growth, which does not come under the 
head either of vice or misery; and in the latter part I have endeavored to soften some of the harshest 
conclusions of the first essay.” (p. 9)
 The new preventive check to population was due to a combination of laws and institutions and self-love 
or self-interest: “To the laws of property and marriage, and to the apparently narrow principle of self-
love (or self-interest), which prompts each individual to exert himself in bettering his condition, we are 
indebted for all the noblest exertions of human genius, for everything that distinguishes the civilized 
from the savage state. A strict inquiry into the principle of population leads us strongly to the conclusion 
that we shall never be able to throw down the ladder by which we have risen to this eminence; but it by 
no means proves that we may not rise higher by the same means.” (p. 331)
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Population and wellbeing since Malthus’ first edition
It is nearly two centuries since Malthus’ first edition was published in 1798. In no 
other two centuries has the wellbeing of mankind been so enhanced as in the two 
centuries since his first edition appeared. In fact, we can say that there has been 
more improvement in wellbeing, as indicated by a large number of conventional 
measures, than in all of prior history. Choose whatever objective measure you 
wish – life expectancy, infant mortality, the incidence of famines and plagues, 
per capita food consumption, per capita real incomes or per capita levels of real 
consumption, or biological measures such as height or weight or ratios of weight 
to height – improvements during the past two centuries swamp those of the 
previous millennia, not just by a little bit but by a lot.
While the Nineteenth Century followed the path laid out in the revised 
editions, that century saw much less progress than the current century. That was 
due, in considerable part, to the rapid growth of urbanization which brought 
with it diseases that caused great suffering and loss of life. The large increase in 
human migrations that came with the industrial revolution resulted in the spread 
of disease on a scale seldom seen before in the world. Even so, there were modest 
improvements in wellbeing, at least among significant segments of the population 
(Fogel 1996). But it was the steps taken near the end of the Nineteenth Century in 
providing clean water and improving sanitation and the beginnings of knowledge 
concerning the transmission and prevention of disease that made possible the 
spectacular gains in life expectancy that have occurred in the current century.
It was also during the Nineteenth Century that the discoveries of labor saving 
farm implements made possible the transfer of labor out of agriculture and into 
other pursuits that converted cities into productive enterprises and permitted their 
rapid growth. At the end of the 18th Century the United States had no city with a 
population of more than 75,000 while London and Paris, two of the three largest 
cities in Europe, had populations of 861,000 and 547,000, respectively (Chandler 
1987). The improvements in wellbeing that came in the last century were intimately 
related to the agricultural revolutions in North America and Europe.
All this has been accomplished while population grew at the most rapid rate 
in the recorded history of the world. It is seldom recognized that world population 
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growth was less than 0.2 per cent annually from about 500 B.C. to about 1400 
A.D. and didn’t exceed 0.5 per cent until the middle of the 18th Century (Kremer 
1993). World population grew very slowly through the Seventeenth Century, with 
the most rapid rates of economic growth generally occurring in the countries with 
the highest rates of population growth. Throughout the Nineteenth Centuries 
and until about World War II, population growth rates in the industrial countries 
were greater than in the developing countries (Table 45.1). only after World 
War II did the developing countries have the higher rates of population growth 
and only then did their per capita income growth exceed that of the industrial 
countries. From 1850 to 1920 population in the developing countries grew 
approximately 0.5 per cent annually. Subsequently the rate exceeded 1 per cent, 
but remained at less than 1.5 per cent until 1950.
Table 45.1:  Expectations of life at birth for six European countries and 
Massachusetts in the US, 1840-1955













Source: United Nations, Population Bulletin, no. 6, table IV.1, 1962.
The period of rapid population growth in the developing economies began 
in 1950 when growth exceeded 2 per cent for three decades. It was also during 
this period, from 1950 to 1980, that the rate of growth of real per capita incomes 
were greater in the developing than in the developed countries and the highest ever 
D. Gale Johnson
 393
achieved in the developing countries or in the developed countries as a group. In 
the years from 1750 to 1920, population grew more rapidly in the developed than 
the developing countries and per capita income growth was greater in the developed 
countries. Contrary to the implicit model of the relationship between population 
growth and economic growth of those who favor slow or zero population growth, 
historically economic growth as measured by the growth of real per capita incomes 
has been highest during periods of rapid population growth.
Let me give you some of the data that lie behind what I have just said. 
Maddison (1995) provides estimates of per capita GDP for most major countries 
starting with 1820. He provides estimates for 11 Asian countries, which may 
be used to indicate the experience of the developing countries for 1820 to 
1950. over that period of more than a century, it is estimated that the 11 Asian 
countries increased their per capita gross domestic product by only 25 per cent – 
from $609 to $863 while their population increased by 84 per cent (or an annual 
rate of less than 0.5 per cent). From 1950 to 1992 the Asian countries increased 
per capita income to $5,300, increasing by five times while population increased 
by 128 per cent (an annual rate of almost 3 per cent).
Data for the 12 Western European countries show an increase in real per 
capita income of $1,228 in 1820 to $5,513 in 1950, with population increasing 
by 131 per cent (an annual growth rate of approximately 0.65 per cent) while the 
real per capita income of the United States grew from $1,287 in 1820 to $9,573 
in 1950. For this period the annual rate of increase in per capita income in the 
United States was 1.56 per cent, much less than the growth rate in developing 
economies from 1950 to 1980.
The 11 Asian countries included Taiwan, South Korea and Japan. It may 
be useful to review the data for the two large Asian countries, namely China 
and India. Magnusson estimates the two countries had essentially the same per 
capita incomes in 1820 – $523 and $531, respectively. And they had almost 
the same incomes in 1950 – $614 and $597. These data indicate the absence 
of a significant increase in real per capita income for more than a century. From 
1950 to 1992, China and India followed quite different paths, with the Chinese 
average increasing to $3,098 and India’s to $1,348, with most of the difference 
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arising in the past 15 years.3 But even at India’s much slower pace of growth 
in a period of 42 years, India more than doubled its per capita income after an 
increase of a tenth in the previous 130 years. And its population grew much more 
rapidly in the recent than the earlier period – by a factor of approximately four.
A measure of improvement in wellbeing that merits serious attention is 
change in life expectancy as well as various measures of infant and child mortality. 
Mortality or life expectancy probably was roughly constant throughout history 
until 1650 when, according to Bogue (1969, p. 566), the average expectation of 
life was 25 years or less. The infant mortality rate was about 30 per cent. Data 
from Roman tombstones indicated that life expectancy was about 20 to 30 years 
during the period of the Roman empire, giving some support to the view that 
for a millennia there had been little or no change in life expectancy. Data for six 
European countries and Massachusetts indicate that as of 1840 life expectancy in 
high income countries was 41 years (Bogue 1969, p. 567). Sixty years later life 
expectancy had increased to 50.5 years, an increase of less than 10 years. In the 
next fifty five years – to 1955 – life expectancy increased to 71 years, an absolute 
increase twice that achieved in the previous sixty years.
Swedish data are available on infant mortality starting in 1750 (Bogue 
1969). Until the beginning of the Nineteenth Century infant mortality exceeded 
20 per cent, in some years exceeding 25 per cent. Infant mortality did not go 
below 15 per cent until 1850 and reached 10 per cent only at the beginning of 
this century. At the present time the available data indicate that there is now only 
one country with infant mortality rates exceeding 15 per cent – the Swedish level 
as of 1850 and many developing countries are now at or below 5 per cent which 
was reached in Sweden about 1940 (World Bank 1996, p. 198). The average 
infant mortality rate for all low income countries is now less than 6 per cent.
3 In 1978, the year before the start of the Chinese economic reforms, the per capita GDPs were $1,352 
for China and $972 for India – a difference of only 39 per cent in China’s favor. In 1992 the difference 
was 130 per cent in China’s favor. India’s population grew by 36 per cent over the period while China’s 
grew 22 per cent. Even if we assumed that the additional population contributed nothing to GDP and 
we subtract their consumption, the difference in population growth rates, the difference in population 
growth rates would account for less than about 15 percentage points of the increase in the ratio of 
Chinese to Indian per capita incomes.
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The rapid world population growth after World War II was due almost 
entirely to a sharp decline in mortality rather than an increase in fertility. In fact, 
fertility has declined almost everywhere. I have long found it incongruous that 
there has been so much concern about rapid world population growth during the 
last half of this century since it has been due primarily to improvements in health 
and thus the length of life, something that mankind struggled for centuries to 
achieve. I can think of nothing that reduced suffering more than reducing infant 
mortality from when one out of every three children died before a year of age of 
one to now when most mothers in the world are confronted with a loss of less 
than one in 20 (a rate of 50 per 1,000 births) and this is continuously changing 
rapidly for the better.
Population an unimportant factor in determining wellbeing 
I believe that the evidence is now overwhelming that the rate of population 
growth is a relatively unimportant factor in determining the wellbeing of a nation’s 
people. As I wrote earlier “...population is but one among many factors that 
determines wellbeing and that it is far from the most important factor. National 
policies that adversely affect the efficiency with which the human and natural 
resources of a country are utilized are far, far more important than population 
growth.” (Johnson 1990, pp.29-30). I would not rule out that within reasonable 
limits (say 1 to 2 per cent annual growth rates), population growth may have a 
positive influence on per capita income growth. This view is supported by Kremer 
(1993) who argues that technological change has been a function of population 
size and thus population growth has not had a deleterious effect on economic 
growth. He does not, for this reason, argue for pronatalist policies, nor do I. But 
he does conclude “...that economists should conduct further research to measure 
the growth and welfare effects of population growth under nonrival technology, 
rather than simply following conventional wisdom and concentrating on the 
negative effects of population growth.” (p. 713).
Recent evidence from world developments should have created doubts 
that population growth rates have been a major factor in determining per capita 
incomes. Evidence points strongly to the importance of policies and institutions 
and the unimportance of population growth rates. The economic experience of 
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the socialist countries where we have a real world test in the different rates of 
economic growth in socialist and market economies that were once part of the 
same countries constitutes one set of evidence. The role of population growth 
can explain little or nothing of the differences in per capita income growth that 
occurred in North and South Korea, East and West Germany, Czechoslovakia 
and Hungary and Austria. or for that matter, in China, before and after 1979 
when major economic reforms were undertaken. It may be noted that population 
growth rates were lower in the socialist than in the market economies in Europe, 
but this seemed not to matter. olsen (1996) has argued persuasively that policies 
do matter, that most countries have not come close to achieving maximum efficient 
use of their resources. The recent large body of empirical work on the effects of 
openness to world markets, political stability, and education on economic growth 
support that conclusion.4, 5
Will we like negative population growth rates?
We are likely to see a real world test of whether negative rates of population 
growth lead to more rapid growth of real per capita incomes than moderate 
positive rates. Every country in Western and Central Europe now has 
fertility rates below the replacement level and will face absolute declines 
in population over the next decade or two unless fertility increases or 
immigration is substantially increased (World Bank 1996). Given the 
 
4 The body of such work is now very large and only two representative studies are noted – Levine and 
Renelt (Levine 1992) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (Barro 1995). 
5 Please not that I do not argue that the rate of population growth has no effect on the rate of per capita 
economic growth. I do not know for sure what the effects have been or are under all circumstances 
and conditions. What I believe is that there are many factors that affect people’s welfare and that even 
if population growth has a negative effect on per capita real income growth, it is very small and much 
less important than many other factors, such as investment in schooling or the extent of governmental 
intervention in markets. I do say that one cannot and should not derive a negative relationship between 
population and economic growth rates from neoclassical growth models. True, diminishing returns to 
labor cannot be avoided, but the relationships between population and economic growth are far more 
complex than implied by diminishing returns alone or any of the other variables normally included in 
such models. Factors such as innovation and discovery, total investment including investment in human 
capital, increasing returns to scale and the rate at which new methods of production are adopted appear 
to be positively related to population density and numbers. Because population growth can be and 
probably is to some degree endogenous in its relationship to real per capita incomes, empirical analyses 
that indicate a positive relationship between the two variables must be interpreted with caution. But 
the same must be said for the few empirical studies that have found a negative relationship between 
population and real income growth rates.
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changes in age distribution that accompany declining populations, 
I anticipate that the population problem that will attract the public’s attention 
in these countries is that of too low a rate of fertility rather than one that is 
too high.
Those who place emphasis on natural resource scarcity and environmental 
degradation will have difficulty accepting the conclusion that negative 
population growth can have adverse long run consequences. What needs to 
be recognized is that many environmental problems people of the world face 
are ameliorated or solved as real per capita incomes increase. I refer here to 
the important environmental problems in the developing countries of unclean 
water and unsafe disposal of human excrement. But other forms of pollution 
abatement also respond to higher incomes, such as reducing air pollution or 
the creation of parks and reduction of the rate of deforestation occur once the 
level of real per capita incomes reach a relatively low level (World Bank 1992, 
p. 54; Antle 1995).
Recent world food developments
The recent increases in world grain prices following an extended period of slow 
growth in world grain production has led to some degree of alarm concerning the 
continued improvement in per capita food supplies in the developing countries. 
An outlandish argument has been made that China may starve the world due to 
an actual decline in grain production and rapid increase in grain use over the next 
three or four decades. Given the proclivity of the world’s press to revel in disaster, 
this argument, if it can be so designated, has received considerable attention. 
But before turning to my own view of what the future may hold, let us briefly 
summarize the developments of the past three or so decades.
Table 45.2 presents data on the daily per capita supply of calories for major 
world regions for 1961-63 to the most recent period for which FAo data are 
available. For the developing regions as a whole the daily caloric supply increased 
by 28 per cent in approximately three decades. The average availability is well 
above the average daily requirements for the developing countries, though this in 
no way assures every one or even most persons in a given region an adequate diet. 
This is particularly true in Africa which has seen little increase in calories over 
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the three decades. The improvement in calorie availability for developing regions 
has been a significant decline in the percentage of the population classified as 
malnourished. The per cent so classified declined from 36 in 1969-71 to 20 in 
1988-90 and is projected to decline to 11 by 2010 (Alexandratos 1995a, p. 33). 
The absolute number of individuals malnourished fell from 941 million in 1969-
71 to 781 million in 1988-90 and is projected to decline to less than 650 million 
by 2010 (Alexandratos 1995a, p. 33). It is generally recognized that poverty rather 
than the absence of food has been and will continue to be the primary cause of 
malnutrition.
The data on the increases in life expectancy and the declines in infant 
and child mortality in developing countries since 1960 signal a significant 
improvement in the availability and effective utilization of the food supply. 
Increased access to clean water and improved sanitation have contributed as 
much as, or perhaps more, than increased availability of food to the declines in 
infant and child mortality. But whatever the relative contributions, these changes 
have benefited millions of the world’s poorest people.
Table 45.2:  Daily per capita supply of calories for major world regions, 1961-63 
and selected years to 1988-90
1961-63 1969-71 1979-81 1988-90
Developing, all 1940 2117 2324 2473
Africa 2117 2138 2180 2204
Latin America 2363 2502 2693 2690
Near East 1825 2029 2245 2442
other, RoW 2116 2292 2425 2626
Developed, all
North America 3054 3235 3330 3603
Europe 3088 3239 3371 3452
oceania 3173 3287 3157 3328
Former USSR 3146 3323 3368 3380
other, RoW 2545 2722 2812 2975
Source: FAo, Production Yearbook, various issues.
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 It has been repeatedly called to our attention that world per capita grain 
production peaked in 1984 and has failed to regain that level. Is this a cause for 
concern? It is not, however, the case that world per capita food production failed 
to increase during the 1980s and the 4.6 per cent growth was only slightly below 
the 5.7 per cent for the prior decade. But in the developing regions, per capita 
food production increased by 13 per cent in the 1980s, significantly more than 
the 8 per cent increase for the previous decade. The growth of per capita food 
output for the developing countries was dominated by the three most populous 
countries – China, 28 per cent(16); India, 20 per cent (2), and Indonesia, 32 per 
cent (18).6
Per capita grain production in the developing countries did increase during 
the 1980s – by 9 per cent. The slowdown in world grain production occurred in 
the industrial countries of Western Europe, North America and in the former 
socialist countries. During the 1980s the European Union, the United State and 
Japan followed policies designed to limit the production of grain.
Even if world grain production grew slowly during the 1980s and early 
1990s, the supply of grain grew more rapidly than did the world’s demand for 
grain during the period.7 How do we know? Because international market prices 
for grain between 1980-82 and 1990-92 fell by about 40 per cent for wheat and 
maize and almost 50 per cent for rice (Table 45.3). Why should grain production 
have grown at a significant rate under these conditions? It is something of a 
miracle that world per capita grain production was approximately maintained. 
Nor should it have been too much of a surprise that world grain stocks, excluding 
China, declined. There was, first of all, a concerted effort on the part of the U.S. 
and EC to reduce governmentally held and subsidized stocks.
And, second, given the declining trend of prices, there seemed little prospect 
that private stockholding would be profitable. As it turned out, as sometimes is the 
case, the market may have gone a little too far, but this is uncertain. The real annual 
 
6 The numbers in parenthesis are the per cent increases in per capita food production during the 1970s.
 Data on per capita food production increases for the most recent decade for which FAo data are available 
– for 1982-84 to 1992-94 differ little than those given for the decade of the 1980s. The increases in per 
capita food output for China was 27 per cent, for India 16 per cent and Indonesia, 36 per cent.
7 I refer to supply and demand in terms of the shifts in the functions over time. The decline in real grain prices 
occurred because the rightward shift of the supply function was greater than the shift in the demand function.
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cost of holding stocks is high – close to 20 per cent of the value of the grain – so 
price would have to double to provide a normal return on holding grain four 
years.8
Prospects: Future supply and demand for food
I believe that the supply of food over the next two to three decades will increase 
at least as fast as the demand for food and probably somewhat faster, leading 
to a continuation of the long run decline in real grain prices. The basis for this 
belief is that there is strong evidence that the rate of growth of demand for food 
in the three decades from 1990 to 2020 will be significantly less than the growth 
from 1960 to 1990. The primary reason for the slower demand growth is that 
population growth rate is now slower than it was for the previous three decades 
and demographers predict that there will be a further reduction in the growth rate 
for the period to 2020. The population projection is the medium UN projection 
and over the past quarter century the UN projections have been remarkably 
accurate for the world population as of 2000.
Table 45.3 presents a projections of world grain use for 1990-2020 in terms 
of annual rates of growth, with comparisons to actual developments for 1960-
1990; this is the “B” projection. The only difference between the two periods 
affecting the growth of grain use is the reduction in population growth rates. 
The annual rate for 1960-1990 was 1.895; the UN medium projection is 1.3. 
The income elasticity of consumption is assumed to be unchanged in the “B” 
projection as is the growth rate for per capita income. The resulting projections 
of grain use indicate a significant decline of a fourth in the annual rate of growth. 
The worst is over.
8 The data in Table 45.3 make it clear that the recent increases in international grain prices are modest 
blips on the long term declining real price trends. The real price of wheat for January through June 1996 
is lower than any annual price from 1970 through 1985 and the recent maize price is lower than any 
price save one for the same period. Rice prices have increased relatively little in the last eighteen months 
– the real price for the first half of this year was less than in 1989 and lower than in 1994. It is difficult 
to understand why quite minor deviations from the long term trends in real prices have caused so much 
excitement. What nearly everyone failed to notice was how the low prices of grain have been since the 
mid-1980s and especially in the first four years of this decade.
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The world food supply can more than keep pace with world food demand 
in the years ahead according to the conclusions of three independent studies 
presented in early 1994 at a conference at the International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI). These were studies done by researchers at FAo, the World 
Bank and IFPRI. There was a remarkable degree of consistency in the results, 
which are summarized in a book edited by Islam (1995). The studies indicate a 
range in the growth rate of grain use for 1990 to 2010 of 1.4 to 1.6 per cent per 
annum and the midpoint is included in Table 45.3 as projection “A” as applying 
to 1990 to 2020. In doing so, I assume that the third decade will have the same 
rate of population growth – it will be lower – and income growth and variables 
affecting use as the first two. Consequently, the “A” projection is likely to be on 
the high side. As indicated, most of the increase in consumption will be due to 
population change.9
Table 45.3:  Growth rates of key variables and alternative projections of  






Population (per cent) 1.90 1.30 1.30
Income per capita (per cent) 1.8 n.a. 1.8
Income Elasticity a 0.31 n.a. 0.31
Per capita growth of grain use (per cent) 0.56 0.15 0.56
Total growth of grain use (per cent) 2.46 1.55 1.86
Notes: a Since price changes were ignored, this is the elasticity of world per capita use of grain for all 
purposes with respect to world per capita income. Estimates for 1960-90 are trend, rather than annual 
point to point rates.
b Projection A takes the projected average rate of per capita grain use growth from three studies surveyed 
by Islam (1995).
c Projection B adopts the rate of per capita grain use growth observed over 1960-90.
Sources: 1960--1990 for growth rates: World Bank, World Development Report 1992, and FAo, Production 
Yearbook, various issues.
9 The annual increase in world per capita grain use in the consensus projection is very small – the range 
of 0.1 to 0.2 per cent. But this figure is largely irrelevant. What is relevant is the rate of increase in the 
developing countries. The annual growth is projected to be 0.5 per cent for a total increase of 16 per 
cent. And I believe that it can be argued that this growth will be demand constrained since real prices are 
projected to decline much as they have in the past.
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Concern has been expressed that further improvements in agricultural output 
may be subject to greater technical constraints than has been true in the past. 
Two comments seem relevant. The first is that the rate of growth of demand 
for food will be significantly slower over the next three decades than for the past 
three. Consequently even if it proves somewhat more difficult to increase output 
in the future than in the past, this does not mean that either real farm prices must 
increase or that supply will grow more slowly than demand. The second is that 
so far there is no evidence of a slowdown in the rate of growth of per capita food 
production in the developing countries. The growth of per capita food production 
in the developing countries in the 1980s was 13 per cent, significantly higher 
than the 8 per cent in the previous decade (FAo 1991). Some put great emphasis 
on the fact world per capita grain production has declined since 1984. People do 
not live by grain alone and as the diets of people of the developing countries have 
improved, other foods have been given increased emphasis in diets. In any case, 
per capita grain production in the developing countries increased by 9 per cent 
during the 1980s (FAo 1991).
Implications for world trade
World trade in grain showed little growth after 1980, following a doubling 
during the 1970s. Since 1980 world trade moved in a range of approximately 
plus or minus 20 million tons from a rough average of 200 million tons. Even 
when the USSR imported 40 million tons annually in the late 1980s, world grain 
trade could not break out of a narrow range. I see little prospect for a significant 
growth in world grain trade during the next decade.10 Trade will not be supply 
constrained; it will continue to be constrained by demand growth.
Much attention has been focussed on the possibility of very large grain 
imports by China. While some outlandish claims have been made that imports 
night be as much as 200 million to 300 million tons, responsible projections put 
the level of imports at 40-45 million tons over the next two or three decades (Lin, 
Huang and Rozelle 1996; Huang, Rozelle and Rosegrant 1995, Koo, Lou and 
R.G. Johnson 1996).
10 The three studies project increases in world grain trade of from 80 million to more than 100 million tons 
for 1990-2020 (Islam 1995, pp. 86-87). In the text I consider only the next decade. 
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Scenarios leading to both higher and lower levels of grain imports have been 
developed by Lin, Huang and Rozelle, but some of the higher ones require serious 
policy errors by the Chinese government if the scenarios were to materialize. 
While such policy errors cannot be ruled out, given recent counterproductive 
grain market and price policies, large grain imports would be likely to finally 
convince policy makers that it was at long last necessary to do something to 
increase agricultural productivity rather than just talk about doing something, as 
has been recent behavior. Agricultural research has been an important factor in the 
success of Chinese agriculture over the past 15 years; if the government neglects it 
as it did during much of the 1980s, grain imports could increase significantly. But 
there is evidence that the benefits of agricultural research are being recognized 
and there have been modest increases in funding in recent years.
An increase in China’s annual grain imports to 40 or 50 million tons could 
be readily supplied, even at real prices as low as or lower than those of the early 
1990s. In fact, there is a possibility that so far as the traditional grain exporters are 
concerned, they will see rather little expansion in demand for their exports. This 
will be the case if grain production in the territory of the former USSR returns 
to the amount of grain in the fields to the level of the late 1980s when the grain 
harvest ranged from 180 million to 200 million tons (clean basis).11 Reductions 
of waste in harvesting, transportation, and marketing and in seed use combined 
with increased yields of forage crops (hay, silage and feed roots) and improved 
efficiency in feed conversion into meat and milk could increase the available 
supply of grain by at least 55 million tons (Johnson 1993, pp. 27-28).
of nearly equal importance is the reduction in the internal demand for 
grain due to the decline in livestock output. In the USSR the production of 
meat and milk were heavily subsidized by large consumer subsidies – in the late 
 
 
11 While returning to the same level of grain production as occurred in the late 1980s may seem to be an 
objective that can be easily reached. It needs to be noted that under the socialist system grain may have 
been produced where it will not be profitable to do so in a market system. For example, the geographic 
pattern of grain prices deviated significantly from those in a market system – the prices did not reflect 
differential costs of transportation and market but were influenced by costs of production. This meant, 
for example, that the prices of grain in Kazakhstan were higher than in the Ukraine. It is probable that 
once the grain market is a competitive one, the grain sown area will decline and some yield increases will 
be required to achieve the same level of grain output as in the late 1980s.
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1980s such subsidies equalled 10 per cent of GNP.12 The production of meat 
has already declined sharply – by more than 40 per cent – and the adjustment is 
not yet complete, especially for beef (ERS 1996, p. 20). The former USSR has 
sharply reduced its grain imports and perhaps as early as this year, the area will 
become a net exporter of grain if crops continue to develop well. As real incomes 
recover, there will be some recovery in meat and milk demand, but it is probably 
optimistic to assume that total meat consumption will recover to much more 
than two thirds of its level of approximately 20 million tons in the late 1980s. I 
have estimated that system change would increase grain availability by 55 million 
tons and the reduction in feed use due to decreased livestock consumption would 
amount to 35 million tons (Johnson 1993). If these are realistic estimates, then 
the territory of the former USSR would shift from being a net importer of nearly 
40 million tons of grain in the late 1980s to a net exporter of 40 million to 50 
million tons, perhaps soon after the turn of the century.13 The productivity gains 
from system change have so far been less than I have assumed but the decline in 
consumption of livestock products has been significantly greater. Consequently, 
grain imports have nearly disappeared sooner than most observers expected. 
The significant grain exports may also emerge sooner than expected. I can think 
of nothing else that could contribute more to the development of a profitable 
agriculture in the former USSR than the emergence of substantial grain exports 
in the early years of the next century.
Consequently in viewing the future of international trade in grain and 
food, it is clearly inappropriate to concentrate our attention on China to the 
exclusion of another area that has a great potential for influencing international 
 
 
12 In the USSR retail prices of meat and milk products in the late 1980s and early 1990s covered less 
than half the cost of bringing these products to the retail store. Consequently, when the subsidies were 
removed, there was a sharp decline in the profitability of livestock production and output fell sharply. 
Consumer subsidies also existed in the socialist economies of Central Europe, though generally at 
not quite as high rates as in the USSR. Livestock production has also fallen in the Central European 
economies with an effect on their grain utilization.
 The future consumption for livestock and poultry products will be significantly less than it was in the 
1980s, with a decline of a third as a possibility once livestock production returns to profitability and 
consumers must bear the real costs of what they consume.
13 If this were not enough bad news for the traditional grain exporters, there is a reasonable prospect that 
the former socialist countries of Central Europe will have significant grain exports within the decade. 
A recent study (ERS 1996) projects that these countries will export almost 12 million tons by 2005 (p. 
13). This is a shift from a net import position of several million tons in the late 1980s. 
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trade. Major changes affecting grain trade are underway in Central and Eastern 
Europe and these changes are large relative to what I consider to be reasonable 
projections of China’s grain imports.14
Concluding comments
My message is a simple one – there is little prospect that the factors affecting 
world food supply and demand can either stop the decline in real market prices 
for grain or result in more than a modest increase in world grain trade. While 
China may emerge as a significant importer of grain, it is at least as likely that 
Central and Eastern Europe will emerge as a major grain exporter and become 
an important competitor for the traditional exporters. While the probable future 
path of real world grain prices represents good news for urban consumers, farmers 
in the developing countries will be under continuous pressure to adjust to the 
declining prices.
14 This paper has not reflected any of the difficulties of projecting future supply and demand for grain due 
to known and possible inaccuracies in China’s agricultural data. The cultivated area and yield data used 
in all of the projections have been based on  data currently published by the government even though 
it is now admitted that instead of the cultivated area being about 95 million hectares it is about 125 
million hectares. If one accepts the official grain output estimates, this means that grain yields have been 
overestimated by about 30 per cent leaving a larger margin for further increases in yield than has been 
assumed to be likely. on the other hand, there is some reason to believe that grain output has been 
underestimated in recent years, perhaps by as much as 10 per cent (Johnson 1994; oECD 1996, p.163). 
My conclusion that grain output may have been underestimated is based on the results of the rural 
household surveys. To add further uncertainty, the data on meat production and on meat consumption 
differ by as much as 50 per cent. If one accepts the meat production data, per capita consumption was 
more than 35 kilograms in 1994 while the per capita consumption data indicate an average of no more 
than 17 kilograms though this estimate may include only meat consumed in the home (SSB 1995).
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Strengthening intellectual property 
rights in Asia: Implications for Australia 
Keith E. Maskus1
In 1900, Korekiyo Takahashi, the first president of the Japanese Patent office, 
announced during a visit to the U.S. Patent office:
“We have looked about us to see what nations are the greatest, so 
that we can be like them. We said, ‘What is it that makes the United 
States such a great nation?’ and found that it was patents and so we 
will have patents.”2
Indeed, Japan adopted a comprehensive patent system, though it was 
distinctive from the American and major European systems. Loosely stated, it was 
designed to promote industrial development through emphasising technology 
acquisition from abroad, domestic diffusion, and incremental invention, as befits 
a technology follower. on behalf of perceived economic and social interests, it 
placed serious limits on patent scope and coverage, including a refusal to provide 
patents for pharmaceutical products until the 1970s. How important the system 
was in Japan’s becoming a “great nation” is a matter for continuing debate, but in 
my view it played a positive role. As Japan matured into an industrial power and 
technological leader, features of its patent regime became the subject of increasing 
complaints by both foreign and domestic firms, prompting its re-examination.
This example illustrates several cross-currents characterising intellectual 
property rights (IPRs), the catch-all phrase encompassing provision and 
enforcement of patents, trademarks, copyrights, legal protection of trade secrets, 
and many related devices. First, IPRs can markedly assist a nation’s efforts to 
 
1 Forty-sixth Joseph Fisher Lecture, 17 November 1997. Reprinted in Australian Economic Papers, 37(3): 
346-361, September 1998.
2 Quoted in Heath (1997, p. 305).
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encourage its own technological, industrial, and cultural development and a 
failure to provide some protection can be costly for inventive domestic firms. 
Second, the terms on which a country may wish to protect IPRs depend on its 
position on the global technology ladder and on social concerns, among other 
things. The demand for protection rises with the level of economic development 
and the character of technology, making IPRs dynamic in nature.
Third, Japan adopted its patent system at the end of the last century, 
during an era of considerable change in global IPRs. The two international 
treaties that codified the classical conceptions of intellectual property rights – 
the Paris Convention (1883) covering industrial property (1883) and the Berne 
Convention (1886) covering copyrights – were negotiated, in part because of 
frustration over alleged infringements in the “newly industrialising countries” of 
the day, such as the United States and Japan.3 Thus, that period provided an 
interesting parallel to the recent outpouring of attention lavished on this most 
arcane of policy areas.
Still, no period in history compares with the last 15 years for the evolution 
of global IPRs. Recall that in 1982 the United States was alone in calling for 
developing GATT disciplines against trade in counterfeit products, an idea that 
was viewed as an irritation by most countries. In contrast, many of the developing 
countries were engaged in a long-running attempt to revise the Paris Convention 
to tilt the global balance further in the direction of uncompensated international 
dissemination of new technologies. This effort resonated with the import-
substitution commercial policies of the day.
The United States (joined shortly thereafter by the European Union and 
Japan) won this battle, sweeping the field before it. By 1986 a commitment was 
reached at Punta del Este to include trade-related IPRs on the agenda of the new 
Uruguay Round negotiations. This was simply the beginning of a tidal wave of 
lawyers and negotiators working feverishly to promote exports of intellectual 
property. Economists largely have sat and watched this happen, sometimes cheering 
it on and sometimes raising fundamental concerns about it, albeit rather feebly.
3 In fact, the United States did not join the Berne Convention until a century later because its 
manufacturing requirements for publishers were inconsistent with the convention. 
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How successful has this wave been? Since 1987, we have witnessed sharply 
increasing levels of legal protection for intellectual property, surely among the 
most significant changes in recent international commercial policies. In that 
period, over 40 developing countries have unilaterally undertaken significant 
strengthening of these rights, both because of external pressure from the United 
States and the EU to do so, and because of changes in their own perceived domestic 
economic interests. Regional trade agreements now routinely include provisions 
for protection of intellectual property rights, with distinctive approaches adopted 
that may have implications for regional trade and investment flows, an issue that 
is completely unstudied in the literature (Maskus, 1997a).
The culminating achievement is the adoption of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), a founding component and pillar 
of the World Trade organisation (WTo). This agreement requires minimum 
standards for IPRs that are, in many instances, far stronger than current norms 
in developing countries. Countries that join the WTo in the future must adhere 
to these standards. Therefore, as the agreement is implemented over the next 
several years the global system will move toward a considerable degree of IPRs 
harmonisation and higher levels of protection.
For their part, developing Asian economies, among the main targets of 
the tidal wave, have been at the center of intense efforts to upgrade protection 
for intellectual property. The most visible complaints still are directed at the 
copying of foreign compact disks, movies, books, and computer software and 
at the passing off of counterfeit consumer goods under unauthorised use of 
trademarks. Such activities, colourfully and pejoratively referred to as piracy, 
continue largely unabated in China, Thailand, the Philippines, and elsewhere, 
though significant enforcement activities have cleaned up much of the problem 
in Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. More subtle complaints arise over 
limits on protection for potentially patentable technologies, including medicines, 
seed varieties, and biotechnological inventions. In addition to external pressures 
for change, it became successively clearer in rapidly growing Asian economies 
that their own innovative firms were disadvantaged by weak IPRs.
In consequence, major legislative changes were introduced over the last 
decade in Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
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and China (see Table 46. 1), among other countries.4 Even Vietnam recently 
passed a law extending copyrights to software, though its requirement that 
software be produced locally has attracted criticism and must be relaxed before 
the country can join the WTo (Heath, 1997). Further, ASEAN members signed 
the Framework Agreement on Intellectual Property Cooperation in December 
1995, which aims to enhance cooperation in reducing piracy in the area and 
to create ASEAN standards and practices that are consistent with international 
norms. Moreover, APEC documents exhort regional economies to enhance their 
IPRs systems, a fact that at a minimum will complement the implementation of 
TRIPs requirements. Taken together, these new laws and institutions represent a 
marked strengthening of the region’s structure of IPRs, though aspects of several 
national systems still come short of TRIPs standards. The effective strength of 
regional IPRs will intensify as enforcement efforts are expanded and regularised 
and as further legislation is enacted in accordance with the requirements of TRIPs.
While the conclusion of TRIPs and the adoption of new laws in Asia may 
have dissipated some of its energy, the wave rolls on. Countries are currently 
choosing mechanisms by which they will protect geographical indications for 
wines and spirits, an area that before now has been neglected outside Europe but 
is clearly significant for Australia. Many developed economies continue to adopt 
ever-stronger standards of protection for biotechnological inventions, computer 
programs, electronic databases, and other new technologies. Moreover, the 
United States is pushing for stronger international protection by asking foreign 
governments to adopt new approaches that are questionable under standard 
IPRs. one example is the current request that Australia extend its pharmaceutical 
patents to eliminate “springboarding,” or testing by rival firms of generic drugs 
during a patent period in anticipation of the lapsing of protection. And the TRIPs 
accord itself is subject to further revision in the year 2000. 
4 The Philippine Congress has not yet enacted proposed new copyright and trademark legislation.
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Table 46.1:  Selected recent IPRs legislative changes in developing East Asia
P.R. China Joined Madrid Agreement on Trademarks, 1989 
Enacted Copyright Law, June 1991 
Joined Universal Copyright Convention and Berne Convention, 1992 
Enacted Unfair Competition Law, December 1993 
Joined Patent Cooperation Treaty, 1994 
US-China Bilateral IPRs Enforcement Agreement, March 1995 
Joined Madrid Protocol on Trademarks, 1996
Hong Kong Enacted Copyright Bill, June 1997 
Enacted Patent Bill, June 1997
Indonesia Adopted amendments to Copyright Law, 1987 
Implemented Trademark Law, 1993 
Action Plan to combat copyright piracy, 1996 
Enacted TRIPs-consistent Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Laws, 1997
Rep. of Korea Enacted Korea Patent Act of 1995 
Enacted new copyright, software, and customs laws in 1996 
Trademark Law of 1996 is under review
Malaysia Enacted Copyright Act of 1987 
Joined Paris Convention, January 1989 
Amended Patents Act of 1983 to remove bar against software patents, 1997
Singapore Enacted Copyright Act of 1987 
Enacted Trademarks Act of 1991 
Enacted Patents Act of 1994
Taiwan Enacted Copyright Law of 1992 
Adopted amendments to Trademark Law, December 1993 
Enacted New Patent Law, 1994 
Enacted Integrated Circuits Protection Law, 1995 
Agreed with US to 18-Point Action Plan on enforcement, 1996
Thailand Enacted Trademark Act of 1992 
Recognised drugs and agricultural chemicals as patentable, 1992 
Enacted revisions to Copyright Law, 1994
To stretch my analogy, tidal waves can have two opposing effects. on the 
one hand, they can raise many boats to higher levels of activity. These recent 
policy changes constitute a major achievement for technology and entertainment 
developers, the vast majority of which reside in a small number of developed 
countries. Those firms will be significant winners from the system. Advocates of 
the new rules point to potential gains in innovation, product development, and 
technology transfer as firms have to worry less about losing their informational 
advantages to free-riding copiers and imitators in different nations. Further, 
countries with strong emerging innovative capacities could gain from the new 
system, particularly if they manage it appropriately.
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on the other hand, waves can leave considerable destruction. Strong 
concerns arise in technologically lagging nations about the potential for tighter 
IPRs to encourage firms to act more monopolistically and to limit international 
access to their inventions and creations. Firms and consumers in the poorest 
countries could be made worse off unless they benefit from the more open trading 
regime that the WTo represents generally.
Between these extremes lies a continuum of national and industry interests 
that must accommodate themselves to the new global reality. Within East Asia, 
the high-income service-oriented and industrialising economies of Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Republic of Korea, and Taiwan already have strong domestic interests 
in IPRs. China, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines also are 
experiencing rising preferences for IPRs, though the benefits for them will be 
longer in coming and there will be transitional costs.
For its part, Australia may be characterised roughly as a net importer of 
technology through trade in high-technology goods, FDI, and licensing, though 
it also has strong and growing interests on the export side. Table 46.2 provides 
some basic indicators. In all of the four categories of IP-intensive manufactures, 
imports continue to exceed exports. However, exports have grown at significantly 
faster rates than imports, suggesting a shift in comparative advantage toward 
Australian production. This is especially true in beverages (including wines), 
pharmaceutical products, and professional and scientific instruments. Both 
imports and exports of these goods have risen faster than aggregate merchandise 
trade, indicating their growing relative importance in Australia’s trade structure. 
More generally, Australia’s growing export strength in high-technology products 
and services, including elaborately transformed manufactures, computer software, 
and pharmaceuticals, has attracted considerable attention.5 Much of this rising 
trade is with East Asia. over the period 1990-1996, the highest growth rates of 
Australian exports were to China, Korea, Hong Kong, New Zealand, and Taiwan, 
while exports to ASEAN as a group doubled.6
5 See Australian Financial Review (May 17, 1995).
6 Source:  Australian Bureau of Statistics.
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Table 46.2:  Basic indicators of Australia’s trade in intellectual property
Panel A. Trade in selected IP-intensive goods (A$ million and growth rates)
1990 1996
Imports Exports Imports Exports
Beverages 300 266 341(14) 676(154)
Pharmaceutical 
products
901 293 1933(115) 942(222)
Electrical machinery 7851 1339 14696(87) 3784(183)
Professional and  
scientific instruments
1941 473 3126(61) 1174(148)
Total merchandise 48705 46169 77608(59) 70008(52)
Panel B. Technology balance of payments ($A million)
1986 1992
Payments Receipts R/P Payments Receipts R/P
281 102 0.36 479 276 0.58
Panel C. Royalties and license fees ($A million)
1990 1995
Debits Credits D/C Debits Credits D/C
1070 210 5.1 1362 322 4.2
Note: Nominal growth rates in parentheses. 
Sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics, oECD Basic Science and Technology Indicators, IMF Balance of 
Payments Statistics
The data in Panels B and C demonstrate that, while Australia continues to 
be a substantial net importer of technology, as measured in its technology balance 
of payments and its net royalties and license fees, receipts (credits) are rising faster 
than payments (debits). Indeed, the increase in the ratio of receipts to payments 
in Panel B continues a long-run trend; this ratio was 0.10 in 1981.
Australia already has a strong IPRs regime, which has contributed positively 
to its technology development. Its status as a growing exporter of intellectual-
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property intensive products and technologies means that it also has important 
interests in the emerging system of protection in Asian developing economies. 
However, these policy changes present Australia with both problems and 
opportunities. Australia has a small but sophisticated and outward-looking high-
technology sector, and a successful record of product and trademark development. 
These are significant advantages that should be enhanced by regional IPRs. It is 
also open to foreign direct investment and technology imports, both of which 
might become relatively scarcer as regional economies converge on Australia’s 
already-strong IPRs.
The challenge for Australia is to maintain the attractiveness of its market to 
foreign investors while ensuring that there is sufficient coherence between IPRs 
and broader regulatory systems to maintain open and dynamic competition in 
the economy. Indeed, Australia could be in the vanguard of nations that maintain 
a pro-competitive counterweight to emerging over-protection of intellectual 
property in the United States and Europe. In this regard, it is positioned to be a 
leader in subsequent multilateral negotiations over IPRs.
The evolving international system
There are no universally applicable guidelines about IPRs from economic theory. 
Intellectual property rights operate in inherently second-best markets and are 
crude attempts to address the potential market failures arising from the conflict 
between finding adequate incentives to innovate and ensuring effective knowledge 
diffusion. Depending on one’s point of view, various aspects of the system may 
provide inadequate protection or excessively strong protection.
Thus, it is no surprise that policies on IPRs, which, with few exceptions, 
are taken at the national level, vary greatly over time within each country and 
across countries (David, 1993). For example, Japan and Italy only began offering 
pharmaceutical product patents in the 1970s. Canada eliminated its compulsory 
licensing procedures in medicines in 1993 and retains the right to review and 
control patented drug prices (Torrens, 1996). Significant differences persist 
between the United States and the European Union over geographic indications, 
biotechnology patents, fair-use exceptions in copyrights and patents, parallel 
imports, and misappropriation of trademarks, among other issues. Moreover, 
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there are substantive and controversial differences of opinion within countries 
about the optimal scope and even wisdom of some forms of rights.
The essential dynamic behind changes in IPRs is that they rise with levels of 
economic development (Rapp and Rozek, 1992; Sherwood, 1997). As a stylised 
fact, as poor countries begin to develop significant capacities to imitate foreign 
technologies and to copy artistic products, their IPRs actually become effectively 
weaker as they find it more advantageous to free ride in the “technology draught” 
(Maskus and Penubarti, 1995; Evenson, 1992). only as countries develop 
innovative capabilities and a capacity to purchase and use new technologies 
effectively under license do economic interests emerge in favour of strong rights 
to deter local imitation. Put loosely, technology developers and exporters prefer 
stronger and more harmonised IPRs, while technology users and importers prefer 
weaker and more variable IPRs.
Thus, the stronger system of rights embodied in TRIPs and in Asian 
legislative changes reflects a recent and dramatic shift upward in the demand 
for globally consistent IPRs and a perhaps grudging willingness of developing 
nations to supply them. This shift may be traced to three fundamental changes. 
First, a system of highly variable national rights became increasingly incompatible 
with expanding integration of markets through the reduction of government and 
natural barriers to trade, investment, and technology flows. In this globalising 
economy, the creation of knowledge and its adaptation to product designs and 
production techniques are increasingly essential for commercial competitiveness 
and economic growth. As has been amply demonstrated, since the early 1980s 
international trade in intellectual-property-intensive goods has risen faster than 
trade in other goods (Maskus, 1993) and FDI in high-technology sectors has risen 
at roughly twice the rate of merchandise trade (Markusen, 1995). International 
technology licensing has also risen rapidly (Mansfield, 1995).
In this environment, firms wish to exploit their technical and product 
advantages on an international scale. This is made easier with strong international 
standards on IPRs, which markedly expand the strategic options for firms, 
allowing them less-constrained choices among inter-firm and intra-firm trade, 
FDI, setting licensing conditions, and pricing to segmented markets. For their 
part, the process of globalisation has convinced governments in many developing 
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countries that access to investment resources and technology are critical for 
growth and that stronger IPRs can play an important role in attracting them. 
Considerable anecdotal evidence suggests that limited IPRs frustrate domestic 
entrepreneurs seeking to conclude licensing deals and joint ventures with 
international firms (Mansfield, 1994; Sherwood, 1993).
A second factor is that technologies for copying software, entertainment 
products, books, transmissions, and certain technologies have become cheaper 
and more reliable, expanding opportunities for international free riding. This 
fact has markedly raised the profile of copyright and patent protection on the 
international policy agenda as innovative firms perceive substantial losses in 
export markets from unauthorised copying.
Finally, the area of intellectual-property law itself remains in considerable 
flux because of the advent of new technologies that do not lend themselves 
easily to protection by standard industrial-property or artistic-property devices 
(Barton, 1993; Reichman, 1994). For one example, computer programs are 
widely protected as literary text, yet many of them have industrial utility, novelty, 
and non-obviousness, suggesting that patent protection is warranted. In general, 
patent protection is considerably stronger than copyrights, because the former 
does not admit fair-use reverse engineering for purposes of employing the idea in 
related programs. Related legal ambiguities relate to computer chip topographies 
and to electronic databases available over integrated networks.
For another, the proper scope of patents for biotechnological inventions 
is widely debated on legal grounds, even ignoring the ethical issues it raises. 
Biotechnological research is expensive but the therapeutical and genetic 
results it achieves are easily copied. Thus, patents are considered crucial for 
the development of the industry. However, some question the applicability of 
standard patents in that products stemming from recombinant DNA techniques 
may be more the result of luck and patience than of originality. Thus, it is not 
clear whether particular products are “inventions” (and therefore patentable) or 
“discoveries of nature” (and therefore not patentable in the classical approach). 
National systems of protection for micro-organisms reflect several approaches to 
this question. At one extreme, many developing economies provide no protection 
at all. At the other, the United States Patent and Trademark office recently has 
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moved decisively toward providing broad patents covering all potential products 
from genetic engineering of a particular plant or a critical research tool such as a 
genetic sequence developed for one drug but that could be required in developing 
numerous pharmaceutical products, all of which would be subject to the initial 
patent (Barton, 1995).7
The largest differences in intellectual property protection occur between 
developed and developing economies. From the standpoint of the industrialised 
(and, increasingly, the industrialising) countries, there are several primary 
shortcomings in the regimes of many developing countries. Inadequate copyright 
and trademark protection promotes extensive copying of entertainment 
and software products and misappropriation of well-known trademarks. 
Pharmaceutical products and agro-chemicals are widely excluded from patent 
protection. Neither is there patent protection for biotechnological inventions or 
patents or sui generis rights for plant varieties. Compulsory licenses are issued 
with inadequate compensation to firms that are seen to be exercising their rights 
insufficiently to achieve desired technology transfer or consumer benefits. Rules 
protecting trade secrets are weak or absent and procedures for administrative and 
judicial enforcement of IPRs are deficient.
The most significant response to these problems is the TRIPs Agreement, 
which introduces the concept of MFN treatment into IPRs (Primo Braga, 1996; 
Maskus, 1997a). While TRIPs mandates dozens of significant changes in legal 
and institutional norms and practices, it is worth mentioning major requirements 
that fundamentally alter the IPRs landscape. The standards discussed are 
minimum requirements in all WTo members but nothing precludes countries 
from adopting stronger practices.
Computer programs and databases must be protected with copyright 
protection for at least 50 years. In most countries this obligation means that 
literal copying must be ended, while the scope for fair-use decompilation and 
reverse engineering may be determined in each member.
7 See U.S. Patent 5,159,135, 7 December 1994, Agracetus cotton patent covering genetic engineering 
of cotton plants and lines; and U.S. Patent 5,328,987, 12 July 1994, Maliszewski (Immunex) IgA FC 
receptors.
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Countries must protect well-known trademarks and rights must be extended 
to service marks and collective marks. Compulsory licenses of trademarks are 
prohibited.
WTo members must protect geographical indications of origin and prevent 
producers from misleading the public about the geographic origin of goods.
Integrated circuits designs must be protected for a minimum of ten years. 
Rights owners have the right to prevent imports and sales of products that 
incorporate the unauthorised devices, even if the merchants are unaware of the 
infringement.
WTo members no longer may exclude any area of technology, such as 
pharmaceutical products, from patent eligibility and the burden of proof in 
process infringement cases is placed on the accused. Patent protection must 
extend for at least 20 years from the application filing date. Patent holders cannot 
be obliged to work their patents with local production (imports are sufficient). 
Compulsory licenses are subject to severe limitations and must bear adequate 
compensation.
Countries must protect new plant varieties, either within their patent 
systems or with a separate system of breeders’ rights.
Countries must develop a system for protecting trade secrets from unfair 
competition, according to specified minimum standards.
WTo members must develop effective enforcement measures, including 
border controls, to prevent international and domestic transactions in counterfeit 
goods and unfair competition. Such measures must include the potential for 
paying damages to rights-holders and for criminal sanctions against wilful 
counterfeiting and copying.
The agreement recognises the potential for abusive practices in the exercise 
of IPRs and gives countries wide latitude to control such abuses. The competition 
rules used for this purpose must be consistent with other provisions of TRIPs and 
the agreement also calls for opportunities for consultation in this area.
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Developed countries were given one year to introduce TRIPs-consistent 
laws.8 Developing countries and countries in transition must meet the detailed 
obligations by January 1, 2000 and least-developed countries must meet them 
by January 1, 2006. Countries may choose to accelerate their implementation of 
TRIPs and, indeed, many Asian members have done so.
Disputes in the treatment of intellectual property will be subject to the 
integrated dispute settlement mechanism agreed in the WTo. However, there 
is a five-year moratorium on the use of dispute settlement against indirect 
violations of TRIPs, allowing nations to select implementation strategies without 
interference.
Regarding this last point, one of the primary benefits of TRIPs is that it 
will move conflicts over IPRs into an established multilateral forum for settling 
disputes. These conflicts likely will become frequent given the high administrative 
expenses of IPRs and institutional resistance to strong enforcement that will 
emerge in many developing countries. 
Policy guidelines for East Asia
A curious aspect of the debate over IPRs is that while economists devote nearly 
all their attention to issues of innovation, technology diffusion, and growth, the 
international policy arena has been driven largely by questions of trademark and 
copyright pirating. The latter area generates the most visible damages to firms 
operating in Asia and is the proximate source of political pressures on trade 
negotiators.
Thus, in the short to medium-term, the primary task for East Asian 
developing economies and newly industrialising economies is to devote more 
resources to administration and enforcement efforts. This will require some 
time because of the significant costs of training intellectual property officials, 
judges, and customs authorities and because effective enforcement will encounter 
considerable opposition from interested parties. For example, a common complaint 
about China is that, despite its modernised national IPRs laws, infringement 
 
8  Australia did so at the end of 1994.
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takes place at regional levels, often with the acquiescence of local governments 
(oksenberg, Potter, and Abnett, 1996). As one observer puts it, “While the legal 
instruments may all be in place, rampant pirating has highlighted the dire state 
of enforcement. Lack of enforcement is one reason why China has not yet been 
admitted to the WTo.”9
It is fair to expect that over time levels of piracy will subside considerably 
in major East Asian developing countries. While this change would require 
absorbing some adjustment costs, open, dynamic economies could experience 
several benefits from the effort. Consider two examples. First, tentative evidence 
indicates that many firms engaged in piracy are capable of profitable production 
under license and also of developing incremental innovative gains themselves. For 
example, generation of indigenous trademarks for culturally distinctive apparel 
and processed foods is an elastic process in developing countries and there are 
considerable consumer gains from the quality guarantees inherent in trademarks 
(Maskus, 1997b). Development of applications software for local markets is also 
frequently a rapid and dynamic response. There is scope for benefiting from 
the designation of local geographic appellations, though building international 
markets for such products is expensive.
Second, econometric evidence suggests strongly that countries with effective 
IPRs and enforcement attract significantly greater amounts of international trade 
(Maskus and Penubarti, 1995). The essential reason for this is that as pirating 
activities are reduced the market for legitimate products expands, more than 
offsetting any tendency toward higher monopoly prices. Such monopolisation 
is rare in open markets in any event. Thus, there are allocative efficiencies from 
limiting the trade-distorting impacts of weak IPRs. Note that because of both 
its geographical proximity to the region and its natural complementarities in 
comparative advantage, Australia will earn a considerable share of the rising trade 
that results.
While markedly reducing counterfeiting will go a long way toward satisfying 
rights-holders in the developed countries, the important long-term issues relate 
to how stronger IPRs might affect technical innovation, international diffusion, 
 
9 Heath (1997), p. 306.
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and growth in the region. Economic theory is surprisingly uninformative on 
this question because of its limited conception of what IPRs are and how they 
operate internationally. For example, if the sole effect of stronger patents is to 
raise imitation costs, then as Asian nations strengthen their patent systems they 
would suffer from lower technology transfer and growth (Helpman, 1993). 
However, if we recognise that well-established patent rights can raise the certainty 
and lower the costs of licensing, the opposite conclusion is supported (Yang and 
Maskus, 1997). Survey evidence indicates that both the amount and the quality 
of technologies transferred depend positively on the strength of local intellectual 
property rights (Mansfield, 1994). Finally, weak IPRs can discourage local firms 
from engaging in innovative activity, a factor that takes on increasing salience as 
countries develop.
What seems clear is that for countries to maximise any net gains from 
stronger IPRs they must devise appropriate systems that interact coherently with 
other policies. Given the need to implement new laws under TRIPs, the time 
is ripe for Asian countries to establish norms that promote effective, dynamic 
competition on their markets and in the region, which is of direct relevance for 
Australia. For this purpose, simply following highly protective American and 
European IPRs standards is neither necessary nor desirable. Indeed, I share the 
view of many scholars that the emerging structure of Asian practices could serve 
as an effective counterweight to the excessive standards evolving in the major 
industrial countries, which involve ever more extensive forms of protection and 
relaxed treatment of horizontal collaboration in applied research.10 
If they consider the issue carefully, Asian developing economies may be 
expected to implement IPRs that meet the TRIPs requirements but maintain 
a balance in favour of diffusion and incremental innovation. It is important to 
recognise that a critical source of technical change and growth is competition 
among followers seeking to improve inventions and to develop specialised 
applications without infringing the original terms of protection (Scotchmer, 
1991). Clearly, such possibilities are determined by both the scope of protection 
and broader competitive factors.
10 Reichman (1996) effectively develops this argument.
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Regarding scope of protection, it is not widely recognised that there 
is considerable room within the mandates set out by TRIPs to promote such 
competition and to achieve other goals (UNCTAD, 1996). Because this is another 
complicated area, I only highlight key points. Countries may wish to establish or 
extend protection for small inventions through utility models. Countries are free 
to set liberal policies on exemptions to exclusive rights in patents and software 
copyrights in order to promote reverse engineering aimed at developing non-
infringing inventions. Fair-use exemptions in copyright for purposes of scientific 
research and education may also be pursued.
Managing the TRIPs obligations to provide patents in biogenetic 
engineering and rights in plant varieties is critically important in countries with 
substantial agricultural sectors and plant resources. This is a delicate issue because it 
requires striking a balance between needs of users of improvements in agricultural 
technologies and opportunities for developing local research opportunities. In 
biotechnology, countries may wish to establish strict standards for disclosure in 
patenting and set a higher bar in identifying novelty and an inventive step than 
the weak one that has emerged in the United States. In protecting plant varieties, 
governments could take full advantage of exemptions for farmers’ privilege and 
for research needs, as spelled out in the International Union for the Protection 
of New Varieties of Plants (UPoV). More broadly, recent experience in Latin 
America suggests that establishing plant breeders’ rights can generate considerable 
local research activity (including in public research institutes) and improve access 
to foreign germplasm supplies, without markedly raising seed costs to farmers 
(UNCTAD, 1996). How effectively such benefits could be transferred to poor 
countries with limited research capabilities remains to be seen. Finally, new 
legislation covering plant varieties may be devised to help conserve biodiversity 
and share rents from exploitation of products developed from native species.
Another critical issue relates to impacts of patent protection on 
pharmaceutical output and prices. These anticipated effects depend strongly 
on competitive aspects of the industry and may be relatively small (Maskus 
and Konan, 1994). Moreover, patents will be phased in over a lengthy period, 
moderating such effects. Nevertheless, in countries with uncompetitive markets 
that have developed local pharmaceutical sectors behind the absence of patents, 
such as India, Thailand, and China, new protection will destroy companies 
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that do not arrange licenses with major international pharmaceutical firms and 
could also increase drug prices. The TRIPs agreement does not prevent the use 
of public monitoring and control of prices in the pursuit of public-health goals. 
Governments that take recourse to such controls must weigh their advantages 
against costs of deterring technology transfer and local production, however. 
Perhaps the most significant issue in establishing new IPRs regimes is the 
need to develop complementary and appropriate competition rules for deterring 
abuse of property rights. Like IPRs, interests in competition policies varies across 
countries for many reasons and their harmonisation into a global anti-trust code 
is unlikely.11 Nonetheless, each country needs to consider its policies in three 
key areas relevant to the exercise of IPRs. First, because patents, copyrights, and 
trademarks provide protected market positions, it makes little sense to reinforce 
that market power by sustaining limits on competition at the distribution level. 
Thus, exclusive representation and licensing laws may need reform and countries 
must take a decision on whether to allow parallel imports under the doctrine 
of international exhaustion. Second, countries need to develop anti-monopoly 
guidelines for the terms of licensing contracts, particularly as these terms conspire 
to limit horizontal competition. Third, the judicious use of compulsory licenses 
under the TRIPs guidelines still provides scope for limiting severe pricing abuses 
and for effectuating technology transfer in cases of refusals to license.
on a broader scale, the effectiveness of IPRs in promoting innovation, 
diffusion, and growth depends on related policies. For example, competitive 
pressures associated with open trade and investment policies tend to spur local 
innovation and technology acquisition. Gould and Gruben (1996) report 
econometric estimates indicating that growth induced by patent protection 
among developing nations is approximately 0.66 per cent higher per year in 
open economies than in closed economies. one reason for this is that access to 
imported high-technology inputs improves under patent protection. This finding 
bears the important implication that as countries liberalise their commercial 
 
 
11 The extent of disagreement even among developed countries  is remarkably wide. one noted legal 
scholar analysed three issues in patent abuses – monopoly pricing, contracts to limit parallel imports, 
and refusals to trade – and found that European and American laws would support quite different court 
rulings (Fox, 1996).
46 Strengthening intellectual property rights in Asia: Implications for Australia
426
policies, accompanying strength of IPRs provides a more affirmative path to 
growth. Moreover, recent econometric evidence supports a growing consensus 
that countries with stronger IPRs attract significantly more FDI than do countries 
without them, other things equal (Mansfield and Lee, 1996; Maskus, 1998). 
Such evidence seems especially relevant for East Asian economies with relatively 
open economies and sustained liberalisation programs associated with ASEAN 
and APEC.
Asian countries will also find it advantageous to improve their national 
innovation systems in order to maximise the potential gains from tighter IPRs. 
Much promising research goes on in universities and government research 
institutes, the results of which often are not commercialised effectively. Here, 
promoting effective markets for venture capital and linkages to domestic and 
foreign private firms who would undertake applications R&D can be valuable. 
Note also that liberalisation of telecommunications markets improves access of 
researchers to the internet and other sources of technical information.
Implications for Australia
Imagine that this optimistic scenario comes to pass in East Asia over the next five-
to-ten years. The results should include a significant reduction in piracy in the 
region, considerably stronger minimum standards for rewarding technological 
innovation and protecting trade secrets, and complementary regulatory systems 
that promote diffusion and competition. Such a systemic reform would be valuable 
in preparing Asian economies for a shift from labour-intensive manufacturing 
with lagging technologies to more innovative technological and service-based 
economies. What would be Australia’s gains and losses from this change? It is 
impossible to assess such impacts quantitatively but important qualitative factors 
are worth discussing.
Potential gains and losses
As mentioned earlier, Australia is a largely open economy that, at least among 
developed economies, is particularly dependent on trade and foreign direct 
investment as sources of competition, exports, and technology. At the same 
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time, Australia unmistakably has a growing comparative advantage in particular 
high-technology goods and services that are sold extensively in Asian markets. 
These characteristics suggest that Australia faces a complex set of tradeoffs in the 
emerging Asian IPRs regime.
The advantages of stronger Asian property rights include the following. 
The first, and probably most significant effect, is indirect. If the new system sets 
the stage for more rapid economic growth and structural change in Asia, it will 
directly expand demand for imported products and services. Australia is well 
suited to realise a significant share of this rising demand because of its trading 
ties to Asia, its proximity, and comparative advantages. For example, additional 
income growth should elastically expand demands for Australian food and meat 
products as diets become richer. To the extent that stronger IPRs accelerate Asian 
structural transformation, they will also expand demand for Australian natural 
resources, capital goods, and business services. 
To gain an idea of how much merchandise trade might be affected by this 
factor alone, consider that Australian exports to ASEAN rose by approximately 
15 per cent per year from 1990-1996, suggesting an income elasticity of import 
demand of around 2. At current trade levels, if stronger IPRs in ASEAN were 
to raise its growth rate by 0.5 per cent per year, annual Australian exports to 
the region would be one per cent higher, or some A$116 million higher than 
otherwise.12 Similar computations suggest a gain in exports to China of A$57 
million, to Hong Kong of A$37 million, A$110 million to Korea, and $34 million 
to Taiwan. These are crude calculations and should not be assigned normative 
content, but they indicate the potential significance of the regime change.
Stronger IPRs would also have beneficial direct impacts in various sectors. 
Perhaps most evident is that protection of Australia’s geographical indications, 
especially important to the wine industry, should support higher export prices 
and additional export growth. Already there seems to be growing recognition in 
Asia of the names Barossa, Margaret River, Hunter Valley, and Coonawarra.13 
 
12 Recall the Gould and Gruben (1996) estimate that stronger IPRs tend to raise growth rates by 0.66% in 
open economies. These computations are based on trade data from Australian Bureau of Statistics and 
recent GDP growth rates.
13 Australian Financial Review (May 17, 1995).
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More generally, stronger protection of Australian trademarks and copyrights 
should be to the advantage of the sporting goods, fashion, food products, and 
entertainment sectors, among others. This may be of particular significance to 
Australian film producers and software developers as they find greater legitimate 
markets in Asia.
Further, to the extent that Australia’s comparative advantage lies in 
its intellectual property with respect to Asia, its position will strengthen with 
additional Asian compliance and enforcement of the TRIPs standards. An 
Australian firm’s contribution to a joint venture is likely to be knowledge-based 
technology, design, and services, while the Asian firm’s contribution is more likely 
to be labor, capital, and land. Evidence noted earlier suggests that stronger IPRs 
should expand Australian firm’s willingness to share technologies in this manner 
because of the additional certainty of retaining proprietary control over them. 
Returns to foreign investment and technology licensing in Asia should be higher 
as a result. Plant breeders in Australia might benefit particularly from additional 
Asian technology protection.
Australia should also experience some gains on the import side. As 
noted earlier, it is expected that additional trademark protection in Asia will 
be instrumental in encouraging local trademark development and product 
differentiation, some of it bound for export markets, such as Australia. In turn, 
Australian consumers should benefit from greater product variety and quality in 
imports, with attendant gains in competitive pressures on Australian producers.
Stronger Asian IPRs are not an unambiguous gain for Australia, however. 
one problem particularly facing small, open economies that already have 
comprehensive IPRs in place is that as Asian systems become more protective 
their markets become relatively more attractive to foreign investors and licensors. 
That is, there may be a substitution effect in investment away from Australia 
toward Asian economies to the extent that local economic characteristics do not 
otherwise discourage it. Similarly, Australian firms will face greater competition 
in trying to gain access to protected foreign technologies. This effect is completely 
unstudied and it is not clear how significant it might be. It does point to the 
importance of Australia improving its attractiveness to foreign investors on other 
grounds in the future. 
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A second factor is that strengthened IPRs in the region will place upward 
pressure on the prices of protected goods, such as pharmaceuticals. This effect 
may be slight in Australia because it already protects patents and copyrights. 
However, as the availability of generic drugs and pirated copies dries up in the 
region, rights-holders will feel less constrained to maintain competitive prices. 
In economic terms, regional import demand curves will become less elastic 
while rights-holders will find it easier to segment markets. Thus, there may be 
some rise in prices, suggesting the need to pay some attention to pharmaceutical 
markets in particular. This factor also supports consideration of further import 
deregulation in areas where distributional monopolies exist, which is advisable 
in its own right. 
Australian policy responses
It is impossible to assess accurately the net balance of these various factors, 
though I expect Australia to experience net gains from the emerging system of 
Asian IPRs. However, the potential gains would be enhanced and the potential 
problems would be attenuated to the extent that Asian countries pursue the 
pro-competitive regulatory approach sketched earlier and Australian negotiators 
might be advised to advocate such an approach.
Australian negotiators have at least one other relevant concern in the 
IPRs area. It will be important to voice the country’s interests in any attempts 
to push for even stronger global standards. Australia has already followed the 
U.S. lead in declaring computer software and algorithms patentable, which is 
of dubious value for the local software industry and might sacrifice long-run 
competitive advantages in favour of firms operating in more open Asian systems. 
It is unlikely that similarly choosing to adopt broad scope of patent protection 
in biotechnology would make competitive sense, nor would tighter restrictions 
against software decompilation. The United States also advocates low standards of 
creativity in protecting electronic databases, which promises to limit information 
diffusion on the internet without commensurate social gain. 
As an open economy that remains sensitive to terms of competition in 
acquiring key technologies, products, and services, Australia is in a unique 
position to argue against this emerging system of over-protection. This could be 
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done by working to see that the TRIPs revision exercise in 2000 is more devoted 
to consolidating its gains than to extending protection to new fields of endeavour. 
In the short term, one highly visible means of making Australia’s case 
is to declare that the market is open to effective competition even as regional 
IPRs are upgraded. This declaration could be made through additional import 
deregulation, in particular allowing parallel imports in copyrighted goods. It is 
also important to remain vigilant in its competition policy. 
Ultimately, Australia has a variety of complicated interests in the 
international system of intellectual property rights. The evolving Asian regime 
presents both challenges and opportunities that must be deliberated carefully 
by both Australian firms and policy makers. Maintaining an effective system of 
rights in the region with due regard for competitive balance is in the mutual 
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47
Human behaviour and the  
transmission of infectious disease:  
An economist’s perspective
Mark Gersovitz1
No one whom I have met likes to be sick. Illness has all sorts of costs. Avoiding 
illness through various preventive activities also has its costs, however, as 
do activities designed to effect a cure or other mitigation of an infection. So 
compromises have to be made about activities that affect health. People make 
these compromises individually and the government does so for people taken 
together.
It is the goal of this lecture to delineate some of the considerations in these 
decisions by individuals and governments as they affect infectious diseases. These 
diseases are either transmitted from person to person, as with HIV, the virus that 
causes AIDS, or tuberculosis, or transmitted by vectors, such as mosquitos in the 
case of malaria or yellow fever. Among other things, a discussion of these diseases 
establishes one role for governments in the health sectors of their societies, and 
thereby defines one meaning of public in the phrase public health.
When most non-economists such as medical professionals first think about 
what an economist can contribute to understanding health, they focus on the 
measurement of costs. A typical question might be: What are the costs of treating 
tuberculosis? And the medical professional would expect an answer of so much 
money based on an accounting of all the very specific components of the costs of 
treating a case of tuberculosis in the usual way. The economy-wide costs of treating 
 
1 Forty-seventh Joseph Fisher Lecture, 3 June 1999. A modified version has been published as “A Preface 
to the Economic Analysis of Disease Transmission”, Australian Economic Papers, 31(1): 68-83, March, 
2000.
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the disease would then be the costs per case multiplied by an estimate of the 
number of cases. If a new treatment becomes available that is equally efficacious 
as the old, its costs could be estimated in the same way and compared with the 
old method to see which is cheaper and therefore better. In fact, however, most 
economists are not particularly adept at such an accounting and leave the details 
of these calculations to cost accountants.
While economists’ concept of costs is much less specific than a cost 
accountant’s, it is the implications of the concept of cost and the different types of 
costs that interest economists. At the most general level, economists are interested 
in how different types of costs affect the choices of individuals and governments, 
in short, their behaviour. Thus economists bring a way of looking at decision 
making by individuals and governments to the discussion of health and infectious 
diseases. This economist’s perspective is based on the notion of rationality at the 
individual level and the notion that a role for governments arises when rational 
behaviour by individuals does not lead to the best outcome for individuals taken 
together. Economics tries to provide criteria to decide between two treatments 
when one costs less but is also less efficacious; at the least, it tries to warn about 
the shortcomings of proposed methods that purport to do so. It includes decision 
making in situations of imperfect information and uncertainty.
By way of final introduction, many of the examples of decisions about 
infectious diseases in this lecture come from the experience of poor countries and, 
in particular, from the instance of HIV/AIDS. Infectious diseases are much more 
widespread in poor countries both because their climates are more conducive to 
these diseases and because individuals and governments have taken many fewer of 
the actions that control infectious diseases in the richer countries. 
Table 47.1 provides information on the percentage of the adult population 
that is infected with HIV in two regions of the world, Africa where the situation is 
worst and Asia and oceania where some countries may be moving in the direction 
of Africa. An important question is whether the present desperate situation of 
parts of Africa is the future for large parts of Asia.
As is typical of much information on infections in general and HIV in 
particular, the statistical basis for understanding is weak. Almost without exception, 
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data on the percentage infected with HIV, that is its prevalence, are not based 
on national censuses or representative random surveys of infection but rather 
on samples of convenience of unknown representativeness. As is conventional, 
high risk groups include prostitutes and their clients, sexually-transmitted disease 
(STD) patients or other groups such as intravenous drug users who are infected 
early in the epidemic and may play a strategic role in its propagation. Low risk 
groups include pregnant women and blood donors, people thought to represent 
the general population of adults. 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, it is generally accepted that the main mode of 
infection is heterosexual with secondary infections passed from mother to baby 
either before or during birth or during breast feeding. Table 47.1 contains 
rather chilling information. Witness the percentages for the African countries 
in the first column of Table 47.1 which reports the prevalence for low-risk 
groups in the capitals of Botswana, Burundi, Malawi, Rwanda, South Africa, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe among others. By contrast, the prevalence for these 
groups in Asia is still low, but ominously, the rates among high risk groups 
in the capitals of such countries as Burma, Cambodia, India, Malaysia and 
Vietnam have reached the levels of Sub-Saharan Africa. In India, in particular, 
the main mode of infection seems to be heterosexual and with high rates 
among high risk groups there is beginning to be significant spread into the 
general population (Bentley, 1998).
Because Table 47.1 only shows data across countries around 1998, it does 
not show how rapidly HIV can spread in a population. The West African country 
of Côte d’Ivoire provides an example of rapid spread: In Abidjan, the capital, 
rates of infection in pregnant women may have reached 15 per cent by 1992 from 
just 3 per cent six years earlier (US Bureau of the Census, February, 1999). AIDS 
was the leading cause of adult death in Abidjan by the early 1990’s (De Cock 
et al, 1989, 1990 and 1991) and infection has spread to both urban and rural 
areas (ouattara, 1988, 1989a and b, Soro et al, 1990 and 1992). By contrast, 
there are such countries as the Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire) 
in which infection, while significant at 3-5 per cent in low-risk populations, has 
remained stable.
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Table 47.1:  Estimates of HIV prevalence, by region and risk factor, about 1998
Sub-Saharan Africa Capital/major city Elsewhere
Country Low High Low High
1 Angola 1.2 - 0.5 -
2 Benin 1.2 48.9 4.2 58.1
3 Botswana 42.9 60.0 31.7 39.2
4 Burkina Faso 9.7 56.8 5.7 -
5 Burundi 23.2 - 3.4 -
6 Cameroon 4.5 16.0 6.7 9.0
7 Central African Rep. 11.7 18.3 15.3 33.3
8 Chad 2.0 13.4 - -
9 Congo 5.8 17.5 4.0 -
10 Congo, Dem. Rep. 3.1 29.0 6.3 -
11 Côte d’Ivoire 15.9 51.9 8.1 -
12 Djibouti 2.4 28.2 - -
13 Equatorial Guinea 1.8 5.7 0.3 2.2
14 Eritrea 3.0 - - 25.0
15 Ethiopia 17.6 43.0 12.7 -
16 Gabon 4.7 16.7 1.2 -
17 Gambia, The 1.0 13.6 2.4 -
18 Ghana 3.6 72.6 3.0 -
19 Guinea 1.5 36.6 1.4 -
20 Guinea-Bissau 2.6 - 3.4 -
21 Kenya 15.9 53.5 9.1 33.6
22 Lesotho 31.1 35.6 8.7 16.2
23 Liberia 4.0 - - -
24 Madagascar 0.1 - - 1.0
25 Malawi 30.8 - - -
26 Mali 2.5 - - 52.8
27 Mauritania 0.5 - - 1.7
28 Mozambique 2.7 7.6 1.5 -
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Table 47.1:  Estimates of HIV prevalence, by region and risk factor, about 1998 
cont. 
Sub-Saharan Africa Capital/major city Elsewhere
Country Low High Low High
29 Namibia 18.1 18.2 10.3 -
30 Niger 1.3 23.6 1.7 33.6
31 Nigeria 6.7 30.5 2.3 60.6
32 Rwanda 32.7 54.5 10.2 13.2
33 Senegal 0.3 1.4 0.1 14.0
34 Sierra Leone - 26.7 - -
35 South Africa 27.0 50.3 18.1 -
36 Sudan 4.5 6.6 - -
37 Swaziland 26.3 35.2 26.5 42.6
38 Tanzania 13.7 2.4 16.6 34.3
39 Togo 6.8 78.9 4.6 7.3
40 Uganda 14.7 35.1 6.9 -
41 Zambia 27.0 58.0 12.7 36.0
42 Zimbabwe 28.0 86.0 29.3 71.8
Asia and Oceania Capital/major city Elsewhere
Country Low High Low High
1 Australia 0.3 0.4 - -
2 Bangladesh 0 1.2 - -
3 Bhutan 0 0 - -
4 Burma 1.5 36.0 1.5 8.0
5 Cambodia 3.8 61.3 2.5 28.0
6 China, Hong Kong 0 0.1 - -
7 China, Mainland 0 73.2 - -
0.4
8 China, Taiwan 0 0 - -
9 India 1.2 32.0 0.8 12.2
10 Indonesia 0 0.2 - -
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Table 47.1:  Estimates of HIV prevalence, by region and risk factor, about 1998 
cont.
Sub-Saharan Africa Capital/major city Elsewhere
Country Low High Low High
11 Korea, South 0.8 0 - -
12 Laos 0.4 1.2 - -
13 Malaysia 0 29.5 0.1 0.1
14 Mongolia 0 0 - -
15 Nepal 0 20.4 - 2.0
16 Pakistan 0.6 3.7 - -
17 Papua New Guinea 0.2 1.9 0 0
18 Philippines 0 0.5 - -
19 Singapore 0 3.7 - -
20 Sri Lanka 0 0 0 0
21 Thailand 2.0 15.9 - -
22 Vietnam 0.2 44.8 0 7.0
3.8 0.5
Source: US Bureau of the Census (February, 1999).
The requisites and consequences of individual rationality
To answer questions about people’s behaviour, economists postulate that 
individuals are rational in that they make the best choices as they see them 
from the options that they face subject to the information they have. At a 
general level, many people may find this rationality postulate to be innocuous 
and perhaps even without content because whatever anyone is observed to do 
could be defined after the fact to be the individual’s best choice. other people 
may bristle at the very notion that individuals understand and choose what 
is best for them or that they even have any options among which to choose. 
The proof of this pudding will be in its eating: Does the starting point of 




For the postulate to be useful in making predictions, it is necessary to 
specify two things: First are the options that the individual actually faces as 
determined both by the disease environment in which the individual operates 
and the information the individual has about this environment, termed the 
constraints that the individual faces. Second is how an individual ranks different 
choices among these options, termed the objectives of the individual. once an 
analyst specifies the constraints and objectives, hypotheses about choices follow 
from the rationality postulate that individuals take the best option as defined by 
their objectives that is available to them as defined by their constraints.
The biology of a disease is the first determinant of the disease environment 
that people confront. Working backward after a person is infected, do they 
recover to become either susceptible again or immune, or do they suffer chronic 
ill health or death, and how are these conditions evaluated by the person? The 
answers to these questions determine part of the costs of being infected. Can 
individuals know when they are infected and infectious, and when others are 
infectious, either through symptoms or through a medical test? Can the course 
of the disease be altered by therapy? If so, the costs of the disease are the costs of 
illness as mitigated by therapy plus the costs of the type of therapy that is chosen.
Now moving backward to the point at which a susceptible person is exposed, 
is the disease transmitted easily or with difficulty and in which ways? What 
preventive actions can a person take to lessen the risk of exposure to infection and 
how much do these preventive actions cost? In particular, is a vaccine available? Is 
a vector such as a mosquito involved and how can it be combatted? To what extent 
is the risk of infection determined by the overall rate of infection and hence stage 
of the epidemic? Are the infectious people who put a particular susceptible at risk 
relatively anonymous as would be the case with influenza or plausibly identifiable 
to the susceptible, as with an STD? 
Information that is relevant to individuals’ decisions about preventive and 
curative or palliative actions are of two main types. The first type of information 
is general. It includes information about the existence of a disease, how it is (and 
is not) transmitted, whether infectious individuals can be asymptomatic, and 
the availability of preventive, curative and palliative options and their associated 
costs. The second type of information is specific to the individual. It includes 
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information about whether a person is infected or infectious and about whether 
the people with whom the person consorts are infectious.
An important question is whether information of the first, general type 
is the real constraint on people’s decisions. If people already have this type of 
information, it is likely to be of little value to provide it over and over again. 
Many economists share an instinct based on experience that there is often too 
little willingness to believe that people may take seemingly dangerous choices 
because they face other considerations than merely a lack of information. People 
may see offsetting benefits in risky choices.
Table 47.2 provides information on the diffusion of general knowledge 
about HIV/AIDS in the adult population of Tanzania based on a representative 
random survey, the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) of 1996.2 As 
Table 47.1 reports, Tanzania has a high prevalence of HIV, perhaps 15 per cent 
throughout the country. The top panel of Table 47.2 provides the respondents’ 
answers to some questions on the general nature of HIV/AIDS. Just about 
everyone has heard of the disease and knows that it cannot be cured. In answering 
five questions about ways to avoid HIV that are generally believed not to be 
efficacious, the majority of people answer in the way that would be conventionally 
correct, although significant numbers do not. More importantly, the vast bulk of 
people know that HIV is sexually transmitted, can be avoided by condom use, is 
transmitted from mother to baby, and can be asymptomatic so that carriers are 
not known to potential partners.
2 A representative random sample is not the only requirement for useful data on behaviour relevant to the 
HIV epidemic. Another requirement is that respondents answer accurately about some of their most 
private activities. Caldwell et al (1994) doubt that surveys with large random samples can elicit accurate 
answers. one troublesome inconsistency in surveys of sexual behaviour is that women typically report 
less (heterosexual) activity than men, whether measured by partners or sexual acts. Wadsworth et al 
(1996) and Gersovitz et al (1998) discuss this issue.
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Table 47.2:  Responses to the Tanzanian Demographic and Health Survey, 1996  
(Weighted by population probabilities)
Question Men Women
Yes No D.K. Yes No D.K.
A. Information on AIDS of a general nature:
Ever heard of AIDS? 99 1 97 3
Can AIDS be cured? 2 96 2 2 95 3
Avoid AIDS by good diet? 13 73 14 16 65 18
Avoid AIDS by avoiding urine or stool? 24 57 20 18 57 25
Avoid AIDS by not touching person with AIDS? 17 67 17 15 63 23
Avoid AIDS by not sharing eating utensils? 22 61 16 18 59 23
Avoid AIDS by avoiding insect bites? 30 54 16 21 52 27
Avoid AIDS by staying with one faithful partner? 83 10 7 79 11 10
Avoid AIDS by using condom? 70 13 18 65 14 22
Avoid AIDS by using clean needles for medical 
injections?
84 8 8 73 13 14
Apparently healthy person have AIDS? 79 11 10 70 16 14
Woman pass AIDS to baby? 77 9 14 75 10 15
B. Person-specific information and AIDS strategies:
Ever tested for AIDS? 11 89 4 95 1
Like to be tested for AIDS? 74 23 3 70 26 4
Advise partner when had STD? 60 40 91 9
Tried to avoid infecting partner? 80 15 52 7
Memo: Partner already infected? 6 41
Behavioural change: Did not start sex. 15 85 13 87
Behavioural change: Stopped all sex. 7 93 7 93
Behavioural change: Started using condoms. 9 91 2 98
Behavioural change: Use condoms more often. 5 95 1 99
Behavioural change: only one partner. 45 55 49 51
Behavioural change: Reduced number of partners. 24 76 15 85
Behavioural change: Man avoids prostitutes, woman 
asks spouse to. 
18 82 4 96
Source: DHS (1997)
47 Human behaviour and the transmission of infectious disease: An economist’s perspective
442
The first step in judging how much of the misinformation should be 
corrected by further information campaigns would seem to be to establish if 
the misinformed have any use for improved information. Presently, there is no 
such analysis which would be best undertaken by seeing if people who increase 
their knowledge change their behaviour. That relatively uneducated and rural 
respondents in Tanzania disproportionately answer incorrectly combined with 
the widespread epidemic does suggest that there still may be groups who could 
benefit from further information campaigns in this country.
Turning now to the second type of information that is specific to 
individuals, Table 47.2 shows that Tanzanians know that in the case of HIV 
infectious people may be asymptomatic and that there is therefore no way to tell 
without a test whether a prospective partner is infectious. This fact naturally leads 
to the question of access to tests, the choice to be tested, and the choice to reveal 
test results to prospective partners. For a number of biological reasons, medical 
tests for HIV infection are not perfectly accurate, but nonetheless provide highly 
important information. Before turning to the determinants of the decision to be 
tested, which raise many strategic questions for individuals that fit well within 
the rationality paradigm, it is worthwhile to consider the range of objectives that 
people have.
Individuals have many objectives in making decisions that affect their 
health. Although a list of these objectives is commonsensical, many of the pitfalls 
in the analysis of health arise from neglecting some of these objectives so it seems 
worthwhile to list them. People are concerned about the direct costs of illness 
to themselves: pain, fear, the loss of income and other opportunities, and early 
death. They want to minimize the money costs of prevention and curative or 
other therapeutic activities insofar as they pay these costs. They value physical 
intimacy of all sorts with other human beings including sexual relations whether 
for pleasure or for procreation. But physical intimacy promotes the spread of 
infection whether with a classic STD, new ones such as HIV, or diseases of 
proximity such as influenza, tuberculosis or leprosy. Individuals may also value 
the costs paid by people whom they infect, such as their sexual partners; to the 
extent they do so, they are termed altruistic. At the same time, individuals may 
want their sexual partners to believe that they are sexually faithful and they may 
want their partners to be sexually faithful independently of their becoming 
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infectious. Furthermore, in the case of vector-borne diseases such as malaria, 
yellow fever, and bubonic plague, among others, people value doing activities 
and being in environments that risk infection. So a lot of considerations are in 
play and objectives are often in conflict, depending on the particular disease. In 
the case of the heavily HIV-infected parts of Africa, it looks like a fundamental 
conflict is between avoiding AIDS and having a family, two fairly basic objectives.
All these considerations are irrelevant if individuals lack choices. In the case 
of HIV in Tanzania, the DHS provides information on some of the strategies 
people have adopted. Their main strategy seems to be to change the type of 
partner: avoid prostitutes, reduce the number of partners or, for almost a majority 
of respondents, restrict oneself to only one partner. A large proportion of people, 
22 per cent of men and 20 per cent of women, report having chosen sexual 
abstinence, either by not starting to have sexual relations or by stopping relations. 
The knowledge requirements and cash costs to adopt a strategy of abstinence are 
particularly simple, nothing more than the knowledge that HIV is a deadly STD. 
of course, with better information, say about prospective partners, these people 
will have better options, including the opportunity to form partnerships and 
have families. By contrast, relatively few people report starting to use condoms 
or using them more frequently. Indeed, in this survey, only 16 per cent of men 
and 6 per cent of women report ever using a condom to avoid HIV on even one 
occasion (data not shown in tables).
Although these results on the relative adoption of abstinence and condoms 
as preventive strategies may seem implausible, they are consistent with other 
less representative samples. In a study of people tested at a centre in Kampala, 
Uganda that comprised several groups of respondents, 16 per cent of one sample 
said they would abstain from sex if they were to receive a negative test result, 
while 25 per cent of another sample reported that they had actually abstained 
since receiving their test results (Muller et al, 1992). In a study of two areas of 
rural Zimbabwe, 24 per cent of 1093 women aged 15-49 reported that they 
abstained, while only 10 per cent of this group reported using condoms with 
their regular partner (Gregson et al, 1998). Fifty per cent of these women claimed 
to want fewer children since hearing about AIDS while only 3 per cent wanted 
more, consistent with the substantial adoption of abstinence which respondents 
report. By contrast, a study of urban Uganda reports both a significant increase 
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in condom use and decrease in sexual activity, accompanied by a decrease in HIV 
infection (Asiimwe-okiror et al, 1997).
If the picture of substantial abstinence is accurate, it means that the costs 
of the epidemic are not just measured by infection but also by what must be 
important sacrifices of happiness by these people who see physical intimacy and 
childbearing as just too dangerous. Although people who adopt abstinence as a 
precaution will contribute to lower population growth, there may be people who 
form monogamous partnerships earlier than they would in the absence of AIDS, 
with the opposite effect on overall fertility. These people also pay a cost if they 
form partnerships with individuals whom they would not choose except for the 
fear that otherwise more suitable partners might be infectious.
The generally low level of condom adoption is widely seen as a troublesome 
puzzle. But there are some good reasons expressed by African respondents in a 
number of studies (Cohen and Trussell, 1996 and Pool et al, 1996). First, an 
important reason these people have sexual relations is to have families. Second, 
the use of a condom would seem to presuppose that one or the other partner 
is unfaithful or suspicious, and this process of inference is one people want to 
avoid, especially with their regular partners. By contrast, there are a number 
of misunderstandings about condoms, such as that they are porous, that could 
possibly be overcome through information campaigns.
Against this background, it seems time to turn to the role of a test for 
infection in the dynamics of the epidemic. Testing and the associated behaviour are 
particularly useful in gaining information about whether people care only about 
themselves (termed egoists) or also about some or all of their partners (termed 
altruists). Presumably if people are altruists, they will test to avoid infecting their 
partners, and such action will tend to slow the epidemic. Philipson and Posner 
(1993) in their book Private Choices and Public Health: The AIDS Epidemic 
in an Economic Perspective argue for an important qualification to this view: 
They emphasize that egoists who test positive may increase their level of activity 
because they personally have nothing to lose while they do not care about the 
consequences for their partners. Furthermore, some people who were thought by 
moderate-risk people to be at too high risk to be acceptable as partners will test 
negative, thereby making themselves eligible for partnerships that will sometimes 
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infect them. In general, therefore, these authors (p. 84) argue that “testing may 
increase the incidence of AIDS rather than being sure to decrease it.”
As for other reasons than deciding about sexual activity, testing in poor 
countries can inform decisions about the future in all sorts of ways such as making 
provision for children who will be orphaned or planning fertility especially because 
without intervention about a third of all children born to infected mothers are 
infected. In a study of men and women clients of a testing centre in Kampala, 
Uganda (Muller et al, 1992), reasons for taking the test were a planned marriage 
or new relationship (27 per cent) suggesting altruism, to plan for the future (35 
per cent), distrust of a partner (14 per cent) or illness or death (not HIV specific) 
of a partner (20 per cent). In rich countries an important reason to test is to begin 
life-prolonging therapy in the case of a positive test but these expensive therapies 
are not available in poor countries. And there are costs to being tested such as 
abandonment by partners who become aware of a positive test. Finally, there are 
the costs of coming back for test results which may not be negligible because the 
recent provision of same-day testing at a centre in Kampala, Uganda has led to 
100 per cent of people learning their test results compared to the 79 per cent who 
learned their results at the same clinic when the technology of testing required 
a return visit after two weeks (Kassler et al, 1998). on the other hand, it may 
be that the additional 21 per cent who learned their results had no use for the 
knowledge, and that costs were not a deterrent.
The first thing to be learned from the DHS about testing in Tanzania is that 
a not insignificant number of people have done so, 11 per cent of men (though 
a lower 4 per cent of women). In comparison to men who have not been tested, 
almost twice as many men who have been tested report stopping sexual activity 
to avoid HIV (6.7 per cent versus 12.3 per cent). Furthermore, almost three-
quarters of men and of women who have not been tested would like to be. So 
testing is a real issue for these people. on the other hand, in the survey only one 
woman and no men report that they have AIDS. Either the people who are tested 
are a self-selected group of people at low risk or there is something anomalous 
about the survey or the estimates of national HIV seroprevalence in Table 47.1. 
In any case, there is little scope for observing egoistical behavior by people who 
test positive for HIV in this data set. 
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Among the people in the DHS survey who reported having had a classic STD 
in the last 12 months, Table 47.2 shows that the majority (vast majority in the case 
of women) claim to inform their partner and take precautions to avoid infecting 
them if they are not already infected.3 Thus these people seem to be broadly altruistic 
in their admittedly self-reported behaviour. But testing for a conventional STD has 
very different benefits from testing for HIV because conventional STDs are curable 
and once people are cured they would not want to be re-infected by their regular 
partners. So the framework of rational behaviour leads to the possibility of very 
different behaviour between conventional STDs and HIV.
In addition to a representative random survey like the DHS for Tanzania, 
there are small scale studies of HIV testing and associated behaviour based 
on samples of convenience. Some of the findings from these studies provide 
important hints about how people see their strategic situation, in some cases 
suggesting egoistical motivations for many.
First, these studies show that a significant number of people who are tested 
do not return for their test results. Furthermore, a survey of 12 HIV testing 
centres in poor countries (Cartoux et al, 1998) found that in 9 centres women 
who tested HIV positive were less likely to return for their tests than women who 
tested negative. These results suggest that either these women can guess the answer 
based on what they know about their past histories or that their circumstances 
mean that they have much less use for knowing their results than women who 
test negative. Maybe they do not care about their partners perhaps because their 
partnerships are casual ones that put them at greater risk in any case.
Second, these studies show that significant numbers of people who are 
tested do not tell their partners about their test results and that they are less likely 
to do so if their test results show that they are infected with HIV. In a study in 
Kinshasa, Congo, 97 per cent of 238 HIV-positive women were unwilling to 
inform their partners of their HIV status (Ryder et al, 1991). In a study in Kigali, 
Rwanda (Van der Straten et al, 1995), 95 per cent of HIV-negative women 
reported discussing their test results with their partner, but only 77 per cent of 
 
3 Petry and Kingu (1996, pp. 267-268) report that almost all people with a classic STD in their sample 
were aware of it, although only 25% of patients who reported STD-like symptoms had a classic STD.
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HIV-positive women did so. In another study in Kigali (Ladner et al, 1996), 71 
per cent of HIV-negative women chose to learn their tests results in contrast to 
64 per cent of the HIV-positive women. of the women who learned their results, 
92 per cent of HIV-negative women in contrast to 85 per cent of HIV-positive 
women told their partners that they had been tested prior to getting their results. 
After learning their results, however, only 51 per cent of HIV-positive women 
intended to tell their partners the results, in contrast to 95 per cent of the HIV-
negative women.
Third, discordant partnerships in which one partner is HIV positive but 
the other is HIV negative provide an important window on whether behaviour 
is egoistical or altruistic once infection has occurred.4 In a study of discordant 
partnerships in Uganda (Serwadda et al, 1995), 17 per cent of men used condoms 
when the woman was the infected partner whereas only 10 per cent of men used 
condoms when they were the infected partner. The number of partnerships in 
the study was too small, however, to be confident that the results were not due 
to chance. Furthermore, most of the members of these partnerships had not 
requested their test results despite having the opportunity to do so. Consequently, 
interpreting these results as suggesting that men protect themselves more than 
they do their partners presupposes that it was not easier for these men to infer 
when their partners were more at risk of being infected than when they themselves 
were. In 28 discordant partnerships in Kigali, Rwanda (Van der Straten et al, 
1995), 84 per cent of men used a condom in the 16 partnerships in which they 
were negative while only 57 per cent of the men did so in the 12 partnerships in 
which they were positive, but again these are very small numbers.
In a study of 149 married discordant couples in Kinshasa, Congo who were 
intensively counseled (Kamenga et al, 1991), 18 per cent of 80 couples in which 
the woman was positive practiced abstinence while the remaining 82 per cent 
used condoms. By contrast, in 69 couples in which the man was positive, 25 per 
 
4 The ratio of male-positive to female-positive discordant partners was close to one in these studies: 69 
versus 80 in Kamenga et al (1991); 12 versus 16 in Van der Straten (1995) and 44 versus 35 in Serwadda 
et al (1995). Carpenter et al (1999) present evidence that the incidence of women in discordant 
partnerships is twice that of men. Even taking account of this finding, the numbers on the ratio of male-
positive to female-positive discordant partnerships suggests that a model in which men become infected 
by very high-activity women and then infect their regular partners/wives cannot be the whole story; too 
many women in the discordant regular partnerships are the infected partner.
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cent practiced abstinence but only 62 per cent used condoms, so that on balance 
13 per cent of the couples engaged in unprotected sexual relations. of the 13 men 
in this study who had extramarital partners after learning their test results, 11 did 
not use condoms with their extramarital partners although 11 of the 13 either 
abstained from or used condoms during relations with their wives. By contrast in 
Kigali while fewer women who tested positive told their partners of their results, 
those who did tried harder than the women who had tested negative to persuade 
their partners to adopt safer practices (Van der Straten et al., 1995). Seventy-nine 
per cent of HIV-positive women who told their partners of their results reported 
discussing condom use with their partner while only 61 per cent of HIV-negative 
women did so; 63 per cent of these HIV-positive women asked their partner to 
use a condom while 43 per cent of HIV-negative women did so; and 39 per cent 
of these HIV-positive women tried to convince their partner to use a condom 
while 18 per cent of HIV-negative women did so (Van der Straten et al, 1995).
Externalities and public health
The foundation of rational behaviour and individual decision making provides a 
basis for public policy. The central concept is the externality. Usually, if individuals 
are not compensated for benefits that they generate for others outside of family 
and friends, they do not take these consequences into account in making their 
decisions. Similarly, if individuals do not pay for costs that they impose on others, 
they do not take them into account. In either case, they generate externalities, 
respectively good and bad effects on the welfare of others, people whose benefits 
and costs are external to their decision making.
From society’s perspective, however, all benefits and costs should be 
included in the weighing of decisions, no matter whether they enter into the 
decisions of the people whose actions lead to the benefits and costs or not. 
For this reason, when there are externalities, there is a divergence between the 
benefits and costs as seen by individuals who take decisions and the benefits and 
costs that concern governments. Such a divergence provides one of the classic 
rationales for intervention by governments. Thus the concept of an externality 




A good example of an externality is environmental pollution that affects 
public health although without necessarily involving an infectious agent. Left 
to himself, a factory owner who pollutes a lake shared by many others reaps the 
full benefit from avoiding the costs of pollution abatement but only suffers a 
small fraction of the total costs of water pollution as one among many members 
of the community. on the presumption that the factory owner does what is 
in his own personal interest, he will choose levels of pollution higher than the 
community as whole would find desirable when it weighs the costs of pollution 
abatement against the total costs of water pollution to the community. A role for 
the government is then to communicate the larger social costs of pollution to the 
factory owner by charging him a pollution fee that represents the full costs of 
pollution to the community. Such a fee will induce the factory owner to reduce 
pollution to the level that the community finds desirable. of course, if the factory 
owner is an altruist who bases decisions on the community’s best interest, then 
there is no need for government intervention; but this assumption is implausible.
In some ways, individuals take decisions that affect the prevalence 
of infections without fully incorporating the effect of their actions on the 
community’s costs and benefits, just as the hypothetical factory owner. Diseases 
that involve transmission from vectors to humans and back to vectors would 
seem to fit the externality model well. For example, a farmer who is infected with 
schistosomiasis (bilharzia) and voids one stage of the parasite into an irrigation 
canal where it can mature into another stage that infects other farmers probably 
does not incorporate these costs fully into his decision, if he does so at all. For 
this type of infectious disease, the people who are put at risk of infection are 
often neither friends nor family; in any case, the way the farmer provides the 
next link in the chain of infection is not transparent. The same situation would 
seem to prevail in the case of diseases that are transmitted directly from person 
to person, but relatively anonymously, perhaps before the infected person is even 
aware that they are infectious. Influenza is a good example, and one that killed 
millions of people in 1919. STDs would seem to allow more scope for altruism 
because a sexual partner is rarely anonymous and is often included among people 
whose interests an infected person wants to take into account. The discussion of 
behaviour associated with testing, however, suggests that many people who test 
positive behave egoistically. Different views of the scope for altruistic behaviour 
seem to have been part of a contentious interchange between two Australian 
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economists (Lloyd, 1991 and 1992 and Parish, 1992) on the relevance of the 
concept of externality to policy on AIDS, so not all economists agree. Finally, 
infectious diseases of any sort may be contrasted with cardiovascular disease 
or cancer, for which there is no externality caused by an individual’s becoming 
ill and, correspondingly, there is not an externality rationale for government 
intervention, although there may be other rationales.
While the notion of externalities is straightforward, situations characterized 
by externalities can lead to seemingly paradoxical results. For instance, consider 
a situation in which a disease spreads among a population comprising two 
groups, one with a high exposure to infection and one with a low exposure. For 
concreteness, the first group may be identified with people with many sexual 
partners and the second with people with relatively few partners, while the 
disease is AIDS. From an individual’s perspective there is no doubt that lowering 
the number of their own partners will lower the probability of that individual’s 
becoming infected, other things equal. But what about the infection rate in the 
population as a whole? 
For sake of argument, assume initially that the low-activity people are not 
active at all. In this case, the epidemic may spread rapidly among the high-activity 
people. Now consider an increase in the activity level of the low-activity group, 
perhaps to one contact. Some of these contacts will be with high-activity people 
and some will result in infections of low-activity people. But if the low-activity 
people have only one contact they will not infect anyone else. In the meantime, 
some of the high-activity people who are not yet infected will be less likely to 
meet infected high-activity people and will be less likely to be infected. This effect 
may even lead to the extinction of the epidemic among high-activity people and 
therefore among the population as a whole, although at a cost to the low-activity 
people who become infected during the transition. To put the lesson of this 
analysis in the opposite way, the observation of an increased prevalence among 
high-activity people need not reflect an increase in risky behaviour by them. 
Instead, it may reflect decreased risky behaviour by low-activity people. Indeed, 
high-activity people may even be decreasing their risky behaviour somewhat.
So much for a theoretical possibility as presented in a stark and simplified 
example. Spurred by this type of example, two economists, Kremer and Morcum 
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(1998), have looked for this effect in a more realistic model of HIV transmission 
calibrated to data from the United Kingdom. They estimate that 80 per cent 
of the heterosexual population has sufficiently low activity levels as measured 
by partner change that an increase in their activity would decrease the national 
prevalence level. Thus the theoretical result may not be a curiosity.
While understanding this phenomenon may be important to the 
interpretation of the dynamics of an epidemic with different groups (Whitaker 
and Rentin, 1992), its policy implications are less clear. Few people would want 
to encourage low-activity people to take risks with their health for some notion 
of the greater good. Nonetheless, such a finding would seem to suggest the need 
to find policies to lower infection rates among high-activity groups who may 
actually be made more vulnerable by campaigns that decrease activity levels 
among low-activity groups.
In the context of infectious diseases, it is useful to distinguish two types 
of externalities that arise, the pure infection externality and the pure prevention 
externality (Gersovitz and Hammer, 1999). The pure infection externality arises if 
individuals do not take into account the fact that their becoming infected affects 
the risks of others’ becoming infected. The discussion of externalities in sexual 
behaviour and the transmission of HIV has focused on this type of externality, 
both negative and positive in the case of the Kremer-Morcum example. In 
contrast, the pure prevention externality operates whether or not the individual 
becomes infected himself. An example would be spraying for malarial mosquitoes 
which lowers others’ risks of becoming infected regardless of whether the person 
who pays for the spraying becomes infected or not.
This distinction between different types of externalities helps to provide 
some qualitative guidance for government interventions. Consider a quintessential 
infection externality: a disease transmitted from person to person and in which 
people are either infected and infectious or well but susceptible to infection; 
a person once cured does not become immune but is once again susceptible. 
In offsetting the externality, it is equally desirable to prevent someone from 
becoming infected as to cure them; the main thing is to keep more people out 
of the infectious group than would otherwise be the case. As a consequence, 
prevention and cures should be subsidized at exactly the same rate. This result is 
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not general; it depends on the structure of the disease as defined by what happens 
to an infected person. Recovery to susceptibility, recovery to immunity, or death all 
imply different types of intervention as between prevention and cure. By contrast, 
many of these issues of policy design do not arise in the HIV epidemic because 
there is very limited scope for government intervention. While HIV transmission 
raises complex questions in terms of individuals’ decisions, the governments 
of poor countries have relatively few options and exclusively preventive ones: 
provision of information, and subsidization of condoms and tests. There is no 
cure and even interventions that mitigate the effects of the infection are generally 
far too expensive to be available in the very poor worst-affected countries.
Vector-transmitted diseases provide further complications in the design 
of an intervention package. Interventions are not restricted only to those that 
either prevent people from infecting each other or cure the infected; there are 
also interventions that affect the population of the vector and its ability to infect 
people. In the case of vector control, pure prevention externalities arise to an 
extreme degree. The government may often have to pay for the whole program of 
vector control because control at the individual level may be entirely impractical; 
the infiltration of vectors from outside a single individual’s perimeter of control 
may be overwhelming. For instance, spraying in one’s own compound may have 
little effect on the probability of getting malaria if one’s neighbours do nothing. 
Absent a method of co-ordinating large groups of people, the definition of a 
government, the result will be that no one bothers to spray.
Formulation of policy using the concept of an externality requires an estimate 
of the discrepancy between benefits and costs at the individual and community 
levels. While the rationality postulate provides a basis for prediction it is also 
closely related to most economists’ solution to another problem: how to evaluate 
what happens as an outsider or policy analyst. Having started with the view that 
individuals choose what is best for them individually, it is not a long step to assert 
that what happens should be evaluated the way individuals do. In the context of 
infectious diseases, this position means that the evaluation of an epidemic is not 
based solely on infection rates, but must take into account that individuals also 
value doing those risky activities that lead to infection. When there are externalities, 
however, individuals’ actions taken together do not lead to the best overall outcome 
as seen by them so that there is a role for government in public health. Thus just 
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because one uses the same method of valuing costs and benefits as do individuals 
does not mean that the world as it exists is the best possible.
Estimation of the costs imposed on others by the person who is infectious 
is a difficult but unavoidable problem in establishing the extent of an externality: 
What is the monetary equivalent of the pain of illness or the loss from a death? 
Economists have some answers. For example, there are studies that derive 
individuals’ valuation of risk to health and life from the wage premium that they 
require to do jobs that pose these kinds of risks (Viscusi, 1992).
An alternative that is sometimes used to avoid the valuation of illness and 
death, especially in the field of health policy, is the cost-effectiveness approach. The 
idea is to calculate the costs of an intervention divided by a given outcome, usually 
lives saved, cases prevented or life years saved (Hammer, 1993). For example, the 
cost-effectiveness calculation could produce a result with the meaning of dollars 
per life saved. Advocates of this approach would then choose to spend the health 
budget on those interventions that have the lowest cost in terms of lives saved. 
But this methodology can be severely misleading and for a number of reasons. 
Hammer (1993, p. 20) gives the following example which is sufficiently telling 
that it deserves to be quoted:
Consider a situation in which two drugs are available to treat a 
particular disease. Drug 1 changes the probability of avoiding death 
from 0.2 to 0.3 and costs $5 per treatment. Drug 2 changes the 
probability from 0.2 to 0.25 and costs $2 per treatment. The cost per 
life saved by drug 1 is $50 ($5/[0.3-0.2]), while lives saved by drug 2 
cost $40 ($2/[0.25-0.20]), making drug 2 more cost effective.
Most people probably would opt for drug 1, though, provided they are 
willing to pay more than $60 to save their life. For any imputed value of life 
greater than $60, the value of the increased probability of recovery outweighs 
the extra cost of the drug Cost-effectiveness ratios, while seeming to avoid the 
contentious issue of deciding on a monetary value of life, merely disguise an 
implicit valuation that may not reflect people’s preferences.
Furthermore, cost-effectiveness abandons the principle of intervention to 
offset an externality as a motivation for government policy. It may be that the 
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greatest cost-effectiveness is realized in cancer therapy, but if this therapy would 
be paid for by a rich private citizen on his own behalf, there is no obvious reason 
to raise tax dollars to pay for such a therapy through the government and certainly 
no reason based on externalities.
So far government intervention has been restricted to subsidizing extant 
prevention or cures. Governments also fund research to develop new preventive 
and curative methods. The economist’s justification here again derives from a 
concept similar to an externality, namely a public good. Because knowledge is 
costly to produce but relatively inexpensive to disseminate, it is difficult for private 
businesses to recover the costs of generating new knowledge. In some cases, such 
as pure science, government plays an important role in directly funding the 
activity to generate knowledge. In other cases, such as the application of pure 
science to produce a specific drug, government creates property rights through 
the patent system to enable private businesses to obtain a protected return on 
their investments for a fixed period of time. Finally, the same sort of rationale 
justifies government information campaigns about the risks of diseases; these are 
activities that the private sector will find hard to make profitable because it is 
difficult to charge people for the service that they get. For instance, neighbours 
talk to neighbours who have heard information but no one is going to take up 
a collection to pay a private business for the costs of the initial radio broadcasts.
Conclusions
The economic approach to infectious diseases is in its infancy, somewhat oddly because 
many economists have long had the intuition that epidemics and infectious diseases are 
quintessential manifestations of the principle of an externality, itself a central concept 
in economics. Yet only recently have economists begun to look at these questions 
in a formal way with some surprising results, such as the consequence of increased 
activity by people with low-activity levels for overall prevalence. There is controversy 
among economists over such basic issues as whether the choice to vaccinate involves 
an externality or not (Brito et al, 1991, Francis, 1997, Geoffard and Philipson, 1997 
and Kremer, 1997) and therefore whether there is justification for public vaccination 
campaigns based on offsetting an externality. Nonetheless, the principles of rational 
behaviour at the individual level and interventions to offset externalities provide a 
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Public policy and higher education
Peter H. Karmel1
The invitation to deliver the Joseph Fisher Lecture this year has given me great 
pleasure not only because of the honour of the invitation itself but because of my 
close association with the University of Adelaide during the 1950s and 1960s. I 
well remember the first Joseph Fisher Lecture in which I was involved. It was in 
1952 and the lecturer was J. G. Crawford speaking on “Australian Agricultural 
Policy”. In those days the lecture was held at night in the Bonython Hall and the 
platform party wore black ties. The official party arrived on the platform at 8.00 
pm to discover a virtually empty hall – the University authorities had neglected 
to advertise the event!  Embarrassed, the 15 or 20 persons present adjourned to 
the Staff Club where Jack Crawford conducted an informal but well informed 
seminar. I hope that we will do better this evening!
Purposes of higher education
The main purposes of universities have recently been described in a report of 
the Commonwealth Minister for Education, Training and Youth Affairs (Kemp, 
December 2000) as: 
•	 to inspire and enable individuals to develop their capabilities to 
the highest potential throughout their lives (for personal growth 
and fulfilment, for effective participation in the workforce and for 
constructive contributions to society);
•	 to advance knowledge and understanding;
•	 to aid the application of knowledge and understanding to the benefit of 
the economy and the society;
1 Forty eighth Joseph Fisher Lecture, 30 April 2001. I wish to acknowledge the help of Mr R. H. Arthur 
in the development of the ideas set out in this paper and his assistance in spelling out details.
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•	 to enable individuals to adapt and learn, consistent with the needs of 
an adaptable knowledge-based economy at local, regional and national 
levels; and
•	 to enable individuals to contribute to a democratic, civilised society 
and promote the tolerance and debate that underpins it.
Few would disagree with this list, although the manner in which a particular 
institution pursues these purposes depends on the priorities or weights it attaches 
to them. 
Most would also agree that public policy relating to higher education 
should aim at facilitating these purposes by:
•	 promoting access to higher education;
•	 pursuing excellence in the work of students and in the scholarship and 
research of academic staff;
•	 providing an environment to enable universities to fulfil their purposes.
My purpose in this paper is to discuss the implications of the current 
arrangements for policy setting and management of our university system, in 
particular government/institution relations and funding mechanisms. These 
unquestionably impinge on the universities’ capacity to fulfil their purposes and 
on the efficacy of public policy in meeting its objectives.
There is general agreement that our universities are in need of a substantial 
financial boost. (This has been recognised by the Commonwealth Government 
in the leaked 1999 Cabinet Submission and by the opposition in its statements 
on the Knowledge Nation.) But the arguments for reform that I shall advance are 
deeper and the longer-term consequences of inaction more serious than simply a 
claim for more money. At stake is the nature and quality of our universities, their 
independence, their international competitiveness and their capacity to serve 
Australia in the 21st century.
The 1990s have seen significant changes in the relationship between 
universities and government. While some have been clearly beneficial (for 
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example, the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS)) the trend has 
been towards an increasing level of government and bureaucratic involvement 
with, and influence over, the way our universities function. Unless significant 
changes are made in the way governments interact with universities, the principles 
of institutional autonomy and academic independence will cease to have any real 
meaning, public higher education policy will falter and our universities will fail 
to meet our expectations.
Centralisation versus decentralisation
The present government involvement in the administration of higher education 
in Australia is highly centralised with a concentration of authority over the system 
in the hands of a government department under a Commonwealth Minister. The 
degree to which the system of higher education is currently subject to a single point 
of view is well illustrated by a reading of the Commonwealth Minister’s current 
report on Higher Education for the 2001 to 2003 Triennium (Kemp, 2000). The 
document is not a report on the state of the universities but rather a specification of 
plans (resources and student numbers) for individual institutions and a declaration 
of policies for universities including a range of requirements that are to be met. 
There is no analysis of student demand, quality of intakes, adequacy of resourcing, 
staff numbers and quality, or quality of outcomes. Nor is there any discussion of 
options or trade-offs between numbers of students, quality and resources.
The flavour of centralised planning that imbues current higher education 
policy is in contrast to the emphasis currently being given to open and free 
markets in the economic world. In the economic world, centralised planning 
has seldom proved successful: decentralised markets are a much more effective 
mechanism for producing and distributing goods and services. The presumptions 
favouring  a more decentralised system of universities are powerful.
The highly centralised perspective of higher education policy places 
emphasis on the pursuit of national objectives laid down by the Commonwealth 
Government. But in a free society national objectives are often imprecisely defined 
and are subject to controversy and change. Universities must prepare students for 
life in a world the characteristics of which are necessarily imperfectly foreseen. A 
university that geared its activities to known requirements could hardly provide 
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an education or conduct research appropriate to meet as yet unknown problems. 
Moreover, one of the roles of a university in a free society is to be the conscience 
and critic of that society; such a role cannot be fulfilled if the university is 
expected to be an arm of government policy. There is thus a strong case for a 
plurality of priorities among universities whereby each institution determines its 
own priorities in the light of its circumstances and its assessment of the current 
and future environment.
The independence of the universities from direct government control or 
influence, i.e. institutional autonomy, is one pillar of a truly democratic society. 
Institutional autonomy is a necessary, if not a sufficient, condition for academic 
freedom – itself an essential element of the kind of society in which we live. The 
universities are among those institutions that should operate at arm’s-length from 
government if they are properly to fulfil their role. In this they are not dissimilar 
to institutions such as the Reserve Bank, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation 
and other independent statutory bodies. Indeed, from 1959 when the Australian 
Universities Commission (AUC) commenced operations until 1987 when the 
Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission (CTEC) was abolished the 
universities were largely, if not entirely, insulated from political pressures and 
their autonomy protected to a significantly greater degree than has recently been 
the case. This is not widely appreciated, either within or beyond the universities.
Decisions on public policy relating to higher education need to be 
informed by objective analysis unaffected by political/electoral considerations. 
The Commonwealth is unlikely to receive advice of this kind from a government 
department subject to ministerial direction and the lobbying of individual 
institutions. Above all, the advice should be based on sound knowledge and an 
understanding of how universities operate and their role in society.
The standard of public debate on higher education in terms both of 
knowledge of facts and sophistication of argument reflects a serious deficiency in 
our capacity for objective analysis. This is well illustrated by several policy proposals 
that have recently emerged. The first example is the proposal for a large-scale on-
line university – a proposal made apparently without detailed consideration of 
the extensive involvement of some existing universities with distance education, 
including on-line delivery, and the not very encouraging experience of the open 
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Learning Agency. Another is the suggestion that regional universities (somewhat 
eccentrically defined) should receive special support for the enrolment of research 
students (Aitkin, 2001) without regard to any rationale relating to research training 
itself. A third example is the Commonwealth proposal to create more science 
places, apparently without considering whether the putative shortfall of science 
graduates is due to a lack of places or a lack of appropriately qualified students.
For these reasons, and to enable the universities better to achieve their 
purposes, I am advocating:
(a) the establishment of an independent body to monitor higher education 
in Australia, to advise the Commonwealth Government through objective 
analysis of higher education issues and to act as an intermediary between the 
government and the institutions; and
(b) the decentralisation of the funding of teaching within universities.
Furthermore, the highest levels of scholarship, research and research training 
need to be concentrated, for any given discipline, in a limited number of locations 
in order to provide a critical mass of inputs and achieve excellence in outcomes. 
The alternative is for these activities to be a by-product of  undergraduate student 
numbers, since these determine staff numbers in the individual institutions. 
This would hardly be a rational way of allocating scarce research resources. 
Consequently I am also advocating:
(c) some concentration of resources, in each discipline, for advanced teaching, 
scholarship and research.
Issues
Before proceeding with details of these reforms, I want to examine a number 
of issues arising from current policies and practices. They illustrate how higher 
education policy has evolved in recent years with little critical and objective 
analysis of its implications and without a proper regard for its consequences. They 
underline the need for reform. I shall discuss them under four headings: student 
numbers; resources; quality and; management.
Student numbers
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over the past decade university enrolments have shown considerable growth, 
increasing by almost 60 per cent. (over the longer run, the expansion of Australian 
university education has been truly remarkable – when I was an undergraduate 
in 1940 there were only about 14,000 students in the whole country, and when 
I came to Adelaide in 1950 there were under 31,000: now the figure is close 
to 700,000 – a 50-fold increase over my working life during which time the 
Australian population has multiplied 2½ fold).
All Students – Australian universities
1989 2000 Increase
000 000 per cent
Non-overseas
     Research 12 33 171
     Graduate course work 53 91 74
     Undergraduate 355 476 34
overseas 21 96 353
Total 441 695 58
Source:  DETYA (2000b).
The increased participation in higher education is partly a reflection of 
a lengthening of the time people spend enrolled as students: research and 
graduate course work enrolments have increased much more than undergraduate 
enrolments and double degrees have become common. Thus while enrolment 
figures reflect the increased participation of the Australian population in higher 
education, they do not give a precise indication of access to higher education.
Access is measured in terms of numbers of students enrolling in higher 
education for the first time. If the numbers of first time commencers are related 
to the size of the relevant age groups, the lifetime probability of a person enrolling 
in higher education can be calculated. Thus, on the basis of current experience, 
some 47 per cent of an age cohort will enrol in a university either on leaving 
school or shortly after or at some later stage in their lives. (Incidentally, there is 
a marked gender differential: the probabilities being 40 per cent for men and 55 
per cent for women).
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The figure of 47 per cent indicates a high level of access to higher education 
in Australia. It is high absolutely and relative to comparable countries. The overall 
figure does, of course, conceal some differential access, particularly in relation to 
socio-economic status and to the situation of indigenous Australians.
First-time commencing non-overseas 
students






Source: DETYA data base and author’s calculations
Moreover the figure of 47 per cent should be considered in the context 
of access to all tertiary education, i.e. to vocational education and training as 
well as to higher education. When access to vocational education and training is 
added to access to higher education, and double counting is eliminated, the life 
time probability of accessing tertiary education comes out close to 90 per cent 
(Aungles, Karmel and Wu, 2000). This must be near to saturation. of course, 
for a given level of access, participation in tertiary education may still increase if 
students take longer courses or more courses or endure more failures.
over the past ten years or so policies have promoted access and the growth 
of the higher education system, but there has been virtually no discussion as 
to what an appropriate level of access or size of the system might be. The fact 
is that trade-offs between student numbers and entry standards, and between 
student numbers and the resources available for teaching each student,  have been 
ignored.
An examination of tertiary entrance scores reveals that some universities 
have relatively low entry standards. This can be illustrated by analyzing the tertiary 
entry scores in 2000 for the eighteen campuses located in New South Wales. Most 
universities admit some students with very low scores, probably because of special 
circumstances. To eliminate these the Universities Admissions Index (UAI) rank 
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at the ninth decile for each campus has been calculated. These indicate the index 
above which 90 per cent of those newly enrolled in 2000 ranked. It can be seen 
that these vary between 75.2 and 46.4 – a wide disparity in standards of entry. 
The overall State average is 64.0.
Entry standards are inversely related to numbers of enrolments. Enrolments 
are largely determined by the number that the Commonwealth is willing to fund 
– a number fixed apparently without regard to standards – and by the desire of 
institutions to grow. Thus standards are determined by the number of students 
universities manage to enrol, and by the general view that the more students 
the better, rather than the number being the result of standards set by the 
institutions. If entry standards become too low the quality of work that can be 
expected of students will fall and degree standards decline. This is not to say that 
some variation in entry standards might not be desirable or that less demanding 
courses do not have a place, but decisions in relation to standards ought to be 
made deliberately.
New to higher education enrolments universities admission index
New South Wales 2000
Campus Ninth decile Campus Ninth decile 
A 75.1 J 55.8
B 62.5 K 53.3
C 70.7 L 54.7
D 52.9 M 75.5
E 61.0 N 67.0
F 55.6 o 75.2
G 74.3 P 70.2
H 54.4 Q 67.8
I 46.4 R 47.1
All Campuses:      64.0
Source: New South Wales Admissions Centre data base and author’s calculations
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over the past decade, with enrolments expanding faster than funding, the 
resources available per student for teaching have declined. As a result the quality of 
the university experience offered to students has deteriorated, also compromising 
standards.
The size of the higher education system to be supported by government 
funding should be the result of a deliberate decision taken after an objective 
analysis which considers the interrelationships among the level of access, the 
standards of entry, the resources (cost) per student, student demand and the 
accessibility of other forms of post-school education and training. This has not 
happened over the past twelve years or so.
Resources
over the past twenty years public funding for higher education institutions has 
not risen as rapidly as enrolments. This reflects the Commonwealth Government’s 
view that the institutions should improve their efficiency so that the burden 
imposed by the universities on Commonwealth finances can be reduced.
In 1989 the Commonwealth Government transferred some of the public 
funding burden to students, requiring them to contribute a portion of the cost 
of their courses either up-front or through income contingent loans. In 1996 the 
Commonwealth raised the charges under HECS and differentiated them among 
courses. Allowing for forgone interest and defaults, HECS charges are tending 
towards covering around 25 per cent of base operating grants.
Commonwealth outlays on higher education in real terms, net of HECS 
receipts, are now 5 per cent lower than they were in 1995 despite an increase of 
10 per cent in non-overseas student load and an increase of 25 per cent in the 
size of the economy as measured by gross domestic product. Virtually the whole 
expansion of domestic enrolments since the early 1990s, as reflected in base 
operating grants, has been funded by a combination of students’ contributions 
and increased teaching loads. Public funding of universities has been significantly 
compressed.
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Commonwealth Government funding for higher education in year 2001 pricesa
1988 1993 1995 2000
$m $m $m $m
Base operating grantsb 3,624 4,294 4,763 4,886
HECS receipts - 250 499 917
Base operating grants, net of HECS 3,624 4,044 4,264 3,969
other Commonwealth funds 313 762 921 939
Net Commonwealth funding 3,937 4,806 5,185 4,908
a  current funding adjusted for cost increases by Commonwealth’s cost adjustment factor; 
b  including HECS liabilities. 
Source: AVCC (2001).
The serious deficiency in funding that the universities have faced in the last 
five or six years is mainly the result of two factors: the introduction of enterprise 
bargaining into university industrial relations in 1993 in relation to which the 
Commonwealth no longer fully funds salary increases, and the Commonwealth 
decision in 1996 to reduce its funding of base operating grants by a total of 6 per 
cent over the years 1997-2000.
To maintain real funding per student at 1995 levels in the light of salary and 
other cost increases an increase in government base operating grants of around 
$¾ billion would be required. In the light of the decline in Commonwealth 
funding of universities that has taken place since the mid-1990s, such an increase 
would not in itself appear to be unduly burdensome for the Commonwealth.
Universities have responded to the above financial pressures by shedding 
staff and/or by enrolling additional students so as to attract marginal funding at 
rates well below the average cost of teaching students. Either way, academic staff 









Source: TEC (1985); DETYA (2000b).
During the 1970s the ratios were around 1 to 12. By 1989 they had fallen 
to 1 to 14 and by 1995 to 1 to 15. These declines were a response to pressures 
for improved efficiency and may have reflected an element of substitution of 
technology for face-to-face teaching. However by the year 2000, the institutions’ 
reduced command over resources forced a further decline to 1 to 18.7 – a decline 
of over 20 per cent in five years. As a result many classes are now far too large; 
staff/student contact has diminished; academic staff have inadequate time for 
preparation, study and their own scholarship and research; and morale is low. In 
the international market for top quality staff, salaries and working conditions are 
making the Australian universities increasingly unattractive.
During the 1970s and early 1980s considerable improvements were achieved 
in teacher/pupil ratios in schools. By and large, in spite of budgetary pressures, 
these improvements have been maintained through Commonwealth and State 
Government support for both government and non-government schools, with 
only a slight deterioration in government schools in some States. (Harrold, 2000). 
This is in striking contrast to the treatment accorded the Commonwealth funded 
higher education sector.
Decisions about the government’s resourcing of the universities need to be 
made in the context of the consequences of these decisions in terms of student 
numbers and the quality of the work of the institutions. Again, objective analysis 
is essential.
48 Public policy and higher education
468
The universities have been active, and in many cases very successful, in 
seeking alternative sources of revenue. However major elements of the revenue 
from new sources are dedicated to particular activities (especially research and 
consultancies), and fees from overseas students are largely absorbed by teaching 
those students. The fact is that the teaching of Australian undergraduates and the 
training of Australian research students has been and remains virtually 100 per 
cent dependent on the Commonwealth Government. It must be remembered that 
the Commonwealth determines the level of HECS payments for undergraduates 
just as it determines the level of its grants; thus, the universities remain almost 70 
per cent dependent on the Commonwealth with its highly centralised mode of 
dealing with the institutions.
Universities revenue by source
1981 1989 1998
per cent per cent per cent
Commonwealth Government grants 89 77 51
HECS - - 17
Fees and charges - 6 16
other 11 17 16
100 100 100
Source: AVCC (2000).
While there has clearly been a welcome diversification of the sources of 
university revenue, it should not be assumed that all diversification is desirable. 
As already pointed out, diversification may not produce resources which are 
available for discretionary use. Moreover the thrust towards the commercialization 
of university activities (especially research), apart from carrying high risks, 
raises the questions of whether commercialization is not a distraction from the 
universities’ core business of teaching and research and whether the skills available 
in universities and the culture that imbues them are generally appropriate for 
commercial enterprises. Enthusiasm for commercialization should not lead us to 
assume that these are settled questions, however desirable commercial operations 




one of the positive consequences of the changes in higher education initiated 
by John Dawkins in 1987 (Dawkins, 1988) (I hasten to interpolate that there 
were a number of negative ones) was an increased emphasis on outcomes 
and a growing consciousness of the importance of institutional efficiency and 
effectiveness. Indeed, concerns about efficiency and effectiveness in education 
had surfaced earlier and reviews of school and higher education efficiency and 
effectiveness had been conducted in the mid-1980s (Karmel, 1985; Hudson, 
1986), but within the universities serious attention to these matters did not 
surface until the 1990s.
The abolition of the binary divide in higher education in 1988, which 
resulted in a doubling of the number of universities, and the subsequent large 
increase in enrolments, stimulated concerns about the quality of the work 
of the universities and resulted in the establishment of the Committee for 
Quality Assurance in Higher Education (CQAHE). The Committee conducted 
inspections and published reports on the institutions in the three years 1993 to 
1995. Universities were given gradings and rewards for good performance. The 
exercise involved elements of both quality assessment and quality assurance. To 
date there has been no attempt to assess its value or effectiveness.
Recently (March 2000) the Ministerial Council on Education, Employment, 
Training and Youth Affairs (MCEETYA) endorsed the establishment of the 
Australian Universities Quality Agency (AUQA) as an independent body to 
conduct quality audits of higher education institutions on a five yearly basis. The 
emphasis is on the quality assurance processes employed by institutions and the 
audits will be conducted on a whole-of-institution basis (Kemp, 2000).
The issue of quality is bedevilled by the complexity of what is meant by 
“quality” in a university setting. Clearly, quality is multi-dimensional. For the 
range of courses offered by a university there are questions of quality in relation 
to course content, teaching, lecturers, graduate outcomes, the environment for 
students, and so on. Quality of research activities or community services raises an 
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equally large range of issues.
Discussions of quality in universities seldom specify quality characteristics 
in ways capable of precise definition or measurement. Moreover, the benefits that 
a university education may be expected to confer on graduates (and which reflect 
the quality of that education) accrue not on graduation but over a lifetime and 
therefore are difficult to assess at any given point of time.
In the production and distribution of most goods and services in the 
market economy, quality is able to be more or less precisely defined and assessed. 
Mechanisms for quality control, quality assurance and quality improvement can 
be devised and applied in a relatively straight forward manner. This is not the 
case in the field of education and the application of techniques established for 
ordinary business purposes may be of little practical benefit and be wasteful of 
effort. This is not to say that concerns about quality are unimportant, but the 
special characteristics of educational and research processes need to be taken into 
account.
The conceptual difficulties in defining what is meant by quality in higher 
education and in assessing it have lead to an emphasis on quality assurance 
mechanisms. Indeed this was the emphasis of the CQAHE in 1993-95 and is the 
remit of the newly formed AUQA. There is a risk that quality assurance procedures 
will be set up in institutions which will absorb considerable resources and be little 
more than rituals pursued to conform with the requirements of bodies external to 
them. A “whole-of-institution” approach seems likely to reinforce this risk, since 
the heterogeneity of a university’s activities makes variability of quality within 
the institution probable. Moreover, the existence of quality assurance mechanism 
is relatively unimportant if quality outcomes are in fact being achieved; if they 
are not being achieved the existence of quality assurance rituals is no guarantee 
of quality improvement. In all considerations of quality in universities the 
fundamental role played by academic staff needs to be emphasized: the surest 
route to high quality outcomes is high quality staff.
The alternative approach to quality assurance reviews of whole institutions 
is peer review on a course or field of study basis; for example, a review every so 
many years of a given course or field of study across all institutions, involving 
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quality assessment and an audit of processes to achieve quality improvement. Such 
reviews rely on the expertise of people with years of experience in the activities 
that they are assessing. The Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education in 
the United Kingdom appears to be operating along these lines (QAA, 2000). 
In fact discipline reviews of law, engineering, accounting, teacher education in 
mathematics and science, agriculture and computer science were conducted in 
the late 1980s through CTEC, with some positive results. The contrast between 
such an approach and that likely to be followed by the AUQA underlines the 
need for a capacity for objective analysis of policy options in this important area.
Management
I shall refer to two separate aspects of management in universities: the first relates 
to the internal management arrangements of the institutions; the second to the 
influence exerted by current government policy on these arrangements.
I have already pointed out, in respect of quality issues, that the provision 
of education services is different from the ordinary business of supplying goods 
and services in the market place. Universities are not driven by the motive of 
maximising profits: there is no bottom line in the private enterprise sense. Instead 
there is a whole range of outputs – course offerings, graduations, research results, 
publications, community services – that cannot be added together to give a profit 
and loss statement or a balance sheet. Moreover the executive of a university 
cannot exercise the same degree of control over the operations of the institution 
as the executive of a corporation of comparable size, because “authority” in the 
university is necessarily disseminated among the professors who are the authorities 
in their own fields. In addition, universities, as currently operating, have only little 
control over the quantities of services they provide and the prices they charge for 
them. In brief, universities are sui generis and the application of management 
practices which work in private businesses will not necessarily work in them.
Many decisions within universities need to be made on a collegial basis – 
although the definition of the “college” is variable and is not necessarily inclusive 
– in particular, appointment of academic staff, admission of students, course 
structure, examining, research evaluation. However, there is no simple dichotomy 
between collegial and managerial styles of governance. The resources available to 
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universities are limited; they have to be managed. Decisions on their allocation 
need to be made strategically, and this may require executive action. In short, 
universities require a style of management that is, at least, consultative in process 
even if firm in final decision-making.
In recent years government policy has been not to attempt to micro-
manage the universities but to induce universities to become more “business like” 
by requiring them to conform to certain practices and to pursue government 
priorities by offering inducements through special programs. These requirements 
and inducements have, in practice, resulted in considerable government 
intervention.
The former include the submission of quality assurance and improvement 
plans, guidelines for the preparation of annual financial reports, equity plans, 
capital management plans, research and research training plans, mission 
statements and strategic plans. These plans absorb considerable resources. They 
are usually of little operational use either within the institutions or for policy 
formulation. Their development seems little more than a ritual. Thus research 
plans have to be expressed in very general terms since a university’s research 
activities are so many and varied, developments are often quite unpredictable 
and progress serendipitous. The application of business techniques to universities 
may, in some cases, turn out to be counter-productive. This appears not to be 
understood by government authorities.
As far as special programs are concerned, the Minister’s recent report 
(Kemp 2000) lists 37 programs, projects and schemes which are managed by 
the Higher Education Division of DETYA. Many of these involve providing 
universities with grants earmarked for specific purposes. This procedure reduces 
the discretion universities can exercise in the allocation of their funds and their 
capacity to determine their own priorities. It reflects the interventionist flavour 
of government policy towards higher education over the last twelve years or so, 
during which additional funding has been provided only in ways circumscribed 
by the Commonwealth. This has been accepted by universities, apparently with 
little questioning.
A prime example of conditional funding is the Commonwealth’s funding 
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for its Workplace Reform Program for universities, involving the payment of 
an additional 2 per cent of the notional salary component of operating grants. 
Twenty one criteria have been laid down and universities are expected to conform 
to at least a number of these. Some of these criteria will significantly affect the 
detailed internal management arrangements of the institutions, and are highly 
interventionist.
Since universities have no bottom line by which to measure performance, 
government policy has supported DETYA in developing a range of performance 
indicators (a practice which has become common in many public sector 
operations). Performance indicators can provide useful information, but they 
need to be interpreted with caution. Some do little more than describe the 
characteristics of particular institutions (e.g. student numbers, range of courses); 
others are influenced by many independent variables which the indicator cannot 
take into account (e.g. pass rates, students’ course experience questionnaires). 
Great care must be taken in comparing the performance of institutions or in 
constructing league tables. The precise meanings of indicators need explication. 
objective analysis of performance indicators is essential if conclusions are to be 
drawn from them.
The Commonwealth Government in allocating funds has made a good 
deal of use of formulae. The distribution of operating grants has been based 
on a formula since the relative funding model was established in 1990. As a 
consequence of the White Paper on research funding (Kemp 1999), the allocation 
of funding for research training, as well as the allocation of the research quantum 
(now institutional grants) and the research infra-structure block grants, is formula 
based. Many universities have themselves adopted the formulae (sometimes in a 
modified form) for internal allocation purposes – a practice which places internal 
allocation procedures in a straitjacket and greatly reduces managerial discretion 
in funding.
As far as allocation among institutions is concerned, the use of publicly 
known formulae almost always produces unintended, but perfectly predictable, 
consequences. Universities feel they have little choice but to play the formula, 
incentives are affected and undesirable consequences emerge (e.g. researchers may 
be encouraged to produce numbers of small, quick and superficial publications 
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rather than a major piece of work, universities may engage in wasteful competition 
and misleading advertising to attract students, diversity among institutions may 
be reduced as they attempt to profit from a common formula). on the whole 
publicly known and automatically applied formula funding ought to be avoided.
Universities have been under pressure for some time to improve efficiency. 
Productivity, as crudely measured, has certainly risen substantially over the past 
decade. Thus, course completions rose by over 80 per cent over the decade 1989-
99, while full time equivalent academic staff rose by less than 20 per cent – a 
productivity increase (completions per academic worker) of over 50 per cent or 
4 per cent per annum. Superficially this is a creditable performance. However, 
this is a quite misleading conclusion because the services rendered by academics 
to students, their research activities and their community services have almost 
certainly diminished. University staff are in the business of rendering personal 
services in much the same way as doctors, lawyers and other professionals. A 
greater throughput of clients inevitably affects the quality of the services rendered. 
Again, objective analysis of this and other management issues is needed.
Productivity (???)
1989 1999 Increase
Course completions 90,477 164,423 82 per cent
Academic staff (FTE) 24,919 29,748 19 per cent
Source: DETYA (2000a,b).
Reforming higher education2
The matters that I have just discussed illustrate the need for major reforms in the 
arrangements for higher education in this country as well as for additional public 
resources. Without these reforms and without additional resources, Australia’s 
higher education system is likely to regress towards a uniform mediocrity. I 
now turn to the question of reform. I shall deal with it under four headings: 
government/institution relations; funding undergraduate courses; funding 
research training and; funding research.
2 What follows is based on the proposals set out in some detail in my paper “Reforming Higher Education” 





An independent statutory body standing between the universities and the 
government, along the lines of the commissions which operated successfully from 
1959 to 1987, should be established. The Australian Research Council (ARC) 
 
 
recently constituted as a statutory body with advisory, policy and operational 
responsibilities also provides an appropriate model. The body should:
(a) advise the government publicly on all higher education matters;
(b) report publicly, say triennially, on the state of higher education in Australia;
(c) accredit institutions for eligibility to receive public funding for undergraduate 
higher education, subject to appropriate conditions;
(d) accredit institutions for eligibility to enrol holders of research training 
awards in particular disciplines;
(e) advise on the number and value of publicly funded undergraduate places 
and research training awards;
(f ) advise on institutional research grants (research block funding);
(g) advise and report on quality assurance mechanisms both within and across 
institutions;
(h) administer programs arising from the foregoing.
The statutory body should have operational responsibilities, i.e. it should 
administer policies and programs and not be purely advisory. Limiting the 
responsibilities of such a body to offering advice and publishing reports is a recipe 
for irrelevance. This was clearly demonstrated in the case of the National Board of 
Employment, Education and Training and its Councils.
The statutory body should be chaired by a respected senior person with 
academic and management experience (of vice-chancellorial status or the 
equivalent) and include eight members: two academics, two practitioners of the 
professions, two business persons and two members from the wider community. 
The members should be persons of high standing, who are well informed on 
how universities work and what they do. The membership should not include 
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current vice-chancellors or senior university executives. It should certainly not be 
representative: the arrangements need to guard against capture by interest groups.
The proposed body would be able to address objectively those issues, 
to which I have referred, relating to the size of the higher education sector, its 
resourcing, its quality and its management and provide the Commonwealth 
with advice on them, indicating the consequences of various courses of action. 
Such advice would be public and would lead to more transparent decision 
making. Moreover, the existence of a buffer body between the institutions and 
the government would greatly reduce, if not eliminate, political pressures on the 
institutions as well as protect the government from lobbying by the institutions. 
Universities would be freer to express their views on policy issues affecting them 
without the concern currently obtaining that they cannot afford to criticize or 
embarrass their paymaster. The low level and quality of the public debate on the 
issues that I have canvassed is proof enough of the reluctance of senior university 
officers to make statements for which their institutions might be disadvantaged.
Funding undergraduate courses
The Commonwealth should move to the funding of undergraduate courses 
through students rather than through direct government grants to institutions. 
To achieve this, the Commonwealth should offer annually some 120,000 
scholarships (almost the current number of first time commencing university 
students – I am assuming a slight tightening of standards). This number would 
support a university system of around the present scale – the number would need 
to be adjusted from time to time in relation to demographics and standards. A 
scholarship would entitle the winner to, say, up to five years of subsidised full 
time equivalent undergraduate or coursework graduate education at a university 
to which he/she can gain entry. Enrolling a scholarship holder would entitle the 
university to an annual subsidy from the Commonwealth for the duration of 
the course. The subsidies would need to vary according to the cost level of the 
student’s enrolment.
At present funding levels the subsidies would need to average around 
$6,500 per annum. To the extent that the erosion of operating grants of the past 
five years is restored in real terms they would need to be higher. Universities would 
Peter H. Karmel
 477
charge higher education contributions on top of the subsidies. on average they 
would need to be around $4,000 per annum. Courses or course work extending 
beyond the five years of subsidised tuition would carry full fees.
Some institutions would compete for students by charging less; others 
might charge more to cover the cost of special services. Some might charge the 
same for all courses; others might take into account differential costs or the 
relative demand for courses. In order to allay fears of the charges being pushed 
too high, it might be necessary for the government to mandate an upper limit to 
the contributions. 
Both the subsidies and the upper limits to the contributions would need to 
be indexed to take account of movements in the cost of the resources universities 
employ. The salaries component should be indexed by movements in average 
weekly earnings and the remainder, as at present, by the Consumer Price Index. 
It would be essential for the students’ contributions to be subject to the present 
HECS arrangements.
The 120,000 scholarships should be divided into three tranches. About 
80,000 should be allocated on the basis of students’ tertiary entrance (TE) scores; 
State and Territory rankings would need to be converted to a national ranking, 
but there is a standard procedure for doing this. About 30,000 should be available 
for mature age entry. These could be allocated on the basis of candidates’ results 
in the Special Tertiary Admissions Test (STAT) administered by the Australian 
Council for Educational Research (ACER) and already widely used for admitting 
mature age entrants. The remaining 10,000 scholarships should be allocated to 
institutions for special entries to be awarded at the institutions’ discretion.
The 120,000 scholarships annually represent about 45 per cent of an 
age cohort. The number of scholarships, and hence the number of subsidised 
enrolments, would need to be determined by the Commonwealth Government 
from time to time after careful analysis, taking account of demographic factors, 
entry standards, student demand, workforce considerations, the availability 
of alternative vocational education and training opportunities, and costs. The 
analysis, and the public advice to the Commonwealth flowing from it, would be 
a major responsibility of the statutory body proposed earlier.
48 Public policy and higher education
478
The suggested reform will meet opposition from staff and student bodies, 
partly because of objections to student charges on principle and partly because 
of fears that universities will push up charges. The former are countered by the 
continuation of the patently equitable HECS arrangements (and by a recognition 
that universities are, in any case socially selective and charging students a 
contribution serves to promote equity in the distribution of costs and benefits 
between those who do and those who do not receive a higher education); and the 
latter are countered by the previously suggested ceiling on student contributions.
The proposals will also be opposed by some universities because they 
fear that the stronger institutions will admit increasing numbers of students 
leaving them with too few. This is especially a fear of regional universities. In 
my view, these concerns are exaggerated. In the current active competition 
for students most regional universities experience strong demand. If anything 
the above arrangements should advantage them as they could compete by 
lowering their higher education contribution charges. However, if necessary, the 
Commonwealth could impose limits on the number of scholarships tenable at 
individual universities. Such a move should allay concerns. Alternatively, lump 
sum annual subsidies of, say, $5m or $10m might be paid to regional institutions.
The proposed reform has many advantages. Entry standards would be 
determined on educational grounds rather than in response to political, regional 
and institutional pressures as at present. The allocation of student places would 
be determined through a combination of education testing and student choice, 
thus avoiding arguments about States’ shares of enrolments. Funding would be 
decentralized and political pressures and bureaucratic intervention would be 
greatly reduced as would bilateral dealing between institutions and government 
officials. The grant assessment and profile negotiation functions of DETYA 
would no longer be required; the number of enrolments, subject to possible upper 
limits, would be a matter for each institution to determine. The universities’ 
independence would be enhanced and they would become patently responsible 
for their own affairs. They could determine their own priorities, and diversity 
in course offerings, teaching methods and student services would be promoted. 
The Commonwealth Government would not be directly involved in assessing/




At the same time, the Commonwealth would be in a position to control 
its expenditure on higher education teaching through the quantum, value and 
length of tenure of scholarships and through the conditions under which HECS 
operates. The Commonwealth could still influence the development of higher 
education through the quantum of scholarships and their value, and through 
the provision of capital to establish and foster new institutions. The quantum 
of scholarships and entry standards would be clearly linked. Governments could 
also expand access for special groups by special scholarship schemes. It would 
remain open to the Commonwealth to provide funding to particular institutions 
for specific purposes under contractual arrangements.
Funding research training
The funding of research training has thus far been built into the operating grants of 
universities. The Commonwealth Government is currently proposing to separate 
out this funding and to attach it to some 21,500 research training places to be 
allocated to universities by a formula based on their research degree completions, 
their publications and the research funds they attract. The research training places 
will bring with them funding to the universities at two rates according to cost, 
and averaging about $23,000 per equivalent full time place per annum.
These new arrangements will cap the number of Commonwealth funded 
higher degree research places and encourage some concentration, but overall they 
will reinforce the emphasis on quantity rather than quality. Institutions will tend 
to play the formula and compete aggressively with each other by enrolling as 
many research students as possible, in order to ensure that they at least maintain 
their relative share of a fixed quantum of funding.
The allocating of research training awards to the students themselves rather 
than to the universities would be a significant advance. Thus the Commonwealth 
should offer annually some 6,000 postgraduate research training awards. This 
number of new awards would support a total enrolment of about 21,500 awardees, 
which corresponds to the present level of funded research enrolments. An award 
would entitle the winner to, say, two years of equivalent full-time research training 
for a master’s degree or four years for a PhD at a university willing to enrol him/
her. The award would carry a subsidy to the university to cover the full cost of 
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training. There ought to be, say, three levels of subsidy according to the cost of 
training: at current funding levels these would average about $23,000.
Candidates for the awards should apply through the university of their 
undergraduate degree or through a university willing to give them status. The 
individual universities would place their candidates in order of merit. Candidates 
would be required to sit the Graduate Skills Assessment Test administered by the 
ACER. Their results in this would be used to calibrate university rankings so as to 
obtain a national ranking of the candidates. 
Candidates successful in obtaining awards would select the institution at 
which they wished to train (not necessarily the university nominating them) 
and, if acceptable to the institution, would enrol there. Students should be 
encouraged to undertake their research at institutions other than those at 
which they were enrolled for their undergraduate studies. Funding them for an 
additional semester of study might be an effective way of achieving this. A width 
of experience is important. In Australia there has been far too little movement 
of research students. Students who do not obtain awards could be enrolled 
by universities on a fee paying basis. For these, access to HECS arrangements 
would be desirable. 
The arguments in favour of concentrating the research activities of particular 
disciplines in a limited number of locations (see below) apply equally to research 
training, that is, the need for appropriate physical infrastructure and sufficient 
senior research staff. There has been a tendency over the past ten or twelve years 
to enrol excessive numbers of research students either to attract funding or for 
reasons of prestige: evidence of this is the great rise in research student numbers 
from 14,600 in 1989 to 37,300 in 2000; of the latter, 9,200 are at institutions 
which were not universities at the beginning of the period.
Concentration of research training would raise research quality generally 
and enhance students’ training experiences. Such concentration could be achieved 
by restricting the tenure of research training awards in a particular discipline to 




Final year studies for honours bachelor degrees are akin to research training: 
they usually involve a research project and are often preliminary to undertaking 
postgraduate research. Such studies need supervision by senior scholars and 
researchers. For these reasons a case can be made for concentrating final year 
honours studies in particular disciplines in those institutions eligible to enrol 
research training awardees.
Funding research
The provision of block funding to universities for research is essential to provide 
physical infrastructure, a staff base on which research activity can be built and a 
capacity to undertake long-term fundamental research unlikely to attract project 
funding.
Present block funding (the research quantum, research infrastructure block 
grants and the ARC small grants scheme), apart from being inadequate in amount, 
is spread too thinly across institutions. Funds are distributed by formulae which give 
insufficient weight to quality and which encourage institutions to expand higher 
degree enrolments, irrespective of their research capacity, and to foster research 
activity, irrespective of its intrinsic merit. The Commonwealth is proposing to 
increase research funding, but the changes currently being implemented through 
the Government’s White Paper on research funding maintain the formula based 
approach to block funding.
In any given disciplinary field, research ought to be concentrated on those 
research teams whose members and facilities have the appropriate strengths; for 
example, in say 10 or so locations rather than spread over up to 38 universities. 
The concentration should be on a discipline not an institutional basis. Such 
concentration would unquestionably raise productivity and research quality.
Australia should move to an assessment of research strengths in universities 
along the lines of the Research Assessment Exercise which has been conducted in 
the United Kingdom for some years (RAE, 2001). The research activities of the 
universities would be classified on a discipline basis into units of assessment. Every 
five years a committee of senior researchers for each unit of assessment would 
review the relevant research activities in those universities seeking assessment in 
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that unit. The committee would rate the quality of the activities. Institutional 
research grants (i.e. block funding to individual universities) would be calculated 
in relation to numbers of active research staff and research costs in each assessed 
discipline weighted by a quality index on, say, a five point scale. There would 
be no predetermined distribution of the quality ratings for a given unit of 
assessment; the classification would be based purely on absolute research quality. 
Some research groups might rate no support; some minor support; others might 
rate considerable support. once the institutional research grant was determined 
for a particular institution (based on the ratings of its assessed disciplines) the 
allocation of the grant would be at the institution’s discretion – support for 
disciplines not assessed could be provided.
The Research Assessment Exercise in the UK is a complex operation and is 
by no means universally popular, but it has been working effectively for 15 years 
and has recently been favourably reviewed. It concentrates research funding among 
the most productive and promising researchers. It does not aim at nominating 
particular institutions to be research universities, but concentrates on disciplines 
within universities. The allocation of institutional research grants along the lines 
proposed would concentrate activity in the most promising locations and enhance 
quality. All research groups would have the opportunity of being assessed.
The suggested reform will probably run into opposition because it will 
expose weaknesses as well as strengths. However, the concentration of research 
on a discipline rather than an institution basis should make it more acceptable. 
All universities would have research strengths in some disciplines. Moreover, 
the assessment of research would be regularly revisited, and institutions would 
be able to use institutional research grants to support any research considered 
worthwhile.
Conclusion
The proposed reforms, involving the funding of most university courses through 
scholarships to students and the concentration of research activity on a discipline 
basis, have been canvassed by myself and others over the past decade (see, for 
example, Miller and Pincus, 1995). They have not received wide support. More 
surprising is that the proposed re-establishment of a statutory body to advise 
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on higher education policy, administer higher education programs, and stand 
between the institutions and the government, has not been discussed to a 
significant extent; indeed its possibility was not even mentioned in the Review of 
Higher Education (West, 1998). In my view this is, perhaps, the most important 
of the reforms that I am suggesting.
Much of the opposition to the funding reforms stems from fears of rising fees, 
of unequal resourcing of institutions, of doctrinaire deregulation, marketisation 
and commercialisation and of barriers to access to university education. Most 
of these fears are unjustified: fees and higher education contributions will be 
moderated by competition and can be capped by government; institutions will 
be resourced in relation to the activities taking place within them; the elimination 
of direct involvement by government in universities’ affairs is essential to the 
promotion of  institutional autonomy, academic freedom and a diverse system 
of higher education, and, in any event, the government can set the ground rules, 
provide broad guidelines and determine the aggregate level of public financial 
support for higher education; access will be promoted by funding a sufficient 
number of scholarships, by maintaining and extending the HECS arrangements, 
by special programs for disadvantaged groups (especially in schools) and by 
promoting greater social and economic equality. 
one of the arguments commonly used in supporting the provision of 
public funds to universities via students rather than directly is that this will create 
a competitive market for university services which will bring with it the efficiency 
and effectiveness benefits that flow from competitive arrangements. There is some 
force in this argument, but I am not relying too much on it for the reforms I am 
advocating. My justification for them has more to do with the maintenance of 
the independence of the universities and the pursuit of excellence than with the 
benefits flowing from market economics.
Students are not and cannot be well informed consumers in the same way 
as those who are operating in the market for detergent or automobiles or other 
ordinary goods and services. ordinary goods and services have characteristics 
that are more or less well known. But the benefits to be rendered by a university 
course cannot be known with any precision to the intending student, nor can 
there be any symmetry in knowledge between student and academic. Also in 
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any given locality there are necessarily relatively few university suppliers and 
certainly not a perfectly competitive market. Thus the optimum properties of 
competitive markets cannot be expected to hold in the market for educational 
services. Moreover universities, as non-profit and publicly assisted bodies, must 
respond to public interest considerations; for example, in the maintenance of 
scholarship and research in basic disciplines or in areas of national concern, even 
if student demand in these areas is low. It should be obvious from my proposals 
on funding and on research assessment that I am not advocating a free-for-all 
deregulated market for higher education, although this appears to be a common 
misinterpretation of what I am suggesting.
The reforms I have outlined will ensure quality higher education for a high 
proportion of the Australian population – in the long run about one half of the 
population will have attended university and more than one third will possess 
degrees of high standing. The reforms will also create numerous concentrations 
of scholarly and research activity at the forefront of the natural sciences and 
technology and in the humanities and social sciences. Thus the objectives of 
widespread access to higher education, of nurturing the most intellectually able 
and of providing an environment in which higher education can flourish will be 
served.
Higher education reform needs to be developed through an objective 
analysis of what is wrong with the present arrangements and how they might be 
improved for the benefit of Australia and Australians. Public policies should be 
judged by their consequences. It is a matter of what will work best, not of being 
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The role of natural resources in  
economic development
Edward B. Barbier1
Compared to some other academic disciplines, economics is not known for being 
particularly tolerant of revisions to its “mainstream” core concepts or paradigms. 
Yet, today a major change is occurring in the economic view of the world, and it 
is likely to have profound implications for many years to come.  
Surprisingly, however, contemporary economists appear to be largely 
unaware that their “worldview” is undergoing such an important change. Perhaps 
one reason is that, unlike previous major innovations in economic thinking, there 
is no one person responsible or associated with the new doctrine, such as a Karl 
Marx with “Marxism”, a John Maynard Keynes with “Keynesian economics”, a 
John Nash with “Nash equilibrium”, or a Milton Friedman with “monetarism”. 
Perhaps another reason is that the change in economic thinking has been fairly 
gradual and unheralded. Just as it is hard to pinpoint a single individual, or 
even a group of like-minded individuals, as being responsible for this changing 
worldview, it is difficult to find a particular body of work, journal articles or 
books that has instigated this change. Instead, in this instance economic thinking 
is evolving more as the result of outside influences and pressures, such as the need 
for economics to be “relevant” to contemporary policy issues and problems. 
So what exactly is this gradual, largely unnoticed, yet possibly profound 
change in the economic worldview? Simply put, the age-old concept of the 
“economic system” has been irrevocably changed. No longer do we consider the 
 
1 Forty-ninth Joseph Fisher Lecture, 30 September 2002.  Since published in Australian Economic Papers 
42(2): 253-72, June 2003.
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economic process of producing goods and services and generating human welfare 
to be solely dependent on the accumulation of physical and human capital. That 
is, an increasing number of economists now accept that there is a third form 
of “capital” or “economic asset” that is also crucial to the functioning of the 
economic system of production, consumption and overall welfare. This distinct 
category consists of the natural and environmental resource endowment available 
to an economy, which is often referred to generally as natural capital.
The rest of this lecture is devoted to elaborating further on the “new 
thinking” concerning the relationship between natural resources and economic 
development, and in particular, on the key issues and debates that are emerging 
from this thinking. As a useful starting point, I will characterize briefly how 
physical, human and natural capital are now thought to contribute to the 
functioning of an economic system. What becomes immediately clear is that the 
services provided by natural capital are unique, and in the case of the ecological 
services and life-support functions of the environment, are not well understood. 
As a result, there has also been considerable debate over the role of natural capital 
in “sustainable” economic development. That is, does the environment have an 
“essential” role in sustaining human welfare, and if so, are special “compensation 
rules” required to ensure that future generations are not made worse off by natural 
capital depletion today? A further debate has emerged over whether environmental 
degradation in an economy may initially increase, but eventually declines, as per 
capita income increases. Empirical verification of this environmental Kuznets curve 
hypothesis has occasionally been cited as evidence that economies will be able 
to overcome certain environmental problems through further economic growth 
and development. Finally, recent economic theories and empirical evidence have 
questioned whether poorer economies that are endowed with abundant natural 
resources develop more rapidly than economies that are relatively resource poor. 
It is often argued that resource-abundant economies are not reinvesting the 
rents generated from natural resource exploitation into productive assets, or that 
commodity price booms actually divert economic resources from more productive 
and innovative sectors.  
In sum, our understanding of the role of natural resources in economic 
development has advanced considerably in recent years, although there is still 
much more to learn.  In the rest of this lecture, I will try to convince you that 
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what we do know about this role is sufficient to recognize that efficient and 
sustainable management of natural resources is a critical policy objective for the 
economic process. We can no longer exclude natural capital from any meaningful 
discussion of the factors determining economic development. our concept of the 
“economic system” has indeed changed irrevocably.
Natural capital and the economic system
Figure 49.1 depicts the basic relationship between physical, human and natural 
capital and the economic system.  



















Source: Adapted from Pearce and Barbier (2000).
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Person-made, or physical, capital (KP), natural capital (KN), and human 
capital (KH) all contribute to human welfare through supporting the production 
of goods and services in the economic process. For example, KP, consists of 
machinery, equipment, factory buildings, tools and other investment goods that 
are used in production; KN is used for material and energy inputs into production, 
acts as a “sink” for waste emissions from the economic process, and provides a 
variety of “ecological services” to sustain production, such as nutrient recycling, 
watershed protection and catchment functions, and climate regulation; and KH 
includes the human skills necessary for advanced production processes and for 
research and development activities that lead to technical innovation. However, 
all three forms of capital also contribute directly to human welfare independently 
of their contributions through the economic process. For instance, included in 
physical capital, KP, is fine architecture and other physical components of cultural 
heritage; KN includes aesthetically pleasing natural landscapes, and provides a 
variety of ecological services that are essential for supporting life; and increases 
in KH also contribute more generally to increases in the overall stock of human 
knowledge.
one way of illustrating how unique are the various “goods and services” 
produced by natural capital is to examine the various economic values that arise 
through the functioning of a natural ecosystem. For example, most natural 
ecosystems generate multiple benefits, or values. Table 49.I illustrates this with 
the example of an aquatic ecosystem. As shown in the table, the concept of total 
economic value (TEV) is one framework that economists have developed for 
categorizing the various multiple benefits arising from natural systems such as 
an aquatic ecosystem. Total economic value distinguishes between use values and 
non-use values, the latter referring to those current or future (potential) values 
associated with an environmental resource which rely merely on its continued 
existence and are unrelated to use. Typically, use values involve some human 
‘interaction’ with the resource whereas non-use values do not.  
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Table 49.1:  Classification of total economic values for aquatic ecosystems
Use values Non-se values


















Source: Adapted from Barbier (1994).
Use values are also grouped according to whether they are direct or indirect. 
The former refers to both consumptive and non-consumptive uses that involve 
some form of direct physical interaction with the resources and services of the 
system: harvesting of fish and wild resources, transport and use for recreation 
and tourism. It is also increasingly being recognized that the livelihoods of 
populations in areas neighboring aquatic ecosystems may be affected by certain 
key regulatory ecological functions (e.g. storm/flood protection, water purification, 
habitat functions, etc.). The values derived from these functions are considered 
to be “indirect”, as they occur through the support and protection of economic 
activities that have directly measurable values (e.g. property and land values, 
drinking supplies, commercial fishing, etc.). Many unique natural environments 
are considered to have substantial existence values, in that many individuals do 
not make use of these environments but nevertheless wish to see them preserved 
“in their own right”. other important non-use values are bequest and cultural/
heritage values. The Everglades in Florida or the Great Barrier Reef off the coast 
of Australia are unique ecosystems that we may wish future generations to enjoy 
in a fairly “intact” state and that are also considered important components of 
national and cultural heritage.
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Natural capital and sustainable development
The importance of the total capital stock concept to sustainability is illustrated 
in Figure 49.2, which summarizes broadly the economic view of sustainable 
development. Most economic interpretations of sustainability take as their starting 
point the consensus reached by the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (the WCED, or Brundtland Commission). The WCED defined 
sustainable development as “development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” 
(WCED 1987). 
Economists are generally comfortable with this broad interpretation 
of sustainability, as it is easily translatable into economic terms: an increase in 
well-being today should not have as its consequences a reduction in well-being 
tomorrow.2 That is, future generations should be entitled to at least the same 
level of economic opportunities – and thus at least the same level of economic 
welfare – as currently available to present generations. Consequently, economic 
development today must ensure that future generations are left no worse off than 
present generations. or, as some economists have succinctly put it, per capita 
welfare should not be declining over time (Pezzey 1989).
As noted in Figure 49.2, it is the total stock of capital employed by the 
economic system, including natural capital, which determines the full range of 
economic opportunities, and thus well-being, available to both present and future 
generations. Society must decide how best to “use” its total capital stock today to 
increase current economic activities and welfare, and how much it needs to “save” 
or even “accumulate” for tomorrow, and ultimately, for the well-being of future 
generations.  
2 Although as Bishop (1993) has pointed out, the objective of “sustainability” is different from that of 
the standard economic objective of “efficiency.” That is, there are potentially an infinite number of 
development paths for an economy, only some of which are sustainable.  Efficiency therefore does not 
guarantee sustainability, as some efficient paths are not sustainable.  At the same time, there is no reason 




Figure 49.2: Sustainable economic development
Development that meets the needs of the present without  
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs
Welfare does not decline over time










All KN is non-essential
“Strong” sustainability 
All KN is essential
Substitutes for KN
Keep essential KN “intact” because of:
•	 Imperfect substitution
•	 Irreversible losses
•	 Uncertainty over values
Source: Adapted from Pearce and Barbier (2000).
However, it is not simply the aggregate stock of capital in the economy 
that may matter but also its composition, in particular whether present 
generations are “using up” one form of capital to meet the needs of today. 
For example, much of the recent interest in sustainable development has risen 
out of concern that current economic development may be leading to rapid 
accumulation of physical and human capital, but at the expense of excessive 
depletion and degradation of natural capital. The major concern has been that, 
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by depleting the world’s stock of natural wealth irreversibly, the development 
path chosen today will have detrimental implications for the well-being of 
future generations. In other words, according to this view, current economic 
development is essentially unsustainable.
While it is generally accepted by most economists that economic 
development around the world is leading to the irreversible depletion of natural 
capital, there is widespread disagreement as to whether this necessarily implies that 
such development is inherently unsustainable. From an economic standpoint, 
the critical issue of debate is not whether natural capital is being irreversibly 
depleted, but whether we can compensate future generations for the current loss 
of natural capital, and if that is possible, how much is required to compensate 
future generations for this loss (Mäler 1995). 
However, economists concerned with this problem appear to be divided into 
two camps over the special role of natural capital in sustainable development. The 
main disagreement between these two perspectives is whether natural capital has 
a unique or “essential” role in sustaining human welfare, and thus whether special 
“compensation rules” are required to ensure that future generations are not made 
worse off by natural capital depletion today (see Figure 49.2). These two contrasting 
views are now generally referred to as weak sustainability versus strong sustainability.3
According to the weak sustainability view, there is essentially no inherent 
difference between natural and other forms of capital, and hence the same “optimal 
depletion” rules ought to apply to both. As long as the natural capital that is being 
depleted is replaced with even more valuable physical and human capital, then 
the value of the aggregate stock – comprising human, physical and the remaining 
natural capital – is increasing over time.4 Maintaining and enhancing the total 
stock of all capital alone is sufficient to attain sustainable development. 
3 For further discussion of this distinction between weak and strong sustainability see Howarth and 
Norgaard (1995), Pearce, Markandya and Barbier (1989), Pearce and Barbier (2000), Toman, Pezzey 
and Krautkraemer (1995) and Turner (1993).  
4 Note, however, that rapid population growth may imply that the value of the per capita aggregate capital 
stock is declining even if the total value stays the same. Moreover, even if the per capita value of the 
asset base were maintained, it may not imply non-declining welfare of the majority of people. These 
considerations also hold for the ‘strong sustainability’ arguments discussed below.  
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In contrast, proponents of the strong sustainability view argue that physical or 
human capital cannot substitute for all the environmental resources comprising the 
natural capital stock, or all of the ecological services performed by nature. Essentially, 
this view questions whether, on the one hand, human and physical capital, and on 
the other, natural capital, effectively comprises a single “homogeneous” total capital 
stock. Uncertainty over many environmental values, in particular the value that 
future generations may place on increasingly scarce natural resources and ecological 
services, further limits our ability to determine whether we can adequately compensate 
future generations for irreversible losses in essential natural capital today. Thus the 
strong sustainability view suggests that environmental resources and ecological 
services that are essential for human welfare and cannot be easily substituted by 
human and physical capital should be protected and not depleted. Maintaining or 
increasing the value of the total capital stock over time in turn requires keeping the 
non-substitutable and essential components of natural capital constant over time.
The two sides in the debate between weak and strong sustainability are 
not easy to reconcile. Recent extensions to the economic theory of sustainable 
development have not so much resolved this debate as sharpened its focus. It may 
take several generations before we know for sure which view of the role of natural 
capital in sustainable development is the correct one. Unfortunately, by then it 
may be too late to correct many of the costly mistakes of the past.
Growth, environment and environmental Kuznets curves
A new area of enquiry has emerged in environmental economics that also has 
important implications for sustainable development. This recent literature is 
concerned with the analysis of environmental Kuznets curves (EKC), that is, the 
hypothesis that there exists an “inverted U” shaped relationship between a variety 
of indicators of environmental pollution or resource depletion and the level of per 
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capita income.5 The implication of this hypothesis is that, as per capita income 
increases, environmental degradation rises initially but then eventually declines. 
Figure 49.3 shows a typical EKC estimated for sulfur dioxide (So2). Although 
estimations of such EKC relationships began in the early 1990s, interest in these 
studies is likely to continue for some time. There are several reasons for this.
Figure 49.3:  An environmental Kuznets curve for sulfur dioxide
The above curve is the environmental Kuznets curve for sulfur dioxide (So2) estimated across the world’s 
rich and poor countries. The “peak” or “turning point” level of per capita income where So2 levels start to 
fall is around $5,000. 
Source: Adapted from Panayotou (1995).
5 The concept of an environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) relationship draws its inspiration from the 
income distribution theory developed by Kuznets (1955), who hypothesized that there is an ‘inverted 
U’ relationship between an indicator of income inequality and the level of income. However, the exact 
origins of the EKC hypothesis are somewhat ambiguous, and appear to be the product of numerous 
studies conducted simultaneously in the early 1990s. Most sources point to the analysis by Grossman 
and Kreuger (1995) of air quality measures in a cross-section of countries for different years, which 
was part of a wider investigation into whether the claims that the economic growth accompanying the 
North American Free Trade Agreement might foster greater environmental degradation. Similarly, the 
study by Shafik (1994) was originally a background paper for the World Bank’s enquiry into growth and 
environment relationships for the World Development 1992 (World Bank 1992). Finally, Panayotou 
(1995) offers perhaps the earliest and most detailed explanation of a possible “Kuznets type U-shape 
relationship between the rate of environmental degradation and the level of economic development” in 
analysis conducted for the World Employment Programme of the International Labour office in 1992.
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First, the EKC is a falsifiable hypothesis that can and will continue to be 
tested through empirical investigation. Thus an increasing number of studies are 
attempting to determine whether the EKC hypothesis holds for various indicators 
of environmental degradation, both over time and across countries, regions, 
states, districts and even cities.
Second, the EKC hypothesis poses an important intellectual challenge. 
Explanations as to why environmental degradation should first increase then 
decline with income have focused on a number of underlying causes, including: 
•	 the effects of structural economic change on the use of the environment for 
resource inputs and to assimilate waste; 
•	 the effects of increasing income on the demand for environmental quality; 
and 
•	 the types of environmental degradation and ecological processes.  
It is not yet clear which of these factors, if any, explain why we might 
observe an EKC relationship. For example, many of the original explanations 
of the EKC hypothesis focused on changes in the composition of goods and 
services due to structural shifts in the economy, the efficiency of resource use, 
the composition of inputs, and technological innovation. However, increasingly 
it has been recognized that the effect of such changes on environment-income 
linkages are not “exogenous” processes – determined by factors outside the 
economy – but are influenced by policy choices (Andreoni and Levinson 2001; 
Lopez 1994; Panayotou 1995 and 1997; Stern et al. 1996; World Bank 1992). 
Similarly, previous conjecture that environmental quality is simply a “luxury 
good”, and thus the demand for improved environmental quality increases more 
than proportionately with income, is proving difficult to substantiate (Lieb 2002; 
McConnell 1997). Finally, it is possible that EKC studies are providing misleading 
information on environment-income linkages (Stern et al. 1996). As discussed 
earlier in this lecture, there is much that we do not know about key ecological 
processes and functions, as well as the valuable services that they provide. Even 
if we observe EKCs for certain indicators of pollution and resource depletion, it 
does not necessarily follow that the overall health and functioning of ecosystems 
will also improve as income increases. 
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Third, and perhaps most importantly, the EKC hypothesis has revived interest 
in the long-standing debate over the environmental implications of economic 
growth (Ansuategi et al.1998). one important interpretation of such estimated 
curves is that economies will eventually “grow out of” many environmental 
problems (Beckerman 1992). Taken to its extreme, this argument suggests that 
we do not have to regard the environment as anything special. As people get richer 
they will increase their demand for the environment and improve it, initially with 
public health legislation, then clean air, then conservation generally.  
However, other commentators have been more cautious, noting that 
conclusive evidence of an EKC relationship applies only to a few pollutants, thus 
making it difficult to use this evidence to speculate more generally about growth-
environment linkages (Arrow et al. 1995).  Still others have pointed out that, even 
for those pollutants displaying EKC characteristics, aggregate global emissions are 
projected to rise over time, demonstrating that the existence of an EKC does not 
necessarily imply that, at the global level, any associated environmental damage 
is likely to disappear with economic growth (Selden and Song 1994; Stern et al. 
1996). Policy makers are following this renewed debate with interest. From their 
perspective, the critical policy issue is whether economic growth should continue 
to be the main priority, with protection of the environment as a secondary 
consideration to be addressed mainly in the future, or whether explicit policies 
to control environmental degradation at the local, national and global level are 
required urgently today.
To date, the empirical evidence suggests that EKC relationships are more 
likely to hold for certain types of environmental damage, e.g. pollutants with 
more short-term and local impacts, versus those with more global, indirect and 
long-term impacts such as carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases (Arrow et 
al. 1995; Barbier 1997; Cole et al. 1997; Selden and Song 1994). In terms of 
types of “localized” environmental damage, the EKC hypothesis seems mainly 
to be valid for air pollution, in particular sulfur dioxide (So2) and to a lesser 
extent solid particulate matter (SPM). The evidence for other localized forms 
of environmental damage, such as water pollution, deforestation, urban waste 
and toxic metals, is more mixed (Barbier 1997; Cole et al. 1997). Moreover, 
environment-income relationships appear to vary across individual countries. For 
example, a study for Malaysia found SPM to be increasing with income (Vincent 
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1997), whereas a study for the United States indicated that SPM and other major 
air pollutants decline with increasing levels of income (Carson et al. 1997). 
However, even when an EKC relationship is estimated, often the turning 
point on the curve, where environmental degradation starts to decline with per 
capita income, proves to be very high relative to the current per capita GDP 
levels of most countries of the world (Barbier 1997). For example, the turning 
point for sulfur dioxide in Figure 49.3 is just under $5,000 per capita. In 
another recent analysis, none of the estimated EKC turning points for various 
environmental indicators are below the minimum income level of the sample of 
countries analyzed, and the turning points for nitrates, carbon dioxide, energy 
consumption and traffic volumes are well above the maximum income of the 
countries in the data set (Cole et al. 1997). In the case of those EKC estimates 
for tropical deforestation that are robust, the per capita income levels of most 
developing countries are also well to the left of the estimated turning point peaks 
(Cropper and Griffiths 1994; Barbier and Burgess 2001; Koop and Tole 1989).  
overall, such results suggest that most countries have not yet reached levels 
of per capita income for which environmental improvement is likely to occur. 
The implications are a worsening global problem of environmental degradation 
as the world economy and populations expand, even for those environmental 
indicators that display EKCs (Selden and Song 1994; Stern et al. 1996). This 
can be seen clearly in Figure 49.4. This figure shows the future trend in global 
sulfur dioxide emissions based on the estimated EKC for So2 depicted in Figure 
3 and employing aggregation of individual country projections of population 
and economic growth over 1990 to 2025. The resulting projections show a rise in 
global sulfur dioxide emissions throughout this period. For example, total global 
emissions of So2 rise from 383 million metric tons in 1990 to 1,181 million 
metric tons in 2025, or from 73 to 142 kg per capita (Stern et al. 1996).6   
6 Selden and Song (1994) conduct similar projections for the four air pollutants for which they 
estimate an EKC relationship, So2, SPM, nitrogen dioxides (Nox) and carbon monoxide 
(Co). Their results show world emissions increasing for all four pollutants through 2025, and 
for SPM and Nox, emissions rise through 2050.
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Figure 49.4: Projected trends for global SO2 emissions
Source:  Stern et al. (1996).
Where the EKC relationship does appear to hold, especially for certain 
air pollutants with localized or short-term effects, there is evidence that the 
eventual reduction in emissions associated with higher per capita income 
levels may be attributable to the “abatement effect” that arises as countries 
become richer (Andreoni and Levinson; Lopez 1994; Panayotou 1997). Also, 
both the willingness and the ability of political jurisdictions to engage in and 
enforce improved environmental regulations, to increase public spending on 
environmental research and development, or even to engage in multilateral 
agreements to reduce emissions may also increase with per capita income levels 
(Carson et al. 1997; de Bruyn 1997; Komen et al. 1997).7 However, it is a great 
leap of faith to conclude from these results that economic growth on its own 
will foster environmental improvement automatically. As Panayotou (1997) has 
concluded, “when all effects are considered, the relationship between growth and 
 
7 on the other hand, corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency may also explain why EKCs 
“break down” for certain countries. See López and Mitra (2000).
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the environment turns out to be much more complex with wide scope for active 
policy intervention to bring about more desirable (and in the presence of market 
failures) more efficient economic and environmental outcomes.”
This conclusion may be particularly relevant for low income and rapidly 
industrializing developing countries, whose current per capita income levels are 
well below the turning points of most estimated EKCs. In the absence of national 
and multilateral policy interventions, environmental degradation will continue 
in these countries as per capita income increases, at least over the medium term. 
In this regard, the observation of Vincent (1997) from his analysis of Malaysia is 
very apt: “The lack of evidence of EKCs in Malaysia does not prove that EKCs do 
not exist anywhere. It does indicate, however, that policy makers in developing 
countries should not assume that economic growth will automatically solve air 
and water pollution problems.”
In sum, the implications of the EKC literature for sustainable development 
are fairly straightforward. Regardless of whether one is an adherent of the weak 
sustainability or strong sustainability view, estimated EKC relationships on 
their own do not help us determine what actual policies are required in the 
economy to manage its total capital stock, including its stock of natural capital. 
Although recent EKC studies appear to have revived the wider “growth versus 
the environment” debate, these studies offer very little support for the view that 
economic growth alone is the solution to all environmental problems. Rather, it is 
clear from the EKC literature that specific policies to protect the environment are 
necessary to reduce environmental damages that are imposing real welfare losses. 
As Arrow et al. (1995) have succinctly put it: “Economic growth is not a panacea 
for environmental quality; indeed it is not even the main issue.”
Natural resource abundance and economic growth
So far, we have examined how management of environmental and natural 
resources, i.e. the natural capital stock, of a country is important for achieving 
sustainable economic development. We have also reviewed the recent findings of 
the EKC literature to make the case that the causal relationship is from improved 
environmental management to enhanced economic development and welfare, 
and not the other way around.
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It is therefore tempting to conclude that, if natural capital is so important 
to sustainable development, then more of a good thing must be even better. That 
is, economies that have a greater endowment of natural resources must surely have 
a much better chance of attaining higher economic growth rates and prosperity 
than relatively resource-poor economies. This must be particularly true with 
respect to low and middle-income countries, whose economies are generally more 
dependent on exploiting their natural capital stock in the transition to developing 
industrial and service sectors and the “take off” into higher and more balanced 
rates of long-run growth.
However, if per capita income is to be sustained or increased in these 
economies, especially with population increases, then any depreciation of natural 
resources must be offset by investment in other productive assets. This implies 
managing natural resources so as to maximize resource rents and channeling those 
rents into productive investments elsewhere in the economy. Although it would 
seem that the windfall profits generated by resource price booms would be beneficial 
to this process, this may not be the case for resource-abundant developing countries. 
In fact, recent evidence suggests that resource-abundant countries, especially 
developing economies, may not be benefiting economically from this apparent 
comparative advantage. Many low-income and lower middle-income economies 
that can be classified as highly resource dependent today also currently display low 
or stagnant growth rates (Barbier 1999). Cross-country analysis has confirmed 
that resource-abundant countries – i.e. countries with a high ratio of natural 
resource exports to GDP – have tended to grow less rapidly than countries that 
are relatively resource poor (Sachs and Warner 1997).  Economies with a high 
ratio of natural resource exports to GDP in 1971 also tended to have low growth 
rates during the subsequent period 1971-89 (Sachs and Warner 1995).
Such evidence might be considered surprising, given the commonly held 
view that abundant natural resources ought to be the basis for economic expansion 
for those countries fortunate to have such a rich endowment. For example, the 
origins of rapid industrial and economic expansion in the US over 1879-1940 
were strongly linked to the exploitation of abundant non-reproducible natural 
resources, particularly energy and mineral resources (Romer 1996; Wright 1990). 
In particular, during 1880-1920, the intensity of US manufacturing exports in 
Edward B Barbier
 503
terms of non-reproducible resources grew both absolutely and relative to the 
resource-intensity of imports. However, there is also evidence that were other 
factors that made this historical situation in the US unique. For example, Wright 
(1990) maintains that, over this era: 
•	 the United States was not only the world’s largest mineral producing nation 
but also one of the world’s largest countries and markets; 
•	 high international transport costs and tariff barriers for manufactured goods 
compared to highly efficient and low cost domestic transportation meant 
that the United States was a vast free trade area for internal commerce and 
industrial expansion that benefited from “economic distance” from the rest 
of the world; and 
•	 because of the quantities of resources that were available combined with the 
large internal markets for goods, increasing investment in basic technologies 
for extracting and processing natural resources was highly profitable.  
As Wright (1990, pp. 665 and 661) suggests: “the abundance of mineral 
resources, in other words, was itself an outgrowth of America’s technological 
progress,” and in turn, “American producer and consumer goods were often 
specifically designed for a resource-abundant environment”.
However, it is doubtful that the unique circumstances over 1879-1940 
that allowed the United States to achieve “congruence” between intensive 
resource use and basic processing and manufacturing technologies, and 
thus attain rapid economic expansion, are applicable to resource-abundant 
developing economies today. For one, after 1940, this unique “congruence” had 
clearly ended for the United States, largely due to changes in the international 
economy, even though the US still had abundant resources.  As Wright (1990, p 
665) points out: “the country has not become ‘resource poor’ relative to others, 
but the unification of world commodity markets (through transportation cost 
reductions and elimination of trade barriers) has largely cut the link between 
domestic resources and domestic industries … To a degree, natural resources have 
become commodities rather than part of the ‘factor endowment’ of individual 
countries.” As some researchers have pointed out, the changed international 
conditions during the post-war era may have also affected the role of primary-
product export promotion as the “engine of growth” for developing economies. 
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During this era, the main source of economic growth in developing countries 
has not been primary-product based exports but labor-intensive manufactured 
exports (Findlay 1996; Findlay and Wellisz 1993).8
Not only are the conditions for “congruence” between resource abundance, 
technological progress and industrial expansion lacking in most developing 
economies today, but it is also possible that increased economic dependence on 
resource exploitation may be detrimental to innovation and growth. For example, 
recent explanations of the limitations of resource-based development have focused 
on the poor potential for such development in inducing the economy-wide 
innovation necessary to sustain growth in a small open economy. Matsuyama 
(1992) has shown that trade liberalization in a land-intensive economy could 
actually slow economic growth by inducing the economy to shift resources 
away from manufacturing (which produces learning-induced growth) towards 
agriculture (which does not). Sachs and Warner (1995) also argue that the 
relative structural importance of tradable manufacturing versus natural resource 
sectors in an economy is critical to its growth performance, i.e. when a mineral 
or oil-based economy experiences a resource price boom, the manufacturing 
sector tends to shrink and the non-traded goods sector tends to expand.   This 
phenomenon is often referred to in the literature as the “Dutch disease” effect.9 
8  From their case study analysis of five open developing economies, Findlay and Wellisz (1993) 
conclude that over the post-war era it was economies with relatively no resources, such as Hong 
Kong, Singapore and Malta, which were among the earliest and most successful exporters 
of labor-intensive manufactures. In contrast, resource-rich Jamaica and the Philippines have 
done relatively poorly, whereas Indonesia and Malaysia have done comparatively better by 
balancing primary exports with rapid expansion of labor-intensive manufactures.
9 originally, the “Dutch disease” phenomenon was associated with the macroeconomic 
implications of an economy’s over-dependence on a single, traded natural resource sector 
(e.g. oil), which emphasized the enclave character of the sector as the predominant source 
of foreign exchange availability (Neary and van Wijnbergen 1986). As the consequence of 
a resource price boom (e.g. oil price shock), expansion of the resource-based sector would 
be accompanied by a change in the real exchange rate, and the rest of the economy would 
decline relatively. The more recent treatments of the “Dutch disease” phenomenon, such as by 
Matsuyama (1992) and Sachs and Warner (1995) discussed here, focus less on the economic 
implications of a resource boom via real exchange rate movements but via internal economic 
distortions caused by the shift of resources from a more innovative sector (e.g. manufacturing) 
to a less innovative sector (e.g. agriculture, minerals). This latter representation of the “Dutch 
disease” is more appropriate for characterizing a small open economy, in which real exchange 
rate determination is not considered.  
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Sachs and Warner (1999) have recently examined evidence over the period 
1960-94 for eleven major Latin American economies to test the hypothesis 
that any natural resource booms occurring in these countries may have had a 
positive impact on their growth performance.10 First, the authors note that the 
main structural feature of these economies is that they have remained by and 
large exporters of primary commodities or manufactured products based on these 
commodities. Second, they suggest that a significant resource boom occurred in 
only four of the eleven countries (Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela), and 
mixed evidence of a boom in another three (Chile, Colombia and Peru). However, 
Sachs and Warner conclude that in only one of these seven countries (Ecuador) 
did a resource boom have a positive and lasting effect on GDP per capita. In two 
countries (Chile and Colombia) there appears to be no effect of a resource boom 
on economic development, and in the remaining four cases (Bolivia, Mexico, 
Peru and Venezuela), the resource boom actually produced a negative impact 
on GDP per capita. on balance, resource booms appear to frustrate economic 
growth in Latin America, most likely through a Dutch disease effect.
If natural resource booms are not important catalysts for economic 
development in poorer countries, then perhaps the process of resource exploitation 
occurring in these economies is not as economically beneficial as it could be. 
That is, the structural economic dependence of a small open low or lower middle 
income economy on exploiting its natural resource endowment may not be 
leading to sustained and high rates of economic growth. This may be occurring 
because natural resource assets, including land, are not being managed so as to 
maximize rents and/or whatever rents are being generated in the economy are not 
being channeled into productive investments elsewhere in the economy.  
Brander and Taylor (1997 and 1998) provide some theoretical support for 
this perspective.  They note that over-exploitation of many renewable natural 
resources – particularly the conversion of forests to agricultural land – occurs in 
developing countries if property rights over a resource stock are hard to define, 
difficult to enforce or costly to administer. They demonstrate that opening up 
trade for a resource-abundant economy with an open access renewable resource 
10 The countries are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, 
Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
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may actually reduce welfare in that economy. As the resource-abundant country 
has a comparative advantage in producing the resource good, the increased demand 
for this good resulting from trade openness leads to greater resource exploitation, 
which under conditions of open access leads to declining welfare in the long run. 
Brander and Taylor conclude that, as the problem lies with the “open access” nature 
of exploitation in the resource-abundant economy, then the first-best policy would 
be for the developing country to switch to more efficient resource management 
policy through simply establishing property rights.11 However, as they acknowledge, 
there are many policy and institutional distortions that currently work against 
such solutions in developing countries. Consequently, Brander and Taylor (1997, 
p. 550) argue in favor of “second best approaches”, such as the imposition of “a 
modified ‘Hartwick’s rule’ (see Hartwick 1977) under which an exporting country 
that experienced temporary gains from selling a resource good on world markets 
might re-invest those proceeds in an alternative asset.” 
Current policies in resource-abundant developing economies appear not to 
be ensuring that any resource rents earned are re-invested efficiently into other 
productive assets in the economy (Pearce and Barbier 2000). Such an outcome 
may be reinforced by corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency and misguided policies 
that benefit special interests that gain from short-term resource exploitation 
(Ascher 1999; Barbier and Damania 2000; Deacon 1994). If this is the case, 
then irrespective of what may happen to a country’s terms of trade or commodity 
prices, any initial “economic boom” associated with land conversion or increased 
resource exploitation is invariably short-lived as the extra rents generated are 
eventually dissipated. once the land expansion and increased exploitation of 
new resource “reserves” comes to an end, or poorer quality land and resources 
are brought into production, then some economic retrenchment is inevitable. 
What we should therefore observe is that economic development in a resource-
dependent small open economy displays an inherently “boom and bust” pattern.
11 In a recent analysis of land expansion in Mexico, Barbier (2002) demonstrates that institutional 
constraints, such as the ejido common-property land management regime, may have slowed 
down the pace of land conversion and deforestation in pre-NAFTA Mexico.  However, 
increased trade liberalization under NAFTA combined with the widespread relaxing of the 
land management rules of the ejido regime could accelerate land clearing in Mexico.
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Again, Brander and Taylor (1997) show that a small, open and resource-
abundant economy that produces both a resource and a manufacturing good 
in the long run will have such a pattern of development. That is, the economy 
will experience early gains from trade, followed by a period of declining utility. 
With the specific case of Latin America in mind, in which raw materials are often 
inputs into semi-processed or processed exports, López (1989) also develops 
a two-good model of a resource-rich open economy in which the open access 
renewable resource serves as an input into an “enclave” export processing sector. 
López demonstrates that improvements in the terms of trade increases the rate of 
open access resource extraction and causes real income to rise in the short-run, 
but inevitably permanent income falls in the long run.
As mentioned above, the classic case of open access resource exploitation 
in many developing countries is conversion of forest to agriculture (Barbier and 
Burgess 2001). If agricultural land expansion in these small open economies 
is associated with a “boom and bust” pattern of economic development, then 
there are two possible consequences. First, economies that have increased their 
agricultural land base significantly over the long run are likely to have lower levels 
of GDP per capita then economies that have tended to reduce their dependence 
on agricultural land expansion. For the latter countries, a shrinking agricultural 
land base may be evidence that tradable manufacturing and other dynamic 
sectors have become structurally more important in the economy relative to 
natural resource sectors and that agriculture itself has become a more capital-
intensive, productive and innovative sector.12 Second, for those countries that 
are dependent on agricultural land expansion, further increases in agricultural 
area will tend to produce only modest increases in GDP per capita. Beyond a 
certain point, additional increases in land expansion will be associated with lower 
GDP per capita, because of the “boom and bust” pattern of resource-dependent 
development described above.
A fairly straightforward way of empirically verifying the above phenomenon 
is to estimate a relationship between GDP per capita and some measure of long-
run agricultural expansion. For example, if the latter indicator was some index, 
12 In the small open economy model of Brander and Taylor (1997), if the country specializes in 
the manufacturing good in the long run, it gains unambiguously from trade.  
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∀it, then the above hypotheses suggest that there may be a cubic relationship 
between per capita income, Yit, and this indicator of long run agricultural land 
change:
    (1)
Table 49.2:   Panel analysis of per capita income and long run agricultural 
expansion for tropical developing countries, 1961-94
Dependent variable: GDP per capita (PPP, constant 1987 $)a
Parameter estimates:b
Explanatory variables All countries 
(N = 1135)























F-test for pooled model 168.01** 126.05**
Breusch-Pagan (LM) test 6576.23** 3614.50**
Hausman test 6.85 44.02**
Adjusted R2 0.368 0.937
Preferred model One-way random effects Two-way fixed 
effects
Notes: a Mean for all tropical developing countries over 1961-94 is $2,593, and for lower income 
countries $1,539. PPP is purchase power parity.  
b t-ratios are indicated in parentheses. 
c Countries with GDP per capita (PPP, constant 1987 $) less than $3,500 over 1961-94. 
d Mean for all countries over 1961-94 is 1.150, and for lower income countries 1.149. 
** Significant at 1% level, * significant at 5% level. 
Source: Author’s estimation.
In the above equation b0  > 0, b1 < 0, b2 > 0, b3 < 0 and | b1| > b2 would 
imply that countries with increased long run agricultural land area would have 
lower levels of per capita income than countries with decreased agricultural land 
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area, and per capita income would tend to fluctuate with long run agricultural 
land expansion.
The above relationship was estimated through employing a panel analysis of 
tropical developing countries over 1961-94. Per capita income, Yit, is represented 
by gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in constant purchasing power parity 
(1987 $). The indicator ∀it is an agricultural land long run change index, created 
by dividing the current (i.e. in year t) agricultural land area of a country by its 
land area in 1961.13  
The results of the analysis for all tropical countries and for low and lower 
middle income countries (i.e. those economies with real per capita GDP less 
than $3,500 over 1961-94) are shown in Table 49.2. For both regressions, the 
estimated coefficients are highly significant and also have the expected signs and 
relative magnitudes.14 Thus the estimations provide some empirical evidence that 
agricultural land expansion in developing countries conforms to a “boom and bust” 
pattern of economic development. This is seen more clearly when the regressions 
are used to project respective relationships between long run agricultural land 
expansion and GDP per capita, which are displayed in Figure 49.5.
As indicated in the figure, an increase in agricultural land expansion in 
the long run is clearly associated with a lower level of per capita income than 
decreasing agricultural land area. For all tropical countries, the turning point is a 
long run agricultural change index of just under 1.2. For lower income countries 
 
13 The data used in this analysis is from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
14 Although only the preferred models are indicated in Table 1, the panel analysis was performed 
comparing oLS against one-way and two-way random and fixed effects models. Alternative 
versions of these models also employed White’s robust correction of the covariance matrix 
to overcome unspecified heteroskedasticity. However, heteroskedasticity proved not to be a 
significant problem in both regressions.  In the regression for all tropical developing countries, 
the F-test for the pooled model and Breusch-Pagan LM test were highly significant, suggesting 
rejection of the oLS model due to the presence of individual effects. The Hausman test was 
significant only at the 10% level, suggesting that random effects specification is preferred to 
the fixed effects model. The one-way model tended to outperform the two-way effects model. 
In the regression for lower income countries, the F-test for the pooled model, the LM test 
and the Hausman test were all highly significant, suggesting that the fixed effects model is 
preferred. The two-way model tended to outperform the one-way effects model. 
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the turning point is 1.3. Although continued agricultural land expansion beyond 
these points does lead to a slight increase in GDP per capita, this impact is short-
lived. For all tropical countries, per capita income starts to fall once the land area 
index reaches 2.3; for lower income countries this occurs sooner at an index of 
1.9. Note as well that for lower income countries, there is very little increase in 
GDP per capita associated with expansion of land over the 1.3 to 1.9 range.
Figure 49.5: Projected trends in agricultural land expansion per capita income for 
tropical developing countries
Source: Author’s estimation.
To conclude, even though a developing economy is endowed with abundant 
natural resources, the country may not necessarily be exploiting this natural 
wealth efficiently and generating productive investments. or, as Wright (1990, 
p. 666) suggests: “there is no iron law associating natural resource abundance 
with national industrial strength.”  It is clear that the open access conditions and 
ill-defined property rights under which many resources, and especially land, are 
exploited in developing economies is partly to blame. It is also the case that in 
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many countries natural resource assets, including land, are not being managed so 
as to maximize rents and/or whatever rents are being generated in the economy are 
not being re-invested productively elsewhere, especially in tradable manufacturing 
and other dynamic sectors.  
Final remarks
Although our understanding of the role of natural resources in economic 
development has improved markedly in recent decades, there is still much to 
learn. Nevertheless, as I have argued in this lecture, the view that environmental 
and natural resources should be treated as important economic assets, which can 
be called natural capital, is becoming more accepted. Armed with this concept, 
economists are now able to show the conditions under which depletion of 
this natural capital stock may or may not lead to more sustainable economic 
development.  
However, the services provided by natural capital are unique and, in the 
case of the ecological and life-support functions of the environment, are not well 
understood.  Improving our knowledge in this area is a critical task. It is also 
one in which economists must learn to work more closely with scientists from 
other disciplines, particularly biologists, ecologists and other natural scientists. 
Such inter-disciplinary efforts are especially relevant for a host of complex 
environmental management problems facing the world today, such as biodiversity 
loss, climate change, and the spread of biological invasions and infectious diseases 
(Barbier et al. 1994). 
Better understanding of these complex environmental problems and of the 
value of ecological services may also help eventually to resolve the “weak” versus 
“strong” sustainability debate in economics. As I have noted in this lecture, the 
heart of this debate concerns whether the environment has an “essential” role in 
sustaining human welfare, and if so, whether special “compensation rules” are 
necessary in order to ensure that future generations are not made worse off by 
natural capital depletion today. These issues are unlikely to be resolved in the 
near future, and I have not attempted to do so here. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
the very minimum criterion for attaining sustainable economic development is 
ensuring that an economy satisfies weak sustainability conditions. That is, as long 
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as the natural capital that is being depleted is replaced with even more valuable 
physical and human capital, then the value of the aggregate stock – comprising 
human, physical and the remaining natural capital – should be increasing 
over time. This in turn requires that the development path of an economy is 
governed by principles somewhat akin to Hartwick’s rule (Hartwick 1977). First, 
environmental and natural resources must be managed efficiently so that the 
welfare losses from environmental damages are minimized and any resource rents 
earned after “internalizing” environmental externalities are maximized. Second, 
the rents arising from the depletion of natural capital must be invested into other 
productive economic assets.
The conclusion that efficient environmental resource management is 
the minimum condition necessary for sustainable economic development may 
surprise those who believe that the causality might run in the other direction. 
Proponents of the latter view argue that the environmental Kuznets curve 
literature provides evidence that environmental problems are likely to lessen as 
economies grow and develop. However, as I have sought to clarify in this lecture, 
the EKC literature does not support such a conclusion. Rather, many EKC 
studies suggest that specific policies to protect the environment are necessary for 
curbing certain forms of pollution and resource depletion, both currently and 
in the future. How key environmental indicators change with rises in per capita 
income is an important issue, but what is of more fundamental concern is how 
different policies can affect this relationship. Specifically, we need to determine 
what environmental policies are required to ensure that the needs of the present 
are met without compromising the economic opportunities to meet the needs of 
the future. With regard to these bigger policy issues, estimating EKC relationships 
for various indicators of environmental degradation is instructive of likely trends 
under current policies, but is perhaps less helpful in indicating what additional 
policies and instruments should be implemented.
Finally, this lecture has also considered a recent paradox concerning the role 
of natural resources in economic development: if natural capital is important for 
sustainable development, why is the economic performance of many resource-
abundant developing countries lagging behind that of comparatively resource-
poor economies? The answer to this paradox seems to be fairly straightforward. 
Simply because a developing economy is endowed with abundant natural 
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resources, it does not necessarily follow that the country will exploit this natural 
wealth efficiently and reinvest resource rents in other productive investments. 
Ill-defined and lack of enforcement of property rights that create “open access” 
conditions for exploiting land and other natural resources in developing countries 
are part of the problem. In addition, rather than ensuring that any resource rents 
earned are re-invested efficiently into other productive assets, current policies in 
resource-abundant developing economies appear to work against this outcome. 
Corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency and polices biased in favor of special 
interests that gain from excessive resource extraction or conversion also exacerbate 
these policy failures. The result is that land expansion and increased exploitation 
of new resource “reserves” in many resource-dependent developing economies are 
not fostering a “takeoff” into sustainable development but rather a “boom and 
bust” pattern of economic growth and development.
In conclusion, the importance of natural resources to economic 
development is now well-established. How a country manages its natural capital 
stock is critical for achieving sustainable economic development. Moreover, 
misinterpretations of the EKC literature aside, the causal relationship is clearly 
from improved environmental management to enhanced economic development 
and welfare, and not the other way around. on the other hand, poor policies and 
the inefficient mismanagement of natural resources can also be detrimental to 
growth and development. of course, it will always be difficult to determine what 
exactly is lost when we deplete natural resources and degrade the environment. 
But at the very least, economic policies should be in place to ensure that welfare-
damaging environmental externalities are corrected, the rents generated from the 
depletion of natural capital are maximized, and that these rents are reinvested 
into dynamic and innovative sectors in the rest of the economy.
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The globalisation debate and how nations, businesses, cultures and individuals 
cope is one of the defining issues of our day. In the absence of other issues it has 
joined imperialism, colonialism and communism and can be wielded like a club 
in any ideological direction. It’s not new, it’s not a policy hatched by some secret 
cabal, it’s a process that has been under way ever since the first person climbed 
down from a tree. Indeed some historians suggest trade as a percentage of GNP 
is lower now than in 1900, and the movement of people is certainly lower now 
than then. Those who revisited the crusaders fought with swords cast in India 
from ore mined in Tanzania. The French saw King Louis XIV drink Yemen coffee 
served on Chinese porcelain, sweetened with sugar from Sao Tome, and smoke 
Virginian tobacco.
China had great trading ships, twice the size of Columbus’ tiny fleet, and 
its sailors traded with India, Africa and the Islamic world. one fleet had a crew of 
20,000 men. This was centuries before Columbus. opponents accuse globalisation 
of favouring big business and concentrating wealth, yet Bill Gates owns a smaller 
percentage of America than Rockefeller did. Look at the Fortune 500 companies: 
most of the leading companies ten years ago have disappeared, as did the great 
Royal fortunes in most of Europe earlier. Company taxes as a percentage of revenue 
in oECD countries have marginally grown over the past decade.
It is the speed of change that destabilises people, but is this all bad? No 
one complains about the speed of change in medical research. Prince Albert died 
of Typhoid from the Thames. The richest man in the world died 150 years ago 
of a disease that could be solved by simple antibiotics that are now cheaply and 
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readily available to the poorest people in most countries. Life expectancy has 
increased by 20 years, infant mortality has fallen by two-thirds, and literacy has 
exploded over the past 50 years. Hundreds of millions have been lifted from 
extreme poverty, especially in China and other economies that have adopted open 
economic strategies.
Technology and science are man’s best friend. Norman Borlaug won the 
Nobel Prize for Peace for breeding dwarf rice and wheat varieties, saving millions 
of lives. Nowadays protestors would try to stop him. Agricultural production in 
the US has gone up by nearly 800% in 75 years. Most American farmers did not 
have electricity in 1990 and their life expectancy was 49 years.  Railways in the 
US cut freight costs by as much as 95% between 1815 and 1990. Refrigeration 
changed forever economies such as Australia, New Zealand and the Argentine, but 
now 40% of the world’s manufacturing exports by value go by air. A three-minute 
phone call between New York and London cost $300 as recently as 50 years ago.
In my youth it took a year’s pay to purchase the Encyclopaedia Britannia; 
now it costs a few dollars for a copy on CD. Thirty years ago Ghana had the same 
living standard as Korea, now Korea is as rich as Portugal, even though Portugal’s 
living standards have exploded since she embraced democracy and joined the EU. 
North Korea was richer than South Korea at the time of partition. Now North 
Korea’s people starve and live in fear. Burma and Thailand’s living standards were 
the same after the war, now Thailand is 25 times richer per person. Thirty years 
ago Japan was a developing country, the Baltic States and the Czech Republic 
had living standards closer to France and Denmark before the Soviet experience. 
Their income per person were just half that of their previous equals by the time 
the Soviet empire imploded. A Taiwan factory owner paid his workers U$7.50 
a month 45 years ago, now it is $7.50 per hour. The Argentine arguably had 
a higher living standard than Australia or New Zealand in 1900. What went 
wrong? What are the common denominators?
open economies and societies do better. Globalisation is not a threat 
to the world’s poor. Marginalisation – the denial of what the world offers – 
is the threat. There are still grave injustices. Free trade in agriculture would 
return to Africa 4 to 5 times more than all the overseas aid put together, and 
ten times more than all the debt relief offered so far. EU and US consumers 
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pay 50% more for their sugar than they need to. This robs jobs from poor 
countries. Abolishing cotton subsidies would return $250 million a year to 
West Africa alone. The Cairns Group of Ministers led by Australia should be 
praised by the NGos because no other political group offers a better, more 
immediate, permanent and effective way of assisting the poorest producers in 
the world. Globalisation should not be demonised or idealised. It offers the 
gift of opportunity, but if politicians, bureaucrats and phoney capitalists wish 
to plunder and protect their narrow interests, there is little that can be done to 
prevent such economic suicide.
Quite a good living is being made by people like Naomi Klein writing 
against global corporates in books such as her bestseller ‘No Logos’. Please, there’s 
no bitterness because she outsells my books.
The world is not being taken over by great companies. In fact their share of 
world trade is smaller now than 200 years ago when the great imperial protected, 
privileged companies carved up India and other colonies. Their shareholding is 
now much more diverse, even democratised. Peter Drucker, the management 
guru, recently pointed out that, through their pension funds, employees of US 
businesses today own at least 25% of US equity capital. If socialism is defined 
as the ownership of the means of production then the US is more socialist than 
Poland ever was. The funds of the self-employed and public employees own 
at least another 10%, giving workers ownership of more than one-third of the 
equity capital of US businesses. Business can no longer trick Governments into 
guaranteeing profits by promising local monopolies. In most cases, the finished 
product has inputs now from many sources and countries.
Anyhow, what is a brand name but a reputation? All that represents is the 
goodwill and trust stored up over years of success. I think the opposite will and 
is happening in spite of what some activists claim. A reputation is vulnerable, 
hard won and easily lost. Corporates live in a world of free information, 
investigative journalists, NGo’s, and opportunistic politicians on the prowl for 
a headline all now need to conduct business in a more ethical and transparent 
manner. Nike has been at the end of protests over ripping workers off in poor 
countries. In Vietnam, Nike pays their workers five times the average wage, 
and in Indonesia three times the average wage. In Vietnam this is causing real 
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problems with doctors leaving hospitals and professors leaving universities to 
work on the factory floor.
The International Labour organisation did a survey in developing countries 
and found that multinationals paid higher wages, had better safety and health 
records, and were more likely to recognise trade unions.  It’s local businesses that 
are more likely to treat their workforce badly. The big corporates are vulnerable 
and must respond to public and shareholders opinion. And this is healthy: it’s the 
trust people have in well-known brands, because they know what they will get, 
that opens up all sorts of possibilities to effect social change and improvements 
in the way people work and live in poor counties. The world is interdependent, 
as is obvious from the SARS scare and the aids pandemic. It’s a bit like Victorian 
England when the rich discovered they were not safe in their mansions and great 
estates if their servants and workers were sick and poorly educated. When that 
impacted on them and their families, the idea of public goods, municipal socialism, 
public sewerage, clean water, and education came of age. Now corporations in 
poor countries understand that they must provide for their workers and they live 
in a wider society. If they dig up an ounce of gold in Southern Africa, companies 
must calculate a cost of over 10 pounds because of aids. If you are employing a 
worker in parts of Africa you must employ three, because two will die of AIDS. 
Therefore many companies are now investing heavily in AIDS prevention. They 
need to because if they don’t they will get taxed to do it and that money will be 
used ineffectively, often stolen.
I’ve been in countries where nothing works but you can always get a cold 
glass of Cola Cola. There’s a trial under way for coke to service condom machines.
Due to public embarrassment and grotesque rip offs in the past, the giant 
petroleum companies like BP and Shell have adopted strict policies of ethical 
behaviour and now refuse to pay bribes. They are working with the United Nations 
and its global compact to provide new transparent standards of behaviour and 
public/private partnerships to alleviate poverty. It’s good business to be a good 
citizen. Virtue gets a real reward. What’s encouraging also is the movement in 
developed countries for consumer to take power and not purchase products that 
damage the environment or are produced in an unethical manner.
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I’ve made my case that in the main globalisation is a good thing. It’s morally 
neutral. What governments do with the wealth a modern and open economy can 
deliver is up to them.
How, though, do we manage a world that has become interdependent but 
not yet integrated, where 2 million people cross borders every day? Let’s look to 
our parents, the greatest generation for inspiration. Even before the 2nd World 
War had finished, great minds and men were thinking of what the new world 
would be like based on the lessons of the 1st World War and the Great Depression 
(which was made deeper, more lethal and prolonged by protectionist measures 
that halved world trade). That depression gave rise to the twin tyrannies of the last 
century. Fascism and marxism were tribal, vicious and protectionist, and from 
this came World War II, which in turn gave birth to the UN, World Bank, IMF, 
and what became the WTo. The words of President Wilson should haunt us even 
now when he failed to convince the US senate to adopt the League of Nations. 
‘Reject this and you will break the heart of the world’, he argued.
We should not forget that one of the key reasons for establishing the GATT 
(now the WTo) was to stop the possibility of the world dividing into rival, 
possibly hostile trading blocks.
What makes the WTO different? 
The WTo is the only international organisation that has a binding dispute 
system. Therefore Costa Rica or New Zealand can take on the greatest economic 
power and win under its rules. If civilisation can be defined as the rule of law, 
then this system is the jewel in the crown of the WTo. Unique also in the WTo 
is that all decisions must be unanimous and final agreements must be ratified by 
all the members’ legislatures and Parliaments.
You are aware that we failed to launch a new round in Seattle and later 
succeeded to launch a round in Doha. Seattle failed, not because of process 
or protest. Governments could not agree in the substance. Europe and Japan 
could not move enough on agriculture, the US had problems on anti-dumping, 
developing countries had problems with investment, competition, trade facilitation 
and government procurement. We succeeded in Doha because all sides made 
50 Globalization
522
compromises. Agriculture was the key issue. We made it a development issue. 
Rich countries spend a billion dollars a day to make food dearer for working 
families. A deal in agriculture would return four to five times more than all the 
overseas assistance to Africa. Agriculture is always a deal breaker or a deal maker.
The so-called new issues are also good governance issues, anti-corruption 
programmes. Everyone gains out of trade facilitation. APEC studies show that 
our region would gain more out of trade facilitation than abolishing all remaining 
import tariffs. For example, it costs four times more to get a container from 
North Africa to New York than from Hong Kong.
A new WTo round could return nearly three billion to the world economy. 
A deal in cotton alone would return over $250 million to the poorest African 
Nations. It would lift over 300 million people out of extreme poverty. The cost of 
Europe’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is equal to Spain’s total economic 
output. The CAP devours half of all the money sent to Brussels. Now Europe is 
enlarging the expenditure is exploding. That’s why there is hope. For the first time 
Europe is talking about decoupling, that is, paying farmers NoT to farm.
The cost of failure is high. The big players have other options. Regional and 
bilateral deals will expand in direct relationship with progress in the WTo. This 
hurts the smaller and poorer players.
Having said all this, I now want to indulge myself as a Kiwi, a Pacific 
Islander, and talk a bit about our region, where globalisation has passed too many 
people by, where too many people sit with their faces pressed against the window 
or TV watching and waiting for a train that may not arrive. Those marginalised 
are in an arc of poverty and instability that stretches from Indonesia across the 
Pacific to the Cook Islands. ours is not a safe neighbourhood. What to do? 
Bismark famously said that talking of a moral foreign policy was like walking 
down a narrow forest path with a large stick between your teeth.
A damning paper on the Pacific Islands and Australia’s aid was recently 
released by Professor Helen Hughes (2003). A similar study of New Zealand’s 
aid programme would, I suspect, come to similar conclusions. Aid has failed the 
Pacific, Hughes argues. Per capita income has grown by less than 1% a year in the 
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Pacific during the past 30 years. In some islands it has declined, while population 
has grown at more than 3% per year.
over the past 30 years the Pacific has received $200 billion in aid. Why 
haven’t the associated policies worked? It’s a tired story repeated in so many 
developing countries. Aid is not an earned income and creates ‘rents’ that distort 
economies, and because the projects are frequently chosen by the ‘beneficiaries’ it 
mainly goes on consumption and not on investment. often on island economies’ 
balance sheets, aid from Australia and New Zealand appears as income, allowing 
governments to avoid and hide from their real and precarious financial position.
AusAID pays for 85% of PNG’s road maintenance. PNG and the Solomon 
Islands could soon achieve a unique Pacific status, that of being its first failed 
states. As I am writing this Lecture, bad and dangerous information is coming 
in from the Solomon Islands. PNG and Fiji 30 years ago enjoyed a higher living 
standard than Mauritius and Botswana. Now Mauritius and Botswana have 
a living standard twice that of our Pacific neighbours. Mauritius has a similar 
ethnic breakdown as Fiji, so these outcomes are not pre-ordained. It is economic 
and political strategies that made the difference.
Hughes goes further, and suggests that with PNG’s population reaching 
10 million by 2025, unless there is a sharp change of direction they face the 
prospect not merely of being a failed state but of becoming a rogue state like 
that of Mobutu and Mugabe. The ingredients are there. Urbanisation, crime, 
tribal gangs, failing education and health policies, and urban employment haunt 
the region. The elites collect the ‘rents’ from generous ‘aid packages’, implement 
economic policies that benefit mainly the few, and sent their children off to 
schools in New Zealand and Australia.
The King of Tonga is now seeking power to overrule any legislation and 
control the media. A free press is a human right, it’s also a pre-condition for 
development. The London School of Economics studied governments in India 
and found those provinces with the highest newspaper readership enjoyed the 
best results, and they responded quicker to droughts and floods, and were less 




Much can be blamed on the colonial past, but that doesn’t account for 
appalling choices now being made. In Tonga, the King and his mates apparently 
followed the advice of the King’s Court Jester and lost nearly 30 million US dollars. 
In 1965 Nauru achieved independence and each person was worth half a million 
Australia dollars, giving them the second highest income in the world. Yet Canberra 
and Wellington were seen in New Zealand and Australia as imposing a new form of 
colonialism. Let’s face it, we were wrong. It has not worked. The Hughes report was 
brought to my attention by a Kiwi journalist, who in an email seeking comment, 
referred to a little book I wrote over 20 years ago entitled “A Pacific Parliament”. He 
cheerfully admitted he rubbished the book then, but now thinks I was a ‘tad ahead 
of my time!’ It is wrong to be right too soon. I guess that’s the closest you ever get to 
an apology from a Kiwi journalist. The book is a little embarrassing to read now, but 
the basic argument about political cover for regional integration, common values, 
the creation of a professional civil service, free media, entrenching principles of 
good governance by property rights, honest courts, effective tax systems, police and 
military personnel properly trained working within legal constraints, remains valid.
The Pacific Parliament was not to be elected but consist of existing MPs in 
the regions, who would also serve as members of the Pacific Parliament, similar 
to the Nordic Council, not like the European Parliament.
To build common values needs patient, long term thinking. Still, my idea is 
more than 20 years old. The concept needs polishing but there is ample economic 
evidence that such pillars and institutions act as external anchors to drive up 
standards. IMF and World Bank studies show countries preparing for entry to 
the European Union have done better than those who have no external pressure 
and objectives. This is true also of countries who wish to join and enjoy the 
benefits of the World Trade organisation. It forces the creation of transparent 
institutions, and property rights, and all those things that make a modern society 
work. Croatia, Poland, Hungary, and now China and Chinese Taipei, have gone 
through this strict process as economies in transition. These are globalized rules, 
standards, rights and obligations.
Mexico was a one-party state, corrupt and inefficient. Joining NAFTA 
forced it to comply with rules of engagement. This economic discipline brought 
with it economic growth, social progress, better governance, and democracy.
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There are certain economic, legal and social conditions that successful 
countries take for granted. They are the rule of law, property rights, accountable 
politicians, an independent judiciary, free media, trade unions and an active, 
engaged civil society. Are these institutions a result of a modern successful economy 
or are economies successful because of the quality of these institutions? We need 
to revisit the ideas of the founders of modern economics and the enlightenment 
upon which our civilization is based.
Immanuel Kant more than 200 years ago wrote in his essay Perpetual 
Peace: “Durable peace could be built upon the tripod of representative democracy, 
international organisations and economic dependence.” He first coined the phrase 
a League of Nations. For those who think globalisation is new, listen again to Mill, 
Hume and Adam Smith who all argued that expanded commerce produced good 
government and thus reduced the prospect for war and enhanced individual liberty.
Adam Smith in 1976 wrote “commerce and manufacturing can seldom 
flourish in any state in which there is not a certain degree of confidence in the 
justice of government.” Money is a coward, so investment will go where it can get 
the best most-secure results. Guess why huge Arab investment funds buy property 
in London and New York and not Syria, Egypt or the Gaza Strip? This idea was 
recently revisited by a group of economists at the IMF. Their report suggested 
that if Cameroon could somehow build political institutions as good as these in 
the average country, its per capita income would rise nearly five-fold, from $600 
to $2760. To make an economy work and reward its citizens takes more than 
capital, labour and technology. Institutions, property rights and transparency 
are crucial. If Bangladesh could lift the quality of its institutions to the level of 
Uruguay, that would give it a 5% lift in GNP.
We are correctly proud of what we have tried to do in the Pacific. But 
it has failed. The deadly prospect of communal violence, corruption, money 
laundering, aids, drugs, refugees, rich politicians, wealthy bureaucrats, phoney 
capitalists and poor angry people in a population getting younger, more angry, 
and alienated looms at our doorstep.
It doesn’t have to be like this, and our failures are not born from meanness 
or lack of commitment. This has been a costly, honest mistake in policies and 
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direction. We shall all pay sooner or later. And we will pay more the longer we 
fail to take leadership. These stories rate a small mention on page 5 of newspapers. 
They will be front-page news soon.
For the virtues of the market, both economic political and civil, to work we 
need institutions and laws that provide predictability that protect property rights 
and ensure liberties and disciplined pluralistic market structures.
I am optimistic. Freedom is growing. Never in the history of our species have 
so many people been free to choose in the political and economic market place. 
Just 20 years ago half of Europe, Latin America, South Africa were imprisoned. 
In our time, think of these photographs and TV clips: Mandela free, Berlin Wall 
collapsing, girls at school in Afghanistan, Tienamen Square.
Can I share my most inspiring moment? Cambodia was as bad as it gets. 
Millions murdered. Phnom Penh had a population of about a million. Pol Pot got 
it down to 30, three zero people. I went to this great capital at night. There were 
only a few hundred lights. What were they? They were cyber-cafes, with queues 
of people standing in line for their turn. If we give these hungry, eager-to-learn 
people the opportunity then they will seek prospects, peace and freedom. They 
fear marginalisation, they like young people everywhere seek the best the world 
has to offer. We must not betray them or let them down. They are the hope of 
the future.
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Paying for the past: Economics,  
cultural heritage, and public policy
C. David Throsby1
Joseph Fisher was not only a successful businessman but also a citizen with a 
strong sense of obligation to the public interest. The combination of private and 
public in Fisher’s curriculum vitae suggests to me that he would approve of a 
lecture in his name being devoted to the matter of cultural heritage, given that 
heritage, as we shall see, combines elements both of widespread private ownership 
and of ubiquitous public benefit. Furthermore, my conjecture that Fisher would 
be favourably disposed towards this topic is reinforced by reference to his interest 
in art. He showed great generosity towards the Art Gallery in Adelaide, described 
handsomely in the inaugural Joseph Fisher Lecture given in 1904 while its 
benefactor was still alive; the lecturer, Henry Gyles Turner, Esq., praised Fisher’s 
munificence in bringing “a fine selection of the world’s masterpieces ... (to) ... 
this far-away corner of the earth”. So here was a man with a clear sense of the 
importance of keeping the past alive for the edification and enjoyment of present 
and future generations.
To begin, we need to understand what is meant by the term “heritage”. As 
its dictionary definition indicates, heritage is something inherited from the past. 
Attaching the adjective “cultural” to it defines its scope more precisely – it means 
we are talking about inherited things that have some cultural significance, where 
the term “cultural” is used both in its anthropological or sociological sense and 
also in its more specific artistic or aesthetic interpretation. Thus inherited rituals 
that help to define Australian identity – like Anzac Day, for example – are just 
as much a part of our cultural heritage as are historic buildings, artworks and so 
 
 
1 Fifty-first Joseph Fisher Lecture, 16 August 2006.
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on. Indeed it is helpful to distinguish clearly between tangible cultural heritage, 
existing as buildings, locations, precincts etc. or as paintings, sculptures or other 
artefacts, and intangible cultural heritage, comprising traditions, customs, beliefs 
etc. as well as artworks existing as public goods like literature or music. 
Thinking about cultural heritage inevitably draws us into contemplation 
of some of the most fundamental emotional and spiritual aspects of human 
experience – the power of place, for example, or the sense of continuity with the 
past provided by our cultural traditions, or the transcendental qualities of art – 
all these are essential ingredients of different items of heritage that make them 
relevant to our contemporary lives. And none of this seems to have anything much 
to do with economics. So what can economics contribute to an understanding 
of cultural heritage? Let us focus for purposes of illustration on the urban built 
environment.
A city like Adelaide has a rich urban heritage, comprising many nineteenth 
and twentieth century buildings and patterns of public and private land use 
that form essential ingredients of the urban fabric and help to give the city 
its distinctive identity. But Adelaide is also a modern city that is growing and 
changing. Decisions must constantly be made as to which old buildings are 
worth preserving and, for those to be kept, what sort of restoration, renovation or 
adaptive re-use is appropriate? Arguments for heritage preservation are generally 
based on historical, archaeological, artistic and cultural assessment; hence 
conservation decisions have in the past been largely the province of art historians, 
archaeologists, architects, urban planners, cultural theorists and others, either 
in their own right as cultural workers on heritage projects or as expert advisers 
to governments or other agencies. Yet it is undeniable that there are significant 
economic dimensions to heritage decisions, even if one uses the word “economic” 
simply to denote “financial”. Resources for the maintenance of heritage buildings 
and sites are by no means unlimited. Choices must often be made where the 
demands of cultural conservation conflict with those of economic development. 
Whatever financial revenues are brought in by new uses for old buildings, for 
example, must be offset against possible damage to culturally significant property. 
Such trade-offs are familiar territory to economists, so there are likely to be 
concepts and tools in the economist’s armoury that will be useful in looking at 
cultural heritage decisions.  
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What sorts of concepts can economists contribute to a discussion 
of heritage? To begin with, as any first-year student knows, the science of 
economics highlights the phenomenon of scarcity and the choices it necessitates. 
Accordingly, economists are inclined to point to the sobering fact of the scarcity 
of material and human resources available for allocation to heritage conservation. 
We cannot conserve everything and so choices must be made. Furthermore, 
resources are costly; if they are used for the maintenance and preservation of 
heritage they are not available for other uses, so they incur opportunity costs. 
The range of tangible and intangible costs that may be implicated in heritage 
decisions is extensive and multifaceted. And, in addition, economists are good 
at pointing out that the preferences of consumers matter; experts and enthusiasts 
may value a building or monument highly, but if it is to be restored using public 
funds, an economic analyst will pose the question as to whether those who pay 
(taxpayers) are willing to do so. A problem arises when taxpayers’ preferences 
are out of line with those of the heritage experts who are making decisions and 
spending money on their behalf.
Yet despite the obvious relevance of these sorts of simple economic 
concepts to an understanding of cultural heritage decisions, the initial efforts 
by economists a decade or so ago to enter the heritage arena were resented by 
heritage professionals, who feared a process whereby their “cultural” decisions 
would be inexorably transformed into “economic” decisions. These experts 
preferred in any case not to have to be worried by financial concerns, and were 
quite content to go on making their decisions on purely cultural grounds. Two 
things happened to change this state of affairs. First, shrinking budgets and 
tightened financial constraints on heritage managers around the world during 
the 1980s and 1990s meant they could no longer afford the luxury of assuming 
that money didn’t matter. Secondly, after a while conservationists began to realise 
that not all economists were the insensitive philistines of legend, but that they 
could bring to the table analytical methods that could actually help to achieve 
better conservation outcomes.
When applied to cultural heritage decisions, economics does what 
economics is good at:  it lays out the dimensions of a decision problem, identifying 
who the stakeholders are and how their interests are affected by the decision; it 
insists on defining objectives and constraints, in particular identifying potential 
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trade-offs when multiple objectives are involved; and it identifies the data needed 
to quantify the relationships between variables and to animate the economic 
discussion. All this it purports to do without imposing its own values; objective 
economic analysis accepts tastes and preferences as given and would not presume 
to assert preferences of its own. 
But wait a moment. Doesn’t this raise the old debate about whether or 
not economics is a value-free science? When an economist looks at heritage and 
analyses it in the above terms, isn’t she unconsciously imposing a set of values, 
the most obvious of which is that in assessing the value of alternative proposals 
before the decision-maker, a monetary yardstick is the appropriate one by which 
to calibrate the decision?  In short, isn’t the cultural professional’s fear justified 
after all, that the economic agenda will finally dominate? This is an issue that has 
been addressed directly in the economic theory of heritage. The question has been 
posed in the following terms: Is it possible that some values associated with culture 
generally, and with cultural heritage in particular, cannot be adequately captured 
within standard neo-classical economic models? In the discussion surrounding 
this question a new concept has emerged in economics, that of cultural capital.  
Economists look upon capital both as a store of value and as a long-
lasting asset that produces a stream of services over time. An item of cultural 
heritage, such as a historic building, can be thought of as just such an asset. 
But its distinguishing characteristic as a specifically cultural capital good is that 
it embodies or yields not only economic value through its financial worth and 
through the economic services it provides, but also cultural value through its 
historical or aesthetic significance and the cultural experiences it provides for the 
community. It is becoming increasingly apparent that the concept of cultural 
capital can be helpful in analysing heritage and in formulating heritage policy. 
This is so for at least four reasons.  
First, the phenomenon of “capital” is, as noted above, an important one in 
economics; defining heritage as capital enables the related concepts of depreciation, 
investment, rate of return etc. to be applied to the evaluation and management of 
heritage. In so doing one can open up a dialogue between heritage professionals 
whose job it is to care for cultural assets and economists who are concerned with 
the formulation of economic and cultural policy.  
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Second, the idea of cultural capital depends on articulating specific forms of 
value. In particular it draws attention to cultural value as something distinct from 
(though not altogether unrelated to) economic value. I return to the question of 
cultural value in more detail later.  
Third, since capital assets are long-lasting, the notion of cultural capital 
leads naturally to thinking about sustainability. We are now accustomed to 
speaking of environmentally or ecologically sustainable development as being a 
growth path for the economy that preserves the natural resources of the planet 
for future generations; in exactly the same way it is possible to speak of culturally 
sustainable development, meaning ways of safeguarding our cultural heritage for 
the benefit of our children and our children’s children. Neglect of cultural capital 
by allowing heritage to deteriorate, by failing to sustain the cultural values that 
provide people with a sense of identity, and by not undertaking the investment 
needed to maintain and increase the stock of both tangible and intangible cultural 
capital, will place cultural systems in jeopardy and may cause them to break down, 
with consequent loss of welfare and economic output.
Fourth, it is usual to apply economic appraisal methods such as cost-benefit 
analysis to public investment in capital assets. Defining heritage as cultural capital 
opens up possibilities for looking at heritage projects in similar cost-benefit 
terms. For example, an intervention involving expenditure of public or private 
funds can be seen as a capital investment project. In such a case, if the asset is 
a historic building or location and the “project” is the restoration, re-use or re-
development of the site, we can suggest that treating the cultural resource as an 
item or items of cultural capital enables the familiar tools of financial investment 
appraisal to be applied. But there is an important difference from “ordinary” cost-
benefit analysis: it is (or should be) the time stream of both economic and cultural 
value that is being evaluated and assessed. In other words, the identification of 
cultural value alongside the economic value generated by the project means that 
the economic evaluation can be augmented by a cultural appraisal carried out 
along the same lines, i.e. as an exercise comparing the discounted present value of 
the time-streams of net benefits with the initial capital costs.
Let us look more closely at these various dimensions of value when applied 
to a particular heritage project, beginning with the different types of economic 
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value the project might generate. Economic analysis applied to cultural heritage 
has drawn increasingly on concepts and methodologies developed by economists 
studying the economics of the environment. As with natural phenomena such 
as wilderness areas or marine parks, cultural heritage gives rise both to direct use 
values – reflected, for example, in the fees tourists pay to visit heritage sites – 
and indirect or passive use values. These non-use values may relate to the asset’s 
existence value (people value the existence of the heritage item even though they 
may not consume its services directly themselves); its option value (people wish to 
preserve the option that they or others might consume the asset’s services at some 
future time); and its bequest value (people may wish to bequeath the asset to future 
generations). These non-use values are not observable in market transactions, since 
no market exists on which the rights to them can be exchanged, so they have to 
be measured by special-purpose studies designed to gauge people’s willingness to 
pay to preserve the heritage asset in question using techniques such as contingent 
valuation methodology or choice modelling. Such methods allow us to gain some 
insight into the monetary values people place on these non-market benefits. For 
example, they provide data on the basis of which it is possible to estimate how 
much revenue might be raised if in fact the hypothetical willingness to pay were 
able to be converted into a real payment, or how much expenditure of public 
funds might be justified to secure these benefits for the community.
In a full-scale assessment of the economic value of a particular heritage 
project, these non-market effects are likely to be especially important. In many 
cases they may overshadow in monetary terms the direct revenue generated by 
the project, providing a justification in their own right for proceeding with it. For 
example, a recent willingness-to-pay study of the heritage benefits of preserving 
views of Stonehenge in England by building a tunnel under it instead of a surface 
road around it found that the heritage benefits alone justified the building of the 
tunnel because they exceeded the present value of construction and maintenance 
costs. Similarly a World Bank study of the non-market demand for the preservation 
of the historic town centre in Fez in Morocco found significant willingness to pay, 
sufficient to rationalise a tax on tourists to Morocco, including on those who do 
not actually visit Fez themselves.
The above economic values, both direct and indirect, are relatively easy 
to measure, at least in principle, because they can all ultimately be expressed in 
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monetary terms. Cultural value, on the other hand, has no ready-made unit of 
account.  In ordinary discourse, people often refer to the “cultural value” of a 
painting, a piece of music, or a historic building; by this they generally mean some 
notion of the cultural worth of the item which transcends a financial measure. 
But this vague notion is not much help for analytical purposes.  So is it possible 
to be more precise?
In fact, we can suggest that the composite notion of cultural value can be 
disaggregated into several constituent elements. Not all of them may be present in 
any particular case, and their significance may vary from one situation to another. 
Let us think of the cultural heritage item under consideration simply as “the site”. 
The principal components of cultural value can be listed as follows.
•	 Aesthetic value: The site may possess and display beauty in some fundamental 
sense, whether that quality is somehow intrinsic or whether it only comes 
into being in the consumption of it by the viewer. Under the general heading 
of aesthetic value we might also include the relationship of the site to the 
landscape in which it is situated, i.e. all the environmental qualities relevant 
to the site and its surroundings.
•	 Spiritual value: Spiritual value conveyed by the site may contribute to the 
sense of identity of the community as a whole and of the individuals living in 
or around the site, and of visitors to the site. It may provide them with a sense 
of cultural confidence and of connectedness between the local and the global, 
i.e. it may help to define the notion of human civilisation and the civilised 
society. The realisation that similar spiritual value is created by other sites in 
other communities may promote intercultural dialogue and understanding.
•	 Social value: The interpretation of culture as shared values and beliefs which 
bind groups together suggests that the social value of the heritage site might 
be reflected in the way in which its existence may contribute towards social 
stability and cohesion in the community. The site may impinge upon or 
interact with the way of living in the community, helping to identify the 
group values which make the community a desirable place in which to live 
and work.
•	 Historical value: This value, however it is received, is unarguably intrinsic to 
the site, and of all the components of cultural value it is probably the most 
readily identifiable in objective terms. Perhaps its principal benefit is seen in 
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the way in which historical value assists in defining identity, by providing a 
connectedness with the past and revealing the origins of the present.
•	 Symbolic value: The site may convey meaning and information which helps the 
community to interpret its identity and to assert its cultural personality. The 
value of the site as a representation of meaning may be particularly important 
in its educational function, not just for the young but for advancing the 
knowledge base and level of understanding of the whole community.
•	 Authenticity value: The site may be valued for its own sake because it is real, 
not false, and because it is unique. An important concomitant characteristic 
is integrity, variously defined in different circumstances; protection of the 
site’s integrity, however interpreted, may be a significant constraint imposed 
on project decision-making when cultural value is taken into account.
To illustrate these various elements of cultural value, consider the case of 
Uluru in central Australia. The cultural value of Uluru to both indigenous and 
non-indigenous Australians can be seen to comprise all six of these characteristics: 
it is a unique, beautiful and spiritual place, providing a sense of identity to both 
the traditional owners and to other Australians, with strong historical links and 
deep symbolic value within Aboriginal culture.  
Although these components of cultural value can be identified for a 
given site, measuring them or ranking them against alternative sites presents a 
considerable challenge. We urgently need clear and objective means of representing 
and measuring cultural value, so that it may be systematically taken into account 
alongside economic value in heritage decision-making processes.  
What can we say about the relationship between economic value and 
cultural value when both are defined in the above-mentioned terms? Because as 
a general rule the more highly people value things for cultural reasons, the more 
they will be willing to pay for them, we would expect some relationship between 
some aggregated measure of cultural value and the assessed economic value of a 
particular heritage asset or of the services the asset provides. Indeed, an appeal 
to the standard neo-classical economic model of individual utility maximisation 
might suggest that the relationship should be a perfect one, thus rendering a 
separate account of cultural value unnecessary. But broadening our view to a 
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more comprehensive notion of value would indicate that the correlation between 
economic and cultural value over a range of heritage items is not at all likely to 
be perfect, since there are some aspects of cultural value that cannot realistically 
be rendered in monetary terms. For example, it is simply not feasible to use a 
financial yardstick to express the value of a sense of cultural identity to individuals 
or communities, or the collective benefits of cultural diversity. So we must look 
to alternative metrics by which the elusive and multi-faceted concept of cultural 
value can be captured. It is pleasing to note that contemporary research in the 
economics of art and culture is beginning to throw some light on this question.  
Let us turn finally to the matter of heritage policy in Australia at the present 
time. The rich diversity of Australia’s cultural heritage takes many forms: the 
artefacts, traditions, rituals and stories belonging to the Indigenous people of 
this country; the significant repositories of moveable heritage contained in our 
art galleries and museums; the iconic buildings in our capital cities ranging from 
the earliest examples of colonial architecture to modern structures such as the 
Sydney opera House; and modest houses, streetscapes, rural outbuildings and so 
on that define local community identities across the land.  Some of this heritage is 
owned by Federal, State and local governments but much of it is in private hands. 
How can cultural policy help in its preservation, maintenance and enjoyment? 
As before, let us concentrate attention on the urban built heritage because, as 
it happens, this area has been the subject of a recent inquiry by the Federal 
Government’s Productivity Commission, which was charged last year with the 
task of examining the benefits and costs of conservation of the built heritage and 
making recommendations for policy.
The Productivity Commission has a reputation for applying the rigorous 
principles of free-market economics to government policy formulation. For 
heritage advocates, the prospect of this Inquiry when it was announced raised 
the spectre of an uncompromisingly commercial attitude to heritage on the part 
of the Commissioners appointed to the Inquiry. Yet in the Discussion Paper 
released as the Inquiry’s first step, full acknowledgement was made of the fact 
that substantial non-market benefits accrue to cultural heritage, and during the 
course of public hearings a sympathetic ear was turned to the many witnesses 
proclaiming the public benefits of heritage protection. Nevertheless, when the 
Draft Report was released in December 2005, the worst fears of the heritage sector 
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were confirmed. Although the Draft reiterated much of the case for dealing with 
the public-good benefits of heritage, its principal policy recommendation was for 
a system of voluntary negotiated agreements to replace the compulsory listing 
process that for decades has been the main regulatory means by which Australia, 
in common with most other countries, has safeguarded its built heritage assets.
The Commission’s proposal was based on the well-known Coase Theorem, 
that negotiated solutions over non-market effects will, under certain conditions, 
be economically efficient. The elegance and simplicity of the theorem, which 
helped win the Nobel Prize for Ronald Coase in 1991, appeals to economists. But 
like the theory of perfect competition, it depends for its application on a set of 
assumptions that are not often met in the real world. The Coase Theorem requires 
that:  interested parties can be defined and property rights assigned; transactions 
costs are negligible or zero; and contracts can be monitored and enforced. As 
the chorus of dissent that greeted the Draft Report made clear, none of these 
conditions could be adequately met by the Commission’s recommended course 
of action.
In the Inquiry’s Final Report, released just last month, the Commission 
has retreated somewhat from its draconian stance, preferring now to rely 
on “unreasonable costs” as a basis for allowing private owners to opt out of 
a statutory listing process.  This seems to me to be a rather slippery concept, 
strongly influenced by short-term financial exigency in circumstances where 
long-run considerations need to be taken into account. The owners of the Palace 
of Versailles, for example, could no doubt have pleaded “unreasonable costs” at 
various times in its history, had they been minded to replace it with something 
less expensive to maintain. This is not to deny the short-term hardships that may 
confront private property owners; rather it is to suggest a stronger assertion of 
the long-term public interest in providing appropriate assistance in such cases. I 
would suggest that a clearer understanding of cultural value would help in finding 
the right balance in heritage policy-making between the cultural and economic 
effects of heritage and hence between the public and the private interest. In fact 
the listing process implicitly recognises the primacy of cultural value as a basis for 




Indeed empirical evidence strongly suggests that any relaxation of present 
controls over heritage conservation would be quite contrary to the expressed 
preferences of the Australian population. Part of the documentation tendered to 
the Productivity Commission’s Inquiry was a report from the Allen Consulting 
Group, who carried out a choice modelling study of the demand for the public 
benefits of heritage in Australia at the present time, based on a random sample 
survey of just over two thousand respondents. This pioneering research showed 
that people have a very strong perception of the existence, option and bequest 
values of heritage; the results also indicated that cultural rather than economic 
motives underlay the public’s approval of government support for heritage 
conservation. In addition the study calculated willingness-to-pay estimates under 
a range of assumptions; these results suggested a significant demand for increased 
public funding for heritage protection over current levels. 
I want to make just two final points in relation to the Productivity 
Commission’s Report. First, criticism of the manner in which the Commission 
proposes to deal with “unreasonable costs” should not be allowed to obscure the 
reality of what this idea is trying to capture. As the Commission points out, much 
of Australia’s built heritage is in private hands, owned by firms and individuals 
who respect the cultural value of the property in their care and who reap private 
benefits from restoring and maintaining it, without the need for government 
assistance.  But for some owners the costs imposed by regulatory controls or 
simply by the physical task of restoration and repair are excessively burdensome 
in relation to the individual benefits the heritage bestows on them. In these 
circumstances – where in effect the benefits of preservation are substantially public 
rather than private – it is appropriate that public assistance should be provided 
if the size of the public benefit warrants it. The difficulty then is assessment of 
the extent of public benefit involved, since even with a more generous financial 
contribution from the public sector, not all old buildings can be preserved. Present 
processes for assessing public value lack common standards across jurisdictions, 
and their implementation is often inadequately resourced. Policy prescriptions 
could focus on improving these processes. Furthermore a stronger recognition 
of the precautionary principle is required, whereby irreversible decisions (e.g. 
demolition) are taken only under extreme risk-averse conditions. Again, the 
policy recommendation should be pointing to sharpened techniques of value 
assessment at all levels of government in the application of regulatory controls.
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The second point concerns funding. The Productivity Commission declined 
the opportunity to recommend either increased funding or potential sources of 
extra finance. The Commissioners’ unwillingness to engage in what is essentially a 
political matter is perhaps understandable. Nevertheless it needs to be pressed that 
a ready source of increased federal funding is in fact available, namely the Natural 
Heritage Trust. The Trust was set up by the Commonwealth in 1997 to help 
restore and conserve Australia’s environmental and natural resources. Allowing 
cultural heritage projects access to the regional and national investment programs 
provided by the Trust could readily be accommodated without compromising the 
Trust’s environmental activities and would, according to the Allen’s survey results, 
be fully in line with consumer preferences. 
To conclude, let me return to Joseph Fisher whose benign ghost haunts 
these scholarly corridors. What would he have made of the Productivity 
Commission’s Draft or Final Reports? This is not an easy question to answer 
because, alongside his championing of the public interest, he was also impatient 
with unnecessary government interference; indeed he made his donation to the 
University of Adelaide four years before his death in order to avoid the 10 per 
cent succession duty which he described as “an unjust and unwise exaction … 
tending to check the flow of public spirited benevolence”. But therein lies the 
clue perhaps. It is through “public spirited benevolence”, whether exercised by 
enlightened philanthropists or by governments on behalf of all of us, that our 
cultural heritage can best be protected, preserved and enhanced, for the benefit of 
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Globalization and the  
Great Divergence in the long run
Jeffrey G. Williamson1
The economic impact of the industrializing core on the poor periphery during the 
century before 1870 was carried by four dramatic global events: a world transport 
revolution, a liberal policy move in industrial Europe towards greater openness, 
an acceleration in GDP growth rates associated with the industrial revolution, 
and colonialism. The transport revolution in seaborne trade connecting ports and 
in the railroads connecting ports to interiors helped integrate world commodity 
markets (o’Rourke and Williamson 1999, Ch. 3; Shah Mohammed and 
Williamson 2004; Williamson 2005, Chs. 2 and 3). While the previous literature 
may have exaggerated the impact of a transport revolution on ocean trade routes 
(Jacks 2006; Jacks and Pendakur 2007), it certainly did not overestimate the 
impact of the railroads on land routes (Keller and Shiue 2007). Since falling trade 
costs from all sources accounted for more than half of the trade boom between 
 
 
1 This paper is a revised version of the Joseph Fisher Lecture presented at the University 
of Adelaide, 10 April 2008. A variant of it was also presented as the John Hicks Lecture, 
University of oxford, 27 May 2008 which was subsequently published as “Globalization 
and the Great Divergence: Terms of Trade Booms and Volatility in the Poor Periphery 1782-
1913,” European Review of Economic History 12(3): 355-91, December 2008. I gratefully 
acknowledge help with the data from Lety Arroyo Abad, Luis Bértola, Luis Catão, David 
Clingingsmith, Aurora Gómez Galvarriato, Rafa Dobado González, Hilary Williamson 
Hoynes, Gregg Huff, Pedro Lains, Kevin o’Rourke, Leandro Prados de la Escosura, Amy 
Williamson Shaffer, Tarik Yousef, and audience responses at the University of Adelaide, the 
Australian National University and oxford University. I also acknowledge comments from 
Albrecht Ritschl, as well as the excellent research assistance of Janet He and Taylor owings, 
and financial support from the Harvard Faculty of Arts and Sciences. The sources of data 
are laid out in the Appendix to the NBER Working Paper version (Williamson 2008, see 
www.nber.org/papers/w13841).
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1870 and 1914 (Jacks et al. 2008: 529), it must have accounted for even more 
than that before 1870 when the fall in transport costs was more rapid and the 
move to free trade was in full swing. In any case, it is clear that falling trade 
costs played a major role in fueling the trade boom between core and periphery, 
and that it created commodity price convergence for tradable goods between 
all world markets. By raising every country’s export prices and lowering every 
country’s import prices, it also contributed to a rise in every country’s external 
terms of trade, especially, as it turned out, in the periphery. The move by the 
European industrial core toward more liberal commercial policy (Estevadeordal et 
al. 2003), a commitment to the gold standard (Meissner 2005) and perhaps even 
imperialism itself (Ferguson 2004; Mitchener and Weidenmier 2007) all made 
additional contributions to the world trade boom. 
The accelerating growth in world GDP, led by industrializing Europe and 
its offshoots, was the second force driving the trade boom before 1870. The 
derived demand for industrial intermediates – like fuels, fibers, and metals –
soared as manufacturing production led the way. Thus, as the European core 
and their offshoots raised industrial output shares, manufacturing output growth 
raced ahead of GDP growth. Rapid manufacturing productivity growth lowered 
their costs and prices in the core, and by so doing generated a soaring derived 
demand for raw material intermediates. This event was reinforced in the core 
by accelerating GDP per capita growth and a high income elasticity of demand 
for luxury consumption goods, like meat, dairy products, fruit, tea, and coffee. 
Since industrialization was driven by unbalanced productivity advance favoring 
manufacturing relative to agriculture and other natural-resource based activities 
(Clark et al. 2008), the relative price of manufactures fell everywhere, including 
the poor periphery where they were imported. 
All three forces – liberal trade policy, transport revolutions and fast 
manufacturing-led growth – produced a positive, powerful and sustained terms 
of trade boom in the primary-product-producing periphery, an event that 
stretched over almost a century. As we shall see, some parts of the periphery had 
much greater terms of trade booms than others, and some reached a secular peak 
earlier than others, but all (except China and Cuba) underwent a secular terms of 
trade boom. Factor supply responses facilitated the periphery’s response to these 
external demand shocks, carried by South-South migrations from labor abundant 
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(especially China and India) to labor scarce regions within the periphery, and by 
financial capital flows from the industrial core (especially Britain) to those same 
regions. That is, countries in the periphery increasingly specialized in one or two 
primary products, reduced their production of manufactures, and imported them 
in exchange.  
Let me rephrase these events in a different way. Whether culture, geography 
or institutions, western Europe launched modern economic growth first, carried 
by rising productivity growth rates, especially in manufacturing. The economic 
leaders had to share these productivity gains with the rest of the world by absorbing 
a decline in the price of their manufactured exports. To the extent that the leaders 
could retain some of the productivity advance for themselves, and to the extent 
that the productivity advance also took place in their big non-tradable sectors, 
the terms of trade effect was hardly a big enough transfer for the periphery to 
keep up with the core. Even though trade made it possible for the periphery to 
share some of the fruits of the industrial revolution taking place in the core, an 
industrialization-driven Great Divergence still emerged. To add to the forces of 
divergence, globalization fostered de-industrialization (e.g. specialization) in the 
periphery so that, according to modern theory, growth rates in the periphery 
fell behind those in the core still further. In addition, globalization-induced 
specialization in primary products must have meant greater price volatility in 
the periphery, and thus, according to modern theory, even greater divergence in 
growth rates.   
Eventually all these global forces abated. A protectionist backlash swept over 
continental Europe and Latin America (Williamson 2006a). The rate of decline 
in real transport costs along sea lanes slowed down before World War I, and then 
stabilized for the rest of the 20th century (Hummels 1999; Shah Mohammed and 
Williamson 2004). Most of the railroad networks were completed before 1913. 
The rate of growth of manufacturing slowed down in the core as the transition 
to industrial maturity was completed there. As these forces abated, the resulting 
slowdown in primary product demand growth was reinforced by resource-saving 
innovations in the industrial core, induced, in large part, by those high and rising 
primary product prices during the century-long terms of trade boom. Thus, the 
secular boom faded, eventually turning into a 20th century secular bust during 
the interwar slowdown and the great depression of the 1930s. Exactly when and 
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where the boom turned to bust depended, as we shall see, on export commodity 
specialization, but the terms of trade peaked somewhere between 1860 and 1913 
throughout the poor periphery. Typically, that peak occurred very early in that 
half century, rather than late, most often between the 1870s and 1890s. To repeat, 
the terms of trade in the periphery peaked long before the crash of the 1930s, in 
some cases seven decades earlier.
This Lecture reports this terms of trade experience for 21 countries located 
everywhere around the poor periphery except sub-Saharan Africa (where the 
data are missing): the European periphery 1782-1913 (Italy, Portugal, Russia, 
Spain), Latin America 1782-1913 (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Mexico, 
Venezuela), the Middle East 1796-1913 (Egypt, ottoman Turkey, Levant), South 
Asia 1782-1913 (Ceylon, India), Southeast Asia 1782-1913 (Indonesia, Malaya, 
the Philippines, Siam), and East Asia 1782-1913 (China, Japan). I focus on the 
19th century secular boom since so much has already been written about the 
subsequent 20th century bust, the latter triggered by the writings of Raul Prebisch 
(1950) and Hans Singer (1950) more than a half century ago. Furthermore, I 
focus on the period from the 1780s to the 1870s, after which the boom had 
pretty much run its course. This focus is in sharp contrast with that of W. Arthur 
Lewis whose famous writings in the 1970s (Lewis 1978a, 1978b) dealt almost 
exclusively with the 1870-1913 period. I argue here that his new international 
economic order had been established long before the late 19th century. Indeed, 
there were signs of a retreat from Lewis’s new international economic order 
between the 1870s and WWI.  I also argue that the secular terms of trade boom 
must have contributed far more to the Great Divergence before 1870 than after. 
Having established that the secular terms of trade boom in the periphery led to 
de-industrialization, slow growth and GDP per capita divergence between it and 
the core, I then measure the extent to which terms of trade volatility did the same. 
Terms of trade volatility was much greater in the poor periphery than in the rich 
core between 1820 and World War I. Since modern development economists 
have established that volatility retards growth, and since external price volatility 
in the poor periphery was far greater before 1870 than at any time between 1870 
and 1940, I argue that these forces must have contributed even more to the Great 




All economic historians agree that a wide income gap between the rich European 
core and the poor periphery opened up before 1913. Economic historians do not 
agree, however, as to when it opened up, and why. My purpose is not to engage in 
the when debate, but rather only to remind us just how much the periphery lagged 
behind during this first global century, and to suggest how importantly globalization 
forces are likely to have contributed to it. Table 52.1 uses Angus Maddison’s (1995) 
GDP per capita estimates to document the Great Divergence after 1820, and real 
wage data are used to extend his series backwards to 1775. Between 1775 and 1913, 
the economic gap between core and periphery widened greatly: Southern Europe 
income per capita fell from 75.2 to 47.3 percent of Western Europe, so the gap rose 
from about 25 to 53 percent; the Eastern Europe gap rose from 30 to 58 percent; 
Latin America from about 25 to 59 percent; Asia from about 44 to 80 percent; and 
Africa from about 54 to 85 percent. Note that the gap rose much more before 1870 
than after: on average, the poor periphery gap rose by about 27 percentage points 
up to 1870, but only by about 5 percentage points thereafter. Thus, Table 1 informs 
us that the forces causing the Great Divergence were never constant, but rather that 
they were much greater before 1870 than after.
I stress the point that the Great Divergence was much more dramatic 
before 1870 than after since it is consistent with the fact that globalization-
induced terms of trade forces in the poor periphery – to be discussed below – 
were also much more powerful before 1870 than after. Furthermore, the modern 
debate over ‘fundamental’ growth determinants like culture (Landes 1998; Clark 
2007), geography (Diamond 1997; Sachs 2001; Easterly and Levine 2003), and 
institutions (North and Weingast 1989; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2005) 
in contributing to the Great Divergence cannot speak to variance in its intensity 
over time. Indeed, William Easterly and his collaborators (1993) pointed out 
some time ago that the contending ‘fundamental’ growth determinants – culture, 
geography, and institutions – exhibit far more historical persistence than the late 
20th century growth rates they are supposed to explain. What is true for the late 
20th century is even truer for the 19th century. Since globalization forces were 
variable between 1782 and 1913 while the fundamentals were not, the former 
have a much better chance of explaining the timing and magnitude of the Great 
Divergence than the latter.  
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Table 52.1:  The Great Divergence: Income per capita gaps 1775-1913
1775 1820 1870 1913
Western Europe 100 100 100 100
Southern Europe 75.2 62.4 52.7 47.3
Eastern Europe 70.0 58.1 48.8 42.0
Latin America 75.2 55.3 37.9 40.9
Asia 56.4 42.6 27.5 20.0
Africa 46.1 34.8 22.7 15.5
Poor periphery average 64.6 50.6 37.9 33.1
Notes and sources 1820-1913: The underlying data are GDP per capita in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars, 
and from Maddison (1995): Table E-3. 
Notes and sources 1775: The projection backwards to 1775 is based on unskilled real daily wages, and is 
an 1750-1799 average. The southern and eastern Europe trends 1775-1820 are assumed to be the same, 
and the African trend 1775-1820  is assumed to replicate Asia. For Europe and Asia (India); Broadberry 
and Gupta (2006): Table 1, Panel A; Table 6, Panel B. For Latin America (Mexico); Dobado, Gómez and 
Williamson (2008): Appendix Table. The poor periphery average is unweighted.
The secular terms of trade boom in the poor periphery 1782-1913
At the outset, a brief commentary is warranted on the heterogeneous character 
and limitations of the net barter terms of trade data that underlie the analysis. 
Twenty-one important regions in the periphery offer terms of trade estimates 
from points well before 1865, some deep into the 18th century, thus covering the 
era prior to the mid-late nineteenth century when, typically, the relative price of 
primary products reached their peak. In every case but Argentina and Mexico, 
these new series are taken up to 1913 and replace the 1865-1939 series used 
previously in my work with Chris Blattman and Jason Hwang (hereafter BHW; 
Blattman et al. 2007). For Argentina and Mexico, the new series are linked to the 
BHW series at 1870. 
For the purposes of this Lecture, the best measure of the terms of trade is to 
construct a weighted average of export and import prices quoted in local markets, 
including home import duties, thus capturing the impact of relative prices on the 
local market. The weights, of course, should be constructed from the export and 
import commodity mix for the country in question. Unfortunately, the data are 
sometimes unavailable for such estimates – what I call in the worst case scenario. 
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It is easy enough even in those cases to get the export prices (and the weights) 
for every region in our sample. However, these prices are rarely quoted in the 
local market, but rather in destination ports, like London or New York. To the 
extent that transport revolutions caused price convergence between exporter and 
importer, export prices quoted in core import markets will understate the rise 
in the periphery country’s terms of trade. on this score alone, any boom in a 
periphery country terms of trade, where it is based on the worst case scenario 
estimation, was actually somewhat bigger than that measured. However, since 
the terms of trade booms are, as we shall see, so big, these worst case scenario 
flaws on the export side are unlikely to matter much for the analysis. Things are 
a bit less accommodating on the import side in the worst case scenario. As with 
export prices in the worst case scenario, import prices are also taken from export 
markets in the industrial core. Since transport revolutions reduced freight costs 
on the outward leg from the industrial core much less (they were high value, 
low bulk products: see Shah Mohammed and Williamson 2004), the periphery 
import price estimates are less flawed in the worst case scenario than are the export 
price estimates. The more serious problem on the import side is the difficulty of 
documenting the import mix for many of the periphery countries, especially as 
we move earlier in the 19th century. The appendix to Williamson (2008) describes 
the proxies used to solve this worse case scenario problem. Having pointed out 
the flaws in the worst case scenario, it should be stressed that there are only 6 of 
these (out of 21).2
2 The following 15 are taken from country-specific sources which do an excellent job in constructing 
estimates which come close to the ideal measure: Argentina 1810-1870 (Newland 1998), Brazil 1826-
1913 (Prados de la Escosura 2006), Chile 1810-1913 (Braun et al. 2000), Cuba 1826-1913 (Prados de 
la Escosura 2006), Egypt 1796-1913 (Williamson and Yousef 2008), India 1800-1913 (Clingingsmith 
and Williamson 2005), Indonesia 1825-1913 (Korthals 1994), Japan 1857-1913 (Miyamoto et al. 
1965; Yamazawa and Yamamoto 1979), Levant 1839-1913 (Issawi 1988), Malaya 1882-1913 (Huff and 
Caggiano 2007), Mexico 1751-1870 (Dobado et al. 2008), ottoman Turkey 1800-1913 (Pamuk and 
Williamson 2008), Portugal 1842-1913 (Lains 1995), Spain 1750-1913 (see Appendix to Williamson 
2008), and Venezuela 1830-1913 (Baptista 1997). The worst case scenarios apply to Italy 1817-1913 
(Glazier et al. 1975) and the remaining five (see Appendix to Williamson 2008): Ceylon 1782-1913, 
China 1782-1913, the Philippines 1782-1913, Russia 1782-1913, and Siam 1782-1913.
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The big picture: Stability, boom and bust
Although the number of countries underlying the poor periphery average is 
limited for most of the 18th century3,  what we do have reveals no trend in the 
net barter terms of trade, that is, in the ratio of the poor periphery’s average 
export price to its average import price. The averages are calculated so that the 
price of each commodity exported or imported is weighted by the importance of 
that traded commodity in the country’s total exports or imports. Furthermore, 
the poor periphery average is calculated using fixed country 1870 population 
weights. The resulting series plotted in Figure 52.1 is waiting for the industrial 
revolution, the transport revolution, peace in Europe, liberal trade policy, and a 
world trade boom.
Figure 52.1:  18th Century terms of trade secular stability in the poor periphery
Figure 52.2 describes quite a different century. Excluding China and the 
rest of East Asia (more on that below), the terms of trade in the poor periphery 
soared from the late 18th century to the late 1880s and early 1890s, after which it 
underwent a decline up to 1913, before starting the interwar collapse about which 
so much has been written. The timing and the magnitude of the boom up to the 
 
3 Until the 1780s, I have only been able to find long time series on the terms of trade in the poor periphery 
for Mexico and Spain. See Appendix to Williamson (2008), Part 2.
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late 1860s and early 1870s pretty much replicates – but in the opposite direction 
– the decline in the British terms of trade over the same period. The secular price 
boom was huge in the poor periphery: between the half-decades 1796-1800 and 
1856-1860, the terms of trade increased by almost two and a half times, or at an 
annual rate of 1.5 percent, a rate which was vastly greater than per capita income 
growth in the poor periphery (0.1 percent per annum, Asia 1820-1870; Maddison 
1995: p. 24), and even greater than per capita income growth in Britain (1.2 
percent per annum, United Kingdom 1820-1870: Maddison 1995; p. 23). 
Figure 52.2: United Kingdom versus the poor periphery: Net barter terms of   
trade 1796-1913
A rise in the primary-product specializing country’s terms of trade implied, 
of course, a fall in the relative price of imported manufactures. And the decline in 
that price implied de-industrialization. When Lewis published his now-famous 
The Evolution of the International Economic Order in 1978 (based on his 1977 
Janeway Lectures), he placed his emphasis on “the second half of the nineteenth 
century” (1978a: p. 14). But if we are looking for Dutch disease forces which 
caused de-industrialization in the poor periphery – the same forces that helped 
create Lewis’ new international economic order, the century before 1870 is the 
place to look, not after.  
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Chinese and East Asian exceptionalism
Not every part of the poor periphery followed the average since what a region 
traded mattered.4 The best example of this is the biggest country in our sample, 
China. Figure 52.3 plots the terms of trade for China, for the poor periphery with 
East Asia (and thus China 5) included, and for the poor periphery without it. The 
difference is astounding. First, China did not undergo a terms of trade boom over 
the century before 1913, but rather underwent a secular slump. Second, as the 
rest of the periphery began the boom between 1796 and 1821, China underwent 
its first big collapse, with its terms of trade falling to one-fifth (sic!) of the 1796 
level. Third, when China finally joined the boom taking place in the rest of the 
periphery, it was very brief since its terms of trade peaked out much earlier than 
the rest, in 1840 after only a two decade boom. Following the early 1860s, China 
underwent the same slow secular decline in its terms of trade that was common 
across much of the poor periphery.6 China’s terms of trade exceptionalism is, of 
course, driven by its unusual country-specific mix of imports and exports. on 
the import side, what distinguished China from the rest of the periphery was 
opium. The price of imported opium rose sharply from the 1780s to the 1820s 
and it maintained those high (but volatile) levels until the 1880s (Clingingsmith 
and Williamson 2008).7 Since opium imports rose from about 30 to 50 percent 
of total Chinese imports over the period, the rise in the opium price helped push 
China’s terms of trade downwards, and in a direction opposite to that of the rest of 
the periphery. Reinforcing that secular fall in China’s terms of trade, was the fact 
that it also exported the “wrong” products since the price of silk, cotton and tea all 
fell dramatically over the century between the 1780s and 1880s, by 60, 71 and 79 
percent, respectively (Mulhall 1892; pp. 471-8).8 Chinese exceptionalism indeed!
4  Carlos Diaz-Alejandro (1984) made this point some time ago, and called it the “commodity 
lottery.” 
5 The other member of the East Asian sample is Japan, but it does not enter the sample until 1857. Thus, 
all of the differences between the series with and without East Asia can be attributed to China before 
the late 1850s. In the second half of the century, the population weight for China is so huge, China still 
dominates the East Asian terms of trade trends.
6 It should be noted that one other country, Cuba, showed “exceptional” terms of trade experience. The 
Cuban terms of trade are not plotted in Figure 6, but it fell by 49 percent between 1826 and 1860, and 
by 50 percent up to 1885-1890. The source of the decline lay, of course, with sugar prices. 
7 I am not suggesting here that the price of opium was exogenous to the Chinese market. Indeed, rising 
Chinese demand helped account for the price boom.
8 To repeat the previous footnote, I am not suggesting that the price of silk and tea were exogenous to 
China. Indeed, China was a major supplier of both to world markets
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Figure 52.3: Chinese exceptionalism: Net barter terms of trade in the poor   
periphery 1796-1913 with and without East Asia
While China was certainly big enough to dominate East Asian trends, 
it should be pointed out that Japan was exceptional as well. First, it remained 
closed to world trade until 1857, so that there is no terms of trade trend worth 
reporting up to that time. Second, when Japan was forced to go open by American 
gunships, it underwent the biggest terms of trade boom by far, just when the rest 
of the poor periphery had pretty much completed its secular boom. East Asian 
exceptionalism indeed. 
Poor periphery variance around the average
While each region in the poor periphery had much the same import mix (except 
for China and its opium), they had very different export mixes. Endowments and 
comparative advantage dictated the export mix, and different commodity price 
behavior implied different magnitudes during the secular boom, as well as different 
timing in its peak. Figures 52.4-10 document terms of trade performance in each 
of the six poor periphery regions, some starting as early as 1782. The regional 
time series are constructed as a fixed 1870 population weighted average of the 
52 Globalization and the Great Divergence in the long run
552
region’s countries (listed above: the European Periphery four, the Latin American 
eight, the Middle East three, the South Asian two, the Southeast Asian four, and 
the East Asian two). Table 52.2 and Figure 52.4 summarize the magnitude of the 
boom and its length (or peak) by region and by major country members, making 
a comparative assessment possible.
Table 52.2: Terms of trade boom across the poor periphery: Timing and 
magnitude
Region Starting year in 
the series
Peak year Annual growth 
rate between 
half-decades 





start to 1886-90 
(%)
All periphery excl. EA 1796 1860 1.431 0.726
European periphery 1782 1855 2.434 1.234
Latin America 1782 1895 0.873 0.851
Middle East 1796 1857 1.683 0.872
South Asia 1782 1861 0.904 0.037
Southeast Asia 1782 1896 1.423 1.423
East Asia 1782 None NA -2.119
European periphery 1782 1855 2.434 1.234
Italy 1817 1855 3.619 0.697
Russia 1782 1855 2.475 1.335
Spain 1782 1879 1.505 1.264
Latin America 1782 1895 0.873 0.851
Argentina 1811 1909 1.165 1.284
Brazil 1826 1894 1.115 1.067
Chile 1810 1906 0.966 0.140
Cuba 1826 None NA -1.803
Mexico 1782 1878 1.096 0.989
Venezuela 1830 1895 0.692 0.677
Middle East 1796 1857 1.683 0.872
Egypt 1796 1865 2.721 1.571
ottoman Turkey 1800 1857 2.548 1.233
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Table 52.2: Terms of trade boom across the poor periphery: Timing and 
magnitude cont.
Region Starting year in 
the series
Peak year Annual growth 
rate between 
half-decades 





start to 1886-90 
(%)
South Asia 1800 1861 0.904 0.037
Ceylon 1782 1874 0.670 0.366
India 1800 1861 0.932 0.024
Southeast Asia 1782 1896 1.423 1.423
Indonesia 1825 1896 3.294 3.335
Philippines 1782 1857 1.480 0.720
Siam 1800 1857 1.534 0.397
East Asia 1782 None NA -2.119
China 1782 None NA -2.342
Notes: The following countries are excluded from the table’s detail since their series begin too late 
(starting date in parentheses): Portugal (1842); Columbia (1865), Peru (1865), Venezuela (1830); Levant 
(1839); Malaysia (1882); and Japan (1857). These country observations were used, however, when 
constructing the regional aggregates and the All Periphery aggregate. Where it says “start”, the calculation 
is the average of the first five years. Where it says “peak”, the calculation is for the five years centered on 
the peak year. The regional and all the periphery averages are weighted by 1870 population.
Figure 52.4: The poor periphery: Net barter terms of trade 1796-1913
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European Poor Periphery 1782-1913. Figure 52.4, Figure 52.5 and Table 
52.2 suggest that the shape of the secular boom and bust in the European 
periphery was pretty much like that of the overall poor periphery average, with 
peaks very close together (1855 versus 1860). However, the magnitude of the 
booms certainly differed. The terms of trade boom in the European periphery 
was much greater than the average (2.4 versus 1.4 percent per annum), especially 
for Italy and Russia. This was also true of the century-long boom up to 1885-90 
(1.2 versus 0.7 percent per annum). As we suggest below, these powerful Dutch 
disease effects may help explain why the industrial revolution was slow to spread 
from the core to the European east and south.
Figure 52.5: European poor periphery: Net barter terms of trade 1782-1913
Latin America 1782-1913. Figure 52.4, Figure 52.6 and Table 52.2 report 
that Latin America also deviated significantly from the poor periphery average, 
but on the down side. The terms of trade boom up to 1860 was much more 
modest in Latin America. Indeed, there was very little change at all in the Latin 
American terms of trade between about 1830 and 1870. At least the new Latin 
America republics did not have to deal with global de-industrialization forces 
during their ‘lost decades’ of poor growth when violence and political instability 
was already doing enough economic damage (Bates, Coatsworth and Williamson 
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2007; Williamson 2007). Still, the Latin American terms of trade boom lasted far 
longer (1895) than was true for the average periphery region (1860), more than 
three decades longer. The more modest early boom in Latin America and its great 
length about balanced out, such that the century-long boom was much the same 
as in the average poor periphery region (0.9 versus 0.7 percent per annum up 
to 1885-90). To summarize, de-industrialization forces were very weak in Latin 
America during its lost decades, when they were strong everywhere else in the poor 
periphery; and they were very strong during its belle époque,9 when they were 
weak everywhere else in the poor periphery.  
Figure 52.6: Latin America: Net barter terms of trade 1782-1913 
Middle East 1796-1913. Figure 52.4, Figure 52.7 and Table 52. 2 document 
that the terms of trade facing the Middle East was pretty much like it was for the 
average poor periphery: the peak was about the same (1857 versus 1860), and the 
magnitude of the boom was similar (1.7 versus 1.4 percent per annum), although 
it was much more dramatic for Egypt and ottoman Turkey (2.7 and 2.5 percent 
per annum) than it was in the Levant.10 The magnitude of the century-long boom 
9 Mexico is an exception. See Dobado, Gómez and Williamson (2008 forthcoming) and Williamson 
(2007).
10 Levant is not shown in Table 2, since the series starts only with 1839.
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to 1885-90 was also similar between the Middle East and the periphery average 
(0.9 versus 0.7 percent per annum). In terms of the globalization price shock, 
the Middle East therefore seems to have been the most representative of the poor 
periphery. 
Figure 52.7: Middle East: Net barter terms of trade 1796-1913
South Asia 1782-1913. our South Asia sample has only two observations, 
Ceylon and India, but the latter is so large that the South Asian weighted average 
lies on top of the India series in Figure 52.8. Like Latin America, India (and thus 
South Asia) had very weak terms of trade boom up to mid-century.11 The South 
Asian and the average periphery terms of trade (still excluding East Asia) peaked 
only one year apart (1861 versus 1860), but beyond that similarity there are only 
differences. The boom in South Asia up to 1861 was far weaker than the average 
(0.9 versus 1.4 percent per annum), and this was even more true over the century 
to 1885-1890 (no growth versus 0.7 percent per annum). Indeed, all of that early 
11  one explanation for the weak terms of trade boom is that India remained a gross (but not a net) 
exporter of cotton goods even when British factory textiles flooded India’s domestic economy. Since 
cotton textiles influenced India’s export prices, and since the latter were falling dramatically up to 1850, 




growth in India’s terms of trade took place up to the 1820s; after that decade, 
India exhibited great volatility (like the spike up to 1861) but no secular growth 
whatsoever. And, to repeat, there was no growth at all in India’s terms of trade 
between 1800 and 1890. Like China, India was exceptional, an especially ironic 
finding given that the literature on 19th century de-industrialization in British 
India has been the most copious and contentious by far, starting with the words 
of Karl Marx about the bones of the weavers bleaching on the plains of India (Roy 
2000, 2002; Clingingsmith and Williamson 2008).
Figure 52.8: South Asia: Net barter terms of trade 1782-1913
Southeast Asia 1782-1913. Like Latin America, the terms of trade boom 
in Southeast Asia persisted much longer, in this case to 1896, and the size of the 
century-long boom up to 1885-90 was much greater (1.4 versus 0.7 percent per 
annum). Yet, there was immense variance within the region (Figure 52.9), much 
more than elsewhere in the poor periphery. For example, the terms of trade for 
Siam grew at only 0.4 percent per annum over the century up to 1885-90, but it 
grew almost twice as fast in the Philippines (0.7 percent per annum), and more 
than eight times as fast in Indonesia (3.3 percent per annum). Due to its size, the 
latter dominates the regional weighted average.
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Figure 52.9: Southeast Asia: Net barter terms of trade 1782-1913
Figure 52.10: East Asia: Net barter terms of trade 1782-1913
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East Asia 1782-1913. We have already discussed Chinese exceptionalism, 
but Figure 52.10 also highlights Japan’s unusual experience. That is, after being 
forced by American gunboat diplomacy to go open in 1857 – after centuries of 
autarchy, Japan underwent a textbook response (Bernhofen and Brown 2005): 
the price of importables collapsed, and the price of exportables soared. Thus, the 
terms of trade improved, and by a factor of six or more (sic!) between 1857 and 
1913 (Huber 1971; Yasuba 1996). 
The impact of the terms of trade on the Great Divergence: 
Argument and post-1870 evidence
How did secular change and volatility of the terms of trade impact economic 
growth before 1913? Was the impact asymmetric between rich core and poor 
periphery? Can the behavior of the terms of trade in the poor periphery help 
explain the GDP per capita divergence over the long 19th century?
Chris Blattman, Jason Hwang and myself (Blattman, Hwang and 
Williamson 2007) recently used a 35 country data base to explore these 
questions for the 1870-1939 period. The sample contained 14 from the rich 
core and 21 from the poor periphery, and it covered about 90 percent of world 
population in 1900. The impact of secular change and volatility in the terms 
of trade was reported separately for the core and periphery, making it possible 
to test for the presence of any asymmetric impact between them. Asymmetry 
regarding secular impact was predicted by the following reasoning. To the 
extent that the periphery specialized in primary products, and to the extent 
that industry is a carrier of development, then positive price shocks reinforced 
specialization and caused de-industrialization in the periphery, offsetting 
partially or totally the short run income gains yielded by the terms of trade 
improvement and the trade response. However, there should have been no such 
offset in the industrial core, but rather a reinforcement, since specialization in 
industrial products would have been strengthened there by any improvement 
in the terms of trade. Thus, the prediction was that while a secular terms of 
trade improvement unambiguously raised growth rates in the industrial core, 
it raised them less in the periphery, or not at all. The asymmetry hypothesis 
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was strongly supported by evidence covering the seven decades after 1870. The 
core benefited from a secular increase in its terms of trade since it reinforced 
comparative advantage there, helped stimulate additional industrialization, 
thus augmenting growth-induced spillovers. That is, dynamic effects reinforced 
static effects. The fact that the periphery, in contrast, did not benefit when the 
terms of trade rose over the long term, or suffer when it fell, appears to confirm 
some dynamic offset to more conventional static gains from trade. The place 
to look for the source of dynamic asymmetry between secular impact on core 
and periphery is likely to be de-industrialization. However, since the secular 
terms of trade in the poor periphery had already reached its peak between the 
1870s and the 1890s, there was hardly any terms of trade boom left to make a 
contribution to divergence in the half century before World War II. However, 
there was such a boom before 1870.
We expected the same asymmetry with respect to terms of trade volatility 
given that ‘insurance’ was cheaper and more widely available in the core. 
Modern observers regularly point to terms of trade shocks as a key source 
of macroeconomic instability in commodity-specialized countries, but, until 
very recently, they paid far less attention to the long run growth implications 
of such instability.12 Most theories stress the investment channel in looking 
for connections between terms of trade instability and growth. Indeed, the 
development literature offers abundant modern microeconomic evidence 
linking income volatility to lower investment in both physical and human 
capital. Households imperfectly protected from risk change their income-
generating activities in the face of income volatility, diversifying towards low-risk 
alternatives with lower average returns (Dercon 2004; Fafchamps 2004), as well 
as to lower levels of investment (Rosenweig and Wolpin 1993). Furthermore, 
severe cuts in health and education follow negative shocks to household income 
in poor countries—cuts that disproportionately affect children and hence long 
term human capital accumulation (Jensen 2000; Jacoby and Skoufias 1997; 
Frankenburg et al. 1999; Thomas et al. 2004).
12 For important early exceptions, see Mendoza (1997), Deaton and Miller (1996), Kose and Reizman 
(2001), Bleaney and Greenway (2001) and Hadass and Williamson (2003). I review the more recent 
(booming) literature below in the text.
Jeffrey G. Williamson
 561
Poor households find it difficult to smooth their expenditures in the face of 
shocks because they are rationed in credit and insurance markets, so they lower 
investment and take fewer risks with what remains. Poor firms find it difficult 
to smooth net returns on their assets, so they lower investment and take fewer 
risks with what remains. Perhaps most importantly, poor governments whose 
revenue sources are mainly volatile customs duties (Coatsworth and Williamson 
2004; Williamson 2005, 2006a) and which also find it difficult to borrow at 
cheap rates locally and internationally, cannot, without serious difficulty, smooth 
public investment on infrastructure and education in the face of terms of trade 
shocks.13 Lower public investment ensues, and growth rates fall. In short, theory 
informs us that higher volatility in the terms of trade should reduce investment 
and growth in the presence of risk aversion. In addition, the less-risky investment 
that does take place will also be low-return. 
Modern evidence seems to be consistent with the theory. Using data from 
92 developing and developed economies between 1962 and 1985, Garey and 
Valerie Ramey (1995) found government spending and macroeconomic volatility 
to be inversely related, and that countries with higher volatility had lower mean 
growth. This result has since been confirmed for a more recent cross-section of 
91 countries (Fatás and Mihov 2006). Studies like these have repeatedly found 
that volatility diminishes long run growth, and we now know more about why 
it is especially acute in poor countries. In an impressive analysis of more than 
60 countries between 1970 and 2003, Steven Poelhekke and Frederick van der 
Ploeg (2007) find strong support for the core-periphery asymmetry hypothesis 
regarding volatility, and with a large set of controls. Furthermore, while capricious 
policy and political violence can and did add to volatility in poor countries, 
extremely volatile commodity prices “are the main reason why natural resources 
export revenues are so volatile” (Poelhekke and van der Ploeg 2007: p. 3) and 
thus why those economies are themselves so volatile. While we have offered some 
reasons why poor countries face higher volatility and why that higher volatility 
13  While greater volatility increases the need for international borrowing to help smooth domestic 
consumption, Catão and Kapur (2004) have shown recently that volatility constrained the ability to 
borrow between 1970 and 2001. It seems likely that the same was true between 1870 and 1901, a 
century earlier, and even more so before 1870 when a global capital market was only just emerging 
(obsfelt and Taylor 2004; Mauro et al. 2006). 




costs them so much more in diminished growth rates, Philippe Aghion and his 
collaborators (2005, 2006) offer more: macroeconomic volatility driven either 
by nominal exchange rate or commodity price movements will depress growth 
in poor economies with weak financial institutions and rigid nominal wages, 
both of which characterized all poor economies before 1913 even more than it 
characterizes them today. 14 Thus, “given the high volatility of primary commodity 
prices … of many resource-rich countries, we expect resources-rich countries with 
poorly developed financial systems to have poor growth performance” (Poelhekke 
and van der Ploeg 2007: p. 6). 
What is true of the modern era was thought by Blattman et al. (2007) to be 
even more true of 1870-1939 when more undeveloped financial institutions and 
more limited tax bases made it even harder for poor households, poor firms and 
poor governments to smooth expenditures. Analysis bore this out: greater volatility 
diminished growth in the periphery, but not in the core. Strong support for the 
asymmetry hypothesis for the 1870-1939 years was especially welcome since that 
result raised the value of a research agenda that would explore its implications for 
the post-1870 years. Furthermore, the economic effects for 1870-1939 were very 
large: a one-standard-deviation increase in terms of trade volatility lowered output 
growth by nearly 0.39 percentage points, a big number given that the average per 
capita growth rate in the periphery was just 1.05 percent per annum.15 These 
magnitudes suggest that terms of trade volatility was an important force behind 
the rising Great Divergence between core and periphery after 1870. The gap in 
per capita income growth rates between core and periphery in the 1870-1939 
sample was 0.54 percentage points (1.59–1.05). Had the periphery experienced 
the same (lower) terms of trade volatility as the core, price volatility would have 
been reduced, adding 0.16 percentage points to average GDP per capita growth 
rates there. This alone would have erased about a third of the output per capita 
growth gap (0.16/0.54=0.3). In addition, had the core experienced the same 
14 See also Aizenman and Marion (1999), Flug et al. (1999), Elbers et al. (2007), and Koren and Tenreyro 
(2007).
15 A contemporary estimate has it that a one-standard-deviation increase in output volatility in the Third 
World lowers annual GDP per capita growth by 1.28 percentage points (Loayza et al. 2007: 345-6). 
While this is certainly a bigger growth impact than that estimated for 1870-1939 (0.39), the modern 
estimate is an output volatility impact, not, as for 1870-1939, a price volatility impact. That is, this 





secular deterioration in its terms of trade that the periphery did (-0.28), instead 
of the observed positive 0.3 percent per annum growth rate, this would have 
reduced output growth there by 0.37 percentage points. Combined, these two 
counterfactual events would have eliminated nearly the entire gap in growth rates 
between core and periphery between 1870 and 1939. 
At least for the seven pre-1940 decades, globalization seems to have had a 
bigger impact on the Great Divergence than did the so-called fundamentals. To 
put it more modestly, it appears that terms of trade shocks were an important force 
behind the substantial divergence in income levels between core and periphery 
during Lewis’ post-1870 epoch. Note, however, that secular movements in the 
terms of trade contributed less to the growth gap between core and periphery 
after 1870 than did volatility (0.16 versus 0.37). The secular boom before 1870 
ought to have contributed much more to the Great Divergence to the extent 
that the terms of trade boom in the poor periphery was so much bigger. And the 
contribution would have been bigger still if volatility was also bigger before 1870.
Impact of the terms of trade boom on the pre-1870 poor 
periphery
There should be no doubt that these global price shocks reinforced comparative 
advantage around the poor periphery, giving a powerful incentive to primary 
product export expansion while severely damaging import-competing 
manufacturing. That is, powerful de-industrialization (or Dutch disease) forces 
were set in motion everywhere in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and 
Asia, helping contribute to Lewis’s new international economic order. Just how 
powerful depended on the size of the export and import-competing sectors. Where 
trade was a big share of GDP, and where, conversely, non-tradable activities were 
a small share of GDP, the de-industrialization impact was also big. It depended 
as well on whether and the extent to which the non-tradable food sector was able 
to keep the cost of food low, and thus the nominal wage in manufacturing low 
and competitiveness high. It also depended, of course, on the extent to which 
the poor periphery could absorb and use effectively the new European industrial 
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technologies. All of these factors mattered, but the main determinant was the size 
of the price shock itself. Where the secular terms of trade boom was greatest, de-
industrialization should have been greatest, ceteris paribus. Lewis and most of the 
subsequent literature has argued that the big de-industrialization impact occurred 
between 1870 and 1913 (Lewis 1969, 1978a, 1978b; Tignor 2006: pp. 256-60). 
Based on the new terms of trade evidence just reviewed, it appears that Lewis 
was off by three-quarters of a century; the big impact must have been during the 
century before 1870 when the terms of trade boom was so much bigger.
So much for timing. What about location of de-industrialization? To make 
the comparative judgment, look at the annual growth rate in each country’s terms 
of trade up to its country-specific 19th century peak (Table 2). According to this 
criteria, 19th century Dutch disease and de-industrialization effects must have 
been much more powerful in the European periphery than they were anywhere 
else in the periphery, even more so than the tropical periphery that Lewis stressed 
(1969, 1978a). It follows that part of the explanation for a lag in the spread of 
the industrial revolution to the European periphery (Gerschenkron 1966; Pollard 
1981) might be blamed, at least in part, on these powerful terms of trade forces. 
The second strongest de-industrialization effect should have been in the Middle 
East and Southeast Asia, at least up to the late 1850s and early 1860s.16 The 
weakest de-industrialization effects were in East Asia; indeed, since China’s terms 
of trade deteriorated, it might be expected that industry was favored there, helping 
account for industrial success in Shanghai. The next weakest de-industrialization 
effects must have been in Latin America where the terms of trade boom was 
almost half that of the periphery average. Perhaps it is no longer a puzzle why 
Mexico and other parts of Latin America were so effective in fending off the 
global forces of de-industrialization up to 1870 (Dobado, Gómez and Williamson 
2008; Williamson 2007). Nor was South Asia far behind since its terms of trade 
boom was not much bigger than that of Latin America. To the extent that India 
underwent one of the most dramatic rates of de-industrialization in the poor 
periphery (Clingingsmith and Williamson 2008), that experience must be 
attributed to domestic forces rather than to external price shocks.
16 Note that the Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian regional terms of trade growth rates to peak are not 
always bounded by the country rates reported for those regions in Table 2. one reason is that some 
countries embedded in the regional averages are not reported in Table 2: e.g. Levant and Malaysia. 




Table 52.3: Terms of trade volatility 1782-1913: Core versus poor periphery 
Region Starting year in the series Before 1820 1820-1870  1870-1913
United Kingdom 1782 11.985 2.91 2.006
Europe periphery 4.036 10.72 7.058
Italy 1817 0.922 19.003 11.214
Russia 1782 3.226 10.722 6.104
Spain 1782 7.959 6.472 6.023
Portugal 1842 N/A 6.681 4.891
Latin America 3.728 6.429 8.14
Argentina 1811 4.409 6.961 8.303
Brazil 1826 N/A 2.174 10.283
Chile 1810 5.116 6.367 7.865
Cuba 1826 N/A 9.435 6.822
Mexico 1782 1.658 5.531 5.379
Venezuela 1830 N/A 8.108 10.185
Middle East 2.902 13.611 7.316
Egypt 1796 2.982 17.861 11.76
ottoman Turkey 1800 2.821 6.549 3.289
Levant 1839 N/A 16.423 6.898
South Asia 11.876 9.628 5.364
Ceylon 1782 17.86 7.59 7.532
India 1800 5.891 11.666 3.196
Southeast Asia 7.788 6.977 7.303
Indonesia 1825 N/A 3.202 6.678
Malaya 1882 N/A N/A 9.199
Philippines 1782 7.992 9.778 6.603
Siam 1800 7.583 7.951 6.732
East Asia 15.554 10.527 4.952
China 1782 15.554 19.752 4.311
Japan 1857 N/A 1.302 5.592
Average periphery 6.46 9.176 7.089
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Note: Volatility measured using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing parameter 6.25, which is appropriate 
for annual observations (Ravn and Uhlig 2002: 375), as we have here. The periphery average is unweighted.
When the magnitude of the secular terms of trade boom is measured up to 
1885-90, the regional ranking remains pretty much the same. South Asia drops 
farther down the list with even weaker terms of trade effects (indeed, close to zero), 
the relatively rapid terms of trade growth of Southeast and the European periphery 
persist, and East Asia continues its exceptional terms of trade decline. The Latin 
America boom keeps the modest middle ground, and the Middle East joins it. 
Thinking comparatively helps. Consider two examples. First, and to repeat, the 
South Asia result should surprise any specialist who is steeped in the enormous 
and contentious literature on Indian de-industrialization written by nationalist 
historians. However, the facts are that the terms of trade shock facing South Asia in 
general, and India in particular, were very modest, implying that much of the de-
industrialization India underwent was of its own supply-side doing (Clingingsmith 
and Williamson 2008). Second, Latin American economic historians make much 
of export-led growth after 1870 during what they call the belle époque, implying 
that the region exploited these world market conditions better than the rest of the 
periphery (Bulmer-Thomas 1994: Chps. 3 and 4). Yet, the Latin American terms 
of trade boom was not much greater than the periphery average, and for Mexico it 
was much less (Gómez Galvarriato and Williamson 2008).  
Impact of terms of trade volatility on the pre-1870 poor 
periphery
By 1870 and certainly by the end of the 19th century, most countries in the poor 
periphery had responded to the terms of trade boom by exploiting comparative 
advantage and increasing their specialization with the export of just a few 
commodities. The top two exports made up 70 percent of all exports from the 
average poor periphery country in 1913 (Bulmer-Thomas 1994: p. 59), while the 
figure was only 12 percent in the industrial core even two decades earlier (Blattman 
et al. 2007: Table 1). Furthermore, most countries in the poor periphery had 
raised exports so that they claimed a large share of GDP by 1890. Finally, while 
some of these commodities had prices which were a lot more volatile than others, 
primary products generally had much more volatile prices than did manufactures 
exported by the core. 
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Was the deleterious impact of volatility as powerful before 1870 as it was 
afterwards? While limited data make it impossible to estimate the impact, we can 
certainly calculate whether the volatility was as great or even greater before 1870, 
and infer the deleterious impact on periphery growth and thus its contribution to 
divergence. Table 52.3 summarizes the results using the Hodrick-Prescott filter, 
where the United Kingdom is taken to be representative of the core. That said, 
terms of trade volatility was much greater in the UK during the wartime years 
1782-1820, than it was in the peacetime Pax Britannica century that followed. This 
result is hardly surprising given what we know about the volatility of the conflict 
itself and its stop-go impact on trade (Findlay and o’Rourke 2007). The peacetime 
years after 1820 were another matter entirely.17 First, terms of trade volatility in the 
periphery was more than three times what it was in the UK, either in 1820-1870 
(9.18/2.91 = 3.2) or 1870-1913 (7.09/2 = 3.5).18 It is of some interest to note 
that the ratio of terms of trade volatility between industrialized economies and 
the periphery in the 1990s was 2.9.19 Apparently, there has been a lot of historical 
persistence in the data, even though the difference between core and periphery 
was greater in the 19th than in the late 20th century. Second, terms of trade 
volatility in the periphery rose over the century, from 6.46 before 1820 to 9.18 
between 1820 and 1870, and to 7.09 after 1870, a result consistent with evolving 
export concentration as the region exploited comparative advantage. Third, terms 
of trade volatility varied considerably around the periphery. Between 1820 and 
1870, the highest volatility measures were recorded in the European Periphery 
(especially Italy and Russia), the Middle East (especially Egypt and the Levant), 
and East Asia (especially China), regions whose long run economic progress must 
have suffered accordingly. Latin America and Southeast Asia consistently recorded 
lower volatility than the rest of the periphery, but it was still more than twice that 
of the United Kingdom. South Asia was about average, but it was still more 
than three times that of the United Kingdom. If we are looking for countries 
17 David Jacks, Kevin o’Rourke and myself are collecting monthly commodity price data 1750-1913 to 
explore more fully these volatility issues, one dealing with the impact of the world going open during 
Pax Britannica, and the other dealing with asymmetry between manufactures and primary products.
18 It may at first seem that the UK should have had the same terms of trade volatility as the periphery since 
it imported all those commodities with volatile prices. However, the UK imported a diverse market 
basket of primary products while each periphery exported just one or two.
19 Loayza et al. (2007: data underlying Figure 3, 346) where volatility is calculated as the standard deviation 
of the logarithmic change.




in the periphery where terms of trade volatility would have had an especially 
powerful deleterious effect on GDP growth performance before 1870, the places 
to look would be China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Italy, Levant, the Philippines, and 
Russia. But with the exception of Brazil and Japan, every periphery country had 
much higher price volatility than did the European core before 1870. There were 
no exceptions after 1870: every country in the poor periphery had higher price 
volatility than did the United Kingdom.
Given that terms of trade volatility was higher before 1870 than after, and 
given that this volatility contributed powerfully to the Great Divergence after 
1870, it seems reasonable to infer that terms of trade volatility in the periphery 
contributed even more powerfully to the Great Divergence before 1870 than after.
Concluding remarks
W. Arthur Lewis (1978a, 1978b) and the literature that followed his pioneering 
work has argued that a new international economic order emerged between 1870 
and 1913, and that global terms of trade forces induced rising primary product 
specialization and de-industrialization in the poor periphery. This paper has 
offered five revisionist findings that speak to the Lewis thesis. First, it has shown 
that the new order was firmly in place at the start of Lewis’ epoch, and that the 
transition took place in the century before 1870, not after. Second, we know 
that terms of trade booms did not raise long run growth in the poor periphery 
1870-1913, and may have lowered it. Given that the secular terms of trade boom 
in the poor periphery was much bigger over the century before 1870 than after, 
and given that de-industrialization and Dutch disease forces were much more 
powerful as well, it seems safe to infer that the Great Terms of Trade Boom helps 
explain the Great Divergence between core and periphery. Third, the terms 
of trade boom varied enormously across the poor periphery, and therefore its 
contribution to periphery performance must have varied as well. over the century 
before the late 1880s, the boom was completely absent in East and South Asia, 
about average in the Middle East and Latin America, and powerful in Southeast 
Asia and the European periphery. Fourth, the terms of trade boom (with its de-
industrialization impact) was only half the story; growth-reducing terms of trade 
volatility was the other half. Between 1820 and 1870, terms of trade volatility 
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was much greater in the poor periphery than the core, in some cases six or seven 
times greater. In the post-1870 epoch, terms of trade volatility was still very big 
in the poor periphery and still much greater than the core, in some cases four to 
five times greater. We know that terms of trade volatility has lowered long run 
growth in the poor periphery in both 1870-1939 and 1960-2000, and that the 
negative impact has been big. Given that terms of trade volatility in the poor 
periphery was even bigger during the century before 1870, it seems plausible 
to infer that it helps explain the Great Divergence. Fifth, and finally, since the 
secular terms of trade boom in the poor periphery reached its peak in the mid-late 
19th century, de-industrialization forces should have abated afterwards. Indeed, as 
the terms of trade started its long secular decline in to the 20th century, those prior 
de-industrialization forces should have become re-industrialization forces, that is, 
industrialization in the poor periphery should have been favored by secular terms 
of trade deterioration in the half century or more before 1930, an ironic finding 
given the rhetoric of Prebisch and Singer. Furthermore, the re-industrialization 
stimulus should have been strongest in locations where the terms of trade peak 
was earliest and the fall from it the steepest. These locations would have included 
East Asia (e.g. Shanghai),20 the European periphery (e.g. the Italian triangle and 
Russia), Latin America (e.g. Brazil and Mexico), and South Asia (e.g. Bombay 
and Bengal). During the decades before 1913, early industrialization was taking 
place in all of these places, but how much of that is explained by a secular (pro-
industrial) terms of trade slump, better pro-industrial policies, improved wage 
cost competitiveness in manufacturing, or getting the ‘fundamentals’ right?21
20 Meiji Japan is an exception: It underwent an improvement in its terms of trade right up to WWI 
(Figure 10), so it never reached a secular peak before 1913. However, like western Europe, it was a net 
exporter of manufacturers very early after opening up to trade, so those “exceptional” global price events 
(compared with the rest of the periphery) fostered industrialization there.
21 Aurora Gómez Galvarriato and I recently explored this question for Latin America (Gómez Galvarriato 
and Williamson 2008).
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Globalization and the environment
Brian R. Copeland1
The world is facing serious environmental problems. Some are local or confined 
within countries or regions, such as poor urban air quality in rapidly growing 
economies, or poor water quality caused by either industrial effluent or poor 
urban sanitation. others have implications that spill over national borders, such 
as threats to biodiversity caused by deforestation and the alarming pattern of 
fisheries depletion worldwide. And still other problems, such as the effects of 
greenhouse gas emissions on climate change, are truly global in scope.
At the same time, the world economy is becoming increasingly integrated. 
Globalization is not new, and the great migrations of the past, including those that 
led to the emergence of countries such as Australia and Canada are a reminder of 
the massive changes that globalization has induced over the years. But the pace 
of globalization seems to have sped up. World trade increased by a factor of 11 
between 1950 and 2000; more than twice the increase in world income in the 
same period. The diffusion of information has accelerated with the development 
of the internet. And the speed with which the financial crisis spread across 
countries a year ago (late 2008) was a startling indicator of how interconnected 
the world economy has become.
Many people think it is no coincidence that environmental problems have 
become more serious as the pace of globalization has increased. This has led to 
much debate in policy circles, and it has stimulated a great deal of academic 
research.  In this Lecture, I would like to review some of what I think we have 
learned from this work, especially during the past 20 years;2 and I would also like 
 
1 Fifty-third Joseph Fisher Lecture, 28 September 2009.  
2 For more comprehensive reviews see Copeland and Taylor (2004), Frankel (2003) and Sturm 
(2003).
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to talk about its implications for climate change. I will not focus exclusively on 
climate change and some of what I will say on climate change is speculative. 
The reason for this is that outcomes in this area are not pre-ordained – they 
depend on government policy responses. And while many governments have 
aggressively responded to some types of environmental problems (such as local air 
and water quality issues), there has not been the same level of systematic response 
to greenhouse gas emissions. As a result, we have only limited data available to 
assess the interaction between globalization, policy responses and greenhouse gas 
emissions. But what we have learned from studying other pollutants can provide 
lessons for thinking about climate change.3
Two key questions have dominated this debate. The first is whether or 
not globalization exacerbates environmental problems. Does freer trade and 
international investment accelerate the deterioration of environmental quality? 
Trade directly increases emissions via increased transport, but it may also 
indirectly generate more environmental problems by shifting economic activity 
to jurisdictions with weak policy regimes. Is there evidence for this?
The second key question is whether globalization makes environmental 
policy implementation more difficult. Do concerns about global competitiveness 
make it harder to introduce and tighten up environmental policies? And, once 
policies are in place, are they less likely to work well in an integrated global 
economy?   Is it harder to achieve environmental quality targets if firms can shift 
their production to regions with less stringent policy?
Is globalization bad for the environment?
It is easy to come up with examples where trade or international investment has 
resulted in environmental damage. Images of toxic waste from rich countries being 
dumped in low income countries had a galvanizing effect on anti-globalization 
activists and led to the Basel convention on shipments of hazardous waste. There 
are several examples of renewable resource depletion – especially deforestation 
and fisheries collapse – that can be linked to trade. For example, fisheries off the 
 
3 See also the recent WTo/UN Environment Programme report (WTo 2009) which provides 
an excellent overview of the interaction between trade, environment and climate change.
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coast of Estonia collapsed shortly after export markets opened in the 1990’s, the 
collapse of bison populations in the US was likely hastened by an export market 
for their hides, and evidence suggests that strong demand for wood in China has 
led to forest depletion in some neighbouring countries.4 And of course trade has 
had direct negative effects on the environment. Trade has provided a conduit for 
invasive species, and shipping generates both air and water pollution.
on the other had, the news is not all bad. Globalization can be good for the 
environment too. An early example comes from Denmark in the 1700’s, where 
there was an ecological crisis due to deforestation – excessive harvesting of trees 
for construction allowed sand dunes to encroach inland (see Kjaergaard, 1994). 
Two factors helped alleviate the crisis. German engineers (an example of trade in 
services) helped build dikes to stabilize the coast line and prevent further erosion; 
and imports of timber from neighbouring countries reduced pressure on local 
forests. In more recent times, technology transfer has meant that new factories 
in developing countries are often much more energy efficient than would be the 
case without foreign technology. And by outsourcing production to low cost 
suppliers new environmentally friendly products (such as hybrid cars) are cheaper 
to produce and are therefore adopted more quickly by consumers.  
In short trade and investment have both good and bad effects on the 
environment, and in this respect it is not unlike any other economic activity – 
some aspects are harmful to the environment and others are benign or beneficial. 
Does this mean trade has environmental effects that are much like economic 
growth – or are there ways that trade may have fundamentally different effects on 
the environment?
To help sort this out, it is useful to decompose the effects of changes in 
economic activity on the environment into 3 different channels – scale, technique 
and composition effects.5
4 See Vetemaa (2006) on Estonian fisheries, Taylor (2007) on bison, and Ferreira (2004) on 
deforestation.
5 See Grossman and Krueger (1993) and Copeland and Taylor (1994, 2003) for more detailed 
development and measurement of these effects.
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Scale effects refer to the fact that trade can have effects like growth – it can 
lead to a scaling up of economic activity. All else equal, one would expect this to 
be bad for the environment. A pure increase in the scale of the economy, without 
adjustments in the type of economic activity or the level of pollution abatement 
or conservation will be bad for the environment.  
But as we know, growth is not always bad for the environment. Water 
quality in many rivers and lakes in Europe and North America is better now than 
it was 40 years ago, and air quality in major urban centres such as London and 
Tokyo has improved in the same time period. This is where the other two channels 
of change matter. Changes in methods of production and consumption can alter 
emission intensities and the use of environmental services.  These “technique 
effects” can be driven by technical change, but in most cases they are driven 
by regulation. There is a great deal of evidence that as incomes have risen in 
industrial countries, environmental regulation has also tightened up.6 Technique 
effects therefore act as a countervailing force against scale effects.
Finally, there are also composition effects. Growth and trade also lead to 
changes in the mix of production and consumption activities. At the macro level, 
countries may shift from agriculture to industry to services, all of which have 
different impacts on the environment. But also within any sector, changes in 
environmental impacts occur as specialization and innovation change the mix of 
economic activity. Consumption in the transport sector, for example, may shift 
from bicycles to cars (which raises pollution) or from cars to subways (which 
reduce pollution).  
one line of argument is that trade causes growth, growth causes 
environmental degradation, and therefore trade is bad for the environment. 
There is a debate about whether growth is bad for the environment, and there is 
some debate about whether trade promotes economic growth.7 But I don’t want 
to pursue this here. Developing countries want to grow – and the interaction 
between economic growth and the environment is a subject for different talk. 
Instead, the question I want to focus on here is whether growth paths in countries 
 
6 See Dasgupta et al. (2001).
7 Brock and Taylor (2006) provide a good review of this work.
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that are more open to trade and investment are worse for the environment than 
growth paths in countries that are more closed. That means that I will not talk 
much about the scale effects of trade on the environment – it is via composition 
and technique effects that trade has the most potential to be different than 
economic growth. 
Composition and technique effects of trade
Trade means that countries specialize more in doing what they do relatively 
well. Successful firms expand; less successful firms are squeezed out.   Low cost 
industries expand; others contract. Consumption patterns change as the mix of 
goods available expands and relative prices adjust. All of this happens even in 
the absence of environmental policy – it is based on standard ideas of the gains 
from trade and comparative advantage dating back to Ricardo. But heterogeneity 
in policy regimes across countries raises the possibility that specialization and 
changes in patterns of production and consumption may also be caused by 
international differences in environmental policy.  
The Pollution Haven Hypothesis is the idea that trade could cause polluting 
industry to shift to countries with relatively weak environmental policy.8 This 
alone need not be a bad thing. We accept this on a regional basis all the time and 
think of it as good public policy. We have rules that say you can’t have a garbage 
dump in the middle of a residential neighbourhood – this causes us to export our 
garbage to a designated area. Zoning regulations separate heavy industry from 
residential areas, and they also protect fragile ecosystems. Regulations tend to 
be tighter in a fragile estuary than on open coastline, and this shifts production 
locations. This can happen on an international scale as well: shifting polluting or 
environmentally threatening industry to a place where the environment has the 
capacity to handle it is not a bad thing. Trade driven by policy differences across 
jurisdictions can be a good thing if environmental policy reflects the sensitivity 
of the environment.
But environmental policy differs across jurisdictions for many other 
reasons – institutions are weak in some countries, and governments are pressured 
 
8 See Copeland (2008) for a more detailed exploration of the Pollution Haven Hypothesis.
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to weaken policy because of concerns about competitiveness in others. In the 
case of global pollutants such as carbon emissions, there are international free 
rider problems. In such cases, trade induced by environmental policy differences 
can be bad for the environment if it systematically shifts polluting industry 
from countries with tough regulation to countries with weak regulation. This 
is particularly troubling in the case of global pollutants because such trade can 
mean that efforts to reduce emissions can be undermined if trade simply induces 
a shifting of polluting industry to countries without emission regulations. In the 
context of climate change, this is referred to as carbon leakage.
So one way that trade can potentially have very different effects than growth 
on the environment is via composition effects, especially if these work to shift 
polluting industry to countries with weak environmental regulations. I’ll come 
back to this and look at the evidence.
A second way that trade can have effects on the environment is via technique 
effects. Again, there are positive and negative effects, but there is reason to be 
optimistic that the net effects here will be positive. Policy stringency is positively 
correlated with real income per capita, so if trade raises real income, it is likely 
to increase pressure for more stringent environmental regulation. And trade can 
also lower abatement costs by increasing flows of technical information and by 
increasing competition in the market for environmental services. However, there 
could be adverse effects on policy as well. Exposure to international markets and 
increased mobility of people could disrupt traditional norms and institutions that 
have evolved to encourage conservation and community responsibility for the 
environment. Again, we need to look at the evidence.
Evidence on the effects of trade on the environment
The critical piece of information we need to determine whether trade is bad 
for the environment is how responsive trade and investment is to differences in 
environmental policy. We need to know this to determine whether the pollution 
haven hypothesis is correct; and we also need to know this if we want to address 




Coming up with good evidence to address this question has been a challenge. 
We can’t do experiments (we can’t take a group of regions; tighten policy in one 
group, weaken it in others; and then wait ten years or so and see what happens to 
trade patterns and plant location), and so we have to infer evidence from changes in 
environmental policy over time and across jurisdictions. But for this to be fruitful, 
we need good data on the stringency of environmental policy for a large group of 
jurisdictions over a long period of time. And we don’t have this.  Environmental 
policy stringency is hard to measure – it is typically a mass of complex regulations, 
and there is usually not a simple index of stringency available. Many economists 
have used data on pollution abatement costs, but these are not available for most 
countries, and the reliability of such data is often in question. Even if we are 
prepared to accept that firms report abatement costs honestly, it may be difficult 
for them to isolate abatement costs from other costs if the entire design of a facility 
reflects environmental policy pressures. Moreover, there are selection problems. If 
the pollution haven hypothesis is correct, then stringent environmental policy will 
chase away the high abatement cost firms, and this can bias our sample if they are 
not around to respond to the survey questions.
The history of work in this area reflects these difficulties.9 For a long 
time (up until about 10 years ago), most attempts to isolate the effects of 
environmental policy differences on trade and investment flows found nothing.10 
In fact, some found that more stringent environmental policy was associated with 
increased competitiveness. There is an argument (Porter and van de Linde 1995) 
that environmental policy can actually increase competiveness by encouraging 
innovation, creating new markets, and reducing waste. And some interpreted the 
evidence as supporting this view.  
However, recent work using better data and improved statistical techniques 
has reversed this finding. Perhaps the most compelling evidence has come from 
studying the effects of the US Clean Air Act on trade and plant location. This Act 
forced tighter environmental regulations in some counties in the US (those not 
in compliance with air quality standards), but not in other counties (those that 
 
9 See Copeland and Taylor (2004) and Brunnermeier and Levinson (2004) for reviews of 
empirical work in this area.
10 Jaffe et al. (1995) provide a comprehensive review of the literature up to the mid-1990s.
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were in compliance). Becker and Henderson (2000) and others have found that 
the Clean Air had a significant effect on plant location within the US – tighter 
environmental regulations shifted polluting industry away from high regulation 
counties. Keller and Levinson (2002) found that foreign investment inflows were 
deterred in high regulation counties, and Hanna (2006) found that the Clean Air 
act encouraged multinationals in high regulation counties to shift some of their 
production out of the US.  
Studies using abatement costs have found similar results. Levinson and Taylor 
(2008) and Ederington and Minier (2003) found that, all else equal, US imports 
are higher in industries subject to more stringent environmental policy, which is 
consistent with the view that environmental policy reduces competitiveness.
The evidence therefore confirms that environmental policy does indeed affect 
competiveness. The next question is whether this effect is big. Is there any evidence 
that trade is systematically causing polluting industry to shift from countries with 
stringent environmental policy to those with weak policy? That is, is the pollution 
haven hpothesis correct? While we can certainly find cases where this has happened, 
it looks like that this is not the case for many pollutants. For example, Ederington, 
Levinson and Minier (2004) find that the pollution content of US exports has 
been rising faster than that of US imports from developing countries as trade has 
been liberalized over the past 30 years. This is opposite to what the pollution haven 
hypothesis predicts. In my own work with Werner Antweiler and Scott Taylor 
(2001), we isolated the pure composition effect of trade liberalization on sulphur 
dioxide pollution. We found that this effect tended to raise pollution in rich 
countries and lower it in poor countries (the opposite of what the pollution haven 
hypothesis predicts). In many cases So2 pollution was in fact increasing in poor 
countries, but this was driven by growth and capital accumulation, not trade per se. 
In short, there is very little evidence in support of the pollution haven hypothesis.
Is this surprising? In most cases, the cost of complying with environmental 
regulation is low – in very few industries does it rise above 5% of costs; and in 
many others it is much lower. Production location is determined by overall cost 
conditions – labour costs, infrastructure, political stability, local expertise, supply 
lines, and so on. Consequently if environmental costs are relatively low, it is not 
surprising that they tend not to drive the pattern of trade.
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If we put all this together, we can come back to our big question – is trade bad 
for the environment? The answer depends on the type of environmental problem, 
and on institutions. Several studies have looked at sulphur dioxide pollution – mine 
(with Antweiler and Taylor, 2001); Frankel and Rose (2005), and Grossman and 
Krueger (1993).  These all have found that on average, trade appears to be good for 
the environment, even if we take into account scale effects. The reason for this is that 
compositional effects turn out to be small, and in many cases tend to shift polluting 
industry to rich countries (because So2 pollution comes mostly from capital 
intensive industry and rich countries are capital abundant); moreover, technique 
effects (more stringent policy) have tended to offset scale effects. So the net effect 
of trade has been small, and possibly positive. This is not to say that environmental 
quality is getting better everywhere – it is not. But growth and capital accumulation 
are much more important than trade for determining environmental outcomes.
The news is not all good, though. There is some evidence to suggest that 
trade is exacerbating renewable resource depletion in some countries. Fishery and 
forestry depletion has been exacerbated by trade in some countries.11 However, 
institutions matter a lot and the impact of trade has varied across countries and 
even across different resources within countries.12 A good example to illustrate 
the complexity of the issue comes from a couple of shell fisheries near my home 
off the coast of British Columbia in Canada. In the 1970’s, the growth of the 
Asian market triggered an export boom in several west coast fisheries, including 
the geoduck and abalone shell fisheries.13 Both were not subject to significant 
pressure prior to the export boom, and neither would have been sustainable in 
the face of a huge increase in fishing. In both cases, a transferable quota system 
was introduced to regulate the fishery. This is exactly what fisheries economists 
recommend, and it is the type of policy that has been highly successful in other 
jurisdictions, notably New Zealand and Iceland. The policy was successful in the 
geoduck fishery – that fishery prospered with the export boom and so far has 
been sustainable. on the other hand the abalone fishery collapsed – this was a 
fishery where the monitoring of the regulations was very difficult, poaching was 
rampant, and the regulatory apparatus was unable to cope with pressures induced 
 
11 See, for example, Lopez (1997, 2000), Ferreira (2004), and Vetemaa (2006).
12 See Copeland and Taylor (2009) for a discussion and further references.
13 See Muse (1998) and Jones and Bixby (2003), as well as the discussion of these fisheries in 
Copeland and Taylor (2009).
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by the export boom. There has not yet been a systematic study of the effects of 
trade on renewable resource depletion, but a number of case studies suggest that 
there is a complex interaction between trade and the effectiveness of institutions 
in determining outcomes.
What about climate change? Is globalization responsible for increasing 
carbon emissions? The fact that carbon emissions are a global pollutant means 
that the policy response has been different for carbon emissions than for other 
pollutants such as So2.  So2 emissions have been regulated because the effects 
occur within the country (or its near neighbours) where emissions occur. 
Moreover the effects of So2 pollution are measurable and occur within a fairly 
short time horizon (although some effects such as acidification are delayed). In 
contrast, carbon emissions have not been systematically regulated to the same 
extent. Because it is a global pollutant and because the effects of climate change 
will occur far into the future, there are free rider problems and many countries 
have not imposed effective regulations. This means that we do not have good 
data to test for the effects of policy on trade patterns and firm location. And it 
also means that the scale effects of trade and growth have not been offset with 
technique effects, as in the case of So2.
one indication of how the lack of active policy response to climate change 
has led to different outcomes between So2 and carbon emissions comes from 
the Environmental Kuznets curve literature.14 A number of studies have found 
an inverse-U-shaped relation between So2 and per capita income. Subsequent 
work indicates that the relation is not automatic and varies across countries, but 
one robust result from this literature is that while there are forces from economic 
growth that tend to increase pollution, these forces can be offset by the policy 
process; and the policy process has in many countries responded to increases in 
per capita income.
No such relation has been found for carbon emissions.15 Similar forces are 
at work increasing emissions, but there has not been the countervailing policy 
response to control them. So there is no environmental Kuznets curve for carbon 
emissions.
14 Barbier (2002) provides a good discussion of this literature.
15 See the WTo (2009) for a discussion of the evidence on carbon emissions.
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Consequently, it has not yet been possible to test for the pollution haven 
effect for carbon emissions because of a lack of data on policy interventions. 
There is some evidence that the net effect of trade on carbon emissions has been 
to increase them – this is because the scale effect of trade (which tends to raise 
emissions) has not been offset with strong policy responses. Attempts to measure 
the pure trade-induced composition effects on carbon emissions have been 
inconclusive, suggesting that the effect is likely small.16
In short, the potential crisis looming over carbon emissions has not been 
caused by globalization; other things, namely economic growth and a lack of 
policy response, are the major culprits. But globalization is likely making the 
policy response more difficult. That is what I’ll turn to now.
Is environmental policy harder to implement in a more open 
economy?
Globalization increases interdependencies between countries, and this means the 
effects of domestic policy changes can spill over international borders. There are 
a number of ways that this can complicate the implementation of environmental 
policy; here I will focus on three major channels. First, governments may yield to 
pressure to be less aggressive on environmental policy because of concerns about 
international competitiveness. Second, some have alleged that international 
trade agreements have constrained the flexibility of governments to implement 
environmental policy – the argument is sometimes made that within the WTo, 
disputes concerns about free trade trump concerns about the environment. 
And finally, it is possible that once in place, environmental policies will be less 
effective in open economies because firms can avoid them by shifting production 
to countries with weaker policy regimes. I will consider each of these arguments 
in turn.
Competitiveness is more of a concern in an open economy than in one 
more closed off to trade and investment. Trade tends to concentrate production 
according to comparative advantage or firms’ success in carving out a market 
niche. This means that production location decisions are more sensitive to cost in 
 
16 See Cole and Elliot (2003).
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open than in closed economies. Technically, supply elasticities tend to be larger 
in more open economies. Hence the heightened concern about the cost effects of 
environmental policy in more open economies.
It is important to note that from a pure national interest perspective (ignoring 
the role of interest groups), these stronger supply responses actually strengthen 
rather than weaken the case for good environmental policy. The costs of policy 
mistakes are higher in more open economies. If trade concentrates production 
of polluting industry in your region or country, then the environmental damage 
from bad environmental policy can be much larger in open than in closed 
economies (Copeland, 1994). The British Columbia shell fisheries I mentioned 
earlier are good examples of this – prior to the export boom, there was not really 
any serious regulation of these fisheries and they were not in any danger. once 
the export boom happened, it was only strong and effective policy that saved the 
geoduck fishery; and it was difficulties in the enforcement of policy that led to the 
collapse of the abalone fishery.
However the distributional effects of environmental policy are also larger in 
open economies than in closed economies. If we focus on production-generated 
pollution, then in a closed economy, it is easier for firms to pass on to consumers the 
increased costs of complying with environmental policy. In an open economy, firms 
face more competition, and so (especially if their competitors do not face similarly 
stringent policy) it is harder to pass on costs. Hence those affected by stringent policy 
are more likely to pressure governments to weaken policy as economies become 
more open.17 The key problem here is that while it is in the overall national interest 
to have strong policy in place, the costs of the policy tend to be concentrated on the 
producers directly affected, and so policy may end up being skewed.
This does not, however, apply to all sectors of the economy – not all producers 
are hurt by stronger environmental policy, and in some cases, strong policy can 
actually increase competitiveness. We have to distinguish between pollution 
generated by consumption (automobile emissions, packaging, household energy 
are examples) and that generated during production. Much of the concern about 
competitiveness is restricted to policies aimed at curtailing pollution generated 
 
17 See McAusland (2003).
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during production of tradable goods. This is because tighter regulation affects 
domestic producers but not foreign producers and therefore can give foreign 
producers an advantage when selling their goods in the domestic market.
However, when policy affects consumption-generated pollution, both 
foreign and domestic producers have to comply. If automobile emission standards 
are raised, then both locally produced cars and imported cars have to comply 
with the standards and so local producers need not be disadvantaged – in both 
cases, costs can be shared with consumers. In fact, it is possible that policy can be 
structured so as to give local producers an advantage – if it is easier for domestic 
producers than foreign producers to comply with tougher standards then local 
producers may actually lobby for tighter environmental policy.18
Another case where tighter policy can benefit local producers is policy 
designed to preserve natural capital – such as fisheries regulation. However such 
regulation typically raises costs (or reduces harvesting) in order to preserve natural 
capital for the future. Producers benefit in the long run, but in the short run 
costs rise (reducing international competitiveness in the short run) and this can 
generate resistance to tighter regulation. 
Theory therefore suggests that if governments are responsive to narrow 
producer interests, then it may be harder to enact stringent environmental policy 
in more open economies. However, this effect is more likely to be found for 
production-generated pollution than for consumption-generated pollution. 
What does the evidence say about what governments actually do? There is a lot 
of anecdotal evidence, but not a lot of careful statistical analysis.  The few studies 
that exist support the hypothesis. Ederington and Minier (2003) and Eliste and 
Fredrikksson (2002) study the US experience and find that pollution policy is 
somewhat weaker in industries subject to high level of import competition. In 
the case of policy aimed at dealing with climate change, governments have often 
created exemptions and loopholes that help to shield the tradable sector from the 
effects of carbon taxes, etc., which is consistent with the hypothesis that they are 
responding to concerns about competitiveness. This evidence is not conclusive 
 
18 McAusland (2008) provides a detailed analysis of the distinction between consumption and 
production generated pollution.
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because it compares the stringency of environmental policy in sectors more open 
to trade than others. It is possible that globalization has helped to ramp up the 
average stringency of environmental policy, as producers respond to concerns of 
green consumers, and as the influence of NGos is amplified via globalization. 
Nevertheless, the evidence is suggestive of a problem.
The second channel through which globalization is alleged to make it 
harder to implement good environmental policy is via the constraints imposed 
by the WTo. Any trade agreement must confront the problem that once overt 
restrictions on trade (such as tariffs and quota) are eliminated, governments still 
face pressure from producers for trade protection and so they look for loopholes 
in the trade agreement. Subsidies, tax exemptions, regulatory exemptions, and 
so forth are all ways of helping out producers who are looking for protection. 
Consequently any trade agreement that is effective has to go beyond overt 
restrictions on trade and try to constrain governments from using domestic policy 
as a substitute for trade policy. These means that trade agreements, including the 
WTo, try to restrict governments from enacting policies that favour domestic 
producers or which favour some foreign producers over others. For example, it 
would violate WTo rules if a government imposed a more stringent emission 
standard on an imported car than on a domestic car. Also, recognizing that 
domestic producers may sometimes lobby for regulation that is harder for foreign 
producers to comply with than local producers, the WTo also requires that 
governments have some scientific justification for imposing an environmental or 
health and safety regulation.  
This means that some domestic environmental policy is subject to scrutiny 
to ensure compliance with international trade rules, and this has sometimes led 
to trade disputes over environmental policy. But as a number of reviews of the 
relevant cases have concluded, there is little evidence that this has constrained 
domestic policy (as long as it is non-discriminatory). The major area where the 
WTo could be said to be making domestic policy harder to implement is with 
respect to competitiveness issues; and this comes back to the distinction between 
production and consumption generated pollution. The WTo allows governments 
to impose regulation and standards on goods that cause environmental problems 
after they come into our country as long as these rules are applied in a non-
discriminatory way. That means we can impose the same emission standards on 
Brian R. Copeland
 589
imported cars as we do domestic cars. However, the WTo does not generally 
allow us to impose taxes or regulations that target producers that generate 
pollution or environmental damage outside our country. So even though we 
may impose stringent regulation on domestic steel producers to offset the local 
pollution caused, we cannot tax or otherwise restrict imports from foreign steel 
producers who despite polluting their own countries may be subject to weak or 
non-existent regulation. That is, governments are not permitted by the WTo to 
try to level the playing field for production-generated pollution. And as discussed 
above, this can exacerbate the competitiveness problem, making environmental 
policy harder to implement.
There is one potentially, but as yet untested, exception to this prohibition 
on policies targeting environmental damage generated by foreign producers 
outside our country. This is in cases where the foreign environmental damage 
may affect the home country – threats to endangered species is one example and 
carbon emissions is another. In the famous Shrimp/Turtle case, the US restricted 
imports of shrimp from Southeast Asia because the harvesting techniques harmed 
endangered turtles.19 This trade restriction was found to be inconsistent with 
WTo rules. However, the rationale for this ruling was not that the US did not 
have the right to use trade policy to try to protect the turtles. Rather, the US had 
applied the policy in a discriminatory way. The rules it imposed on Southeast 
Asian producers were more stringent than those imposed on producers in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, and so the US was violating the non-discrimination 
rule. In fact, the WTo ruling determined that the endangered turtles were 
trans-boundary resources and noted that trade measures were not necessarily 
inconsistent with WTo rules. This potentially opens the door to carefully 
designed (non-discriminatory) policies that target such environmental damage. 
This has implication for attempts to control carbon emissions, and I will come 
back to this.
The third way that globalization can make it harder to control environmental 
problems is that environmental policy may not be as effective in an open economy 
because firms may simply relocate to avoid tough regulations. If pollution has 
 
19  Khalilian (2009) provides a good discussion of this and other cases and reviews the broader 
issues of the interaction between WTo rules, trade measures, and environmental policy.
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only local effects, then the main concern is displacement – regulation may solve 
your environmental problems by passing them on to some other jurisdiction. 
This may or may not be reason for concern (depending in part on the sensitivity 
of the trading partner’s environment, and the quality of their environmental 
policy), but at least in this case, the Home country’s policy does improve Home’s 
environment.
If pollution is global, then it is possible for policy to be ineffective and 
not improve the policy-implementing country’s environment at all. If carbon 
emitting firms simply shift location in response to a carbon tax, then Home’s 
carbon tax may be unsuccessful in improving Home’s environment. 
This is (as is well known) one of the major policy concerns in the debate 
on how to deal with climate change, and in that context it is referred to as carbon 
leakage.  Given the evidence that environmental policy does affect firm location, 
trade and investment flows, some carbon leakage will occur. The question is how 
much.
We have two types of evidence. We have the results of computer simulation 
models that attempt to forecast into the future, and we have the evidence of past 
experience with other pollutants. Computer simulation models do predict carbon 
leakage. The predictions vary widely – from 5% to 20% of any reductions in 
Annex I countries are predicted to be offset by increases in emissions by countries 
not constrained by agreements to reduce emissions.20 The predictions vary widely 
because they depend on how the computer models are specified. Such forecasts 
and should be treated cautiously.
The evidence from our past experience comes from mostly other pollutants, 
as discussed above. As discussed earlier there is pretty good evidence that more 
stringent environmental policy raises production costs and affects competitiveness. 
More stringent environment policy targeting production-generated pollution 
will deter investment in that sector and, all else equal, will shift some production 
to other jurisdictions. But the effects in the past have been rather small, and as 
Ederington et al. (2004) show, these effects have been dwarfed by other changes 
 
20 See Frankel (2009).
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in the economy over the years. In the case of So2 regulations, the US imposed 
tighter environmental policy, but US imports became cleaner relative to US 
exports during the same time period. As Levinson (2009) notes, other changes – 
such as innovation, capital accumulation, growth, and preference changes have 
turned out to be much more important for determining trade patterns than the 
costs of complying with environmental regulations. We don’t know if the same 
pattern will hold for carbon emissions. To the extent that the carbon content of 
production is higher than the So2 content, it is likely that competiveness effects 
may be larger. But past experience suggests it is going to be other unforeseen 
changes in the world economy that are going to matter more in the long run.
Implications for the design of climate change policy
In some ways, the policy needed to deal with greenhouse gases (for ease of exposition, 
I’ll usually refer to these as carbon emissions, but obviously policy has to be directed 
at all such gases) is quite straightforward. Carbon emissions impose costs on others 
and need to be restricted. That is, the right to emit these gases should be thought of 
as a resource that is in limited supply. We live in a market economy where resources 
that are in limited supply are allocated through prices. So carbon emissions need to 
be priced. Prices simplify the decision process for producers and consumers – they 
don’t have to try to figure out the environmental impact of each good when they 
try to decide which to buy. Good and services that generate a lot of carbon would 
have a high price to reflect their environmental impact. Moreover prices would 
encourage innovation to economize on carbon intensity.
While using prices to deal with pollution problems is usually quite complex, 
for carbon emissions the solution is actually quite simple. For most pollutants, the 
location of the pollution source matters. That is, generating water or air pollution 
in the middle of a densely populated city is more damaging than doing it far 
away from population centres. Polluting drinking water is more damaging than 
polluting the open ocean. Consequently, for most pollutants, the appropriate 
price for a unit of emissions varies with location; and the pattern of variation 
across locations is very complex to calculate. This is one reason why the use of 
pollution taxes is relatively rare. However, in the case of carbon emissions, it does 
not really matter where the emissions come from. Carbon emitted from a city is 
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just as damaging from the countryside; and carbon emitted form Australia is just 
as damaging as from Canada. What this means is that in an efficient regulatory 
system, the appropriate price for carbon emissions is the same everywhere in the 
world. Ideally, there should be an integrated market for carbon emissions with a 
single global price, just as there is a world price for oil and other commodities. 
Carbon emissions is one of the very few pollutants for which the idealized 
textbook solution of a uniform pollution tax or tradable permit system applies.
of course, the fact that the solution to the problem requires global 
coordination is also what makes achieving that solution elusive. Countries can’t 
agree on what the target emission level (and hence the target price) should be; 
and they can’t agree on how the burden of compliance should be shared. Hence 
the reality at least for the near future is that some countries will not regulate 
carbon emissions at all; and others will do so with varying degrees of effectiveness. 
This variation across countries in the stringency of environmental regulation in 
a regime where these same countries are becoming increasing integrated in other 
ways creates major challenges in implementing policy. As discussed above, trade 
makes the implementation of environmental policy more difficult.
What lessons can we draw from the previous work on trade and environment 
for policy design in such a world?  
First, since policy stringency will vary across countries, competitiveness 
concerns are a major factor impeding the implementation of climate change 
policy. For those countries that are serious about meeting their emission targets, 
this heightens the need for policies that are cost effective (i.e. that minimize 
compliance costs); and this means that policies that create incentives to innovate 
and use prices to allocate scarce resources are desirable. Carbon taxes and cap and 
trade schemes both meet these criteria, with carbon taxes having the advantage of 
simplicity (especially with respect to achieving broad coverage of all polluters), but 
with cap and trade schemes being more politically attractive because governments 
have the option of awarding permits free of charge to polluting firms.  
Second, the carbon leakage issue needs to be confronted. Although there 
is debate about how serious the carbon leakage problem will be, the perception 
that it will be significant will impede the implementation of policy unless it is 
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addressed. This means that the world will likely move to a regime where carbon 
content taxes (or some equivalent remedy) are applied to imports from countries 
that are not adequately regulating carbon emissions. This will be a significant 
departure from the current regime under which it is illegal for countries to tax 
or restrict imports based on the pollution generated outside of their jurisdiction. 
The WTo currently is somewhat inconsistent in the way it treats export 
subsidies. If countries have domestic policies that provide explicit subsidies that 
have the effect of subsidizing exports, then importing countries can legally impose 
countervailing duties to offset these subsidies. This acts both as a deterrent against 
such subsidies and helps address competitiveness concerns than could potentially 
undermine free trade agreements.
However, countries that do not adequately regulate pollution are also 
effectively subsidizing their firms by allowing them access to environmental services 
at a price below their true social cost. In principle there is no difference between this 
and an explicit production subsidy; and if polluting firms export, they are effectively 
receiving an export subsidy. However WTo rules and most trade agreements do 
not allow governments to impose countervailing duties to offset the implicit export 
subsidies arising from weak environmental policy in their trading partners.
The reason for this is because of concerns that such a system would be 
subject to abuse: governments could use it opportunistically to protect local 
producers.  Moreover, while there is an obvious benchmark rule for explicit 
production or export subsidies – the rule is these subsidies should be set at zero – 
there is no such obvious benchmark for environmental regulation. Environmental 
regulation should ensure that producers and consumers bear the full social costs 
of their activities. But for most pollutants, these costs vary with location, income 
and other factors; and therefore there is no agreement on what the benchmarks 
should be. Consequently, determining when a countervailing duty could 
legitimately imposed to offset implicit subsidies arising from weak environmental 
policy would always be a subject of great controversy and litigation, making such 
a regime open to abuse and likely unworkable.
However, carbon is different because it is a global pollutant for which the 
location of the emission source is more or less independent of its environmental 
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impact. This has a couple of implications which suggest that a regime allowing 
border taxes to offset weak policy in exporting countries might be workable. First, 
it is much easier to agree on what the benchmark price for carbon emissions 
should be. Ideally, in an international agreement there should be a common 
price across countries; and this would provide a clear benchmark. But even in 
the absence of such an agreement, those countries that adhere to binding targets 
will have their own implicit prices for carbon, and these could be used as an 
objective basis to calculate the import levy.21 Second, there is some precedent for 
such an approach. The Montreal Protocol on ozone depleting gases contains trade 
remedies for enforcement purposes. And the WTo ruling in the Shrimp/Turtle 
case raises the possibility that trade remedies to deal with global environmental 
problems may be WTo-consistent.
Nevertheless any policy regime that opens more doors to import protection 
has the potential to be manipulated by governments responding to local pressures 
to protect producers; and it seems inevitable that this would occur. To minimize the 
potential for conflict, it would desirable for any such regime to be multilateral with 
established procedures such as those within trade agreements such as the WTo.
Conclusion
Environmental outcomes depend on individual behaviour of producers and 
consumers, social norms, and the environmental policy regime. Current 
environmental policy is not sufficient to ensure that individuals face the full 
social costs of their impact on the natural environment. Consequently, many 
types of economic activity, including international trade, can be harmful to the 
environment.
Research over the past few years has identified some cases where trade 
has been good for the environment and others where it has been harmful. But 
 
21 McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2009), using a computer simulation model of the world economy 
argue that the benefits of using border tax adjustments to prevent carbon leakage would be 
rather small and may not be large enough to offset the administrative costs of such a system. 
Their work, however, does not take into account political constraints and so cannot assess the 
issue of how including a mechanism to deal with carbon leakage affects the scope of a climate 
change agreement and the stringency of emission targets.
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the evidence does not support the view that growth paths of economies more 
open to trade are more damaging to the environment than those more closed to 
trade. Economic growth and capital accumulation, if not coupled with effective 
environmental policy, have a much more significant impact on the environment.
However, globalization can make the implementation of environmental 
policy more difficult. There is some evidence that concerns about the effects 
of policy on international competitiveness have restrained governments from 
implementing effective policy. The opportunity to shift production between 
countries can also hamper the effectiveness of policies aimed at trans-boundary 
and global environmental problems, such as climate change. Moving forward 
towards an effective policy on climate change will require that these issues be 
confronted. 
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54
Exploring the mysteries of trends and 
bubbles
Peter C. B. Phillips1 
It is a pleasure to visit the University of Adelaide and an honour to present the 
Joseph Fisher Lecture. This lecture series has a long list of eminent economists as 
past speakers. It is a particularly welcome opportunity therefore to present what 
appears to be the first lecture in this series on econometrics. 
Econometrics is a statistical tool that forces economic ideas to face the 
reality of observations. As Milton Friedman once remarked about economics, 
simple theories are the most powerful, like the power of rational decision making 
that underlies most economic models. What makes the subject of econometrics 
difficult is that simple theories of human behaviour like rationality are never right. 
Econometrics must simultaneously confront the reality that economic theories are 
inevitably wrong yet in many cases contain a powerful kernel of truth. Measuring 
these kernels of truth in the presence of near universal model misspecification is 
one of the challenges that make econometrics an exciting and relevant subject. 
Trends and bubbles in modern econometrics
My subject in this lecture is trends and bubble phenomena. The primary focus 
is on economic activity. But as we all recognize, trends and bubbles occur in the 
natural and physical world. So their relevance extends well beyond economics and 
other matters of human affairs. To broaden its coverage this lecture draws upon 
examples of such phenomena in areas like climate change that are of pressing 
global concern in the modern world with their own concomitant economic 
1 This paper is a revised version of the fifty-fourth Joseph Fisher Lecture presented at the University of 
Adelaide, 18 February 2010. The author thanks the School of Economics at the University of Adelaide 
for their hospitality and Jiti Gao for arranging this visit.
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implications. Happily, one of the big export industries of econometrics is the 
novel and rapidly changing econometric technology of stochastic trends which 
has opened up many new areas of application in other disciplines over the last 
two decades
With the advent of the recent sub-prime financial crisis, we all know 
something about bubbles. The Asian financial crisis, the dot com bubble in 
the 1990s, and the latest global financial crisis have reawakened interest in 
this important and little explored field. It has alerted the new generation of 
economists as well as the public at large to the reality that bubbles intermittently 
occur in financial markets, that they have consequences on the real economy, 
and that we need methods to assist us in identifying them to avoid some of these 
consequences. Econometrics helps deliver such methods. 
Trends are phenomena we like to think we know a great deal more about 
than bubbles, partly because they are omnipresent and have been studied so 
extensively. Macroeconomics, for instance, has had a long-time focus on modelling 
and explaining economic growth. Time series econometrics has produced a 
massive volume of research on nonstationarity and trends over the past three 
decades. And microeconometrics frequently focuses on changing behaviour over 
time. Yet in spite of the enormous attention, trends are phenomena about which 
we really know very little. 
Trends and bubbles are mysteries. Trends are compelling mysteries to 
econometricians because they are a major characteristic of virtually all time series 
in economics and finance and they must be addressed in modelling. Bubbles are 
fascinating mysteries to economists because they are so difficult to anticipate, so 
difficult to model in terms of rational behaviour, and potentially tumultuous in 
their effects on human economic conditions and the course of human progress. 
Trend is a simple five letter word whose modern dictionary meaning is ‘a 
general direction or tendency, particularly over time’. The definition has appealing 
econometric implications and gives an astonishingly simple way of thinking 
about data – trending data go up, down, or stay constant. Public discussion and 
media commentary repeatedly rely on these simple characterisations in describing 
the world around us. We talk of trends in education, in health, in sociological 
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characteristics such as crime, suicide and divorce, and in human characteristics 
such as body mass indices, obesity, senility, longevity, and sports performance. All 
these topics are discussed and analysed in terms of their trends. The discussion 
captivates interest because trends point to the future – where the data are going – 
and this inevitably rivets public attention.
Professional economic commentary has the same preoccupation. Prominent 
economists such as the Chairman of the Federal Reserve or Governors of Reserve 
Banks regularly pronounce on trends in economic phenomena. We hear comments 
like “if current trends continue then we will be out of recession by the end of 
the year”, or “a newly emerging trend is the recovery in house prices”, or “long 
term trends in performance show that stocks outmatch other financial assets”. 
These pronouncements give the impression of scientific authority, especially 
when they appear in scientific presentations or as congressional testimony by a 
respected central bank authority. After all, central banks collect and publish data, 
have teams of economists on hand to analyse it, have public mandates to ensure 
price stability and economic growth, provide regular forecasts of key economic 
indicators, and their spokespeople are highly qualified professional economists. 
So the authenticity of central bank commentary on economic affairs often goes 
unquestioned. 
But commonly used phrases such as “if current trends continue” do not 
stand up to the simplest scrutiny. What is meant by the word “current” – the 
last five days, five months or five quarters of data? How is the concept “trend” 
formalized and measured – a straight line through the data, a curve or some 
random drift? How are we expected to interpret and use quantities that are not 
properly defined? once these questions are raised, the apparent precision of the 
statement vaporizes. In place of a clear message, we see something impressionistic 
– a hazy signal whose interpretation relies on some implicit understanding of 
the concept of a trend. The concept is so loosely defined and elusive that trend 
takes on a mysterious character. Like the inscrutable Hamlet, the protagonist in 
Shakespeare’s most famous play, you never really know what it is going to do next. 
In short, no one really understands trends but everyone sees trends in data.2
2 This ‘law’ of econometrics was suggested in Phillips (2003). The analogy with Hamlet was given in 
Phillips (2010), on which some of the discussion in this paper draws.
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Yet there is a basic human instinct that drives us all to look for trends in 
data. This instinct is a desire to bring order to disorder. Learning to understand 
the world around us (the seasons, the environment, topography and climate) is 
a basic human survival instinct. Bringing order to disorder is like creating a map 
to describe aspects of the territory which holds our interest. Maps can be very 
useful. But the territory is always more complex, just as living organisms are 
always more complex than the stylized diagrams of their component parts that 
we see in medical texts. 
The same is true with data. The human instinct is to bring order to the 
disorder of data. When we see a cloud of points on a chart, we have an irrepressible 
urge to put a line through it – to show where it has been and where it is going. 
This human urge turns the observer into an eyeball statistician – a fellow who 
draws a line through a set of point based on unwarranted assumptions with a 
foregone conclusion. 
one important characteristic of this human statistical instinct is that 
drawing a line through a set of points produces a smooth curve which has 
direction. That is how we usually see things and how we draw them. We don’t 
take the pencil off the page. We draw a smooth curve or one with a kink if we 
really need to turn a sharp corner. Smooth curves are differentiable and curves 
with kinks are (one-sided) differentiable. A curve that is differentiable tells you 
where it’s going at every observation. It’s predictable. That is the outcome of this 
instinctive thinking – it reveals a direction vector for the future from a cloud of 
points. It is this characteristic, this limiting characteristic of the human statistical 
instinct, that is implicit in media and public scientific commentary about trends. 
It explains why public pronouncements about trends are so frequently accepted 
– people are by nature sympathetic to this form of trend analysis and they like to 
think they know what these pronouncements mean. 
Modern econometrics has challenged this simplistic view. The biggest 
change in econometrics over the last three decades is the recognition in empirical 
research that trends are stochastic. Trends involve inherently random elements – 
like Hamlet we never know what to expect next – and yet the trend process may 
explore the whole sample space in a recurrent non-differentiable manner like a 
Brownian motion. With non-differentiability we lose the direction vector and no 
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longer have the forecasting capability at any point in time that is delivered by a 
smooth curve. The modern dictionary definition of trend is no longer relevant. 
A more fitting characterisation is given by the middle English (circa 1590) verb 
“trenden”, from which the word trend is derived and whose meaning is “to turn or 
roll about” like the wandering course of a coastline or a river. The recent usage of 
trend as a general direction or tendency originates from 1884 and that usage soon 
became dominant and was popularized in reporting economic statistics. By the 
1960s the usage in statistical time series analysis and econometrics had narrowed 
further and trend had come to mean a simple deterministic function like a time 
polynomial or sinusoidal time polynomial. It is this perspective on trend that 
is presented in classic time series treatments such as the texts of Grenander and 
Rosenblatt (1957) and Anderson (1971). 
Analysing trends that are inherently stochastic is a far more challenging 
task for the econometrician than drawing a line through a set of points, which 
partly explains why so much has been written on this subject over the past 30 
years. A Google search (october, 2012) on “unit roots”, which we often take as 
the simplest embodiment of a stochastic trend, produces 252,000 thousand hits, 
which exceeds “microeconometrics” (150,000 hits), “time series econometrics” 
(144,000 hits), and “ARCH models” (118,000 hits).3 A vast amount of empirical 
evidence now supports the presence of unit autoregressive roots or near unit roots 
in economic and financial data. Theories of efficient markets and martingale-like 
phenomena in capitalist economies are consonant with this econometric notion 
of a unit root and the shock persistence that comes from temporal aggregation. 
The best predictor of tomorrow’s price is typically still today’s price. 
Bubbles differ from trends because the general tendency during an upswing 
contrasts with the general tendency during collapse. During an upswing we 
have sub-martingale behaviour where the conditional expectation is a price rise 
tomorrow whereas, during a collapse, the conditional expectation is a price fall, 
giving super-martingale behaviour. The silent elephant in the room, of course, is 
that we don’t know when the behavioural mechanism will shift from martingale 
to sub-martingale or sub-martingale to super-martingale. With financial asset 
prices, the upswing uncertainty stems from doubts over the continuation of a 
3 “Cointegration” – the sister subject of “unit roots” – records 901,000 hits.
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rally and whether or when a correction or collapse will begin. During the 1990s 
Nasdaq bubble, the Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan articulated this 
type of uncertainty as a loaded question in his famous 1996 dinner speech with:
“How do we know when irrational exuberance has unduly escalated 
asset values?’’
Greenspan’s remark underscores the fact that we usually don’t know when 
an asset price bubble begins and, even after a collapse, academic disputes arise 
over whether a bubble has actually occurred. Such disputes are often ridiculed in 
the press and popular writing.4 These are some of the many issues that modern 
econometric methodology can address and clarify. 
In view of the ubiquity of trends across the business, social and natural 
sciences, methodology for analysing and interpreting trend behaviour has wide 
applicability. In consequence, the rapidly developing technology of stochastic 
trend analysis in econometrics has been imported by other disciplines and many 
new applications have emerged. Two areas that bear particularly on the present 
discussion are planetary climate change and biodiversity (the number of different 
species or genera of life forms). Data sets for these phenomena are the longest to 
which econometric methods have ever been employed. The time frames involve 
hundreds of millions of years in the case of fossil records in counting genera 
and hundreds of thousands of years in the case of climate change based on ice 
core samples and sea sediment data. These long range data embody planet-wide 
trends that call out for analysis which can help us understand the course of Earth’s 
climate and life forms over time. 
Long term trends in climate
To illustrate, we look at climatological data based on ice core samples that extend 
over geologic time frames and are measured in thousand year (kyr) or million 
year (myr) units. Against this time frame economic time series are extremely 
4 See the article by Pástor and Veronesi (2006) and the biting critique in Cooper (2008, p. 9): “People 
outside the world of economics may be amazed to know that a significant body of researchers are still 
engaged in the task of proving that the pricing of the Nasdaq stock market correctly reflected the 
market’s true value throughout the period commonly known as the Nasdaq bubble. … The intellectual 
contortions required to rationalize all of these prices beggars belief.”
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short, especially when it comes to studying trend behaviour. Yet many of the 
same problems (such as the inherent random elements in trend, shortfalls in 
theory guidance, and ambiguities between trend and cycle) continue to manifest 
themselves. Having more data, in effect, does not always lead to an improvement 
in analysis or understanding. Sometimes, especially with trending time series, the 
advent of more data simply means that the investigator has more to explain. In 
this event, trends appear endogenous to the sample. Then, as in economics, it is 
the synergy of good theory, data, and statistical methodological that is most likely 
to enhance understanding. 
The graphs shown in Figure 54.1 are based on (linearly interpolated) data 
constructed from ice core samples at the Vostok station in Antarctica (Petit et al. 
1999). These data cover the past 420kyrs with time measured from right (past) to 
left (present) on the horizontal axis. The figure contains four (slightly overlapping) 
panels that show the time paths of different variables over this historical period, 
each series having its own axis: (i) temperature measured in oC deviations from 
mid-twentieth century levels; (ii) methane gas (CH₄) levels in parts per billion 
Figure 54.1: Vostok ice core data from Antartica over 420kyr for temperature   
 (deviations from mid twentieth century levels), CO₂, CH₄ and dust
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volume (ppbv); (iii) Co₂ levels in parts per million volume (ppmv); and (iv) 
dust levels in ppm. The temperature graph reveals many well-known features: 
(i) the (relative) stability of temperatures over the holocene (the last 12kyrs), 
considered to be decisive in the neolithic revolution and the emergence of human 
civilization; (ii) the long but variable cycle (with periods between 80–120kyrs) 
between major glacial epochs; (iii) the relatively short inter-glacial periods; (iv) 
some less dominant subcycles, also of variable period; and (v) evidence of random 
wandering behavior between episodes of deglaciation. 
Spectral analysis of these series reported in Petit et al. (1999) shows spectral 
peaks around 100kyr, 41kyr, and 19–23kyr periods. These peaks are thought to be 
partly associated with certain orbital forcing mechanisms (orbital eccentricities, 
obliquities and precession), although the links are by no means unequivocal and 
there is considerable variation in the empirical periods compared with the orbital 
mechanisms. An alternative astronomical theory involving three dimensional 
orbital inclination to the invariable plane (the plane of the solar system) leading 
to 100kyr cycles arising from dust accretion within that plane has been advanced 
by Muller and MacDonald (1997). Unit root tests that I have conducted confirm 
evidence of random wandering behaviour in the series between these various 
glacial epochs, so there is strong evidence of stochastic trends in the data.
No present climatological (or planetary) simulation models are capable of 
generating time paths of this type over long geologic periods. Frequency domain 
methods, while informative about dominant periodicities, struggle to deal with 
the many separate components in these trajectories, particularly the unit root 
nonstationarity, the irregularity in cyclical behaviour, the abrupt terminations, 
and the prolonged holocene period which is a singular event in the record. 
Causal analysis among the series is complicated by the intermittent, irregular 
and non-concurrent sampling of the different series. Co-movement analysis does 
not fit within the usual cointegrating model framework of econometrics, yet 
co-movement is clearly apparent and of great importance, not only in terms of 
ongoing discussions on anthropogenic driving forces of climate change5 – measured 
by recent increases in greenhouse gas emissions (carbon dioxide, methane, and 
5 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth Report released in 2007 confirmed 
that atmospheric Co₂ concentrations rose from 280ppm in 1750 to 379 ppm in 2005 (see http://www.
ipcc.ch/). As is apparent from Figure 54.1, the level 379 ppm exceeds by around 100 ppm all previously 
recorded levels of atmospheric Co₂ over the last 400,000 years.
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nitrous oxide) – but also in terms of the possibly causative relationship between 
atmospheric dust particulates and temperature.6
Another option for modelling these series might be the use of breaking 
trend functions, such as those that have been popular in econometrics over the 
last two decades. Structural break models offer flexibility to capture differences 
as well as commonalities across epochs and could be used to fit trigger point 
thresholds for the initiation and termination of glacial periods. However, 
these models have typically been developed in a univariate context and would 
need to be extended to multiple, sequenced, alternating breaks with common 
thresholds and feedbacks among the series and to allow for random wandering 
behaviour and cyclical features associated with orbital forcing in order to achieve 
congruence with these data. All of these requirements, combined with break 
point and threshold determination and the singularity of the holocene era, 
push the envelope of present econometric capability and reveal the fragility and 
arbitrariness of structural break modelling when it is carried to excess.
Finally, direct nonparametric fitting and data smoothing offer alternate 
modelling methods. Neither approach deals well with abrupt terminations, 
threshold triggering or random wandering behaviour within epochs. Neither 
do these methods allow for the use of astronomical forcing variables or other 
causal effects known to be important from climate theory, such as greenhouse gas 
amplification or ocean current influences. Nor do they allow easily for multivariate 
treatment that permits interaction between the series.
In short, none of the models or econometric methods for studying trends 
seem to measure up to the task of modelling these series. To take the problem 
to the next level, these series can be viewed in the context of even longer climate 
trajectories. Paleoclimate records from various sources are now available over very 
long time frames extending to hundreds of millions of years. The data are partially 
based on deep sea sediment cores extracted at a large number of oceanic sites, as 
described in Muller and MacDonald (1997) and Lisiecki and Raymo (2005a, b).
6 Some alternate planetary evidence of climatic causative forces arising from dust storms is available from 
astronomical observation. Ten planetary dust storms have been observed on the planet Mars since 1877. 
over the last decade two major planetary dust storms (2001 and 2007) have been closely monitored by 
the Hubble telescope and Mars rovers. It was observed that the 2001 dust storm led to a temperature rise 
of some 30˚C, affirming a strong planetary link between dust and temperature.
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These extremely long series raise the difficulties of trend modeling to an 
entirely different level. Sediment core data reveal a steady downward drift in 
temperature over the last 5myr period, leading to a growing incidence of glaciation 
accompanied by an increase in the amplitude of the glacial/deglacial fluctuations 
(appearing like nonstationary volatility on this time scale). The 41 kyr cycle is 
a dominant characteristic 3 to 1 million years ago, whereas the ∼100kyr cycle 
appears dominant over the last million years.7
The picture is further complicated over the far longer 65myr period 
following the Cretaceous-Tertiary (or so-called KT) boundary event to the 
present. While the drift in temperature over this period has generally been in a 
downward direction, it is by no means linear or monotonic and there have been 
substantial periods of warming, associated with an Antarctic thawing 25myr ago, 
prior to reglaciation some 12myr ago. Finally, the estimated climate record over 
the last half billion years has a pronounced cyclical pattern embodying much of 
the variation that over shorter geologic periods is reasonably perceived as upward 
or downward trend.
These long span paleoclimate data highlight that trend is a complex 
phenomenon with features that are random and endogenous to the sample size. 
As we lengthen the time span of observation, what first appears as a pattern of 
drift later becomes absorbed into a cycle with a longer period or even manifests as 
volatility. The pattern continues to repeat itself over different time scales.
Is trend itself then a phenomenon that is relative to time scale? If so, when 
we model trend how do we take account of the wider picture presented by a longer 
time frame when that data is not available to us? And what form of asymptotic 
theory is appropriate in a finite sample where the trend form is random and 
endogenous to the sample size? These are hard questions that push the limits 
of present understanding and methodology. In the absence of data, the answers 
must lie in good theory, better econometric technique, and fast algorithms for 
adapting models that are inevitably misspecified.
7 The orbital inclination theory of Muller and MacDonald (1997) offers an explanation of this major 
change in climate trend. Changes in orbital inclination take the Earth periodically (around 100kyr) into 
a dust belt. Dust accretion is affected by random astronomical events such as asteroid collisions which 
periodically replenish dust in this belt around the sun, thereby disturbing the glacial cycle.
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To capture the random forces of change that drive a trending process, we 
need sound theory, appropriate methods, and relevant data. In practice, we have 
to manage under shortcomings in all of them. It is at least some comfort for the 
econometrician to know that these manifold difficulties of modelling trend are 
not confined to economics.
Detecting financial bubbles
In his book The Adventure of English the famous author and broadcaster Melvyn 
Bragg (2003) wrote that “hindsight is the easy way to mop up the mess we call 
history.” While directed towards the study of history, this profoundly perceptive 
remark exposes some of the limitations in ex post econometric research. It is 
always easy, and can be misleading, to characterize past data – mop up the sample 
variation – by adding lags, covariates or using structural breaks to dummy out 
individually awkward observations. Far more challenging is to develop a truly 
anticipative ex ante econometric methodology that might be used as a warning 
alert system of changes in behaviour or system responses. 
Some economists believe that the creation of such methodology may be 
altogether too challenging, especially with regard to financial markets and asset 
price bubbles – witness the statement of this commonly held position in The 
Economist newspaper (15 June 2005) that “bubbles can be identified only in 
hindsight after a market correction”. only when the full cycle of exuberance and 
collapse is complete, it is suggested, can a financial bubble be identified.8
Displayed in Figure 54.2 is the dot com bubble in the 1990s which is said 
to have created and destroyed about 8 trillion dollars of shareholder wealth over 
a period of 6 or 7 years. The data are given in real terms, including fundamentals 
– dividends – which behave very differently from prices. From this descriptive 
characterisation, the market fell first to 36 percent of its peak value and then to 
24 percent of its peak value.
The warning cited earlier that Alan Greenspan made in his dinner speech 
about financial markets in the 1990s was cast as a question – how do we know when 
8 Even then, as we have discussed in footnote 4, academic disputes continue over whether a bubble has 
actually occurred.
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irrational exuberance is escalating asset values? How too might we distinguish 
between a long-term upward drift in stock prices and such exuberance? Such 
slow drifts are expected – they represent the long run return from investing in 
stocks as a risky asset – but they are usually imperceptible and undetectable over 
short periods of time because their magnitude is swamped by noisy volatility. 
Figure 54.2 shows that with the Nasdaq data something much more dramatic 
than a small drift was going on over a short time frame in the 1990s. Greenspan’s 
speech was given in December 1996, by which time the graphic shows that there 
had been some escalation in prices. The first econometric question is how to 
define irrational exuberance. The second is how to detect it when it is occurring 
and the third is whether it can be anticipated. In effect, in December 1996 was 
Greenspan speaking on the basis of empirical evidence? Did the data at that point 
in time support his concerns over market exuberance?
It is unclear from Greenspan’s speech whether the Fed had conducted 
any empirical research analysing the data and assessing evidence for exuberance. 
Given its substantial team of researchers, massive data archives, and expertise 
in empirics, it seems likely that some empirical analysis had been attempted. 
However, at that time (1996) there were no ex ante econometric tests for financial 
bubbles. In recent work Phillips, Wu and Yu (2011) show that by using recursive 
calculations of right sided unit root tests it is possible to distinguish submartingale 
Figure 54.2: Monthly real Nasdaq prices and dividends 1973:2 – 2005:6. Both   
 series are normalized to 100 at the beginning of the sample. (Adapted  
 from Phillips, Wu and Yu 2011).
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(exuberant or mildly explosive) behaviour from martingale behaviour soon after 
the change in behaviour occurs. These right sided unit root tests are econometric 
tests for the emergence of a bubble in the data. With this approach it is possible 
to date stamp the emergence of exuberance and the termination or collapse of the 
bubble. No methods are currently available to determine the peak of a bubble.  
Figure 54.3 shows the results of one of these recursive tests applied to the 
Nasdaq asset prices and dividends graphed in Figure 54.2. The test used here is 
a simple ADF unit root test with a 5 percent size. The direction of the test is not 
against stationarity on the left tail, as the ADF test is commonly used, but on 
the right tail against explosive (submartingale) alternatives. The test is conducted 
recursively, so that the calculated statistic provides an observation by observation 
measure of exuberance in the financial market. When the trajectory of the 
statistic hits the critical level (obtained from the limit theory of the test statistic 
under the null hypothesis of unit root or martingale behaviour), the crossing 
time determines the origination of the financial bubble. As seen in Figure 54.3, 
empirical application of this test dates the emergence of financial exuberance 
or mildly explosive market behaviour in Nasdaq prices to June 1995, some 
18 months prior to Greenspan’s statement about irrational exuberance. Thus, 
empirical evidence supports the view that Greenspan’s remark had evidential basis 
Figure 54.3: Time Series of the ADF t-statistic for the log real Nasdaq prices and  
 log real Nasdaq dividends from April 1976 to June 2005. (Adapted   
 from Phillips, Wu and Yu 2011)
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even though this type of anticipative test was unavailable at that time. Similarly, 
when the time series of recursive calculations falls below the critical value, the 
crossing time determines the termination of the bubble. Figure 54.3 shows the 
termination of the Nasdaq price bubble as September 2000, at which point there 
is a return to normal martingale-like behaviour. Throughout the period of the 
bubble in the 1990s there is, by contrast, no evidence of ballooning in dividend 
fundamentals, confirming that Nasdaq asset prices diverged from fundamentals 
over 1995–2000. 
The econometric methodology in this empirical exercise involves the simple 
reduced form autoregressive model 
where allowance is made for structural change in the autoregressive 
coefficient. The time series Xt follows a unit root autoregression with innovation 
εt over period t < τe, which transforms into a mildly explosive
9 time series over 
the period τe ≤ t ≤ τf (with autoregressive coefficient δn = 1 + c/kn > 1 where kn 
tends to infinity slower than the sample size n), and then reverts to a unit root 
autoregression for t > τf  from some re-initialization X* that may be related to 
the level of Xt prior to the origination of the bubble. This simple model has 
two structural breaks that capture the transition to and from a mildly explosive 
process which characterise the emergence of a bubble and its subsequent collapse. 
This model is readily extended to accommodate further transitions that might 
occur during the sample period if multiple bubble episodes were present in the 
data. Methodology for detecting multiple bubbles is now available using a rolling 
window version of the recursive tests just described (see Phillips, Shi and Yu 
2012).
A central advantage of the autoregressive structure in comparison with 
more complex time series models is that all of the energy in distinguishing the 
martingale and submartingale behaviour is concentrated in the autoregressive 
coefficient which produces a powerful statistical test. Unlike left sided unit root 
tests against stationary alternatives which are well known to lack power, right 
9 The concept of a mildly explosive time series and the associated asymptotics for this type of process were 
developed in Phillips and Magdalinos (2007a, b).
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sided tests are very sensitive to explosive departures from the null and this remains 
so for models with weakly dependent innovations. 
In order to ensure a consistent dating algorithm, we arrange for the size 
of the test to go to zero as the sample size tends to infinity. The critical value 
of the test then passes to infinity, ensuring that there are no false positives 
asymptotically and leading to consistent determination of the bubble origination 
and termination dates. Various modifications of this test procedure are possible 
to enhance its performance in detection and avoid unnecessary warning alerts 
when the statistic crosses the threshold for a very short period of time in relation 
to sample size.10
Figure 54.4 shows the results of a further application of this detection 
procedure by Phillips and Yu (2011) to US rental-adjusted real house prices 
10 Technically, this adjustment can be achieved by factoring into the critical value a slowly varying function 
of the sample size.
Figure 54.4: Time series plot of the US monthly real house price index over   
 January 1990 to January 2009 adjusted by the rental price. The   
 estimated bubble origination and collapse dates are shown,   
 together with the August 2007 commencement date of the subprime  
 crisis (Adapted from Phillips and Yu 2011)
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based on the Case – Shiller composite 10 index (sourced from Shiller’s website) 
standardized by the CPI. As shown in Figure 54.4, a significant bubble is found 
by the recursive test during the early part of the 2000s. The estimate of the bubble 
origination date is May 2002, which strongly supports the position taken by Baker 
(2002) who claimed that there was a housing bubble at that time, well before 
other commentators. The dating mechanism shows that the bubble collapsed in 
December 2007, soon after the subprime crisis erupted. The bubble is analysed 
by these methods in Phillips and Yu (2011) in the context of the broader timeline 
of the global financial crisis of 2007–2008 and its aftermath. This study also 
developed tests of the transmission of exuberance across markets that included 
housing, commodities (oil) and asset backed commercial paper, finding that there 
were contagion effects across these financial markets. 
Conclusion
one of the recent contributions of econometrics has been the development 
of tools for studying trends and bubbles. Both phenomena take us away from 
the regular world of stationary processes into the broad, complex universe of 
nonstationary time series. Important to the progress that has been made, this 
work acknowledges salient features of economic and financial reality – that trends 
have stochastic elements and that bubbles do occur. Accordingly research has 
fostered new techniques to evaluate trending mechanisms and distinguish among 
random wandering behaviour, trend stationarity, breaking trend behaviour, and 
the mildly explosive processes that underlie bubble phenomena. We now have 
the capability to evaluate nonstationarity in terms of the memory characteristics 
displayed by the time series and explore potential relationships between variables 
that embody long range dependence. Many of these elements are relevant in 
empirical work with trending data such as the climate data discussed in this lecture. 
In that context, it quickly becomes apparent that trends are poorly understood 
in relation to both underlying theory and econometric methodology. Without 
improvements in both theory and methodology, empirical work is simply little 
more than a glorified version of running a line though a set of points. 
Complex models are sometimes needed to provide sufficient detail for 
empirical research to be useful. But simple econometric models, like simple 
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economic theories, have powerful advantages of focusing attention on key features 
of interest. In studying bubble phenomena, this principle is well illustrated 
by a mildly explosive autoregression which captures the key distinguishing 
characteristic of exuberance and thereby enables powerful new methods of 
bubble detection. That technology provides a date stamping methodology for 
use in empirical research and gives policy makers an early warning diagnostic 
to alert them to changes in financial markets. While further research on theory 
models and econometric methodology is needed, the methods we have developed 
are now being used by central bank surveillance teams in many countries. one 
positive externality of the global financial crisis is that there is now intensive 
professional interest in this area and much ongoing research that covers theory, 
econometrics, and empirics of financial bubbles.
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Can Asia grow fast on its own? The 
economics of the dynamic middle
Peter A. Petri1
Wall of worry
According to most recent projections (Table 55.1), by 2030 Asia’s emerging 
economies2 will become larger than those of the United States and the European 
Union.3 By then, the world economy should be twice as large as it is today and 
middle-income countries will dominate demand and production (Appendix Table 
55.A). These trends imply extensive (and hopefully peaceful) rearrangements of 
economic and strategic influence, and could lead to unprecedented innovation 
and prosperity as well as severe stresses on the environment. In other words, they 
need to be taken seriously. But are these projections reasonable or even feasible?
Many observers don’t think so. The prospects for the “Asian century” (see 
for example ADB 2011) contrast sharply with recent (August 2012) negative 
global trends, including in Asia, and much negative commentary. The global 
recovery has been far slower than expected – even given warnings about the 
grueling history of financial crises – due to the depth of the initial U.S. financial 
shock and the extent of its eventual spread to sovereign debt markets in Europe 
1 This paper is a revised version of the Joseph Fisher Lecture presented at the University of Adelaide, 13 
July 2011.
2 The data used in this paper relate to China, India and Southeast Asia and are based on Petri and Zhai 
(2012), a background paper for an ongoing study of ASEAN, China and India (a grouping also referred 
to below as ACI). The diversity of this group cannot be addressed adequately in this short analysis, so 
the qualitative arguments are dominated by China, which accounts for about two-thirds of the group’s 
GDP.
3 We use projections by CEPII (Fouré et al., 2010) which broadly represent recent studies. Appendix 
Table 55.1 shows that the region’s per capita income would roughly triple and its share of the world 
output more than double, from 13 percent in 2010 to nearly 30 percent in 2030. 
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and elsewhere. While Asian economies held up well in the initial stages of the 
crisis, four years later they are also succumbing to its effects. 
Predictions of doom
The structure and durability of Asian growth are now widely questioned. The 
argument is that rapid Asian growth cannot continue because it has been driven by 
unsustainable factors. Eventually, some cyclical or unexpected trigger will generate 
a crash, and growth will then stabilize at much lower levels. These views originate, 
in part, in a financial community eager to avoid missing still another bubble. 
James Chanos, a hedge fund manager who earned his reputation by reportedly 
shorting Enron, has long predicted that the crash of China’s real estate markets 
“is going to be a doozy”4 (oprita 2010). Martin Wolf (2011) of the Financial 
Times has compared China to Japan in the 1980s, where “the attempt to sustain 
4 Whether intended or not, the term “doozy,” which means “something extraordinary” in American slang, 
is unusually appropriate. This word entered popular use as “Duesy”, the nickname of the Duesenberg 
J-model automobile, which was designed to be the best and most prestigious in the world. The car was 
launched with much fanfare on 1 December 1928, but soon the Great Depression hit and its markets 
evaporated. Less than 500 units were ever sold, mainly to movie stars and gangsters. The company 
collapsed in 1937.
Table 55.1: Projections of real output growth rates to 2030, and actual 1990-
2010 (percent per year)
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growth in investment-led domestic demand led to a ruinous credit expansion.” 
And two of The Economist’s (2011) “most influential economists of the decade,” 
Professors Nouriel Roubini and Tyler Cowen, lead the army of doom: Professor 
Cowen rhetorically asked: “How about a bone-crunching, bubble-bursting, no 
soft landing, Chinese auto crash-style depression within the next seven years?”5 
These projections do not merely anticipate a cyclical downturn, or a gradual 
deceleration as countries approach the global productivity frontier (both of which 
are inevitable), but the end of growth based on transient causes.
Policy studies have reinforced these worries. While generally hopeful about 
Asian growth, ADB’s Asia 2050 report (ADB 2011) is thoroughly hedged and 
goes to some length to emphasize that growth is not foreordained and could slow 
dramatically.6 A prominent Chinese publication noted that “if there’s a sustained 
slowdown, China will find itself in serious trouble without a proper plan. It would 
be at risk of a financial crisis and social conflict, and unable to pull itself back 
onto a path of steady growth. Hence, the government cannot afford to ignore 
these ‘prophets of doom.’”7 Avoiding deceleration – the middle income trap – 
also became a central theme of the recent World Bank-Development Research 
Center of the State Council China 2030 study (World Bank-DRC 2012). 
The middle income trap
These concerns have some basis in economic research. For example, by Garrett 
(2004) and Gill and Kharas (2007) argue that countries tend to get stuck in a 
“middle income trap” because their wages become too high to compete with low 
wage economies and they don’t have enough technology to compete with advanced 
economies. The evidence is mostly anecdotal, with Latin American economies 
often used to illustrate growth deceleration at middle income levels. on the other 
hand, Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore have clearly sailed past these dangers. 
In an important empirical contribution, Eichengreen, Park and Shin (2011) 
5 That prediction was made about seven years ago (Cowen 2006), and it came true shortly after it was made, 
but in the United States and Europe and not in China. The Chinese economy has still not experienced 
a crash, although it is now decelerating. There is an extensive inventory of expired predictions of doom. 
The most interesting in retrospect is Gordon G. Chang’s (2001), The Coming Collapse of China, which 
even identified the precise cause that would precipitate the crash in a chapter entitled: “WTo Accession 
Will Trigger Collapse.”
6 There are some rebuttals to these views – see for example Roach (2011).
7 Caixin editorial, 29 June 2011. <http://english.caing.com/>
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estimate that the probability of encountering a substantial deceleration in growth 
rates rises at around $17,000 per capita – a level that the World Bank classifies 
as high income, and one that China and other Asian economies will approach in 
the next two decades.
But the empirical case for growth deceleration at middle income levels is 
far from robust. Figure 55.1 shows retrospective differences between “past” and 
“future” growth rates (each based on a 15-year interval) for countries in different 
quartiles of the world’s per capita income distribution, centered on years between 
1975 and 1995. The bottom and top quartiles are represented with solid lines 
and middle-income countries with dotted lines. The diagram is dominated by 
a powerful global trend: general growth deceleration in the early 1980s has 
gradually turned to acceleration in the 1990s.
From the 1970s to the mid-1980s, both middle income groups lagged the 
bottom and top quartiles of countries – everyone was decelerating then, but the 
Figure 55.1: Growth rate acceleration by country income quartile.
Notes: forward less backward growth rates, each calculated over a 15-year period from the year indicated. 
Lines are averages for quartiles of countries, ranked according to per capita PPP GDP in the year 
indicated.




middle-income groups decelerated more sharply than others. This appears to 
confirm the hypothesis of the middle income trap. In the late 1980s, however, 
the middle-income countries began to catch up, and by the end of the data in 
1995 the four groups were lined up in order, with the least developed countries 
accelerating the most and the most developed ones the least. Some obvious 
implications of Figure 55.1 are that global trends dominate results by country 
groups, and that differences among the latter don’t follow a consistent pattern 
over time. 
Far more detailed analysis is needed to understand changes in long term 
growth rates, and there may not be enough data to distinguish conclusively 
among alternative explanations. For example, it is possible that the middle income 
decelerations in the early years of Figure 55.1 reflected the special circumstances of 
the 1980s and 1990s, namely the foreign exchange rate crises that roiled middle-
income economies during that period. For obvious reasons, middle-income 
countries then had much larger net, non-official foreign exchange exposures than 
either poorer or richer economies, and were therefore disproportionately exposed 
to these shocks. Because of those experiences, most middle-income countries 
today (along with their creditors) avoid such “currency mismatches” and some 
have accumulated substantial foreign exchange reserves. 
The theoretical underpinnings of the middle income trap are also tenuous. 
The analogous “low income trap” has a familiar analytical basis: when incomes are 
low, people are unable to save and therefore cannot accumulate enough capital 
to raise incomes. No similarly compelling model has been offered to explain why 
countries should be able to move to middle income levels but not beyond them. 
Azariadis (1996) provides a survey of theoretical explanations for traps at levels 
above the low income threshold, but most hinge on peculiarities of demographic 
and saving functions – such as the possibility of drastic declines in human capital 
investment – that do not appear to be relevant to Asia’s current circumstances. 
We offer one possible explanation for the middle income trap in a recent 
Asian Development Bank study (ADB 2013, Ch. 1). The question that study 
asks is: why might middle-income countries be unable to switch to new drivers of 
growth when their wages rise? In other words, what would prevent them following 
the path traveled by advanced economies by raising skill levels, improving legal 
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and financial systems, and developing better tools to manage demand? There is an 
important common denominator to the factors required to move beyond middle 
income stages: they take a long time to develop. If a country grows fast enough 
– and faces a wall of worry about its future – there will be great uncertainty 
about when these factors will be needed, and the investments may not be made 
early enough to assure a smooth transition. This leads to a classic coordination 
problem, as identified for example by Rodrik (1996). 
The “lead time” explanation will be especially relevant to economies that 
(a) need to switch to more complex production structures that require long-
lead-time investments, and (b) approach that stage at a high speed or growth 
rate. In other words, it is a theory of why fast-growing, middle-income countries 
decelerate. The hypothesis also contains solutions. It calls for identifying future 
infrastructure requirements, both institutional and physical, perhaps based on 
the experience of more advanced economies, as recommended by Lin (2010). It 
also suggests that planning – not developing sectoral directives, but creating an 
active dialogue about expected economic conditions – could reduce the chances 
of poor outcomes by resolving uncertainty about the economic environment. 
And it may suggest intervention, for example in education and infrastructure, to 
offset the riskiness of distant future returns.
Scope of this study
We take as given that Asia’s growth drivers are changing and that these changes 
could, in the worst case, lead to a prolonged period of adjustment and slow 
growth. But the conventional narrative is essentially backward-looking – it argues 
that historical trends cannot be sustained, but does not pose the question whether 
“new” growth engines might supplant the “old” ones. That is the subject of this 
paper. 
The thesis of the paper is that new sources of demand, including some 
already on the horizon, could drive growth at rates similar to those experienced 
in the past, subject, of course, to gradual deceleration as the gap between Asian 
and frontier technologies narrows. Moreover, this demand does not require as 
large a shift in production structures or as much technological upgrading as is 
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commonly assumed. Put simply, China does not have to compete with Boeing 
and Airbus to grow fast (although it is trying to do that too); it merely has to 
become good at selling clothes, furniture, apartments, electronics and cars to the 
Chinese middle class. 
To make this case, we assemble evidence that Asia’s burgeoning middle 
spenders – households, firms and governments with relatively low but rapidly 
growing incomes – will become the most important source of global demand in 
the intermediate future. Moreover, this demand will be focused on products and 
services that are similar to those now exported to advanced countries, and may 
be even better adapted to the production advantages of Asian economies. Asia’s 
potentially massive middle demand could generate exceptional scale economies 
and play a role similar to that played by exports to advanced countries in the past. 
Since this demand appears to match the region’s comparative advantage, it could 
continue to drive factors from less to more productive activities, autonomously 
sustaining high rates of productivity growth and investment. 
Even in the best case the transition will not be simple, rapid or smooth. 
It will take time to shift incomes to households and to government services 
spending, to design products appropriate for middle income markets, and to 
develop distribution systems that serve them efficiently. In some cases, challenging 
policy measures and new institutions will be also required. Some of these factors 
are examined in ADB (2013) report and will be noted in this paper.
To tackle these issues, we limit the analysis in several ways. First, we focus 
on economics and abstract from the other forces that will affect growth, such as 
those associated with resource and environmental issues, and the political and 
social transformations that many emerging economies face alongside economic 
development. These “other” transformations also pose great risks. To be sure, the 
pragmatic politics of contemporary East Asia have allowed several countries – 
Japan, Korea, Indonesia and Taiwan – to complete major political transitions 
with, if anything, positive effects on growth. 
Second, we examine structural mechanisms and abstract from cyclical factors 
that may be more important in a shorter time frame. Even in their periods of 
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miracle growth, Korea and Japan experienced major cyclical setbacks. A significant 
slowdown appears inevitable across much of Asia at this writing. Asian economies 
are subject to the usual shocks, from overheating and financial bubbles to global 
business cycles and raw material price increases. Indeed, economies undergoing 
rapid change appear to be especially vulnerable to financial crises; Asia has not 
escaped them in the past, nor will it in the future. From a long-term perspective, 
however, crises can have positive results: as the region demonstrated in 1997–98, 
they can trigger reforms that bring economic institutions in line with the current 
requirements of growth. 
Third, we emphasize autonomous growth, in the sense of regionally-driven 
growth, and abstract from the role that trade with advanced economies and other 
regions will play in Asia’s future. This is not to deny the importance of such 
broader economic integration. Trade is likely to remain central to Asia’s growth 
strategy, especially since the region’s reliance on imported raw materials is expected 
to rise. But it is nevertheless useful to single out regional drivers of growth: if Asia 
is to develop much faster than the rest of the world, it cannot depend on export 
deepening as its growth engine. 
This, then, is a limited survey of the feasibility of sustained, fast growth. It 
is not offering a prediction, but rather a demonstration of one of possibly many 
multiple equilibria. 
The dynamic middle as an engine of growth
We use a Shumpeterian analytical framework and emphasize the role of growth 
engines in driving high rates of investment and productivity growth. We start by 
defining this concept and then turn to possible growth engines in Asia’s future. 
We conclude with anecdotes on some engines that could be emerging drivers of 
Asian growth. 
The term “growth engine” is not well defined. It is often assumed to be 
something that we “know when we see,” as U.S. Supreme Court Justice Potter 
Stewart famously said about pornography. The concept of a growth engine was 
particularly effectively presented in Schumpeter’s (1942) explanation of the 
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dynamism of a capitalist economy, although earlier examples can be identified 
(Kondratiev 1925). Schumpeter argued that the “evolutionary character of the 
capitalist process is not … due to a quasi-automatic increase in population and 
capital. …The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in 
motion comes from new consumers, goods, the new methods of production and 
transportation, the new markets, the new forms of industrial organization that 
capitalist enterprise creates” (p. 82). In other words, dynamic growth is not an 
automatic product of exogenous changes in factors and productivity. Rather, it 
results from novel events that provide an impetus for investment and further 
innovation.
What are growth engines? 
Applications of the “fundamental impulse” concept multiplied as economists 
focused on the problem of development after World War II. Kaldor (1957), for 
example, emphasized investment in industry which led to productivity gains 
through scale and innovation. Hirschman (1959) and Nurske (1953) highlighted 
economies of scale, and Kravis (1970) saw trade as the “handmaiden of growth” 
because it expanded markets to exploit production advantages and improved 
productivity. Contemporary endogenous growth theory (Romer 1986) has 
returned to the concept of the growth engine by emphasizing the self-fueling 
accumulation of knowledge. 
The place of a growth engine in the growth process is schematically illustrated 
in Figure 55.2. The upper layer of the diagram corresponds to the usual growth 
accounting equation linking output to labor, capital and total factor productivity, 
while the lower layer suggests that it is also necessary to study mechanisms that 
ultimately drive these proximate determinants of growth. 
How does a growth engine stimulate investment and TFP growth? Modern 
growth theory offers several possibilities, including endogenous productivity 
growth due to accumulating knowledge. In this paper we focus mainly on 
another candidate, the transfer of resources from relatively low- to relatively high-
productivity sectors. To see this, we represent an economy’s overall productivity 
as: 
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(1)  Q = ∑i qi si
where Q = overall productivity 
qi = productivity in i
th sector
si = share of resources engaged in i
th sector 
Then the change in productivity is: 
(2) dQ = ∑i dqi si + ∑i qi dsi 
The variable Q can change either because of productivity growth in the 
several sectors (the first term) or because of resource shifts among them (the 
second term). We assume that qi differ, at least temporarily, hence the second term 
matters. Productivity differentials between the traditional and modern sectors 
played an important role in early development theory, which focused on Lewis-
style8 wage setting in agriculture. There is now again interest in such differentials 
due to firm-level theories that explain international trade in terms of productivity 
heterogeneity. 
Productivity differentials among firms and sectors are presumably due 
to market imperfections that impede the flow of resources from low- to high-
productivity activities. These differences are hard to identify empirically, as it is 
generally difficult to get accurate measures of absolute productivity levels. But 
8 See Lewis (1954) and Fei and Ranis (1964).
Figure 55.2: Growth engines
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there is considerable evidence that productivity growth rates differ across sectors 
and among countries for substantial stretches of time, thus creating potential 
intersectoral and international gaps. For example, Eichengreen, Perkins and Shin 
(2010) report that Korea’s thirty-year productivity growth rates ranged from 
negative 4 percent in education, health and social work to positive 14 percent 
in electrical machinery. They also report that almost half of Korea’s productivity 
growth in the 1970s and 1980s was due to resource shifts in the sense of equation 
2. Deng and Jefferson (2011) report large labor productivity differentials among 
sectors and regions within China – on the order of 2:1 two decades ago, and still 
as high as 1.6:1 recently – despite similar factor market conditions.
If sectoral productivity differentials are large, then the shift effects of engines 
that move resources into the right industries can be substantial. For example, if 
productivity is twice as high in a “modern” sector than in a “traditional” sector, 
then a growth process that shifts one percent of an economy’s resources into the 
modern sector will add one percentage point to the overall productivity growth 
rate. Korea again offers a useful benchmark: in 15 years between 1975 and 
1990, about 30 percent of the economy’s labor force moved from agriculture to 
manufacturing and services. 
Against this background, we define a growth engine as a profit opportunity 
that induces significant investment and hence shifts of resources into relatively 
high-profit activities. often such an opportunity will arise due to a productivity 
increase in the target sector itself. This definition does not require, as some do, 
that a growth engine generate further profit opportunities in the process of its 
operations.9 Thus the growth engines we discuss may “run out of steam” as the 
adjustment to its effects is completed. But we do restrict attention to processes 
that are significant enough to yield macroeconomic results. Thus, we are 
interested in potentially large, productive, and fast-growing sectors that can have 
a macroeconomic impact. 
9 A more demanding definition would regard growth engines as processes that not only respond to an 
exogenous profit opportunity, but also endogenously generate additional opportunities through their 
operations. For example, Kaldor saw industrial investment as an especially strong engine because he 
believed that industrial activity led to income distribution effects that expanded opportunities for 
growth. While scale and agglomeration effects are likely to be associated with many of the engines 
analyzed in this paper, endogenously generated opportunities are not used as a definitional requirement.
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By “profit opportunity” we mean a chance to earn excess return on capital. 
This will make an activity expand rapidly; it provides a magnet for entrepreneurship, 
ideas and resources. Such opportunities may emerge spontaneously: the diffusion 
of the internet in the 1990s led to the US dot-com boom (and eventual bust). 
In other cases, governments facilitate the exploitation of new opportunities or 
create them, say, through the adoption of a trade agreement or building new 
infrastructure such as a highway or train system.
Asian growth engines in practice
An (over)simplified view of the traditional pattern of East Asian development 
is that exports helped to drive the shift toward more productive industries. 
Based on technologies borrowed or purchased from abroad, exports offered 
attractive returns10 and provided large-scale opportunities for investment and 
for transferring low productivity agricultural workers into high productivity 
industrial jobs. (of course, other enabling factors had to be in place, otherwise the 
East Asian growth model would have been replicated much more widely.) over 
time, as wages increased, export industries were forced to improve productivity 
and shift to more sophisticated products. It is difficult to imagine how such wide 
ranging, productivity-raising shifts in output could have been based on domestic 
or regional demand in the early stages of Asian industrialization. 
If Asia’s domestic markets are to drive rapid productivity growth today, 
three conditions will have to be met. First, income growth will have to generate 
rapidly expanding demand for modern products and services, similar to those that 
were exported advanced countries in recent decades. It appears that investment 
demand and consumer expenditures by the middle class do in fact generate such 
shifts, as described below. Extensive needs lie behind this demand: in much of 
Asia infrastructure and housing are underdeveloped and the natural and built 
environments are neglected. Firms that address these needs can grow much 
faster than the economy. If their productivity levels are high, overall productivity 
growth will follow. 
10 In some countries devaluations, subsidies and various types of administrative support helped to highlight 
export opportunities in the early stages of export development. The large literature on these issues is 
surveyed in ADB (2008).
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Second, the structure of Asian demand will have to match comparative 
advantage. This is likely to be true because middle income growth generates 
demand for consumer durables. Moreover, the basic, labor-intensive varieties 
of products favored by lower middle income consumers – so-called frugal 
innovations, in the terminology of business strategist Prahalad (2010) – correlate 
well with the strengths of Asian producers. They have the further advantage of 
proximity to their own markets. In fact, foreign firms serving these markets may 
also have to invest in Asia for access to market knowledge and production cost 
advantages. Thus, entrepreneurship, innovation, capital and technology should 
converge in the relevant industries. Asian firms may themselves master the 
tools to concentrate these resources, ranging from raising capital and creating 
international brands to operating fragmented production chains. 
Third, there must be scope for improving productivity in expanding 
industries. This condition is also likely to be met: Asia’s emerging economies 
are still well behind the productivity frontier in non-traditional industries and, 
given their relatively low per capita income levels, will remain so for some 
decades. (of course, this generalization inevitably hides important country and 
sector differences.) The vast economies of scale implied by Asian growth will 
stimulate and facilitate catch-up. To be sure, to sustain the catch-up process, 
Asian economies will need to continue improving institutions, including finance 
and governance.
Examples of sectors that meet these conditions are what are regarded as 
engines of the “dynamic middle.” In these sectors, strong demand is fortuitously 
matched to productivity-raising opportunities on a relatively large scale. These 
reinforcing advantages do not necessarily benefit every middle income economy, 
but they do appear to be working in concert in many Asian countries. Indeed, 
the fact that the industrial agglomerations typical of Asian economies are lacking 
in other middle income economies – say in Latin America and the Middle East – 
may explain why they failed to progress as rapidly at similar stages of development. 
(of course, in many cases they also failed to invest heavily, or invested in the 
wrong industries, or borrowed too much – pitfalls that are less likely to impede 
Asian growth.)
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As with growth based on exports, growth based on the dynamic middle will 
be amplified by scale effects (including scale, scope, variety and agglomeration 
effects) and by urbanization. Vigorous investment is both a cause and result of 
these processes. In fact, there may be even broader pro-growth effects associated 
with reaching middle income ranks. For example, a rising middle class could also 
generate greater social cohesion and more effective governance (Easterly 2001). 
Potential Asian growth engines: A typology
Growth engines can be categorized by the source of excess profits. Demand-
based engines reflect new demand for products or services; they generate excess 
profits while markets adjust. Productivity-based engines reflect favorable changes 
in technology or input prices; they allow firms to realize high margins while the 
competition catches up. Policy-based engines reflect profit opportunities created 
by government through direct expenditures, or indirect measures involving 
regulation, deregulation, taxes and subsidies. Potential Asian growth engines exist 
in each of these categories. 
Demand-based engines
over the next two decades, the growth in world demand is likely to be dominated 
by low- and middle-income countries, and especially those in Asia. These trends 
are illustrated in Figures 55.3a and 55.3b, based on global projections by Fouré et 
al. 2010). The figures show that the share of low- and middle-income economies in 
world consumption will reach 53 percent by 2030, while their share in the growth 
of world consumption, that is, in the new markets that are being established then, 
will be close to 80 percent. The growth rate differentials between advanced and 
emerging economies are so large in most projections that the basic message would 
be the same even if projections at the most conservative end were used. 
Figures 55.3c and 55.3d repeat the exercise for investment expenditures. 
They indicate even larger shares for low- and middle-income countries – which 
have significantly higher savings rates than advanced economies – amounting to 
65 percent of world investment and 90 percent of the growth in world investment. 
Asia’s emerging economies account for roughly two-thirds of these magnitudes. 
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These changes in international growth patterns will dramatically increase 
the size of the global middle class (defined as people spending between $10 and 
$100 per day). In 2010, only one-third of the world’s population was in this 
expenditure category; by 2030 that share is likely to rise to nearly two-thirds 
(Petri and Zhai 2012). Middle and upper expenditure classes should, by then, 
account for more than 75 percent of the total population of ASEAN, China and 
India (see Figure 55.4). 
Figures 55.3a and 55.3b: Global consumption shares
Petri and Zhai 2011. Baseline/WorldTrade
Source: author’s calculations based on Fouré et al. (2010)
Figures 55.3c and 55.3d: Global investment shares
Petri and Zhai 2011. Baseline/WorldTrade
Source: author’s calculations based on Fouré et al. (2010)
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Figure 55.4: Shares of populations by expenditure class
Source: Petri and Zhai (2012)
Figure 55.5: Change in populations by expenditure class, 2010-2030 (millions)
Source: authors’ calculations based on Petri and Zhai (2012)
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Amplified by large Asian populations, these changes in expenditure 
composition have major implications for both Asian and global demand. The 
projected contributions of various groups of economies to global expenditure 
categories in the next 20 years are summarized in Figure 55.5. The middle class 
dominates the figure, with Asian economies accounting for most of the expansion 
in this and other expenditure groups. Two billion Asians – nearly one-third of 
the world’s population – will move from low income categories into the middle 
class by 2030. By then, extreme poverty will largely end in Asia, and as many 
Asians will be added also to the highest expenditure brackets as in all advanced 
economies combined (Petri and Zhai 2012). 
If other emerging market contributions are added to Asian contributions, 
virtually all of the growth of the middle class will occur in emerging economies. 
Emerging economies will also account for about two-thirds of the increase in the 
world’s high expenditure class. Thus, by 2030 more than 80 percent of middle-
class and more than 50 percent of upper-class consumers will live in emerging 
economies. The obvious implication is that Asian producers will have “front row” 
seats on the major market developments of the next two decades. 
Not surprisingly, McKinsey & Company, a prominent consultant to 
multinational companies, has been eagerly assessing these momentous changes. 
Much of their work has focused on the BRICs, attempting to identify the product 
implications of these new markets. They found, for example, that television sets 
and refrigerators achieve nearly complete penetration as household reach the lower 
limit of the middle class, but air-conditioners, motorcycles and automobiles begin 
to take off only as they move higher into the middle expenditure range (Figure 
55.6). Most of these durables then reach full penetration at the upper end of the 
middle expenditure bracket. To facilitate these purchases, in turn, distribution 
systems tend to become much more sophisticated; supermarket penetration, for 
example, rises from roughly one-third at average income levels, corresponding to 
the bottom of the middle expenditure class, to around 90 percent at the upper 
end (Figure 55.7).
McKinsey has also focused attention on the implications of urbanization, 
which typically accompanies middle income development. The growth of industry 
and services promotes agglomeration. China is now in the steepest segment of the 
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Figure 55.6: Consumer durable penetration by daily income
Source: McKinsey Global Institute (2010)





urbanization process; India is about to enter it. The implications include both 
demand and production effects; cities require large investments in infrastructure 
and real estate, and urban densities offer higher rates of productivity and 
economies of scale. McKinsey projects that there will be 221 cities of 1 million or 
more in China by 2025, seven times as many as there are in Europe (McKinsey 
2009). In rough terms, this growth will require 40 billion square meters of new 
residential and commercial space, representing an investment of $12–16 trillion, 
or around $1 trillion annually. In another study, McKinsey (2010) estimates that 
residential investment in China and India alone would reach $2 trillion in 2030, 
not counting related infrastructure investments. Examples of these opportunities 
are provided below.
Importantly, these directions of market growth play into Asia’s production 
strengths. The commonly used method to measure comparative advantage is 
Balassa’s Revealed Comparative Advantage measure, which in Figure 55.8 is 
plotted against differences in expenditure structure between middle and low 
income consumers. It shows that Asian RCAs are correlated with middle class 
expenditure differentials, that is, with the fastest growing markets of the future. 
Figure 55.8: RCA index vs. expenditure shares
Source: authors’ calculations
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This analysis is conducted on a fairly aggregated level in this paper, but more 
detailed analysis would likely point to even stronger relationships, since within 
any product category middle technology producers tend to have an advantage 
in low-end, price-competitive product relative to the more advanced varieties 
(Eichengreen, Perkins and Shin 2010). 
Productivity-based engines
Asia’s catch-up is based on multiple foundations, including ample investment 
for introducing new embedded technologies, vigorous national and international 
competition, educated labor forces and, in many countries, substantial foreign 
investment. These factors are likely to continue, and if anything will be amplified 
by maturing technological capabilities. 
Technological catch-up is likely to remain an important factor in future 
Asian growth and the substantial opportunities remain for sustained progress. 
Gaps between productivity levels in emerging Asia and advanced countries 
are large. At the same time, the environment for technological diffusion and 
implementation is improving thanks to increased regional competition and 
integration, high rates of investment, rapid demand growth, and the pressure of 
rising wages. Meanwhile, advanced-country firms with technology assets have 
few alternative opportunities to match those offered by Asian markets, and are 
generally, though reluctantly, willing to trade technology for market access. 
Asia’s capabilities for absorbing and generating technology are also improving 
rapidly, although the results are uneven and some countries still have a long way 
to go (Jimenez, Nguyen and Patrinos 2012). The ratio of R&D investment is 
rising rapidly and a rapidly increasing proportion of students is enrolled in higher 
education. The oECD reports, for example, that China increased its R&D 
expenditures at rates exceeding 20 percent per year throughout the global crisis, 
roughly doubling its share of world R&D between 2004 and 2009 (oECD 
2012). The unusual density of economic activity and industrial and research 
agglomerations in Asia encourage the flow of ideas and people among firms. 
These flows are reinforced by research outsourcing and by global technological 
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developments – especially the internet – that were not available to developing 
economies in the past. 
Intra-Asian trade growth will provide additional support for the growth of 
Asian productivity. Gravity equations suggest a disproportional increase in the 
bilateral trade of rapidly growing economies – in other words, they will become 
unusually important partners to each other. Asia is likely to remain the world’s 
industrial belt, although specialization patterns within the region are likely to 
shift. This will be facilitated by new transport corridors that will link north-south 
and east-west trade routes. By 2030, the result could be a reasonably integrated 
industrial belt with 3.2 billion people and $40 trillion of output (ADB 2009). 
Trade promotes productivity through multiple channels. It enables 
production chains to be fragmented across countries with different factor prices 
and production conditions. While labor costs will rise throughout Asia, differences 
remain wide and will sustain a range of production techniques for some time to 
come. Should Chinese wages rise steeply, for example, there would be ample 
opportunities to relocate labor intensive processes to Vietnam or India. Trade 
also raises productivity by permitting greater economies of scale in each product 
variety, and thus generates benefits from access to more diverse final goods and 
from more productive inputs. Finally, much recent research confirms the new 
theoretical view that an important consequence of trade is to shift resources to 
productive firms within sectors (Melitz 2003). 
These beneficial effects of trade growth are likely to be amplified by declining 
trade barriers. Asian economies are now among the most active in negotiating 
bilateral and regional FTAs. Agreements have been concluded between ASEAN 
and the so-called “plus 6” (China, India, Japan, Korea, Australia and New Zealand) 
and other countries in Latin America and elsewhere. Discussions are underway on 
a Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement among 11 countries including the United 
States, and on an agreement to connect the large economies of China, Japan and 
Korea. All of these could eventually lead to a massive Asia-Pacific free trade zone 
(Petri, Plummer and Zhai 2013). Asia has a particular incentive to pursue global 
liberalization since its resource-poor economies will increasingly depend on other 
regions to meet rising food, energy and raw materials requirements.
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Policy-based engines
Policy can promote growth by correcting market failures and by removing 
impediments to economic activity. Recent development theory also emphasizes 
the need for institutions to support market development. The “new structuralist” 
approach (Lin 2010) argues that governments need to lay the foundations for 
economic growth by investing in the soft and hard infrastructure necessary to enter 
new industrial activities consistent with an economy’s comparative advantages.
Soft infrastructure – the institutional, legal and financial framework of 
economic activity – will be critical for future growth. The World Bank’s “Doing 
Business” indicators rank Singapore, Hong Kong and Korea among the best in 
the world, but China, Indonesia and India are at or below the global median (91st, 
129th, and 132nd, respectively). This is good and bad news. on the positive side, 
the scope for progress is very substantial and many countries are now aggressively 
targeting the quality of the business environment. on the negative side, the 
climate testifies to the strength of traditional impediments to progress, including 
widespread corruption. Asia’s small scale enterprises sometimes also impede 
progress. For example, many countries greatly restrict large-scale, competitive 
business models in the service sector. That Asian economies can perform well in 
services is demonstrated by the success of business process outsourcing in India, 
the Philippines and other countries; the challenge is to replicate these models in 
large, domestic markets. 
Government expenditures on hard infrastructure should have an even more 
salient impact, affecting both demand and productivity. ADB (2009) estimates 
that around $8 trillion will have to be invested in Asian infrastructure over the 
next decade (Table 55.2). In orders of magnitude, this estimate is consistent with 
McKinsey Global Institute’s projection that China and India alone will spend 
$1.33 trillion on infrastructure annually by 2030 (McKinsey 2010). Energy, 
communications, transport and other infrastructure indicators are central to 
“Doing Business” surveys and hence increasingly the target of “national brands”. 
Transport is critical in dense, trade-dependent Asia and the region is 
embarked on many ambitious investments. Seven of the world’s ten best airports 
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(as ranked by London-based Skytrax) and seven of the world’s ten largest seaports 
are in Asia. Much of this capacity is state-of-the-art; the Shanghai port, for 
example, doubled throughput between 2004 and 2007.11 In remarkably little 
time, China built a road system similar in scale to that of the United States and 
its rail systems now covers 74,000 km (and is scheduled to expand to 120,000 
by 2015). Its urban transit systems are highlighted below with the example of 
the Shanghai metro, now the world’s largest. McKinsey Global Institute (2011) 
estimates that in the next 20 years India will build one subway system equivalent 
to Shanghai’s every year, while China will build two to four. These massive 
projects have their share of hiccups, ranging from major accidents to financial 
disasters and extensive corruption – perhaps inevitably, given that these industries 
are new to the region. Yet many projects are moving forward in an otherwise 
weak investment environment and are accumulating experience that will improve 
efficiency over time. Despite inefficiencies, these projects may look like a bargain 
in retrospect, as wage increases, stiffer regulations, greater political constraints 
and higher industrial and residential land prices make infrastructure development 
more difficult and expensive. 
11 The infrastructurist.com, 25 June 2011.
Table 55.2: Infrastructure investment requirements, 2010-2020
Source: ADB (2009)
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Energy output has matched the blistering pace of industrial growth. 
Increasingly, Asia is also embracing the renewable sector. China and India are now 
the largest investors in wind energy, and installed 56 percent of the world’s new 
capacity in 2010. China has led infrastructure investment because of its powerful 
central control: the state has encouraged, funded and facilitated a wide range of 
investments. A significant share of infrastructure investments (estimates range 
from $1.6 to over $2 trillion) has been funded by essentially local government 
debt through financial platforms backed by project revenues. Some of this debt is 
in trouble and will eventually need to be taken over by the central government. 
Better models for financing infrastructure will need to be developed in the future, 
but the progress made has been substantial – and arguably at a cost that cannot 
be replicated at more advanced stages of development.
New industries may also emerge from social and environmental goals, 
although their contributions to growth will depend in part on yardstick used. Asia 
is now the world’s leading emitter of greenhouse gases and faces a wide range of 
environmental problems. Many Asian countries also lag behind in public services, 
including health, education and public safety (ADB 2013). These concerns 
will become more prominent as expectations rise and the region’s citizens gain 
influence in political decisions. The resulting expenditures and investments will 
contribute to welfare growth, but may not increase productivity as conventionally 
measured. For example, policies that substitute costlier low-carbon fuels for coal 
would likely increase welfare while reducing conventional productivity. 
Some Trillion Dollar Examples 
Asia’s economic history is punctuated by anecdotes of remarkable innovation. For 
example, in the mid-1950s when the United States scaled back its expenditures 
after the Korean War, Korea became desperately short of hard currency earnings 
and had virtually no raw materials, capital, technology or market connections 
for building an export industry. Within months, however, it “discovered” the 
market for wigs made from human hair and quickly became the world’s leading 
exporter. Japan’s electronics, Taiwan’s computers, Thailand’s auto cluster offer 
other, more advanced examples. What will be the anecdotes of Asia’s future? one 
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cannot predict or even imagine the industries that will be generated by the forces 
discussed in previous sections. Nevertheless, some emerging examples illustrate 
the possibilities.
Tata Nano 
By 2030, Asia’s emerging economies may purchase 100 million new automobiles 
a year (up from around 25 million units now), representing annual sales of around 
$1 trillion. The new kinds of products required by this remarkable market – and 
more generally by the new middle classes – are illustrated by India’s entry-level 
automobile, the Tato Nano. When introduced in 2008, it attracted worldwide 
attention and was heralded as the new “Model T.” 
To be sure, the Nano met with huge skepticism. Some called it two motor 
scooters with a tent in between. It had five seats, was smaller than the 2-seat 
Daimler Smart, and had a maximum speed of 60 miles per hour. Its instrument 
panel was a speedometer (Figure 55.9). But its $2,300 price was less than half that 
of competitors and sales jumped off to a fast start. In the event, the Nano had 
problems, including safety issues, and sales fell way behind those of competitors. 
Today India’s low-end market is handily dominated by the locally-produced 
Maruti-Suzuki Alto, which sells for twice as much as the Nano. It will take more 
experiments to find the right products for India’s middle income market – the 
Figure 55.9: Tata Nano (l) and Maruti-Suzuki Alto (r)
Source: Nano - , Tata Nano <http://www.mestrecarros.com>, Maruti-Suzuki Alto <http://www.
cars4indians.com>
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Nano example shows that the price-quality tradeoff will be hard to get right – but 
the point is that this experimentation is taking place in Asia and to a large extent 
by Asian firms, and the industries that capture the market are bound to be built 
in Asia. 
Hallstatt, Guangdong?
Housing Asia’s urban populations will take extraordinary investments. If 600 
million people move into cities in the next two decades, some 150 million 
apartments will have to be built, requiring investments of at least $20 trillion, 
or $1 trillion per year. These investments have begun in a spectacular fashion, 
encouraged by easy credit policies followed during the global financial crisis in 
China and Southeast Asia. Indeed, many argue that a massive real estate bubble 
has already formed in China. Real estate prices soared in many cities, and large 
numbers of new units – maybe as much as one-quarter according to unofficial 
estimates based on unused electric meters in China – came to be unoccupied. 
Led by government efforts, prices have since settled back, but they remain high 
relative to income and there is no evidence of a general market collapse so far. (In 
contrast to European and US real estate markets, Chinese residential real estate is 
financed with conservative mortgages and considerable equity.)
The property market will certainly remain volatile, as should be expected 
given the speed of the region’s development and the inherent uncertainties 
associated with such long-lived investments. But all of this is fully consistent 
with huge long-term demand. In response to rising social concern about access 
to affordable housing, the Chinese government is now aggressively building 
subsidized units – some 36 million units are planned for 2011–2015. Thus, while 
the market is softening, housing investment remains reasonably strong. Land is 
still controlled by the state and is easily developed; there are few regulations to 
protect agricultural land or to require high construction standards, or insist that 
former occupants be fairly compensated. However one might judge the welfare 
implications of these factors, they facilitate fast and extensive urban development.
An example of the jubilant competition in the real estate sector is provided 
by a project to replicate Hallstatt, a prototypical Austrian village and UNESCo 
World Heritage Site (Figure 55.10), in Huizhou, a city of four million people 
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just north of Shenzhen. The site is complete with lake and a steep mountain 
backdrop, which is currently being dug from a larger mountain. When the 
citizens of Hallstatt learned of the project, they were shocked – no one had asked 
for permission! The owner of Hallstatt’s inn was pleased, however, hoping that 
millions of Chinese would now want to visit the original.12
Shanghai Metro
The Shanghai Metro is a remarkable example of large-scale infrastructure 
investment. Until recently, underground subway systems were mostly built by 
wealthy cities. In the last 15 years, however, Shanghai developed the world’s 
largest underground system with 427 kilometers of track (Figure 55.11). The cost 
is not known, but may have been on order of $30 billion ($1,500 per resident). 
This is a large investment compared to per capita income, but it’s difficult to 
12 Tony Paterson, “Alpine villagers bewildered as China clones their home”, The Independent, 20 June 
2011.
Figure 55.10: Hallstatt, Guangdong?
Source: free web image, <http://www.uploadimages4free.com/browse_images/hallstatt_in_winter_
austria-221.html>
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think of any other investment, in transportation at least, that could have provided 
similar value. Due in part to improvements in the city’s infrastructure, Shanghai’s 
property prices have risen dramatically and are now similar to those in the world’s 
most expensive cities. 
The cost of building a subway system in China appears to be at most one-
fifth as high as the cost of doing so in an advanced economy, due to low labor costs 
and few political impediments.13 Assuming that these differences diminish with 
development, given usual discount rates – and especially very low current rates 
– it might even make sense to build a system that is not fully utilized for many 
years. It also makes sense to factor such expectations of systemic change directly 
into development policy. For example, the current U.S. interstate highway system 
(launched in the 1950s) or Japan’s Shinkansen rail system (launched in the 1960s) 
would have been far more difficult and costly to build only a few decades later. 
The Shanghai Metro and 14 others already built or in progress in China 
are also generating technological expertise that will make China a leader in public 
transport infrastructure. Both Beijing and Shanghai have plans to double their 
13 Keith Bradsher, “Clash of Subways and Car Culture in Chinese Cities”, New York Times, 27 March 
2009.
Figure 55.11: Track length of the Shanghai Metro (km)
Source: author’s calculations based on Wikipedia, accessed 12 July 2011
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current subway systems over the next decade. Twenty other cities are planning to 
begin building subway lines. McKinsey (2011) estimates that China and India 
alone will build 1150–1900 km of subway tracks (three to five times the size of 
the Shanghai system) every year for the next 20 years. Subway projects can be 
also become convenient stimulus programs when economic activity slips. For 
example, the National Development and Reform Commission approved 25 new 
projects in response to deteriorating economic numbers in 2012.14 
To be sure, important mistakes have been made in this expansion process. 
For example, Shanghai’s special Maglev line to connect the airport to the city 
ends in a terminal well outside the center, as it became impossible to continue the 
line into the city center due to cost and public objections. The high-speed train 
collision in Wenzhou that killed 40 people is another prominent example. But 
the Chinese government is not deterred; in 2012 the State Council announced 
that it will triple the high-speed rail network, from 13,000 to 40,000 kilometers 
by 2015, connecting virtually every city with more than half million residents. 
China has also begun to export high-speed rail components to Siemens, the 
German company that helped to develop some of the Chinese system.15 The 
impact of such projects is large compared to the risks, both in generating demand 
during construction and in raising productivity in the long run. 
Conclusions 
Asia’s future growth will require sustained productivity growth at a rate and over 
a period of time never before experienced in countries so large. The foundations 
of Asia’s success remain in place, including high savings, entrepreneurial, market-
oriented economies and, for the time being, favorable demographics. At the same 
time, Asia is outgrowing its external drivers of growth and will need to replace 
them with new, autonomous engines. 
There is a now much pessimism about the likelihood that Asian can make 
these transitions. Powerful global headwinds are slowing Asian growth and there 
is widespread condemnation of the stimulus programs, particularly China’s 
14 See “China Make High-Speed Rail Sale to Siemens”, Wall Street Journal, 9 August 2012.
15 See “Asia: Subways Add to Chinese Stimulus”, Wall Street Journal, 17 September 2012.
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infrastructure investments, that helped Asia ride out the worst of the global 
financial crisis. There also are worries about the longer-term effects of the middle 
income trap. 
All of these are serious concerns, but this paper argues that Asia’s new 
growth engines are likely to be up to the challenge. Some promise massive new 
markets in the $1 trillion range. The fuel for these engines is the “dynamic 
middle”, referring to rapidly rising middle class consumption, urbanization and 
infrastructure investment and the vigorous growth of middle technology industries 
that are associated with these demands. Moreover, Asia’s patterns of comparative 
advantage should enable the region to capture much of its own new demand, 
generating economies of scale and new clusters of entrepreneurship, investment 
and innovation. Asian integration will also permit deeper exploitation of 
fragmented production based on the region’s diversity. Asia’s rising multinationals 
are increasingly spearheading these efforts. 
Indeed, the economics of the middle may have wider applications than are 
discussed in this paper. For example, projections suggest that urban economic 
growth in coming decades will take place largely in “middleweight” cities, in 
contrast to megacities, which now face diseconomies (McKinsey Global Institute 
2011). A more general formulation may be that all kinds of catch-up processes 
are accelerating – probably due to improved information flows – allowing middle 
activities (or countries or cities) to close in on these in the lead, while leaders 
experience the slower progress characteristic of the frontier. 
If this hypothesis is correct, Asia’s progress need not be scaled to the growth 
of the rest of the world or to the size of high-income economies; it can evolve at 
its own, faster pace. of course, effective institutions will be essential for steering 
development through these transitions and managing the inevitable shocks. Asian 
economies still have far to go in developing the financial systems, business laws 
and regulations, and mechanisms of public and corporate governance that will be 
needed to cope with greater prosperity. But most have managed such institutional 
transformations pragmatically and successfully in the past.
Despite the prospects for autonomous growth, Asia will remain deeply 
interdependent with the rest of the world. Its rising requirements for energy, 
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food and raw materials will make global trade and trade rules increasingly 
important. Thus, Asia will need the support of global economy to drive growth 
with its dynamic middle; it cannot become protectionist or afford protectionism 
in advanced countries. Increased tensions with advanced or other emerging 
economies are likely, but so are powerful incentives to manage these strains. Asia’s 
development can serve as an engine of global growth and all countries have a large 
stake in supporting its rise. 
None of this implies that Asia will grow fast. This paper sidesteps questions 
of political stability and the feasibility of growth in the face of global resource 
and environmental constraints. Nor does it claim that the “high equilibrium” 
represented by the region’s autonomous growth is the only such alternative. 
But it does argue that sustained, rapid Asian growth is plausible, even without 
the growth engines of the past. Among the world’s major regions, Asia is best 
positioned to keep global economic development on track, the headwinds and 
pundits notwithstanding. 
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56
Multinational corporations and 
development: Changing perceptions
Jagdish Bhagwati1
It is an honour to be giving the Joseph Fisher Lecture this year. I must say also 
that I am doubly pleased. The Lecture has been given by international economists 
whom I much admire. Max Corden, who is Australia’s “national treasure” and 
one of my oldest friends, has given it twice. James Meade who (with Harry 
Johnson) was the undisputed doyen of international economists has given it also. 
So has Paul Krugman who was my student and my “discovery” at MIT and from 
whom I have learnt more than I have taught him. Following in their footsteps is 
presumptuous but pleasurable. 
I also noticed that Mr. Fisher was a man much to admire. He was for long 
a successful newspaper man. Today, the power that the media exercise is evident 
even more than in Mr. Fisher’s time. All of us who work in public policy are aware 
of the need to cultivate the media so that our ideas get attraction and therefore 
traction. My daughter who once worked as an Intern at the Financial Times in 
the Weekend Section being edited then by Robert Thomson (then Editor of the 
London Times and now of the Wall Street Journal), told me how even Luciano 
Pavarotti wanted to take the phone when she said that she was calling for this 
influential newspaper. She added: “Now I understand why you would dash out 
of the shower to take the phone if I said that Peter Passell of the New York Times 
was calling!” 
Mr. Fisher was also an accomplished businessman who made his money 
in the apparent belief that economic well-being is hard to sustain unless wealth 
accumulates. But, like the Dutch burghers of my colleague Simon Schama’s 
Embarrassment of Riches, and the Jains and Vaishnavs of my native state of Gujarat 
1 Fifty-sixth Joseph Fisher Lecture, 13 July 2012.
56 Multinational corporations and development: Changing perceptions
652
(from whose tradition Mahatma Gandhi derived his moral sensibility), he believed 
that wealth must be deployed, not for self-indulgence, but to do charitable works 
(of which his endowment of this Lecture is only a small example). I have described 
such altruism as Personal Social Responsibility. 
It is also apparent from all I have read about Mr. Fisher that he brought 
a sense of moral rectitude in his business dealings. That he was heavily involved 
in the Bank of Adelaide and never compromised himself strongly suggests that 
the current preoccupation of the critics of the financial sector, that it undermines 
morality, reverses cause and effect. We acquire moral values in all sorts of ways: 
from our parents, from our schools, and from reading great literature that poses 
moral questions (as in Fyodor Dostoevsky whose Crime and Punishment has 
Sofia turning to prostitution to feed her family, posing a moral conflict instead 
of suggesting absolutes). We bring these values to where we work. The notion 
instead that where we work determines our values is for the most part wrong: 
it is a quasi-Marxist fallacy that argues that where we work, like the means of 
production, determines our morality. I would suggest also that the fact that the 
financial sector offers the highest returns to crooked behavior implies that those 
who are crooked to begin with will be attracted to this sector. The Bernie Madoffs 
are more likely attracted to finance rather than made by finance. 
Since the evolving ideas about Multinationals have led to the notion that 
they ought to practice Corporate Social Responsibility, I can think of no better 
subject to address in honour of Mr. Joseph than the evolving role of multinationals 
in development. 
The arguments of both the critics and the proponents have gone through 
significant changes as structural changes in the world economy have occurred, 
together with changes in society and governance such as a growing civil society and 
the spread of democracy worldwide. Equally, it is now clear that, if multinationals 
are to play a welcoming and beneficial role in the developmental process, they 
need to re-conceptualize the way they operate in the host countries. If they do so, 
they will become true friends of the developmental process, and the opponents 
who charge that they are foes will lose political salience.
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Alternative views of the impact of globalization
The earliest arguments as the leaders of the newly independent developing 
countries began to plan for accelerated growth and resulting poverty reduction.2 
It involved answering a basic economic-philosophical question: how would 
integration into the world economy on dimensions such as trade, equity 
investment (i.e., multinationals), migration, and technology (e.g., intellectual 
property protection) work? Would, as the opponents argued, integration into 
the world economy on these different dimensions lead to disintegration of the 
national economy; or would it help instead? 
At the time, I distinguished among four different schools of thought 
(Bhagwati 1977, Ch. 1). First, there was the benign impact model: this fitted into 
economists’ thinking, because they are used to “mutual gain” outcomes. Thus, 
multinationals would earn profits but they would also bring such things as funds 
and technology to the host countries, and freer trade would or could benefit all. 
Then, there was also the more-pleasing template of benign intent. Multinationals 
saw themselves as agents of benign change. This was a form of aid given to reflect 
the white man’s burden: it was altruistic. Then there was the malign impact view. 
President Cardoso, who was earlier an eminent sociologist in Brazil, and Raul 
Prebisch of Argentina and first Secretary General of UNCTAD, were among those 
who propounded this bleak view. The former is known for the “dependencia” 
thesis that the developing countries would wind up in a state of dependency 
with increased international integration: multinationals were seen as sources of a 
malign impact. Finally, there were many, some in the developed countries as well, 
who thought in terms of malign intent: aid, for instance, was being given to hold 
the decolonized countries in a neocolonial embrace.
Let me now treat the evolution of thinking about multinationals and their 
role in development, using this fourfold division of views that characterized 
different scholars and policymakers in the postwar years.
2 I have called this the progressive and activist “pull up” strategy for reducing poverty, in contrast to 
the conservative characterization of it as a passive “trickle down” strategy that suggests the Earl of 
Nottingham and his vassals are eating lamb and venison at a high table, with crumbs falling to the dogs 
and serfs below.
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Benign impact arguments for multinational corporations 
At the outset, the benign impact arguments in favour of investing in developing 
countries came, as one would guess, principally from mainstream economists. Let 
me recap just a few of the important ones that led many to argue that there was 
a “presumption” that multinationals (MNCs) brought good to the developing 
countries. 
Several economists focused on the inflow of funds that MNCs would 
bring to the host countries. If MNCs earned a return equaling the value of their 
contribution to the host country (i.e., there were no uncompensated externalities 
or other market failures or policy-imposed distortions), one may deduce that there 
was neither benefit nor loss to the host country: what the MNCs contributed to 
the host country was what they earned, leaving no “surplus” that would benefit 
the host country.3 But if MNCs are taxed by the host country, as they are, that 
implies that the MNCs earn less than their contribution to the host country. 
Yet another pro-MNC presumption followed from the fact that, if real 
wages were bounded from below and there was surplus labour available as in the 
Marx-Lewis model of the reserve army of labour available at a given wage, the 
social return from funds brought in by the MNC investment would not just be 
the private return on the investment but also the wages earned by the surplus 
labour that was hired thanks to the investment influx. Since countries like India 
and China had abundance of surplus labour at a given wage, the MNC investment 
would have a social return that exceeded its private return. That reinforced greatly 
the tax-defined presumption in favour of MNCs.
However, MNCs do not bring in just funds (sometimes they do not even 
do that, raising all their funds in the host country). They also bring in external 
(marketing) networks and internal diffusion of knowhow. Again, economists had 
long hypothesized that MNCs are the source of new management techniques and 
of new technologies which diffuse at low cost through the host country. There are 
now numerous empirical studies of the channels through which such diffusion 
occurs. 
3 This argument applies to “small” inflows. If the flows are large and there are diminishing returns, then 
the inflow of capital will depress the return to capital and generate a “surplus” or gain to the host country. 
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MNCs now source their inputs from many sources and they virtually 
guarantee external sales of the components they manufacture. For example, 
retailers like Wal-Mart are conduits for purchase in the host country and sales in 
foreign countries. 
It is not surprising therefore that worldwide the benign impact view of 
MNCs has come to prevail. Countries such as India (where the pre-reforms policy 
based on a malign view of MNCs had reduced equity investment by MNCs to 
around $100 million) have come around to increasingly opening their doors to 
welcoming MNCs. The early view of MNCs in many of these countries – that 
MNCs were foes of development – has changed to the benign view that they are 
friends instead.
one could even say that there is now a virtual competition among many 
developing countries for MNCs, much the way states in the United States compete 
to attract manufacturing firms to locate in them, granting all kinds of rewards 
such as tax holidays, subsidized land and other benefits, raising the legitimate 
question whether, once these giveaways are factored in, the MNCs remain 
beneficial to the host countries/states. A legitimate fear is that we may be getting 
a race to the bottom, and the presumption that the taxes on MNCs leave the 
host country better off may be getting reversed by such giveaways. Astonishingly, 
but not surprisingly (given the self-serving lobbying by MNCs, a subject I turn 
to later in this Lecture), the MNCs have wanted the oECD countries to reduce 
taxes, arguing that they distort allocation of investments among host countries 
of course they have not symmetrically argued that subsidies would do that too! 
The malign impact arguments
The specific malign-impact arguments that had provided support for the anti-
MNC policies in earlier times have now lost salience. The principal ones related 
to adverse impacts on local entrepreneurship and to political intrusions. The 
former has been discredited; the latter is no longer compelling.
Albert Hirschman was the most articulate proponent of the view that 
MNCs would stifle local entrepreneurship. This fueled attempts at imposing the 
requirement that only joint ventures with local partners would be acceptable. But 
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it became clear that MNCs could be conduits for increasing the competitiveness 
of local firms: as noted above, diffusion of technology and “best practices” often 
follows MNC entry, which can spill over to the competitiveness of domestic 
rivals. This happens, for the most part, by example; but it also happens because 
the host country workers employed by the MNCs often acquire the skills and 
knowhow which lead to their setting up their own new firms.4 Where local 
knowhow matters (typically in the shape of contacts and networking which 
enable the MNC to function more efficiently in the host country), joint ventures 
often follow. Thus, forcing MNCs into marriage with some local firm/investor is 
more likely to imply profit-sharing with the lucky firm chosen to meet the host-
country requirement, creating rentiers rather than true entrepreneurs.
The question of political intrusion has been one of the greatest concern. 
Just think of how Pepsi and AT&T got involved with Kissinger and the CIA 
in facilitating the destabilization of the Allende regime in Chile in 1973 and 
the military takeover by Pinochet;5 or of the Katanga intervention in the DRC 
and assassination in 1961 of Patrice Lumumba by Union Meuniere. Today, with 
massively increased transparency and the growth of civil society groups that 
monitor and agitate against such practices by MNCs, it is far less feasible for the 
MNCs to behave in these reprehensible ways. 
Recently, however, new malign-impact arguments have come from the 
civil society and from labour unions in the developed countries. They are also 
misplaced, however.
The most astonishing argument has come from groups that argue that 
MNCs “exploit” local workers by paying them “low wages”. of course poor 
countries have low incomes and low wages, but instead of comparing the wages 
paid by MNCs with local wages in non-MNC firms the comparison is made with 
wages back home. In fact the MNCs win hands down because, for the most part, 
there is an observed premium for those employed in an MNC – something many 
scholars have tried to explain in terms of the efficiency-wage and other models. If 
4 As an example, Uday Kotak, who represented Goldman Sachs in India, has now set up his own Kotak 
bank and become the most important financial entrepreneur in India.




one asks workers if they should be paid higher wages, it is not surprising that they 
say “yes”, since income has a positive marginal utility in most settings.6
Specious assertions in support of the exploitation argument are also made 
by saying that MNCs earn high profits and can “afford” to pay higher wages. 
This supposes that MNCs are earning abnormal profits. But in industries like 
apparel, which are often the object of agitation by our unions and NGos that are 
asserting exploitation, the competition is fierce and I have never seen evidence of 
abnormal profits. 
I have been in debates where a union leader would flamboyantly wave a 
sweatshirt and say that it costs $10 in New York but the wage paid in Guatemala 
is only 50 cents. Quite respectable economists at the pro-labor Economic Policy 
Institute have argued this way also. Typically, for instance, a $100 jacket in an 
Ann Klein store would be contrasted with a wage of $2 per hour in Nicaragua 
in the Export Processing Zone. But this is not sensible. For one thing, out of ten 
coats designed, nine will probably bomb out, leaving the effective sale in New 
York at $10 instead of $100. Also, transport costs and tariffs (which are high on 
apparel) push up the retail price but not profits in New York. So we are probably 
down to $5, which looks far less melodramatic. Likewise, the gross value of the 
retail sale of diamonds in New York is no index of the value added in Zambia to 
which the wage paid in Zambia might be related: Zambia may be adding only 
$100 worth of value to unpolished diamonds that sell, after being polished, for 
$10,000 in New York.7
While many NGos are simply confused about all this, more importantly 
labour unions in the developed countries are agitated about competition from 
the developing countries. Hiding behind the façade of altruistic concern with 
exploitation of workers abroad, they seek to prevent the outflow of direct foreign 
investment (DFI) to developing countries abroad and the resulting addition to 
competition for themselves. 
6 I am not sure about the British, who seem sometimes to put conditions on proposed increases in their 
wages like: “provided” others get wage increases also.
7 See the extended discussion of this specific form of anti-MNC argument in Bhagwati (2004, Ch. 12).
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The claim that MNCs exploit and hence harm foreign workers by paying 
them “low” wages is in fact the opposite of what MNCs manage to achieve for 
these workers. By increasing the demand for workers, MNCs generally will 
increase employment and/or improve wages: that is the only successful way 
to help workers in a sustainable fashion. Take China, for example. The rapid 
growth in Guangdong province, aided immensely by MNCs spearheading an 
unprecedented export boom, greatly increased the demand for Chinese workers. 
As long as workers were in elastic supply (the “reserve army of labour”), the added 
demand for labour led to increased employment. But then the supply of labour 
began to increase at a much slower rate as the delayed effect of the one-child 
policy kicked in, and as the inflow of additional labour from the hinterland (as 
distinct from the availability of surplus labour within Guangdong province) 
became difficult because of urban infrastructure problems. The result was that 
wages began to rise. This also meant that working conditions improved in a 
market where labour began to be scarce rather than abundant. 
The foregoing arguments suggest that MNCs and economic development 
are generally speaking friends, not foes. But one caveat must be entered. If the 
host country is not smart about the policy framework within which the MNCs 
come in, it can turn MNCs into foes of development. As Ian Little of oxford has 
wisely remarked, DFI into a country is as good or bad as its own policies. This is 
best illustrated by the classic contrast between the “Import substituting” (IS) and 
“Export Promoting” (EP) varieties of DFI, the argument being that the former 
is likely to be bad for the host country’s economy whereas the latter is beneficial 
because it makes better use of domestic resources. 
That an IS strategy has been generally counterproductive, except for an 
early phase of development, is now conceded by development-and-trade scholars 
except for a handful of prominent economists, chief among the latter being Dani 
Rodrik of Kennedy School at Harvard and Joseph Stiglitz at Columbia University. 
There is far too much empirical evidence now from many economists, including 
Arvind Panagariya of Columbia, which simply cannot be ignored. There is also 
compelling evidence that once outward orientation was embraced and growth 
enhanced, the resulting growth did pull over 200 million above the poverty line. 
In short, the growth has been “inclusive”, contrary to popular assertions. The 
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revenues generated by the enhanced growth are also enabling direct expenditures 
finally to be undertaken, not just promised, that will (if properly managed) lead 
to improvements in such things as healthcare and education for the poor. 
What Ian Little says is that if the IS strategy is a bad framework to get a lot 
out of your own resources, it will be bad for the use of foreign resources as well. 
This sounds like commonsense, and it has also been demonstrated theoretically 
by many economists including myself, Koichi Hamada, Richard Brecher and 
Carlos Diaz Alejandro. While India had discouraged DFI prior to the reforms, 
so we can test for Little’s proposition, China certainly was into IS strategy and 
allowed for more IS-variety DFI inflow, while its DFI in Guangdong Province 
was based on outward orientation. The earlier IS variety is sometimes described 
as “tariff-jumping” DFI policy, whereby DFI is attracted by closing the market 
to imports as against domestic assembly. In China such DFI was often a failure. 
Mann (1987) has documented beautifully why and how the Beijing Jeep DFI 
by Chrysler failed, for example. By contrast, the EP variety in China was a huge 
success. 
By way of an aside, now that the Chinese market has become uniquely 
gigantic, the Chinese are reverting to the old-style IS variety of DFI policy again 
– but now to great advantage. China is now saying again to foreign firms, as 
at the time of the Beijing Jeep, if they will not produce in China, enabling the 
Chinese then to pick up their technology on the cheap, China will simply turn to 
their rivals. Faced with the choice of losing a huge market to its rivals (e.g., GE 
versus Siemens) by resisting the Chinese tactic and surrendering to it by investing 
instead and having the Chinese pick up its technology on the cheap, the foreign 
firm can do little but choose the latter option. I see no way, short of infeasible 
collusion among the foreign firms, that this Chinese tactic can be countered. 
The Chinese, thanks to this tactic of technology-extraction which has become 
possible now because of the enormous growth of its market, have thus provided 
a new and favourable twist to the IS type of investment from the viewpoint of 
the host government. However, it applies only when the host country’s market is 
immense, and – as Baldwin (2012) stresses – only for products whose value chain 
cannot be fragmented into many stages. 
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MNCs and rule setting: A problem area
So far, I have been dealing with the question of MNCs and development in terms 
of the outcomes within a policy framework that they themselves did not manage 
to define. But once we drop this assumption, as we must, then the benign view 
of MNCs which now prevails begins to change and the need for international 
governance to minimize possible malign effects from rules reflecting lobbying 
interests becomes more evident.
The track record of MNCs in defining rules is not exactly exemplary. 
Well-known examples include the lobbying by American MNCs against the 
International Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk Substitutes which had been 
approved by nearly all nations, with the lobbying going so far as to get the USTR 
to threaten smaller countries into not enforcing the Code. Similarly, cigarette firms 
in the US insisted on their being granted the ability to advertise their cigarette 
brands in Thailand even though it was clear that such a concession would increase 
sharply the total amount of cigarette consumption, not just increase their share. 
American firms have lobbied fiercely to prevent the automatic extension of 
FDA bans in the US on hazardous drugs to sales abroad on the argument that it 
is up to these governments to prevent such sales if they care to do so, ignoring the 
fact that these governments may be ignorant or, more likely, captured/bribed into 
not enacting such bans by these very firms.
Recent examples include the damage that US multinationals have done 
to the cause of multilateral free trade. They have been pushing for Free Trade 
Agreements, which are Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) because the trade is 
free only for members of the FTA. As such, they undermine the principle of non-
discrimination and, as I have pointed out in my 2009 book, lead to a veritable 
flood of FTAs. That flood has now become a “systemic” issue, creating a maze of 
criss-crossing discriminatory tariffs depending on source and to arbitrary rules 
of origin that I have called a “spaghetti bowl” phenomenon and affliction. The 
FTAs also have led to a variety of trade-unrelated and self-serving requirements 
to be imposed on weaker countries in one-on-one negotiations by the lobbies 
(including MNC lobbies) of the hegemonic powers such as the US and the EU, 
turning the trade game into a shell game. At the same time the US MNCs have 
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put their weight behind undermining the Doha Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations, greedily asking for ever more concessions from other countries 
when the crying need after ten years of negotiations is to settle with what we have 
and then to go on to another Round for “unfinished business”. 
Corporate social responsibility
Having occasionally behaved less than responsibly in defining the rules and 
institutions that relate to international governance, MNCs now face demands 
from civil society to step up to what has come to be known as Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR). 
Economists such as Milton Friedman have opposed this by arguing that 
altruism should be left to the shareholders. The shareholders can spend moneys 
earned by way of dividends and capital gains from their ownership of stocks in 
the Corporation on doing good in ways they like: there should be no role for the 
Corporation to do altruism. To put it differently, management should stay out of 
doing CSR except insofar as CSR is being undertaken with a view to protecting 
the corporation from unscrupulous attacks on them by NGos advancing their 
own agendas.8
This is an issue that did not exist when there were family firms since 
ownership and management were flip sides of the family. Now that management 
and shareholding are divorced in the case of most corporations, the question of 
CSR by management on behalf of the corporation as such becomes pertinent.
My own view is that corporations are legal persons. Besides, society today 
sees them as having an identity that extends beyond ownership. So there is a 
widespread perception that Corporations should act on altruism as if they were 
legal persons with an identity of their own. once this is conceded, it is inevitable 
that management will take a central role in defining CSR. Legitimacy will then 
require that CSR be not the sole prerogative of the CEo or the Board of Directors 
8 Unscrupulous NGos in fact will zero in on even good firms which have a big visibility simply because 
that makes the campaign more “effective”! Naomi Klein once suggested this to me, when I was deploring 
the campaign against Nike, implying that ends justified the means. For an interesting discussion of this 
tactic, see the brilliant book by Kleiner (1996, pp. 108–09).
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but should require that voices of the workers and lower-level management be 
heard before any decisions are taken on what the content of the Corporation’s 
CSR program should be. 
one of the “efficiency” effects of CSR by management, which makes CSR 
a matter of “enlightened self interest”, is in attracting employees that feel more 
enthused about the firm. There is much evidence that many lower-level executives 
want to work for firms that are ethical and seen to be altruistic.
Such CSR by MNCs must reflect some commitment to expenditures on 
programs in the host, not just the home, countries. This corporate altruism by 
MNCs should not be seen as atonement for the alleged harm that they do to 
development. As argued above, I believe that MNCs, by and large, do a lot of 
good. I see CSR by MNCs as essentially adding to the good they do.
of course CSR need not be uniform, following the dictates of some zealous 
activists. Rather, altruism must allow for diversity: let a hundred flowers bloom, 
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